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The new normal of environmental law will likely feature reduced enforcement of existing federal environmental statutes, elimination of federal regulations deemed anti-business, slashed funding for climate change response programs, and state preemption of local sustainability initiatives. Attorneys representing environmental interests will be "bringing a knife to a gunfight" should they continue to attack such stalwart principles of conservative jurisprudence as federalism, textualism, and originalism, or to seek the reversal of strong precedents that narrow standing, limit the reach of the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses, and expand the scope of the Takings Clause to include allegedly confiscatory environmental and land use regulations. What is needed is a litigation strategy that goes beyond accommodating, adjusting, or massaging conservative jurisprudence. Counsel should advance arguments that will most effectively result in victories for the side identified with environmental protection and sustainability. This article provides the framework for the adoption and advancement of conservative constitutional principles (a set of doctrines that I call "right environmentalism"), presents six illustrative scenarios, and discusses two examples from the early twentieth century of counsel successfully appealing to conservatives on the Court (Muller v. Oregon and Buchanan v. Warley), examples that can serve as models for today's very serious challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the late U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis' approach to judicial decision-making in relation to a mystery regarding Brandeis' claim that appellate judges in America only need to be fifty-one percent right when making legal judgments. Brandeis' personal confidence is addressed, along with his experiences as a practicing lawyer and and a judge on cases such as the 1908 women's labor law matter Muller v. Oregon. Ex-Justice Benjamin Cardozo is assessed.

The article focuses on the Brandeis Brief, a story that has served an important role in the narrative on the rise and demise of legal formalism. It discusses England's judicial effort to frame labor laws as healthcare intervention to overcome political and constitutional barriers to interference with market relations. It presents information on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Muller v. Oregon and Lochner v. New York.

In this article the author discusses the legal brief filed by Louis D. Brandeis and Josephine Goldmark in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Muller v. Oregon. The author asserts that the legal brief remains a landmark in U.S. constitutional lawyering. The reasons for his observation are stated. In addition, the author presents the results of an examination of Brandeis's concluding paragraph.

Part II. Takes a look at the history of the United States Supreme Court case, Muller v. Oregon. Right of Oregon to limit the workday of a woman in a laundry to ten hours; National Consumers League's foray into the social reform movement; Rift in the women's movement.

In 1905 in Lochner v. New York the U.S. Supreme Court voided a law setting 10 hours as the maximum work day for bakers on the ground that it violated the constitutional right of both employee and employer under the 14th Amendment to contract concerning hours of labor. In 1908 in Muller v. Oregon the same Court unanimously upheld a 10 hour law for women workers in factories and laundries. It should not be surprising to discover that the liberty of contract doctrine was always one that pertained exclusively to adult males. The view that women, especially married women, needed the special protection of the state was certainly no stranger to the common law. However, rationales for that paternalism changed over time. The original common law view of women classed them with children and sometimes mental incompetents, all of whom needed the special protection of the state because they were supposedly unable to fully care for themselves. In the late 19th century cases and treatises there was a transition to a different rationale, the biological differences between sexes, particularly the need to protect the health of women as childbearers.

It has been traditional to demarcate Muller v. Oregon as the first Supreme Court case to benefit from a social science perspective and Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka as the first case to rely on social science evidence. This article explores the hypothesis that social perspectives have long been a part of the Court's decisionmaking when it has confronted difficult social issues. Two 19th-century race opinions, Dred Scott v. Sandford and Plessy v. Ferguson, are used to support this position. The authors suggest that the social perspectives contained in the other articles in this special issue reflect a long-standing association between social science information and law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]