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Ethical questions normally arise in sport because its participants are human moral agents and because its practice community entails the observance of rules and responsibilities that humans generally owe one another in a social practice of voluntary competition. Since nature sports are not defined by this kind of inter-agential activity, it would appear that there are no comparable ethical constraints on their pursuit. This paper considers conflicts of preference versus right between humans, how these are resolved, and whether these rights are relevant in assessment of nature sport activity vis-à-vis nonhuman creatures. Relying on a goods perspective instead of a rights framework, via Korsgaard, I argue against an assumption that human preference is sufficient to override consideration of nonhuman animals' functional goods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Exemption from blameworthiness is bound to implicit or explicit claims of diminished agency, or even non-agency. This poses a dilemma in navigating moral relationships affected by mental illness. While it is crucial for assessments of responsibility to be responsive to the significance of mental illness, must this responsiveness come at a cost to symmetrical moral relations? In this paper we argue, contra recent critiques, that Strawsonian accounts of responsibility are able to navigate this dilemma, and can accommodate significant exculpation on the basis of mental illness while maintaining symmetrical relations. We understand this to be part of the larger recognition that while we have certain fundamental entitlements within our moral relationships, it is also possible to be over-entitled, and to expect too much of others. Our account draws, in particular, on the moral significance of difficulty. Difficulty is inherently scalar, and in drawing on this explanatory framework we explicate a theory of both excuse and exemption by degree. We argue for a significant realm of excuse on the basis of mental illness that is fully compatible with symmetrical relations. However, we also acknowledge the limits of this accommodation on Strawsonian grounds, and argue that these limits are justified and appropriate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pessimists about moral deference argue that there is something special about moral beliefs which make it impermissible for agents to defer on moral matters. In this paper, I argue that, even if pessimists are right that there is something special about moral beliefs, that is not enough to render moral deference impermissible. A stronger requirement—the rationality requirement—makes deferring to experts not only permissible but also rationally required. When one does not defer to one's perceived moral expert, one either violates Belief Consistency or violates Belief Closure. The moral considerations, such as moral understanding or virtue, for not deferring to experts either fail to show that not deferring is a better option than deferring or fail to show that those moral considerations outweigh rationality requirements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the social conception of moral agency, this paper claims that many agents commonly exempted from moral responsibility, like young children, adults with late-stage dementia, and nonhuman animals, may nevertheless qualify as participants in moral responsibility practices. Blame and other moral responsibility responses are understood according to the communicative emotion account of the reactive attitudes. To blame someone means having an emotion episode that acts as a vehicle for conveying a particular moral content. Therefore, moral agency is argued to be manifested in communicative exchanges between a claimant and a defendant. While many human and nonhuman agents are justifiably exempted from ascriptions of moral responsibility, this does not necessarily exclude such agents from the community of moral agents altogether. Toddlers and dogs, for instance, seem capable of other-directed reactive attitudes, like resentment, and could, therefore, qualify as participants in moral responsibility practices with respect to the claimant position. Therefore, we may have reason to adopt a distinct claimant-directed participant stance to some beings, even if they fail to qualify as apt targets of blame. This expanded theoretical room for moral agency is argued to make explicit further normative considerations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this study was to determine whether a turning point (change in substance use and substance-related problems) and a cognitive variable (a change in moral agency) interacted to predict recidivism and future offending. Participants were 7,117 (5,640 males, 1,477 females) low-to-moderate-risk justice-involved youth from the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice study and 1,354 (1,170 males and 184 females) high-risk justice-involved youth from the Pathways to Desistance study. The main effects for a change in moral agency and a change in substance use, as well as a change in their interaction, predicted a change in offending. A potentially important inter-study difference surfaced in which the interaction occurred at the promotion end of the bipolar continuum in the low-to-moderate-risk sample (moral agency and absence of substance use/problems), and at the risk end of the bipolar continuum in the high-risk sample (moral neutralization and more social consequences for substance use). It would appear that another way turning points contribute to desistance besides addition/mediation and reciprocity is by interacting with relevant cognitive factors like moral agency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many liberal philosophers claim that people are free to do as they will by default; any interference must be justified. This supposed presumption of liberty does a significant amount of theoretical work for public reason liberals such as Gerald Gaus and John Rawls. This paper shows that Gaus’s explicit defense of a presumption of liberty fails. Gausa and his many followers repeatedly appeal to a particular thought experiment from Stanley Benn. We argue that this thought experiment fails to show that there is a presumption of liberty, but instead shows, at best, the trivial point that when any particular moral concern is specified to be the only relevant concern, then there is a presumption in favor of that concern. Further, Gaus, along with Shaun Nichols, has tried to demonstrate empirically that the intuitions and conclusions he draws from this example are fairly uniform and universal among other moral agents, but we explain why their experimental results do not vindicate any such conclusion. We conclude that undermining the alleged presumption of liberty places public reason liberalism in serious jeopardy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this editorial essay, we argue that Generative Artificial Intelligence programs (GenAI) draw on what we term a "hypercommons", involving collectively produced inputs and labour that are largely invisible or untraceable. We argue that automatizing the exploitation of common inputs, in ways that remix and reconfigure them, can lead to a crisis of academic authorship in which the moral agency involved in scholarly production is increasingly eroded. We discuss the relationship between the hypercommons and authorship in terms of moral agency and the ethics of academic production, speculating on different responses to the crisis of authorship as posed by GenAI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Inspired by Aristotle and Goffman this article considers how the study of virtue acquisition may be pursued through an observational theorising about social interactions in institutions. Adapting Goffman’s and Harré’s notions of moral order and moral career, it proposes character education to be a dialogic process requiring negotiation between social actors over time. Taking part in educational institutions, learners learn to perform various roles in a manner by which virtues are to be attributed. But this is not all. Goffman’s and perhaps Aristotle’s accounts are arguably too ‘thin’ to allow for moral change, unless these processes themselves are mastered by learners and may be transcended by them. It is thus by applying the sociological imagination to the institutions we are in, the criticality necessary for true character is developed. The role of sociology in character education is therefore twofold: to inform educators in the creation of institutions and practices that transmit and manifest virtues; and, as an essential part of a virtue-ethics curriculum—giving moral agents the sensitising concepts necessary to understand, negotiate and mould the social frame. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Moral agents possess a moral point of view: they have a moral identity or a moral self-conception. This implies that, in order for an organization to be a moral agent, it must have a moral point of view. Importantly, acquiring such a point of view is a social process. In light of this, I argue that collective moral agency is a social construct. It follows that organizations can but need not be moral agents. This raises questions about the validity of our corporate responsibility practices. In particular, as an organization might lack moral agency, it can be illegitimate to hold it responsible for its actions. I go on to investigate the interests that members might have in preventing or promoting collective moral agency and thereby address the political dimension of this social construct. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We propose a new account of collective moral obligation. We argue that several agents have a moral obligation together only if they each have (i) a contextspecific capacity to view their situation from the group's perspective, and (ii) at least a general capacity to deliberate about what they ought to do together. Such an obligation is irreducibly collective, in that it does not imply that the individuals have any obligations to contribute to what is required of the group. We highlight various distinctive features of our account. One such feature is that moral obligations are always relative to an agential perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In today's China, countless parents embark on a journey of moral peril in search of treatment for their children with autism, navigating a bustling yet chaotic market of therapies. Based on 13 months of fieldwork in the Pearl River Delta, this study examines how the boom of China's autism therapy industry has plunged parents, who are relentlessly striving for their children's futures, into deeper vulnerability. I view the "ethics of trying" as parental enactment of their moral agency in seeking therapy and reveal how it serves as a moral engine for the industry's growth in the early 21st century, as well as how it leads to moral tragedies for parents as new norms of therapeutic choice emerge with government and professional guidance compelling them to make optimal therapeutic choices within a critical developmental window. Although parental efforts to avoid "agent-regret" can paradoxically lead to significant remorse, the moral tragedy they encounter can also prompt reflection and reevaluation of their approach to their child's condition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can those dominated and oppressed by racialized power structures be held responsible for their actions? On some plausible accounts of moral responsibility, the answer is "no": domination exempts the oppressed from moral obligations because they are structurally deprived of the freedom to make choices for which one might be blameworthy. In this article, I use the work of Frederick Douglass to offer a different understanding of moral responsibility. Attending to specific arguments that Douglass makes regarding the moral responsibility of slaves, and the tensions it raises with other parts of his corpus, I argue that one's ability to act as a moral agent is deeply tied to the environmental resources at their disposal. Drawing on distributed theories of cognition, I offer a Douglassonian conception of "distributed moral agency," contending that Douglass's writings draw our attention to various environmental factors that can scaffold moral responsibility, even among the enslaved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper delves into the intersection between Kant's moral theory and evolutionary perspectives on personhood. It explores how Kant's emphasis on rationality in moral agency aligns with evolutionary studies on the development of moral behaviors. By examining the transcendental implications of Kant's Categorical Imperative (CI) and the evolutionary origins of moral agency, this study aims to illuminate the link between Kant's conception of moral agency and personhood. Additionally, it investigates how Kant's call for CI resonates with evolutionary insights on the adaptive nature of social cooperation in human societies. Through this analysis, we seek to deepen our understanding of the cognitive, social dimensions of moral agency and moral status within the framework of Kant's moral theory and evolutionary perspectives on personhood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Artificial Intelligence (AI) raises ethical concerns. This article discusses the Ethics of AI, focusing on artificial moral agency (AMA), with the purpose of investigating whether AI can possess moral agency similar to human beings, or more precisely, have a moral experience. We argue that AI lacks the intrinsic capacity provided by freedom for moral agency. By employing cybernetic approaches and systems theory, we conclude that AI emulates ‘principles of judgment’ by adhering to extrinsic norms, highlighting the need for reflection on AMA and its social impacts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bernard Williams' philosophy is shaped by a distinctive and abiding interest in the borderlands between Philosophy and History. He famously considers moral philosophy, and particularly moral theory, to over‐step the border that marks the real 'limits' of the discipline, and in his later work he explicitly advances the idea of doing 'impure' philosophy, by which he meant philosophy that mixed itself with history. By examining the complex impression left on Williams' historical self‐consciousness by his engagements with two very different figures in the history of philosophy, namely Descartes and Wittgenstein, I will explore a number of ways in which philosophy and history are closely intertwined for Williams. This will draw out the positive vision he modelled for us of 'impure' philosophy—a philosophical style he took to contribute to nurturing philosophy as a humanistic discipline. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Should moral blame stop at the grave? We often blame the dead for the bad things they did while alive. But blaming the dead poses a prima facie challenge to accounts which take our blaming practices to aim at communicating moral disapproval to wrongdoers or at improving their moral agency. If these kinds of aims are made definitional for blame, blaming the dead becomes impossible. But even on accounts which say that paradigmatically, blame is a form of moral engagement which aims to effect changes in the wrongdoer, blaming the dead may seem unjustified, pointless or even irrational. In this paper, I explain how blaming the dead can be made sense of and justified. However, not all cases of blaming the dead fit this explanation, because blaming the dead is not a homogenous practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Who has responsibility for addressing the security implications of climate change? States and the United Nations justify their existence on the promise of providing security. Yet, although the national and international security implications of climate change are increasingly acknowledged, incorporation of climate change in national security planning or institutional arrangements is far from universal, while debates in the UN Security Council about its role in addressing climate change have been characterized by contestation. This article examines key debates about the responsibilities these institutions have for providing security in the face of the threats posed by climate change, examining the extent to which these institutions accept responsibility for providing security in these contexts. Drawing on Toni Erskine's notion of institutional moral agency, the article examines a 2017 inquiry into the national security implications of climate change in Australia, and the September 2021 UN Security Council debate on the international security implications of climate change. These two case studies explicitly focus on the question of institutional responsibility – of the Australian Government and the UN Security Council respectively – for addressing the threat of climate change. In both cases these institutions stop short of accepting responsibility for providing security in the face of climate change, with limited policy responses or institutionalization as the result. With the security implications of climate change increasingly apparent, and increasingly recognized by these (and other) actors, the failure to accept responsibility raises potentially significant questions about the legitimacy of these institutions themselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although virtue ethics has repeatedly been proposed as a suitable framework for the development of artificial moral agents (AMAs), it has been proven difficult to approach from a computational perspective. In this work, we present the first technical implementation of artificial virtuous agents (AVAs) in moral simulations. First, we review previous conceptual and technical work in artificial virtue ethics and describe a functionalistic path to AVAs based on dispositional virtues, bottom-up learning, and top-down eudaimonic reward. We then provide the details of a technical implementation in a moral simulation based on a tragedy of the commons scenario. The experimental results show how the AVAs learn to tackle cooperation problems while exhibiting core features of their theoretical counterpart, including moral character, dispositional virtues, learning from experience, and the pursuit of eudaimonia. Ultimately, we argue that virtue ethics provides a compelling path toward morally excellent machines and that our work provides an important starting point for such endeavors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Women's March on 21 January 2017, opened a new social and political landscape for Muslim women to engage in Islamic liberatory activism. I locate Muslim women's participation in the marches following the 2017 'Muslim travel ban policy' as a site for discovering the link between the politics of resistance and the utility of Islam as a source for liberation. I argue that Muslim women living in minority and post-secular contexts resort to faith as a source of agentival liberation to address the political rhetoric of anti-Islamic sentiments and policies. The outcome of this research demonstrates (1) how Muslim women activists challenge the Western narratives of being oppressed and explore the ways they want to represent themselves; (2) how Islam serves as a catalyst for theological resistance and how this enhances the role of Muslim women as moral and spiritual agents in transforming their political and social conditions; (3) how the Islamic liberation in the US context historically intersects with Black churches' resistance toward White racism; and (4) how Muslim women's agency as spiritual beings is linked to the promotion of justice in the Western liberatory movements. Overall, the article shows how Muslim women resort to their spiritual journey and use such narratives to confront unjust political rhetoric and policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Artificial intelligence (AI) is an integral part of our everyday lives and plays a crucial role in our wellbeing, culture, society, and industry. Some types of AI are known to exhibit emotions, but they are not very common in present-day AI. Some researchers suggest that by endowing AI systems with emotions, emotional experiences could be created in them that help create empathy and a feeling of connectedness with users in applications like mental health, therapy, education, museums, and related experiences. The demand for AI systems, especially those that are embodied or affective and evoke attachment from people, encompasses the need for ethical and moral agency. These systems should be capable of independently evaluating and making socially and legally responsible ethical judgments and decisions. This will contribute to the development of more empathetic, caring, compassionate, therapeutic, healing, and ethical machines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is an abiding scepticism in normative theory that individual responsibility for global injustice lies outside commonsense moral thought because it is not grounded in an intuitive conception of human agency. Despite the grim realities of injustice in an interconnected world, this scepticism holds that human beings cannot properly internalise a nonrestrictive view of responsibility because it cuts against their experience of agency in the world. Against this view, this article argues that individual responsibility for the realisation of global justice is supported by a pervasive, and socio-politically influenced, feature of the phenomenology of agency: moral imagination. Moral imagination connects actions which are within the domain of an ordinary life to larger projects of social and political change. Since there is no compelling reason for the scope of those projects to be restricted, there is an accessible understanding and experience of the phenomenology of agency which grounds individual global responsibility in the real world. I call this a dynamic phenomenology of agency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to some pessimists, trusting moral testimony is an action in which the agent does not think about moral questions by herself, and thus it is unacceptable. I argue for optimism by giving some reasons to display moral agents are still depending upon their own in many cases of moral testimony. Specifically, I argue that testimony is a form of social cooperation: the division of epistemic labor. My strategy is as follows: First, I give a principle to show when an agent could reasonably trust moral testimony. Specifically, an agent could reasonably accept the testimony, when she can reasonably expect she would make the same or similar judgment with the testifier. Second, I show how moral testimony could work as a form of social cooperation. Given the principle of the same judgment, it is reasonable for the agent to form a moral belief and act with moral testimony. And it provides us higher efficiency in moral knowledge and shows respect for each moral agent. After that, I provide explanations for the problem of moral disagreement and moral understanding with such a principle for moral testimony. Finally, I respond to some possible objections and give some clarifications of my argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The prevalence of automation and advent of intelligent machines have created new constellations in which the attribution of criminal responsibility is complicated. Automation results in complex settings of interaction, while the conduct of technical systems is becoming less determined, predictable, and transparent. There is an ongoing scholarly debate regarding how these developments shape moral and legal agency, as well as the best ways of allocating responsibility. Concerns have been expressed about the emergence of responsibility gaps, calling for ways to ensure accountability. This article explores whether these apprehensions can be empirically substantiated. A factorial survey study (N = 799) conducted in Switzerland was used to research attribution mechanisms in criminal cases involving various forms of human-machine interaction. The results revealed that the level of automation significantly affected the attribution of responsibility. In cases of high automation, attribution became considerably more complex and more actors, especially corporate entities, were called to account. A difference in automation level (i.e., the question of how much humans are still 'in the loop') had a stronger effect than did the aspect of technology being described as capable of learning. However, the involvement of intelligent technology seemed to have made the responsibility attribution more arbitrary. According to the respondents, there were no discernable responsibility gaps. However, in the present research, significant shifts among the agents called to account were observable. Yet, since these evasion mechanisms are hardly covered by today's law, there is an ongoing risk of a gap between the desire for punishment and actual legal constructs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Intelligent machines – from automated robots to algorithmic systems – can create images and poetry, steer our preferences, aid decision making, and kill. Our perception of their capacities, relative autonomy, and moral status will profoundly affect not only how we interpret and address practical problems in world politics over the next 50 years but also how we prescribe and evaluate individual and state responses. In this article, I argue that we must analyse this emerging synthetic agency in order to effectively navigate – and theorise – the future of world politics. I begin by outlining the ways that agency has been under-theorised within the discipline of International Relations (IR) and suggest that artificial intelligence (AI) disrupts prevailing conceptions. I then examine how individual human beings and formal organisations – purposive actors with which IR is already familiar – qualify as moral agents, or bearers of duties, and explore what criteria intelligent machines would need to meet to also qualify. After demonstrating that synthetic agents currently lack the 'reflexive autonomy' required for moral agency, I turn to the context of war to illustrate how insights drawn from this comparative analysis counter our tendency to elide different manifestations of moral agency in ways that erode crucial notions of responsibility in world politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article "Towards an Ethical Critique of the History of Philosophy in Mexico from a Gender Perspective" by Fanny del Río, published in the journal Diánoia, examines the systematic exclusion of women in Mexican philosophy from a gender perspective. The author uses three models of epistemic injustice to analyze this exclusion and proposes ways to combat it. The article also addresses the moral responsibility of agents in social oppression and mentions the case of police officers Thomas Lane and Alexander Kueng, convicted for not intervening in the violence exerted by Derek Chauvin against George Floyd. Additionally, it highlights the invisibility of women philosophers in Mexico and proposes raising awareness and promoting change from the classrooms. [Extracted from the article]

Based on fieldwork research among the Bosniak (Muslim) population in rural areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this article starts with the technique of summoning the dead, aimed at obtaining information about missing goods. It argues that the practice of summoning the dead, like practices aimed at magically harming others, is based on the same moral rules that govern everyday relations between the living and the dead. While these rules are generally followed and observed in everyday life, they can also be deliberately inverted to one's own advantage or to the disadvantage of others. Ultimately, I argue that the dead prove to be moral agents who act when moral norms are violated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) raise important questions about whether people view moral evaluations by AI systems similarly to human-generated moral evaluations. We conducted a modified Moral Turing Test (m-MTT), inspired by Allen et al. (Exp Theor Artif Intell 352:24–28, 2004) proposal, by asking people to distinguish real human moral evaluations from those made by a popular advanced AI language model: GPT-4. A representative sample of 299 U.S. adults first rated the quality of moral evaluations when blinded to their source. Remarkably, they rated the AI's moral reasoning as superior in quality to humans' along almost all dimensions, including virtuousness, intelligence, and trustworthiness, consistent with passing what Allen and colleagues call the comparative MTT. Next, when tasked with identifying the source of each evaluation (human or computer), people performed significantly above chance levels. Although the AI did not pass this test, this was not because of its inferior moral reasoning but, potentially, its perceived superiority, among other possible explanations. The emergence of language models capable of producing moral responses perceived as superior in quality to humans' raises concerns that people may uncritically accept potentially harmful moral guidance from AI. This possibility highlights the need for safeguards around generative language models in matters of morality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Because moral understanding involves a distinctly first-personal grasp of moral matters, there is a temptation to think of its value primarily in terms of achievements that reflect well on its possessor: the moral worth of one's action or the virtue of one's character. These explanations, I argue, do not do full justice to the importance of moral understanding in our moral lives. Of equal importance is the value of moral understanding in our relations with other moral agents. In particular, I argue that an understanding of moral matters is of central importance within relations of solidarity. In addition to highlighting an overlooked aspect of moral understanding's value, this view also has important implications for what solidarity requires of those who stand in that relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this study was to determine whether a change in school grades could serve as a turning point for delinquency, and whether it did so by forming a reciprocal relationship with a change in moral agency. Separate samples of 3,558 (2,829 males, 729 females) and 3,559 (2,811 males, 748 females) low-to-moderate risk justice-involved youth from the same data set served as participants in this study. Cross-lagging school grades and moral agency, while controlling for prior levels of all predictor and outcome variables, two four-variable pathways were tested (grades → moral agency → grades → recidivism; moral agency → grades → moral agency → recidivism). There were significant indirect effects in both pathways across samples, although none of the four direct effects were significant. These findings support the notion that small changes in behavior (grades) and cognition (moral agency) produce a chain reaction capable of predicting desistance from crime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This document is an introduction to a special issue of the journal Social Theory & Practice. The issue focuses on the topic of group agency and collective responsibility. The introduction provides an overview of the themes and questions explored in the issue, which include the possibility of genuine reasoning and action by groups, the social and moral consequences of group agency, and the political dimension of corporate agency. The issue includes papers on topics such as acting for others, non-standard group activity, the social construction of collective moral agency, structural injustice in corporate entities, and team reasoning and collective moral obligation. The authors express gratitude to all those involved in the creation of the special issue. [Extracted from the article]

This article is a review of Julian E. Joachim's book, "Gott—Mensch—Natur: Der Personenbegriff in der philosophischen Anthropologie Heinrichs von Gent." The book explores the concept of personhood in the medieval philosopher Henry of Ghent's work. Joachim examines Henry's views on individuation, individuality, the eternity of the world, creation, and freedom of the will. The reviewer notes that the book provides valuable insights into Henry's ontology and compares his ideas to those of Thomas Aquinas. However, the reviewer suggests that the book could have been more concise and would have benefited from an index. [Extracted from the article]

Inquiries into organisational scandals repeatedly attribute wrongdoing to the normalisation of deviance. From this perspective, the cause of harm lies not in the actions of any individual but rather in the institutionalised practices of organisations or sectors. Although an important corrective to dramatic tales of bad apples, the normalisation thesis underplays the role of management in the emergence of deviance. Drawing on literatures exploring ideas of amoral (Carroll in Bus Horiz 30(2):7–15, 1987) or ethically neutral leadership (Treviño et al. in Calif Manag Rev 42(4):128–142, 2000) we seek to bring management back into the explanation of organisational wrongdoing. Amoral theorists point to management's ethical silence, but they also describe the way in which that silence is sustained by a series of organisational characteristics. We build on this work in arguing that it is management's deliberate focus on bottom line performance, the diffusion of responsibility and high levels of organisational identification that explain the emergence of wrongdoing. We apply these ideas to the case of the UK's Stafford hospital which hit the headlines in 2009 when it was reported that poor standards of care had led to a mortality rate markedly above that expected for a hospital of its type. We conclude with a discussion of the circumstances which translate amoral management into unethical outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the process of moral agency development as a community-supported process. Based on a multimethod qualitative inquiry, including diaries, focus groups, and documentary analysis, we analyze the experiences of middle managers in two Norwegian hospitals during the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic. We find that moral agency is developed through a community-embedded value inquiry, emerging in three partially overlapping steps. The first step is marked by moral reflex, an intuitive, value-driven, pre-reflective response to a crisis situation. In the second step, the managers involved the community in value calibration, a collective-ethical sensemaking. In the third step, they took active stances to translate values into actions, with an increased awareness of values and an ability to explain and justify their actions. We label the steps, respectively: value inquiry-in-action, value inquiry-on-action and reflective enactment of value. An analysis of the process reveals two aspects critical for moral agency development: it happens through confrontation with uncertainty, and it is relational, that is, embedded in a community. While uncertainty forces an intuitive moral response, dialogical reflection in the community develops value awareness and relationships of mutual care and support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Central to the debate on the moral relevance of shame is whether we take others' assessments of our moral shortcomings seriously. Some argue that viewing shame as a social emotion undermines the moral standing of shame; for a moral agent, what is authoritative are his own moral values, not the mere disapproval of others. Adam Smith's framework sheds some light on the contemporary debates in philosophy on the moral value of shame. Shame is mostly a social emotion but has moral value for Smith. This is because we desire sympathy and share an ongoing social practice of morality with others. Smith developed the underpinnings of an account for a sympathetic basis of shame. An agent is evaluated through the sympathetic process to determine whether he/she has lived up to shared norms and morality. Shame emerges from the understanding that we ought not to be favorably thought of by others, the impartial spectator, or by our own conscience. We want to avoid shame for two reasons: first, we want to receive praise which gives pleasure, blame and blameworthiness operate by giving pain. Secondly, we are pleased with the sympathy of others. According to Smith, shame is a very painful emotion. Given our dread of pain and love of pleasure, we are motivated to be not blamed or blameworthy. We want to be favorably thought of so as not to be, or feel, shamed. Our dread of blameworthiness and our desire for sympathy motivates us to be a person who acts according to the norms and morality of society. Shame has a moral value both as a social emotion and when it arises from our conscience; however, Smith was also aware that there are limits to shame as a moral value, which arises from misjudgments of spectators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years there has been growing interest in adapting virtue ethics to the ethics of technology. However, it has most typically been invoked to address some particular issue of moral importance, and there is only a limited range of works dealing with the methodological question of how virtue ethics may contribute to this field. My approach in this paper is threefold. I start with a brief discussion of Aristotelian virtue ethics, with a view to constructing a framework in which to then address at least some of the aspects of the growing technicization of life that call for scrutiny. I subsequently proceed further by outlining three possible models of virtue-theoretical analysis within the ethics of technology, giving special attention to those changes in human agency where technicization can be seen to exert a significant influence. Finally, I focus on the third such possibility, the extended virtue model, as a basis for calling for a more inclusive account of moral agency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has been argued that a retributivist criminal justice system treats offenders with a respect lacking in alternative criminal justice systems; retributivism presumably recognizes that offenders are fellow members of the moral community who can be held responsible for their actions. One version of the respect argument builds on P.F. Strawson’s moral responsibility theory. According to Strawson, we may take either a participant or objective attitude toward other people. The former is the default attitude when interacting with other adults, whereas the latter is fit for children and the mentally disabled or ill, whom we merely try to manage and handle as best we can. The participant attitude also involves holding people responsible when they do wrong. Supposedly, a retributivist criminal justice system functions as a natural continuation of our everyday, participant, and responsibility-holding practices, unlike alternative systems that adopt an objective attitude toward offenders. I argue that this is wrong. The participant attitude requires reciprocity and, usually, some level of equality too. Even an idealized retributivist system has little room for this, not to mention the flawed versions of this system we see in reality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to provide a gender-sensitive analysis of economic agency in Islamic economic philosophy. Design/methodology/approach: A critical review of classical ethics literature and the concept of khilafah is undertaken and discussed in conjunction with the current understanding of homo Islamicus. Findings: Building on the principles of khilafah, the concept of homo Islamicus is a pious stand-in for the flawed homo economicus. Among its flaws is the complete absence of a discussion of women as economic agents. To remedy this the discipline must acknowledge explicitly the denial of women and gender from the discussion of moral agency and include gender as a category of analysis for economic agency. This is only possible by: (1) introducing a non-patriarchal reading of khilafah as the model of agency and (2) by operationalising taqwa as the cardinal virtue of the economic agent instead of neoliberal rationality. Research limitations/implications: If Islamic economic philosophy is to contend as an alternative mode of economics, it must consider gender and class dimensions in its micro-foundation discussion, economic agency is one of them. Originality/value: This study reveals the patriarchal readings that are part of the foundation of the concept of the economic agent in Islamic economics, problematising it and providing a gender-sensitive concept of economic agency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Charting is an essential component of professional nursing practice and is arguably a key element of patient safety in surgery: without proper, objective, and timely documentation, both benign and tragical errors can occur. From surgery on wrong patients to wrong limbs, to the omission of antibiotics administration, many harms can happen in the operating room. Documentation has thus served as a safeguard for patient safety, professional responsibility, and professional accountability. In this context, we were puzzled by the practices we observed with respect to charting compliance with the surgical safety checklist (SSC) during a study of surgical teams in a large, urban teaching hospital in Canada (pseudonym 'C&C'). Methods: This article leverages institutional ethnography and a subset of data from a larger study to describe and explain the social organisation of the system that monitored surgical safety compliance at C&C from the standpoint of operating room nurses. This data included fieldnotes from observations of 51 surgical cases, on-the-spot interviews with nurses, formal interviews with individuals who were involved in the design and implementation of the SSC, and open-ended questions from two rounds of survey of OR teams. Findings: We found that the compliance form and not the SSC itself formed the basis for reporting. To meet hospital accuracy in charting goals and legislated compliance documentation reporting requirements nurses 'pre-charted' compliance with the surgical checklist. The adoption of this workaround technically violated nursing charting principles and put them in ethically untenable positions. Conclusions: Documenting compliance of the SSC constituted a moral hazard, constrained nurses' autonomy and moral agency, and obscured poor checklist adherence. The findings highlight how local and extra local texts, technologies and relations create ethical issues, raise questions about the effectiveness of resulting data for decision-making and contribute to ongoing conversations about nursing workarounds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The emergent quest for the good life in rapidly transforming China, Laos, and Vietnam can only be understood as part of the political economy of late socialism. This special issue critically engages with the notion of the good life and its ramifications in late-socialist social life through the perspectives of people and communities living amid political economic changes. In this introduction, we weave together the volume's nine empirical contributions by conceptualizing the good life as a field of struggle in which people grapple with the contradictions of late socialism to realize their vision of a good life. We underscore four domains of action in which people articulate and act out their vision: comfort and pleasure, caring and being cared for, cosmology and nature, and freedom and autonomy. Their practices reveal how the paradoxical value frameworks of late socialism impose limits on the possibilities of living well together. Yet, they also indicate the moral agency of people circulating between seemingly incommensurable social orders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The term rûaḥ (plural: rûḥôt) is usually translated into English as 'wind', 'breath', or 'spirit'. With such a wide semantic range, scholars have debated the meteorological, anthropological, and theological nuances of the term. This article surveys five themes in the history of that scholarship: (1) diachronic approaches to mapping the meaning of rûaḥ ; (2) attempts to track two modes of rûaḥ : the so-called life-giving vs. empowering aspects; (3) distinctions between the meanings of rûaḥ and nepeš ; (4) the functions of rûaḥ in designating ecstatic experience; and (5) the role of rûaḥ -language in describing notions of human subjectivity and moral agency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent examination of Adam Smith's mention of trust and his understanding of the role of trust in interpersonal relations add to his standing as a theorist of modernity. Smith's development of the notion of trust is confined to an account of trustworthiness, which is consistent with his theory of moral agency based on the principle of the impartial spectator. In addition, it is demonstrated that the predominance of trustworthiness in Smith's understanding relates to the significant presence of cottage industry in a globalised commercial economy, through which reliance on others is foregrounded. At the same time Smith was unable to grasp the disposition and agency of a trustor, a person giving trust, and their confidence in choosing to balance the risk of depending on strangers with the advantage such dependence might provide. In this way both Smith's understanding of trust and the nature of trust itself are explicated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As human beings, we do not live in a world devoid of value, but rather in what could be called a moral ecology that gives us reasons for action. Theorists of social practice such as Alasdair MacIntyre have analyzed the moral ecology as practices with inherent values and goods, but they have given less attention to the moral agents living in the moral ecology. In this article, I build on Hannah Arendt's analysis of promising and forgiving and argue that these are "stabilizers of action" that cut across various practices and constitute a moral life of self-constancy. Human beings are moral agents in virtue of these moral powers, and they must be cultivated within the social practices where humans develop. This is made difficult in a liquid modern world that puts emphasis on change and flexibility rather than on integrity and self-constancy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Artificial intelligences (AIs), although often perceived as mere tools, have increasingly advanced cognitive and social capacities. In response, psychologists are studying people's perceptions of AIs as moral agents (entities that can do right and wrong) and moral patients (entities that can be targets of right and wrong actions). This article reviews the extent to which people see AIs as moral agents and patients and how they feel about such AIs. We also examine how characteristics about ourselves and the AIs affect attributions of moral agency and patiency. We find multiple factors that contribute to attributions of moral agency and patiency in AIs, some of which overlap with attributions of morality to humans (e.g., mind perception) and some that are unique (e.g., sci-fi fan identity). We identify several future directions, including studying agency and patiency attributions to the latest generation of chatbots and to likely more advanced future AIs that are being rapidly developed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This special section aims to shed light on moral milieus and agencies in contemporary capitalist central and eastern Europe. Drawing on case studies from Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Romania, and Russia, it offers insight into changing perceptions of proper economy and practice amongst a broad range of actors—from landfill workers to business managers and the super-rich. The contributors explore how actors at various scales morally construct, contest, and defend ideas of justice, (re-)distribution, and social worth, as well as socio-economic hierarchy, inequality, and harm. They analyse the capitalist moral transformation and order in the region and examine the local appropriation of and buy-in to (as well as critique of) aspects of neoliberal moral orders—a topic sidelined in much of the existing moral economy scholarship. Exploring a broad range of moral economic phenomena, the contributors move beyond the conventional definition of morals as prosocial norms and action, approaching morals as a broader empirical phenomenon of economy and politics. They examine the actions, practices, and reasoning of different actors in relation to shifting notions of acceptable and unacceptable, just and unjust, and praiseworthy and blameworthy behaviour. As such, this collection makes the case for widening the empirical object and analytical purchase of moral economy to include the study of not only moral critiques and resistance to capitalism but also the diverse moral agencies, milieus and orders of capitalism, and the ways in which the advancement and embedding of the capitalist moral order has shaped economic life in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Xiao-filiality is the most fundamental concept in the Chinese intellectual-cultural tradition. It represents not only family values but also religious, political and ethical ideologies. The conception of xiao, which originally denoted the meanings of presenting offerings to deceased ancestors and inheriting their legacy in the Shang dynasty, went through two stages of evolution from the early Zhou dynasty to the Warring States period. In the first stage, xiao was extended to ethical domain with the humanistic turn from human-spirit relationship to human-human relationship. Xiao was not only expanded to the empirical exercise of serving living parents but also established as a ritual-ethical norm that defined people's familial, social, and hierarchical role duties and regulated their conducts of dealing with interpersonal relationships. As a result, the religious authority of paranormal ancestral spirits was transferred to the social-political authority who enforced the implement of the ritual-ethical norm of xiao. In the second stage, Confucius and his followers on the one hand recognized the importance of compliance with this prescribed ritual-ethical norm, and on the other internalized it to become the individual agent's moral emotion and free choice. Consequently, the social-political authority was further transferred to the internal authority of moral autonomy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores moral approaches to conflict resolution in Tivland. violent conflicts have continued to deteriorate in Tivland resulting in forfeiture of lives and property. The study employed the phenomenological method which focused on a detailed portrayal of the experience of violent conflicts. The primary sources involved the use of unstructured oral interviews. Findings show that violent conflicts in Tivland have no ethical justifications since they act against human dignity and demean the status of humans as moral agents. The research also found out that It is the observation of this study that, while peaceful societies flourish, conflict-ridden societies remain poor and underdeveloped like Tivland. The need for moral retrospection or evaluation toward sustainable conflict resolution becomes imperative. Since effective conflict management usually leads to an improvement in the social relations and conditions of the parties involved, there is every need to resolve these conflicts if the social conditions in Tivland must be improved for good. The research argued that ethical principles are capable of reinvigorating peaceful co-existence in Tivland despite decades of violent conflicts. It recommended that the application of the principle of double effect and the just war doctrine are useful models in taming crises if applied adequately. the government should establish security outlets in the conflict-prone areas of Tivland, and all parties in conflict must be conscious of our common humanity to restore the dignity and sanctity of Human life. The research concludes that peace must reign in Tivland if the approaches to conflict resolution are applied effectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the global financial crisis, banks have become more regulated to advance ethical sales cultures throughout the sector. Based on case studies of three retail banks, we find that they construct the 'appropriate advisor' in different ways. Inspired by Bakhtin's work on ethics, we propose a vocabulary of relational ethics centered on the 'answerable self.' We argue that this vocabulary is apt for studying and discussing how organizations advance ethical sales cultures in ways that instead of encouraging value congruence and alignment allow for ethical openness. In such cultures, employees—as moral agents—are morally questioning, critically self-reflexive, and answerable for their own actions toward others in their social relationships. Our paper makes three theoretical contributions, namely, problematizing the idea of cultural alignment and value congruence, demonstrating that identity regulation can both comprise and support the 'answerable self,' and advancing our understanding of the interdependence of ethical openness and ethical closure in fostering ethical sales cultures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article studies the parable of the compassionate and caring Samaritan as source of radical lessons in dispensing care. In the parable, Jesus stressed that the dispensing of care should be primary and conformity to customary obligations are to be subordinated. This study primarily examines the power of obligatory customs that Jesus “overpowered” and attempts to elaborate on the following reasons why Jesus had to dethrone customary obligations. First, traditional customs turned prejudices have debilitating effects on character, behaviour, and moral agency. Secondly, overcoming negative prejudices will free our minds for creative responses and lead us toward a better understanding of compassionate care as possessing a divine character. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]