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Prominent explanations for appellate review prioritize the ideological alignment of the lower and reviewing courts. We suggest that interpersonal relationships play an important role. The effect of...

Researchers often study the impact of legal change by investigating judges’ decisions and ignoring litigants. Many scholars believe the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal increased how specific factual allegations must be to avoid dismissal, but studies generally fail to find an effect. Using text analysis, I find evidence that litigants and their lawyers changed the information they provided after the decisions in certain types of cases. These results call into question prior studies and illustrate the need to consider the behavior of litigants. They also help shed light on issues of access to courts and separation of powers.

While panel effects—instances in which panel composition affects the votes cast by judges—have been widely documented, scholars are unsure why these patterns persist. We outline three possible mechanisms, acquiescence, deliberation, and strategy, through which panel effects might occur; develop indicators for each; and test them using a data set of search and seizure cases decided by the US courts of appeals between 1953 and 2010. Our analysis provides some evidence that counterjudge success stems from a combination of all three theories, although strategic considerations have the substantively strongest and most consistent effects.

Using a unique and vast dataset and new measures derived from natural language processing, we investigate the flow of information to the Supreme Court via briefs. Our study provides an opportunity ...

Judges sitting on three-judge panels in the U.S. Courts of Appeals make decisions under the shadow of potential review by supervising courts, the full circuit sitting en banc and the Supreme Court. Review is more likely for published decisions, particularly when a dissent is present. Unpublished decisions do not have binding precedential status. These factors create the potential for judges to be strategic in deciding whether to publish a decision or write a dissent. We develop a formal model of decision aggregation that takes the possibility of negotiating a tradeoff between the ideological location of a rule and its precedential value into account. Implications of our model are tested empirically using an original data set of search and seizure cases. Our model and results indicate that preferences within the panel and judicial hierarchy coupled with discretionary review influence judges’ decisions regarding publication and dissent, and that these choices have important consequences.

Many observers are concerned that campaign contributions could affect the decisions of elected judges. However, the empirical correlation between contributions and judicial decisions is consistent with two different explanations of judicial behavior: (a) money influences judges or (b) contributors choose to support candidates with a similar philosophical or legal perspective. In this article, we take advantage of North Carolina’s shift to a voluntary public finance system for state Supreme Court candidates to obtain more credible estimates of the contributions–behavior relationship. Applying a difference-in-differences research design, we provide evidence that justices who opted into public financing became relatively less favorable toward attorney donors. We also find partial support for our hypothesis that participating justices became more moderate in their voting patterns. Taken together, these findings suggest that public financing reduced responsiveness to donors among participating justices.

Despite an inherent kinship, the studies of political science and law spent many decades isolated from one another. In recent years the two fields have become more and more integrated, with an increasing number of political scientists collaborating with law professors and joining law school faculties. Political science is a rigorous discipline that can benefit both legal scholars and lawyers. Public Law—the subfield of political science that studies law and courts—has much to offer in understanding how judges make decisions and how larger political and institutional contexts affect the legal system. Furthermore, law students can only benefit from exposure to the methodological approaches that are standard in political science. Enhanced integration of political science and law will inherently expand the knowledge and reach of lawyers and legal scholars due to the important contributions discussed in this article.