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In this essay, I discuss the difficulty of sustaining an inquisitorial system of policy research and analysis when it is embedded in a broader adversarial political setting. Conflicts of interest in public policy research exist on a continuum from blatant pecuniary bias to more subtle ideological bias. Because these biases are only partially susceptible to correction through individual effort and existing institutional practices (peer review, replication), I consider whether a more explicitly adversarial system might be preferable to the awkward hybrid that exists today. But there are important disanalogies between policy-relevant empirical debates and the kinds of conflicts we address with our adversarial legal system. If we are stuck with a muddled inquisitorial-adversarial hybrid, we need to encourage norms of “heterogeneous inquisitorialism,” in which investigators strive for within-study hypothesis competition and greater clarity about roles, facts, and values.

Factfinders in civil cases must often make a constellation of decisions, such as assigning responsibility and blame, making compensation and (sometimes) giving out punishment. These decisions are likely to evoke numerous social and moral concerns and, therefore, inevitably implicate a variety of instrumental and symbolic goals. We argue that descriptions of legal decision making that fail to consider the psychological interplay among these different goals are likely to come up short in their efforts to explicate the ways in which jurors and other factfinders make decisions in civil cases. Instead, we suggest that decision making in civil cases can profitably be thought of as a process by which decision makers attempt to maximally satisfy a wide variety of goals in parallel. In contrast to many traditional legal and economic portrayals of legal decision making which posit that decision makers can pursue single motives as instructed, Part I argues that jurors and other finders of fact deciding civil cases ought to be thought of as pursuing many different goals simultaneously. This Part briefly describes many of the goals that may underlie decision making in civil cases and introduces a set of basic goal management principles that define how these goals interrelate. Part 11 describes social psychological research that suggests that legal decision makers may be motivated to pursue a variety of goals in addition to the traditional goals of determining fault, compensating plaintiffs, and deterring defendants. Different motives for distributing resources, value expressive goals and a need to restore the proper relative moral balance between the parties may all play a role in civil decision making. In Part 111, we propose that decision makers may attempt to simultaneously satisfy these multiple goals through a process of parallel constraint satisfaction.

Drug markets have been targeted for increasingly tough enforcement yet retail prices for cocaine and heroin fell by 70-80%. No research has explained adequately why prices have fallen. This paper explores the possibility that part of the explanation may lie in the failure of drug dealers to respond to risks the way the simplest rational actor models might predict.

In the last decade, the study of social norms has become a major focus of theory and research in law and economics. Surprisingly, this "new norms" literature has almost completely ignored decades of systematic theory, experimentation, and field research on normative processes by social psychologists. We demonstrate that there are multiple mechanisms by which normative influence operates, each with its own principles and consequences. We also identify a host of situational and dispositional (individual-difference) moderators that either attenuate or amplify the effects of normative influence sources. Finally, we show that the internalization process is much less mysterious than some have suggested; it can occur through any of several well-studied processes. By taking these theoretical distinctions and moderators into account, the new norms literature will necessarily become more complex, but not necessarily chaotic or incoherent. Because these complexities are facts of social life, acknowledging them will allow the new norms theorist to improve their predictions and hence their norm-management implications.