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The relevance of this study lies in the need to consider the legal instruments for deterring a nuclear conflict in connection with the crisis of nuclear safety and instability in the current military-political geo-environment. The purpose of this study was to examine international experience in the field of legal consolidation of prohibitive norms of deterrence necessary to prevent nuclear threats. The following general scientific and special methods were employed in the study: analysis, synthesis, deduction, induction, generalisation, as well as formal legal, legal hermeneutics, logicallegal, comparative legal, and historical-legal methods. The study examined the specialised international legal framework of regulatory documents in the field of nuclear safety, safe operation of nuclear facilities and nuclear deterrence, as well as nuclear deterrence strategies and their development depending on the geopolitical situation. Based on the results of the study, it is determined that the legal regulation of nuclear conflict containment is in the form of prohibitory orders consolidated in the relevant international treaties in the field of nuclear and radiation safety. The study highlighted the main international treaties positioned as legal means of nuclear deterrence. The interaction of "soft" and "hard" law in nuclear and radiation safety agreements was considered, as well as the specific features of consolidating such norms in municipal law. The study provided generalising conclusions in terms of nuclear deterrence strategies, specifically, a vision of a new concept in this area, based on technological superiority in non-nuclear means of repelling nuclear strikes and massive precision non-nuclear retaliatory strikes. It was also concluded that attention should be paid to the development of a new international treaty that would combine all the rules prohibiting the use of nuclear energy for military purposes, as well as the rules governing nuclear and radiation safety as integral components of global nuclear security. The practical significance of this study is that its materials can be used for further development of the concepts of non-nuclear or legal nuclear deterrence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article introduces a new meaning of the acronym M.A.D. (Mutually Assured Destruction) in the field of security. From the original connection with nuclear issues, its use is moving to the area of cyberspace. The text introduces the basic division of domains important for human activities. It explains their importance in terms of undeniable usability and availability for mankind, at the same time, it draws attention to their vulnerability and the need to ensure their protection. It deals in more details with the new fifth domain – cyberspace. In this context, security threats are mentioned and some legal aspects are indicated.

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During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in nuclear deterrence as part of a larger strategic vision. Known as MAD or Mutually Assured Destruction, it included widespread investments in nuclear arsenals and delivery systems that would ensure nuclear capability in the advent of a first strike by an adversary. We revisit MAD in the context of the unfolding climate catastrophe and the context of growing tensions between the United States and China. Each government is investing in defense capabilities. Given the unfolding carbon footprint such a struggle will entail, even if China or the United States never engage in actual combat, we ask: does an unfolding military buildup between the U.S. and China assure our mutual destruction? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the need for al tailored nuclear targeting strategy that complements nuclear deterrence in the U.S. Topics include a comparison of countervalue targeting and counterforce targeting strategies, conventional nuclear integration (CNI) strategy of the U.S and the reliability of countervalue nuclear threats for U.S. deterrence.

The year 2018 is rich with anniversaries. In the current international context the 50th anniversary of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is certainly having special relevance. However, in the view of the need to examine the prospects of ensuring strategic stability, the role of nuclear weapons in world politics and the contours of the new world order yet another anniversary – twenty years from the beginning of the ‘second nuclear age’ – is just as important. In order to identify the substantive aspects of this phenomenon this paper provides a comparative analysis of distinctive features of both the first and the second nuclear ages. The author identifies the causes and prerequisites for the beginning of the ‘first nuclear age’ and examines, on the basis of a wide range of policy papers and analytical reports, the evolution of the United States’ approaches to nuclear strategy, deterrence and military and political goal setting. Special focus is on such issues as the achievement of strategic parity between the Soviet Union and the United States and the role of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Agreement and the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in the development of the concept of strategic stability and informal code of conduct of nuclear powers. The paper emphasizes that although the ‘first nuclear age’ coincides chronologically with the Cold War, these two phenomena are not identical. As for the ‘second nuclear age’, the author links its emergence with such developments as India and Pakistan joining the nuclear ‘club’, long-range missile tests carried out by the DPRK, and the revision of the U.S. policy regarding the anti-missile defense which led to the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The author concludes that defining characteristics of the ‘second nuclear age’ include the retention of the ‘central deterrence’ accompanied by a growing importance of new political formats involving both nuclear and non-nuclear states, many of which have culturally specific approaches to military policy and strategic planning. All these factors combined form a backbone of military and political interactions between the leading powers within the emerging world order.

Since the conclusion of the Second World War, the world's great powers (i.e., the United States, Russia, and China) have been locked in an escalating race to develop the next game‐changing weapon. The pivotal weapon examined in this paper is hypersonics. The desire to master hypersonic weaponry is particularly strong amongst the "lesser powers" or "Davids" (e.g., Iran and North Korea), as they hold the belief that hypersonics are the "Assassin's Mace" that will grant them the critical first strike advantage against the militarily superior great powers. This study examines the intensifying "hypersonics arms race" between these nations and more importantly, the potential of this increasingly contentious rivalry to destabilize the tenuous world peace purportedly effected by the "Mutual Assured Destruction" ("MAD") doctrine. Even if this "hypersonics arms race" does not lead to another global conflict, it does serve to flame regional tensions in the Middle East and Northeast Asia, ultimately setting the scene for proxy wars, as the great powers could ply their respective allies with hypersonics technology, with the aim of furthering their own strategic agendas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Beginning with a brief outline of the ethical contradictions inherent to nuclear deterrence, this paper highlights the flaws of commonly acknowledged theories regarding the efficiency of nuclear threats. The paper concludes that a theory of "existential deterrence" is the only way to somewhat safeguard the rationality of nuclear deterrence. The backbone of this contention is a metaphysics of time according to which the actual and the potential coincide, and future events necessarily occur. In that framework nuclear deterrence appears to be an ethical abomination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The act naam-chaau (mutual destruction) can be taken as a move, a process, or a terminal strike registered at specific junctures in the intensifying situation of Hong Kong, triggered initially by the government's attempt to amend a law to allow it to extradite alleged individuals in the territory to China despite massive opposition by people across social sectors. In the course of the leaderless popular movement against government since June 2019, through media publicity, flash protests and overseas lobbying, the work of naam-chaau has given rise to higher level damages, restrictions and concerns beyond police frontlines. The popular English phrase "If we burn, you burn with us!" is often adopted to annotate tactical actions which undermine the legitimacy of the state apparatus in question. During the "Be Water" resistance movement, physical and non-physical confrontations are mediated on multiplying levels or "front lines" of the resistance. Noting the continual evolvement of such tactics and with a focus on the widening significance of violence — not least that of the police- and system-violence — I reflect on the situated moves of naam-chaau as a terminal reciprocity. With a perspective on mutual destruction as a real possibility when the new Hong Kong normalcy comes to stay, we could look at this gaming tactic on three levels, culminating in what has been characterized as "the endgame." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is one of the most significant instruments dealing with the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In addition to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, its main objectives include promoting cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy and further achieving nuclear disarmament, with the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. The three major objectives of the NPT are, namely, nuclear non-proliferation, peaceful use of nuclear energy, and nuclear disarmament. The treaty was opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. Twenty-five years later, the state parties of the NPT met in May 1995 and agreed to extend the treaty indefinitely. More countries have adhered to the NPT than to any other similar arms limitation and disarmament agreement. As of June 2019, 191 states have come to participate in the treaty. North Korea, which acceded in 1985 but never came into full compliance, announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, following the detonation of nuclear devices in violation of core provisions of the treaty. Since then North Korea has continued developing nuclear weapons against all odds and against all sanctions from the international community. North Korea's repeated violations of the duties of non-proliferation stipulated in the NPT imply a bleak future for peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula. Also, nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia will potentially become a serious threat to the stability and security of the international community. Taking into account this context, this essay addresses the legal and political aspects of the NPT regime with special reference to the interrelationship between international law and international relations. Specifically, it examines several issues, including the process of the development of nuclear weapons in North Korea, a review of the NPT regime, the law and politics of nuclear weapons, and South Korea's policy choice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article refers to the nuclear strategy of the U.S. namely mutual assured destruction (MAD). Lately, MAD has been facing an air of dissatisfaction and attacks. MAD has been objected by some critics on moral grounds as they say that it is a doctrine that threatens civilian destruction on a national and sometimes, global scale. Some critics are of the view that American power is unnecessarily limited by the MAD strategy in their dealing with the Soviets. But it has been contended by the defenders of MAD that it provides the best opportunity for keeping away from a general nuclear war. INSET: Origin of an attack.

The article presents information concerning various strategies of deterrence adopted to evade nuclear warfare in the 1980s. It incorporates information concerning the strategy of mutually assured destruction. This strategy was adopted not to harm the enemy's military forces instead it was made to take the enemy's population as hostage. The article also includes information concerning the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's deterrence strategy. As a part of this strategy, weapons and resources were hold ready to prevent the aggressor from reaching his objective at the level of conflict he has chosen. It also includes information on other measures that were adopted to limit the use of nuclear weapons.

The article argues that the nuclear arsenal of the U.S. would not be completely destroyed in case of a surprise nuclear attack launched by the Soviet Union and the devastation caused by the expected retaliatory nuclear attack by U.S. is sufficient to deter the Soviet Union from nuclear warfare. The author also discusses the consequence of nuclear war between two countries. Three arms of the U.S. strategic nuclear forces are the intercontinental ballistic missiles, the nuclear-powered missile submarines and intercontinental bombers.

The article cites two points on nuclear deterrence and a specific proposal based on those points. The first point that the author wants to cite is that deterrence through the threat of mutual assured destruction is not the best strategy for the United States. The second point is that to accept the threat of mutual assured destruction, would mean the creation of mass and deadly weapons. Reducing the level of overkill without requiring or producing any change in the strategy of nuclear deterrence is proposed by the author.

The article reports on the reliance of the international community in nuclear deterrence to prevent the outbreak of war over Berlin. According to military analysts, deterrence has played a crucial role in the prevention of armed conflict among nations. The widespread conviction that the capacity of each side to inflict nuclear destruction on the other makes war between them senseless and therefore impossible. The possibilities of nuclear deterrence failing to prevent the outbreak of a major war are several. In the first place, the Soviet leaders may conceivably decide that their capacity to destroy all, or almost all, American retaliatory bases is sufficient to prevent effective retaliation.

What do nuclear weapons mean for the stability of the military balance? Mutually assured destruction (MAD) describes a stalemated balance of power where nuclear adversaries possess survivable retaliatory capabilities that ensure neither side can escape devastation in an all-out nuclear war. Moreover, the strong form of this empirical claim, which one might term “deep MAD,” is that mutual vulnerability is an inalterable and unchangeable condition. Drawing from recently declassified primary sources, we test several of deep MAD's premises and predictions on one of its foundational cases: Soviet nuclear policy during the second half of the Cold War. We find that Soviet leaders remained seriously concerned about the nuclear balance even in an allegedly deep-MAD environment where warheads numbered in the tens of thousands. Indeed, Soviet leaders were uncertain that they could indefinitely maintain a secure second strike despite strenuous efforts. The reason for these discrepancies, we argue, is that the nuclear balance is actually more malleable than commonly admitted. The possibility that MAD might one day be escaped meant that US attempts to manipulate the nuclear balance during the latter part of the Cold War could carry political weight, even while MAD was still possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the disarmament agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. It has been noted that the spring of 1956 was an important turning point in that disarmament policy is realizable to both nations however is likely to continue indefinitely. The two countries nevertheless, have shown amicability as far as the good cause for humanity is concerned. Meanwhile, the disarmament program envisaged by the U.S. would begin with pilot projects and confidence building exercises, including a tryout of aerial reconnaissance and ground inspection in a relatively small area of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. This early-warning system which aims to eliminate a surprise attack to each's territory is then negotiated to the Soviet Union.

Space systems are critical enablers of a wide range of applications utilized by a global range of consumers. The provision of critical space services is vulnerable to, among other things, deliberate interruptions through anti-satellite weaponry and means. The intrinsic characteristics of space systems make them both very efficient and very hard to replace, such as limited weight, the high cost of replacement and the low number of assets. Deliberate human threats to space critical infrastructures are many, varied and highly efficient, stemming also from legitimate technologies for protection that can be modified to become efficient anti-satellite weapons. In addition to the technical details, a few issues stand out. The first is that deliberately targeting satellites lends itself to a form of MAD logic (mutually assured destruction), which limits the willingness of states to do it for fear of reprisal or being themselves affected, due to interdependencies. The second is that certain forms of anti-satellite weaponry have become accessible to non-state actors, who do not respond to traditional deterrence and for whom jamming, cyber-attacks and other forms of weaponry are cost effective and efficient means of incurring huge damage with no immediate loss of life (which is an important political consideration). The third is that vulnerability also extends to military users, whose systems should, theoretically, be better shielded, more resilient and afforded more redundancy. In practice, those systems are not enough and, in the case of the US, more than 90% of military communications are routed through civilian systems. This has given rise to interesting new approaches and insights towards US vulnerability, highlighted by a number of high profile military exercises. Now, the US military speaks of "fog of electrons", space as an Achilles' heel, critical dependence of drones and smart weaponry on space infrastructures, the equalizing effect of space system targeting on American military superiority etc. These trends are also important for other countries to note. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As China invests in its nuclear forces and U.S.-China relations become increasingly strained, questions of U.S. nuclear doctrine require greater attention. The key strategic nuclear question facing the United States is whether to attempt to maintain and enhance its damage-limitation capability against China. The answer is less straightforward than it was during the Cold War, because China's nuclear force is orders of magnitude smaller than the Soviet force was. Part of the answer depends on the military-technical feasibility of the United States achieving a significant damage-limitation capability: What would be the outcome of military competition over the survivability of China's intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and command and control, and over the effectiveness of U.S. ballistic missile defenses? The answer also depends on the benefits that a damage-limitation capability would provide; these could include contributions to homeland deterrence, extended deterrence, and reassurance of U.S. regional allies. The final piece of the analysis concerns the potential costs of a damage-limitation capability, which could include increased escalatory pressures during crises and growing political tension between the United States and China. A thorough analysis demonstrates that the United States should forgo such a capability because the prospects for preserving a significant damage-limitation capability are poor; the deterrent benefits would be small; and the escalatory and political costs would be relatively large. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Congress will not enact meaningful campaign finance reform. Under the nation's current legislative, regulatory, and judicial regimes, remedies to the problem of money in politics appear unattainable. This Comment provides an entirely novel approach toward reducing the corrosive influence of outside money on the U.S political system. Aided by the power of the profit motive, this Comment proposes the creation of Super PAC Insurance, a nonpartisan private entity with one central goal: deterring outside Super PACs and 501(c)(4) organizations from spending money in elections. The Comment details the mechanics of Super PAC Insurance, addresses its legality, and proposes several variations on its basic model. Super PAC Insurance disincentivizes outside spending by applying the principle of "mutually assured destruction." As demonstrated in the 2012 U.S. Senate race in Massachusetts-when then-Professor Elizabeth Warren and Senator Scott Brown took The People's Pledge-adding costs can effectively deter Super PACs from spending in elections. Once Super PACs know their spending will trigger a barrage of opposition spending by Super PAC Insurance, they should be less likely to spend against an insured candidate. Thus, Super PAC Insurance will reduce the influence of money in politics writ large. In the wake of Citizens United and its progeny, American political spending has skyrocketed out of control. Rather than produce despondency among reformers, this new reality must catalyze innovation. This Comment's private ordering solution moves beyond government paralysis and offers a workable path forward toward reducing the influence of outside money in politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Students of international politics known as ‘proliferation optimists’ argue that when it comes to the spread of nuclear weapons ‘more may be better’ because nuclear weapons deter great power war and produce greater levels of international stability. This essay provides a critique of proliferation optimism, challenging optimism’s conception of nuclear deterrence theory, its logical underpinnings, and its policy recommendations. It does this by conducting an intellectual history of proliferation optimism, identifying the core weaknesses of proliferation optimism as a theoretical framework, and articulating the myriad threats posed by nuclear proliferation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Some facets of the life of Hans Bethe after World War II are presented to illustrate how Paul Forman's works, and in particular his various theses-on mathematics and physics in Wilhelmine and Weimar Germany, on physics in the immediate post-World War II period, and on postmodernity-have influenced my biography of Bethe. Some aspects of the history of post-World War II quantum field theory, of solid state/condensed matter physics, and of the development of neoliberalism-the commitment to the belief that the market knows best, to free trade, to enhanced privatization, and to a drastic reduction of the government's role in regulating the economy-are reviewed in order to make some observations regarding certain 'top-down' views in solid state physics in postmodernity, the economic and cultural condition of many Western societies since the 1980s, the decade in which many historians assume modernity to have ended. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the history of nuclear weapons, the related arms control efforts and the rationalizations associated with. It discusses the role of national security intelligence cultures that almost abandon the concept of virtue ethics to arrive at utilitarian suicide scenarios like mutually assured destruction. It highlights the two elements of strategic decisions and treaties essential for commitments to murder which help recognize that weapons of mass destruction were not invented.

The article discusses the humanity of the sort of revolutionary anti-colonial struggle described by psychoanalyst Frantz Fanon in his book "The Wretched of the Earth," focusing on the role of colonized black intellectuals. The author discusses Fanon's thought on decolonization in terms of the concept of mutual assured destruction (MAD) and special attention is paid to the relationship between violence and morality in anti-imperialist revolutions.

Warfare today is associated with neoliberal projects for global governance rather than the territorial strategic objectives of nation states. As such, political commentators have routinely begun to insist that the world has seen the end of apocalyptic threats of nuclear war that marked the Cold War era. Yet for all that contemporary war appears as a limited policing action, the world still possesses vast arsenals of nuclear weapons. This article examines one of the few studies to have argued for the ongoing political significance of such weapons, Hardt and Negri’s Empire trilogy. By focusing on the various ways in which they have posited nuclear weapons’ relationship to the global biopolitics of Empire, it contends that a significant continuity can be discerned between their work and earlier postmodern analysis of nuclear deterrence, which saw deterrence as a crucial determinate of postmodern life. Drawing on Carl Schmitt as a key figure in contemporary thought on sovereignty, and offering a re-reading of his ideas via this earlier generation of theorists, it will examine the relationship between air power, atomic weaponry, and the political ordering of a global nomos in order to conceptualise deterrence in the present moment. It argues that this postmodern thought on deterrence continues to be relevant in understanding the biopolitics of Empire, while showing that the principles of deterrence render Empire a more indeterminate structure in world affairs than Hardt and Negri suggest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After being debated in academic circles for years, the idea of a common European Union strategic culture was elevated to a policy objective in the 2003 European Security Strategy. However, whether the European Union has a strategic culture or not is still up for debate. By drawing on developments in strategic culture theory, this article demonstrates that the idea of strategic culture is not only compatible with the European Union, but may be a particularly useful conceptual tool for studying actors for which cultural factors can make up for the lack of more material ones, such as borders, language, political structure, national history, and so on. Offering a fresh perspective on the European Security Strategy, it shows that a specific strategic culture has evolved in the EU, in which consensus on a comprehensive approach to security as a unique European asset has become a focal point for the fledgling European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). However, the article concludes that this does not provide for a robust strategic culture. The repeated emphasis on the EU's unique potentials as a comprehensive security actor will also invite criticism if the EU fails to mount operations that reflect its own success formula. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on "Die Nuklearkrise: Der Nato-Doppelbeschluss und die Friedensbewegung der 1980er-Jahre," a conference that focused on the reaction to the Double-Track Decision made by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) during the Cold War. It took place in Heidelberg, Germany, and topics discussed included the German peace movements against the decision, the nuclear crisis during the Cold War, and the weapons of the Unites States and the Soviet Union.

In this article, the author discusses strategic nuclear policies of the U.S. from 1945 to 1968 to counter the communist threat from the Soviet Union and to deal with a threat from Iran. The author says that the U.S. policy makers based the strategy from the international security dynamics and technical developments. He mentions the strategic concepts which characterize the policy including strategic bombardment, limited war, and mutually assured destruction.

Many commentators who publicly calculate “how much is enough” in terms of the U.S. strategic capabilities necessary to support national goals continue to adhere to the Cold War formula that was known as “assured destruction.” That formula, however, is inadequate at best and likely misleading in the post-Cold War era. It bases such calculations on a simplistic numbers game based on weapons and targets and generally is unrelated to the goals that U.S. strategic forces are expected to support. A goal-driven approach to calculating how much is enough offers the opportunity to have such calculations driven by the needs of strategy as opposed to having strategy driven by numbers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With a number of threatening new applicants, some of whom you would not want to meet on a dark street at night, pushing into our once exclusive Nuclear Club, and with our arsenals being so compulsively enlarged, we are obsessively making a time bomb of our world. We all fear, even as we build our bigger and better arsenals, that the time may come when the world is so wired, so set to 'launch on warning', that we will soon be living on the brink of a nuclear holocaust, which could strike at any moment due to patriotic fervour, or our pride, or anger, or fear, or madness, or paranoia or mere confusion, or even computer error. In such a situation the only way to resolve the contentious situation before it is too late could well be the uncompromising takeover, and consequent disarming, of the world by a power that uses the force of its arsenals - whether for good or evil - for domination rather than destruction. Admittedly, we might far more ideally opt for a world based on community and cooperation. But history tells us that this is not to be. The world's mounting contentions predict something far more dramatic for our heedless future. The fact is, if we cannot get our act together, global domination might well be the only option to save the world from itself, when civilization, toying with the masochistic temptations of Mutually Assured Destruction, is so balanced at the edge of doom. 'A Disarming Story' is about the implications of global domination as an alternative to the possibility of global destruction. It considers how some nation or anonymous power, either benign or malign, might use its destructive capabilities to ultimately take over - indeed, to hi-jack - the world and then to disarm it, in order to be in total control. Of course, this does not mean that the world would welcome such a transformation; for once our fences and our fortresses have been taken down, nations can no longer sponsor the divisions of the world. In fact there can be no nations in an undivided world, a world deprived of its weapons. And so, instead of bemoaning a loss which in fact could be a gain, we would have to work together, on our common ground, to create the kind of ideal community that could not only assure the future itself, but the future's happiness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes deterrence in international conflicts. Assume a strong country has several opponents and faces a military capacity constraint, which is not exhausted after just one war. Two main effects are at work. If the strong country is constrained, then reputation is more expensive and may occur less often. The problem is that the opponents may (but need not) be more aggressive compared to a world without a constraint. It may be that an “axis of evil” does not exist before a war occurs, but is implicitly formed even by moderate countries after the first war was waged. A point of interest is whether the constrained strong country should obtain additional capacity, given that the objective is to minimize the number of wars. The analysis sheds some new light on the U.S. foreign policy, the United Nations and the “axis of evil” [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

1We are grateful to Martin McGuire for guidance and to the National Science Foundation (Grant SES‐03‐14713) for financial support. We examine how the theory of deterrence differs from a Cold‐War type of setting to a War‐on‐Terror type of setting. Our central conclusion is that deterrence of terrorist states should resemble Cold War deterrence. Deterring terrorist groups is more difficult. In either case, failure of deterrence will have far less traumatic consequences than during the Cold War, unless we ourselves are overcome by fear. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]