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When Japan attacked European and U.S. possessions in the Asia-Pacific region in December 1941, the Australian government had on order more combat-ready operational aircraft from American firms than from Australian and British industries combined. The U.S. was thus critical to the equipping and expansion of the Royal Australian Air Force. This article demonstrates that the framework of imperial defense provided a means by which the Australian government sought to secure American supply, although pressures on U.S. industry ultimately delayed the Australia air force's modernization and expansion program in 1940-1941. The war with Japan nonetheless created the potential for a more direct Australian-American relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the Syrian War, the US and other Western countries trained, equipped and paid Syrian rebels to fight the government and, later, root out the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). When states use armed groups to attain foreign policy objectives, control is a key concern. The US sought to enforce such control over providers and recipients of lethal military assistance in the period from 2013–18. We investigate the parallel CIA and Department of Defence assistance programmes. We challenge theoretical assumptions related to the application of the principal-agent model to explain the dynamics of foreign assistance to rebels. We argue that, in the US strategy to control rebels, co-ordinating the providers and dividing the recipients of security assistance were essential conditions. Meanwhile, the delays in recruitment, the limitations on the number of soldiers trained, the short supply of weapons and the strict regulation of the actions carried out by the rebels all reduced the efficacy of the assistance. This way of instrumentalising security assistance helped the US and its Western allies to crush ISIL while avoiding a collapse in Damascus. However, this happened at the expense of rebel cohesion, autonomy, and legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research examines patterns and factors influencing U.S. civil-military relations interventions in developing countries. Drawing on theories of new clientelism and geopolitics, it proposes developing states’ political traditions and U.S. geostrategic interests jointly shape U.S. intervention policies through an interactive effect. Quantitative analysis of U.S. military assistance and engagement data across 97 developing countries (1990–2020) supports key hypotheses: U.S. civil-military intervention is higher in military-dominated polities and states of major geostrategic interest, with military political traditions amplifying geostrategic factors. Case studies of Egypt and India further reveal differentiated pathways of U.S. military influence across varying political systems. The findings provide new explanations of U.S. foreign military behavior, analytical perspectives on Third World military diplomacy, and insights for developing countries in responding to great power military pressures while preserving sovereignty and security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In contexts as diverse as civil war interventions, alliances, and military coalitions, states often militarily assist protégés to counteract unfavorable power shifts. Existing theoretical work finds that such assistance mitigates commitment problems and reduces the probability of war. We develop a model that captures this but also includes information asymmetries. In many cases, overcoming the commitment problem encourages the protégé to take greater risks in bargaining, thereby increasing the probability of war due to incomplete information. Using mechanism design, we show that in some cases, no feasible transfer can reduce the probability of war to zero. More broadly, our results indicate that encouraging policymakers to further expand military assistance can backfire despite empirical relationships that may appear otherwise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Democrat Party’s (DP) decade-long period in office ended with a military intervention on 27 May 1960. In the coup declaration, the National Unity Committee (NUC) announced that Turkey would remain loyal to its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) alliances as well as Turkey’s other international commitments. Turkey’s economic and military dependence on the USA (United States of America) also remained unchanged, contrary to the expectations of the Kemalists, leftists, and anti-DP circles who had mythicized the NUC’s role in Turkey’s independence from the USA. This study examines primary sources such as US archival records and the records of the Turkey’s constituent assembly and provisional government. It analyses the diplomatic relations between Turkey and the USA during this period and shows how Turkey’s dependence on the USA continued through economic and military assistance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With a negotiated decolonisation and a steadfast friendship between Félix Houphouët-Boigny and General Charles de Gaulle, Côte d'Ivoire, which had become independent, maintained excellent relations with France, its former colonial power. These close relations allowed it to benefit, within the framework of the Franco-Ivorian cooperation agreements, from French military assistance in setting up its armed forces. With this help, the Ivorian Army and Gendarmerie were thus taking their first steps under France's military leadership. But divergences appeared at certain levels and the question of extra-military tasks or, more precisely, the importance granted to them in the missions of the Ivorian Armed Forces was the subject of heated debates between the two partners. The crux of the issue was the establishment and development of the Ivorian Civic Service, for which Abidjan had turned to Israel in the belief that this would not jeopardise French influence in the Ivorian defence establishment. This article revisits this issue by highlighting the intricacies and challenges in the creation of the Ivorian Civic Service. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Western states have provided billions of dollars of military aid to Ukraine to help it in its war against Russia. Yet, despite numerous discussions of the ethical issues raised by the war, there has been little discussion of the opportunity costs of this military assistance. Is it right that the West has prioritized military assistance to Ukraine, when the conflict in Ukraine is just one of numerous challenges facing the world, from forced displacement to global poverty, preventable disease to climate change? This article offers the first detailed engagement with this issue, taking seriously the nonideal feasibility constraints that states face. It firsts set out the prima facie case against assisting Ukraine militarily due to the opportunity costs. It then explores—and largely rejects—two responses: that military assistance is required to protect Ukrainian self-determination and that it is needed to stop the march of authoritarianism. It argues that the opportunity costs objection has serious force and counts against much of the provision of military assistance to Ukraine (although not all). This argument has broader implications for the extent to which states should prioritize military aid over other means of addressing global challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Norwegian parliament has agreed to fund the Nansen Support Program for Ukraine, promising to deliver a total of NOK 75 billion (EUR 6.7 billion) in military and civilian aid to Ukraine over the period 2023–2027. In 2023, half of the aid was delivered in the form of military support, the other half constituted civilian support, including humanitarian relief and direct support to the Government of Ukraine. Over the next four years, the distribution between military and civilian aid through the Nansen Support Program will be decided on an annual basis. To achieve the long-term goal of making Ukraine ‘well-functioning, democratic and safe’, and supporting the country’s ambitions for European integration, the Norwegian aid is intended to strengthen democratic institutions, the rule of law and civil society in Ukraine. This paper examines the debate on Norway’s assistance to Ukraine and discusses the competing, or even conflicting, goals of helping Ukraine win the war and strengthening Ukrainian civil society, looking for answers to several difficult questions: How will the Norwegian government ensure that funding to Ukraine is in fact spent ‘in line with Ukraine’s needs’ and does not enrich criminals or facilitate unlawful activities? How will the funding help strengthen Ukraine’s democratic institutions and civil society? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Illicit arms trafficking in Ukraine has been a significant issue since the Cold War, with leftover Soviet stockpiles providing lucrative smuggling routes. With over US$100 billion in aid being provided by the West, a sizeable portion being in the form of small arms and guided infantry weapons such as MANPADS and ATGMs (Masters & Merrow 2023), and accompanying ammunition, Action Plans have been developed conducive to limiting eventual diversion of military aid into the illicit market. What this paper seeks to analyse, is the United States’ ‘Plan to Counter Illicit Diversion of Certain Advanced Conventional Weapons in Eastern Europe’. The plan highlights steps towards limiting illicit arms trafficking such as increased traceability, provision of end-use-monitoring (EUM) capacities and training, intelligence sharing, and capacity building for border management. This paper argues that the current iteration of the United States’ effort to limit arms trafficking, though still in its infancy, has provided some benefit in Ukraine’s efforts to combat the illicit diversion of arms, and could limit the presence of US-made weapons in the illicit arms market, as has been the case thus far. However, this paper does argue that, given the context of lacking institutional accountability, the role of corruption, an inconsistent and incoherent legal framework for gun ownership, as well as lacking coordination with US partners, the Action Plan will unlikely help reform the structural conditions that established Ukraine as a lucrative arms market before the war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite advances in wearable robots across various fields, there is no consensus definition or design framework for the application of this technology in rehabilitation or musculoskeletal (MSK) injury prevention. This paper aims to define wearable robots and explore their applications and challenges for military rehabilitation and force protection for MSK injury prevention. We conducted a modified Delphi method, including a steering group and 14 panelists with 10+ years of expertise in wearable robots. Panelists presented current wearable robots currently in use or in development for rehabilitation or assistance use in the military workforce and healthcare. The steering group and panelists met to obtain a consensus on the wearable robot definition applicable for rehabilitation or primary injury prevention. Panelists unanimously agreed that wearable robots can be grouped into three main applications, as follows: (1) primary and secondary MSK injury prevention, (2) enhancement of military activities and tasks, and (3) rehabilitation and reintegration. Each application was presented within the context of its target population and state-of-the-art technology currently in use or under development. Capturing expert opinions, this study defines wearable robots for military rehabilitation and MSK injury prevention, identifies health outcomes and assessment tools, and outlines design requirements for future advancements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Foreign military personnel routinely participate in educational and cultural programs administered by the U.S. military. In addition to bolstering the capacity of the recipient military, one of the primary goals of these programs is to professionalize the military of the recipient state. It is hoped not only that the soldiers will internalize norms of human rights and democracy themselves but also that they will become influential members of the military in the future. Existing cross-national research, along with selective anecdotes of U.S.-trained soldiers leading coups and rebellions, suggests that military aid may be ineffective. To date, however, a nuanced understanding of the more granular effects of military aid on the recipient country has been hindered by a lack of data and a focus on the macro-level. We address this lacuna by examining norm transmission among a sample of the Hungarian officer corps. We show that while soldiers who graduated from IMET programs display more favorability toward human rights and democracy, they do not believe the military should remain insulated from policymaking. We believe this is a valuable step toward a deeper understanding of how U.S. military aid shapes recipient militaries and, more broadly, how norms are transmitted between allies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The western response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was unprecedented. The states of the European Union, the G7 and NATO have targeted Russia with sanctions and diplomatic isolation, and furnished Ukraine with military assistance sufficient to ensure the Zelensky regime's survival. These efforts have proven insufficient to dislodge Russia from its occupation of Ukrainian territory. Nonetheless, when launched in the aftermath of the invasion, they were seen (and often justified as) as bold, innovative, and steadfast—a necessary response to a grievous act. What explains this response? In this article we argue that the answer lies in the emotions of guilt and shame for past actions and mistakes in the West's dealings with Russia and Ukraine. Informed by a qualitative discourse analysis of key speeches, statements and interviews with leading western policy-makers (past and present), we regard these two emotions—expressed as apologies and the acknowledgment of mistakes—as important drivers of policy. This article contributes to the bourgeoning literature on emotions in world politics. In addition to offering a coherent explanation of the West's unprecedented response our argument has policy implications. While the admission of wrongdoing is laudable, it can lead to actors overcompensating, resulting in further mistakes and policy failures. Fast-tracking Ukraine into the European Union would be one such error. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Nordic Countries have taken different approaches towards a shared goal of helping Ukraine's independence and sovereignty against Russia's invasion while securing the safety of the Nordic region. The Nordic countries have taken and resettled over 0.2 million Ukrainian refugees since the beginning of the war as of early 2024. The combined financial aid to Ukraine from the Nordic countries totals approximately €19.03 billion. Among the Nordic countries, Denmark and Finland have taken a military-centric approach by sending most of their funds towards military support, while Sweden took a more humanitarian approach. Iceland and Norway took a balanced approach maintainin g equality in terms of providing humanitarian and military aid. Denmark, Norway and Sweden have taken a long-term initiative towards helping Ukraine. Even Iceland is also undergoing the approval of a five-year-long plan to help Ukraine in the war. All five of the Nordic countries are now members of NATO, as Finland and Sweden have joined recently, to ensure the security of the Nordic region. The Nordic countries have sided with Ukraine against Russia since the beginning of the invasion and plan on supporting it as long as it takes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The legal principles of receiving and using international aid received by Ukraine from foreign donors - foreign states and international organizations - are considered. The risk criteria in the provision of lethal weapons to the Defense Forces of Ukraine and the desire to ensure even greater control over the provided lethal weapons and its diversion outside the country and even to the European black market during the decision-making process regarding aid to Ukraine were assessed. As an example, the former Yugoslavia, where it was not possible to fully control the circulation of weapons during the wars. In response to the Russian Federation's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, the Council of the European Union on February 28, 2022 adopted an unprecedented decision (2022/338/CFSP) to finance and supply 450 million euros of lethal military aid to the Ukrainian Defense Forces [3], an amount that was doubled by Decision (2022/471/CFSP) dated March 23, 2022 [4]. But in this rush to war, the European Union's strict arms control framework was given little consideration. In particular, the Council of the European Union has not publicly formulated how it takes into account the risks of a long-term conflict in Ukraine, such as the diversion of weapons to the Russian Federation and unwanted non-state armed groups; the post-conflict proliferation of small arms and light weapons and the concomitant growth of transnational crime and regional instability, and even the potential for accusations of war crimes by the Ukrainian side against Russian prisoners of war [5]. The formulation of these risks during the decision-making process of the European Union regarding Ukraine is of great importance. The right to collective self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter provides a fundamental legal basis for the provision of international military assistance to Ukraine by individual states. But the specific powers of the European Union regarding the financing and coordination of such supplies are contained in the new European Peace Fund (hereinafter referred to as the EPF), created in March 2021 [6]. However, the powers of the European Union in the EFM are determined by the criteria for evaluating arms exports to the European Union. Common Position (2008/944/CFSP) dated December 8, 2008, and the International Arms Trade Treaty dated December 24, 2014 (hereinafter - Arms Trade Treaty) [7]. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The essence of Russian security policy is composed of the combined use of conventional and unconventional threats in both war and peacetime. Russia aims to dominate the process of escalation especially by frequently threatening nuclear war in Ukraine. It attempts to maintain the strategic initiative superiority, forcing its enemies to act under its control. Put differently, through the means of manipulating the fear of nuclear war in Ukraine, it tries to avert other states from directly intervening in the battlefield and to prevent military aid delivered to its enemies from becoming strategic. Methodologically, this article examines Russia's effort to gain dominance in escalating tensions through nuclear risk as a case study. The nuclear risk hinges on the uncertainty of nuclear deterrence. The nuances of this often-ignored uncertainty are explained in this article. Since such a uncertainty poses credible risk of nuclear war, absolute victory is not possible. No party will get everything it wants; therefore, the only solution is diplomatic compromise through negotiation. The importance and implications of this article lie in the fact that the problems and warnings examined here are likely not only in Ukraine but also in a possible future crisis over Taiwan or future conflicts involving nuclear powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drones have become an essential component of modern military arsenals, representing unmanned aerial vehicles capable of performing a variety of tasks, from surveillance and reconnaissance to precision strikes and assistance in military operations. This paper examines the classification and use of drones in the integrated and cybernetic battlefield, analyzing the existing types of drones and the advantages and disadvantages of their use. Various types of drones, their characteristics, capabilities, advantages, and limitations depending on the type and purpose of the operation are examined. The high flight autonomy, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, striking potential, precision, and reduced manufacturing and operating costs make drones a highly topical subject in military scientific research. The vulnerabilities and specific limitations of these new weapons, such as vulnerability to radar interference, adverse weather conditions, technological novelty, and doctrinal action limitations, create problems, restrict use, and decrease target effectiveness. Additionally, the paper analyzes the role and impact of Kamikaze drones in military operations in the current integrated and cybernetic battlefield, highlighting their ability to precisely target and surprise the enemy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examine how materiel and non-materiel organizational capital, as conveyed by military aid, differ in their effects on recipient nations with respect to governance. The authors analyze the Varieties of Democracy (vDem) dataset’s Regime Corruption Index alongside Security Sector Assistance expenditures as reported by the US Aid to Security Sector Actors (USASSA) dataset. They find that non-materiel forms of investment toward building partner nation capacity create generally better governance outcomes than materiel ones that involve transfers of weapons systems or supplies. They further contend that investments toward social cohesion and norms transmission “build the capacity to have capacity built.” In other words, they work to mitigate the negative externalities associated with the transfer of technical skills and materiel aid on recipient nation governance. As such, this work suggests that investment in social capital is a decisive factor in determining success versus failure. This research calls attention to a common blind spot among policymakers and practitioners, which is the near complete omission of social capital as an explicit security cooperation design consideration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Proxy wars are an increasingly common feature of great power competition in the 21st century. In this context, the role of the small states is less clear and has not been properly addressed in the academic literature. Although states of this type have often been chosen as battlegrounds for such wars and have even acted as proxies for the superpowers, this article argues that they are also capable of conducting proxy warfare themselves. Since the start of the 2014 conflict in Donbas, Eastern Ukraine, this country has experienced proxy interventions from many external actors, both large and small, that provided resources to both conflict parties. One of the smallest states which has been trying to affect the course of this conflict in support of the Ukrainian government is Lithuania. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with the security and defence policy-makers in Vilnius, the article aims to explain why Lithuania is punching above its weight and interfering with this conflict from backstage. The empirical evidence points to an almost perfect alignment of interests between the current governments in Kiev and Vilnius in that they both see Russia as their long-term 'enemy' which makes Ukraine a surprisingly suitable proxy for Lithuania to exploit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine is the most severe challenge that the European Union faces. The EU has generally responded in a united and robust manner, overcoming the clash of national interests that had previously characterized its policymaking vis-à-vis Russia. The most transformative and significant decision that the EU has made is to treat Ukraine as a candidate for EU membership. However, cracks have appeared in the EU's unity, and the enlargement process will be long and difficult—and it could be derailed if Ukraine's territorial integrity is not restored. That will depend on increased European efforts and continued US military assistance to Ukraine, neither of which appear certain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has resulted in massive refugee migration. In this article we consider how the European Union (EU) and the United States have so far managed this influx of people. For reasons explained in the article, the EU is more focused on humanitarian aid, while the United States is especially engaged through military aid. The EU and the United States have historically employed both overt and covert means of limiting refugee migration, and this has been especially the case with migrants of color. Ukrainian refugees have no problem entering EU countries and receiving help (work permits, housing, etc.), while the United States uses various ways that make entry into the United States fairly complicated and thus contain Ukrainian migration (e.g., difficulty filling out applications, finding a sponsor in the United States). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Modern Turkish History Studies / Çagdas Türkiye Tarihi Arastirmalari Dergisi is the property of Journal of Modern Turkish History Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Small-state leaders can profit enormously by collaborating with great powers on clandestine intelligence activities. The United States historically has provided billions of dollars in military and economic aid to intelligence liaison partners that host intelligence collections facilities or support joint covert operations. While many of these relationships are characterized by trust and mutual benefit, others are subject to a constant struggle for control. Unlike the scrutiny paid to overt base negotiations, this clandestine bargaining largely has been overlooked in intelligence and International Relations literature. This review of the negotiations surrounding the U.S.–Pakistani joint covert operations in Afghanistan during the 1980s addresses this void. Declassified documents and memoirs reveal that Pakistani leaders deliberately deceived Washington as to their motives and commitment to the joint Afghan program in order to maximize their negotiating leverage. This case study demonstrates that acquiring accurate information regarding a partner's intentions is a critical factor in determining power dynamics within an intelligence liaison relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2004, competition between the European Union (EU) and Russia over the European political, economic and security order intensified sporadically, with a focal point in Ukraine. The EU's main mitigation tactic in response to this competition used to be denial, but in 2022, following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, this approach became untenable. As a result, the EU entered the competition as an emerging geopolitical actor in three important respects: engaging in a conflict over the European order; utilising its (still limited) hard power; and extending its geographical borders. Most importantly, the EU is actively trying to shape the future of the European order that was challenged by Russia's war against Ukraine. While pursuing its goals predominantly through civilian means, the EU has also taken major steps to strengthen its hard power capabilities and contributed military assistance. Furthermore, by granting candidate country status to Ukraine, it took a clear stance on its future borders, while these were violently contested. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the reign of Süleiman the Magnificent, the Ottoman conquests were directed toward the west. The conquest of central Hungary by the Ottomans in particular was the beginning of a long struggle. It was both difficult and costly for the Ottomans to hold the region and a significant part of the region, which remained under Ottoman rule for about 150 years, was lost in the "Holy League" wars. With the Treaty of Karlowitz, the last piece of land to the north of the Danube in Hungary was the province of Temeşvar. As the province of Temeşvar was by that time a frontier region, Ottomans made some military, financial and administrative arrangements there in order to keep Temeşvar because they predicted that this place would one day be the target of Austria. Indeed, after Damad Ali Pasha’s defeat in Varadin in 1716, the Austrian forces chose the Temeşvar castle as their first target and Prince Eugene besieged the castle with a large army. The Ottoman military administration could not send sufficient military aid here due to the recent defeat. The castle commander, Mustafa Pasha, continued his resistance for 57 days with a small number of soldiers. But the castle was handed over to the Austrian forces when no help came as a result of the long defense. After the castle was surrendered, Mustafa Pasha came to Belgrade and sent a letter to the sultan about the defense and delivery process of the castle. This paper, in the submission letter (arz) of the Castellan of Temesvar, Mustafa Pasha, attempts to analyze the siege of the castle by the Habsburg forces, the defense of the fortress, the situation of the people of the castle, the military aid that did not come despite the distress call, the surrender process and the issues that emerged afterward. The information in the Pasha’s submission letter has been evaluated based on other sources belonging to the period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As Cold War tensions rose, Soviet aid was offered to the nascent Somali government in pursuit of broader geopolitical machinations that were seen to supersede Somali interests, laying the groundwork for a decades-long mismatch between local intentions and Cold War superpower objectives in the Horn of Africa. Vast quantities of materiel and training were provided to Somalia from 1960 onwards, and by 1976 Somalia boasted a 22,000-man army and was the fourth most heavily armed nation in Sub-Saharan Africa, largely due to Soviet largesse. One year later, the Soviets were expelled and the assistance ceased, having left Somalia with an unsustainable, corrupt, and repressive security structure as a direct result of high levels of foreign assistance that were not well coordinated with host nation sustainment capabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the early 1970s, as Sino-American relations thawed, China and the United States reached some consensus on the Korean Peninsula issue: seeking and maintaining a long-term stable and peaceful situation on the Korean Peninsula; recognizing the legitimate existence of both North and South Korea with equal political status; separately safeguarding the interests of North Korea and South Korea while restraining their respective allies; acknowledging the temporary presence of US forces in South Korea as a crucial factor in stabilizing the peninsula. As a result, China found itself in a dilemma in dealing with the Korean issue, unable to achieve "peaceful reunification" as desired by North Korea within the framework of the United Nations. Kim Il-sung harbored resentment toward this situation. In efforts to maintain its alliance with North Korea, China provided substantial military and economic aid and took various measures to consider Pyongyang's sentiments and interests. However, all these efforts proved insufficient to bridge the growing gap between China and North Korea in their foreign policy strategies: North Korea resisted China's anti-Soviet diplomatic strategy and opposed Mao Zedong's "Theory of Three Worlds," while China joined and maintained the existing international system. Continuing to promote world revolution, North Korea was willing to resort to force to achieve reunification. However, China emphasized regional peace and stability. Ultimately, the changing dynamics of Sino-American relations led to a state of estrangement in Sino-North Korean relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of the University of Latvia. History / Latvijas Universitātes Žurnāls. Vēsture is the property of University of Latvia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Estado & Comunes, revista de politicas y problemas publicos is the property of Instituto de Altos Estudios Nacionales (IAEN) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista Española de Derecho Internacional is the property of Asociacion Espanola de Profesores de Derecho Internacional y Relaciones Internacionales (AEPDIRI) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Media reports suggested that some South Africans were serving in the Israel Defence Forces in the war between Israel and Hamas in late 2023. The South African government threatened to prosecute them for their participation in the conflict. Section 198(b) of the South African Constitution provides that one of the principles governing national security in South Africa is that “[t]he resolve to live in peace and harmony precludes any South African citizen from participating in armed conflict, nationally or internationally, except as provided for in terms of the Constitution or national legislation.” The Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act (1998) provides for the circumstances in which a South African citizen or permanent resident can, with authorisation, take part in an armed conflict in a foreign country. Failure to get authorisation or to comply with the condition(s) of the authorisation is an offence. The Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in Country of Armed Conflict Act, which is meant to repeal the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act, is not yet in force. In this article, the author illustrates how South African citizens or permanent residents who participate in foreign armed conflicts can be prosecuted and punished. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista de Derecho Politico is the property of Editorial UNED and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)