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Malaysia’s economic growth and democratisation since 2003 have vaulted it into the ranks of the middle powers in the international system. However, Malaysia remains hesitant about its middle power status. It has assumed a counterhegemonic or pro-multipolarity role; it has supported some new international rules and institutions; it leads regional governance institutions; and it advocates for small countries on development issues. However, these middle power behaviours are countered by a continuation of traditional Malaysia diplomacy which is inactive in shaping the emergence of superpower China as well as being disruptive and personalistic, most recently because of its embrace of radical Islam. It would require major shifts in international system structures and Malaysian national role conceptions for Malaysia to become a fully active middle power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do states sustain failing policy? The literature on path dependency and cognitive habits shows how foreign policy logics become axiomatic. Yet these explanations focus too much on people and not enough on policies. We argue that the content of policies matters for the degree and depth of their entrenchment. Policies with long-term time horizons, immeasurable objectives and diffuse effects are especially vulnerable to stasis. Engagement policies toward China are a paradigmatic example. We focus on Canada's engagement policy, which exhibits both stasis and change, and refer to similar policies of other countries. Drawing on primary evidence including interviews with high-level diplomats and decision-makers, we find that engagement aimed at socializing China was sustained despite growing evidence of its failure—including through a multi-year diplomatic crisis. Change only became possible through 'institutionalized debate', meaning the purposeful creation of formal channels for debate. The article makes three contributions. First, we identify a novel explanation of stasis, showing that the content of policies matters. Second, we introduce a practical pathway—institutionalized debate—that can disrupt stasis once a policy logic is habituated. Finally, we identify an aspect of socialization ignored in the literature: when operationalized as policy, it becomes resistant to reversal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, the financial statecraft literature has expanded from a focus on great powers to encompass the behavior of emerging powers. While offering an important corrective, the literature does not yet adequately address the full variety of the emerging powers' strategies of financial statecraft. In particular, we argue that regional middle powers behave differently from regional great powers even when they have similar capacities at the global level. For instance, both India and South Korea are categorized as emerging powers in the financial statecraft literature and deploy regional strategies to reduce their financial vulnerability. Yet their financial statecraft strategies have clearly differed in practice. India has sought to challenge the global status quo and influence its neighbors, while South Korea has pursued more modest and defensive goals. Drawing on the middle power literature, we posit that middle powers' relative position within their home regions explains such differences among the financial statecraft of emerging powers. To demonstrate the utility of this approach, we examine South Korea's financial statecraft in the Asia-Pacific region. We find that its position as a regional middle power effectively explains its patterns of bilateral and regional cooperation in the monetary sphere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Middle powers were visible actors in Myanmar's peace-donor landscape, from the beginning of that country's peace process in 2011 until the 2021 coup. Considering Myanmar's longstanding dependency on China and generally difficult relationship with larger powers, this appears to be significant. However, the literature on middle powers remains incapacitated by a definitional opacity that makes application of the term difficult, despite consistent references to their mediating capabilities. Recent scholarship has applied an 'entrepreneurial' lens to understanding middle power behaviour, implying middle powers are driven by a confluence of material and ideational factors. Based on fieldwork interviews with over fifty informants examining Norwegian, Japanese and Australian engagement with peacemaking in Myanmar 2011–2021, this paper expands on the entrepreneurial label and argues that middle powers in Myanmar acted as peacemaking entrepreneurs—as actors that traded upon their peacemaking reputations to secure concomitant material benefits. Nevertheless, this paper argues that engaging in peacemaking entrepreneurship proved to be problematic in Myanmar's context, given it tended to favour incumbent power. Indeed, in stark contrast to theoretical assumptions of these actors as neutral intermediaries, this paper raises serious questions about the contribution of middle powers in peacemaking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Convergent environmental crises have triggered scholarly attention towards the question of how great powers understand and engage with the environment, given their role as systemic actors within the international order. Environmental great powers – those that can employ both positive and negative powers to advance or block environmental cooperation – are typically limited to those who have the capability to influence environmental issues, and the responsibility to do so legitimately. Using a constructivist lens, this paper extends this analysis to the role of middle powers, who can influence environmental issues through their support for international cooperation, backed by their actions. We focus on Australia, an oft-cited middle power known for supporting the international rules-based order. By examining Australia's record on two current, interlinked environmental crises, climate change and biodiversity, we show that although it provides legal support for environmental cooperation, it also engages in, and conceals, significant political obstruction to meeting its obligations. Given the need for all states to address the surpassing of safe limits of planetary boundaries, and for its contribution to the destruction of systems upon which humanity depends, we argue that Australia might be deemed an ecocidal middle power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Characterized by their ability to impact the world order without having superpower status, middle powers contribute significantly to maintaining global stability and fostering notable advancements. The notion of middle powers is longstanding in international relations, with its roots traceable in the writings of the Italian 16th century thinker Giovanni Botero. The literature concerning middle powers is full of debates and considerations about their definitions, characteristics, and objectives. Türkiye and Brazil have been chosen as primary subjects of this study to exemplify the growing role of middle powers as mediators due to their involvement in international negotiations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Structural shifts in patterns of international production, trade, and investment have been spurred by the globalization of supply chains. Today, however, a range of factors, including wars and sanctions, the increasing divide between Western and Chinese approaches to the economy, the increasing links between economic security and national security, and between trade and environmental regulation, are contributing to the fragmentation of international economic frameworks and growing populist and protectionist sentiment. Competition for advantage through industrial subsidies and the setting of digital and environmental standards risks enshrining a less-than-global economic order. In many fields, however, multilateral cooperation, rulemaking, and enforcement in serving shared objectives, in various international organizations, multi-stakeholder forums, and by the private sector, continues to function well. In this ever-more complex international context, where clubs, coalitions, and informal networks among nations are increasingly prevalent, middle powers are wise to remain both agile and resolute in ensuring that national interests are advanced through smart diplomacy, encompassing working with like-minded in caucuses and informal settings that serve to build broader consensus, engaging business and other stakeholders at home and abroad in support. Canada's experience and current efforts provide a constructive example for middle powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the puzzles to the Philippines’ middle power status is how it responds to great power rivalries in the Indo-Pacific. As a claimant state to the South China Sea, its responses in the maritime domain could reveal unique foreign policy patterns on how middle powers respond to overlapping maritime borders. However, the middle power literature cannot make sense of the inconsistencies in the Philippines’ foreign policy vis-à-vis the South China Sea, showcasing deference and defiance policies between 2016 and 2023. This study argues that bridging role theory into middle power literature can retrieve a more nuanced understanding of how middle powers behave. Utilizing primary and secondary data, this qualitative inquiry captures state narratives of the Philippines’ role conceptions and concludes: (1) Duterte’s abandonment of the US alliance and appeasement to China as ‘active independent’ and ‘anti-imperialist agent’ role conceptions; and (2) Marcos’s alignment to the US regional order, sea-based power projections, and leverage of the Philippines’ arbitral ruling representing ‘faithful ally’ and ‘example’ role conceptions. Bridging role theory in assessing maritime diplomatic actions allows for a nuanced understanding of why foreign policy inconsistencies occur.

Studies have argued that gridlock in the multilateral trade regime has contributed to processes of regime shifting and creation through the expansion of regional and bilateral agreements. Scholars have long debated the impact of such agreements on the multilateral regime exploring their effect on the incentives of insiders, countries that have signed such agreements, and outsiders, countries that are excluded from such agreements. Based on interviews with officials from sixty member states at the World Trade Organisation, this paper examines this issue by analysing the behaviour of insiders and outsiders in the multilateral trade regime. While analysis of trade and investment diversion might lead us to predict that outsiders will have a stronger interest in the multilateral regime, I find that insiders, particularly middle powers, are key drivers of attempts to end the stalemate in the World Trade Organisation by championing what became known as Joint Statement Initiatives. I explain this position by the systemic support of middle powers to the multilateral regime and by the shift in trade governance towards deep integration issues in which discrimination against outsiders is infeasible or costly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides insight into Turkey’s strategic pursuit of a more active and influential role as a mediator in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. Turkey, positioning itself as a middle power, seeks to elevate its global standing. This involves a delicate diplomatic balancing act in its foreign policy approach towards both Russia and Ukraine. The equilibrium thus achieved positions Turkey as a natural mediator, serving as a catalyst for brokering a peace initiative among the conflicting parties. Ankara’s diplomatic activism is not just a tactical move but also a manifestation of Turkey’s broader global ambitions, underlining its commitment to playing a more significant role in shaping international affairs. These aspirations clash with a rising penchant in Turkey to pursue a more militaristic and coercive foreign policy, which stands in contradiction to the role of a benign power.

Education aid comprises an essential part of Turkey's overall development assistance, often given special attention as a part of its soft power and public diplomacy. The current study aims to examine Turkey's activism in international education through education aid. It is argued that Turkey's rise as an education aid donor country is mainly the result of a transformation in its foreign policy, of which education aid is an increasingly prominent part. Recipient needs, fragile state priority, cultural affinity, and donor self-interest are the primary rationales for the provision of education aid, and its sustainability depends on solving certain substantial economic and geopolitical issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The conventional expectation that middle powers support the liberal international order (LIO) is now increasingly being questioned. This article seeks to explore why and how emerging authoritarian middle powers contest the LIO through a study of Turkey's contestation of the EU. By conceptualizing contestations of the LIO as claims to global justice, the article examines the justice claims that underlie Turkey's contestation; with regard to discourse, it does so through a qualitative content analysis of President Erdoğan's speeches, and with regard to practice, through a survey of Turkey's contestatory foreign policy practices. The article shows that middle powers can discursively attack the legitimacy of the LIO by underlining its constituents' failures in upholding their moral duties towards citizens extending beyond their borders (impartiality) and to those who suffer from structural inequalities in the international order (mutual recognition). It demonstrates that their contestatory practices, however, are made with a view to pursue the sovereign interests of the state, with minimal regard for impartiality and mutual recognition. The article unpacks this inconsistency and finds that authoritarian middle powers' contestation of the LIO is mainly driven by concerns for regime security, where the centrality of an issue area to the government's survival prospects is the key factor which determines whether contestation will occur. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars have attempted to theorise the social structure of the international system from the perspective of the 'middle powers' for decades. However, scholars have struggled to agree on the essential dispositional characteristics of this category of actors, stunting theoretical progress. Drawing on sociological and literary approaches to the rhetoric of the 'middle class' in domestic societies, this article shifts the terms of this debate away from asking who the 'middle powers' are or what their 'essence' is , to ask what actors do with the term in practice. Combining this with and contributing to scholarship on hierarchy in international relations, I recast 'middle powers' as a category of practice and argue that one of the term's main uses is to differentiate certain status-anxious states – that hold no real prospect of achieving great power status – from 'small states' that occupy the lowest stratum of stratification within the 'grading of powers'. Following an illustrative case study of Australian and Canadian attempts to establish the 'middle power' category in the 1940s, the article then outlines the contributions of the argument for the study of status and hierarchy in world politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the context of the revitalized scholarly interest in small and middle powers, we employ a relational network approach to study the role of non-major powers as bridges and hubs. Contrary to prominent conceptions that centre on preconceived country groupings or states' variable attributes, such as the size of their territory, economy, or armed forces, our study foregrounds the influence that states gain from their position in international networks. We begin by developing an ideal-typical theory of bridges and hubs. We then employ these concepts to discuss empirical examples, examining the extent to which our cases embody these ideal types. Our approach sheds light on the rationale for geostrategic relocation and how states can use networks to gain influence in world politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides insight into Turkey's strategic pursuit of a more active and influential role as a mediator in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. Turkey, positioning itself as a middle power, seeks to elevate its global standing. This involves a delicate diplomatic balancing act in its foreign policy approach towards both Russia and Ukraine. The equilibrium thus achieved positions Turkey as a natural mediator, serving as a catalyst for brokering a peace initiative among the conflicting parties. Ankara's diplomatic activism is not just a tactical move but also a manifestation of Turkey's broader global ambitions, underlining its commitment to playing a more significant role in shaping international affairs. These aspirations clash with a rising penchant in Turkey to pursue a more militaristic and coercive foreign policy, which stands in contradiction to the role of a benign power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several articles and analyses published in 2020, in international journals and on the websites of prestigious think tanks, were drawing attention on the role that the middle powers are playing in today's international politics. In the context of the war in Ukraine and the growing rivalry between the United States of America and China, these middle powers seem to assume a much more prominent role in global politics. But how can we identify these middle powers, what defines or sets them apart from other powers in the international system, and how extensive may their influence be in the international system? Our approach presents models for the identification of middle powers on the map of world states and an extremely concise analysis of the evolution and roles of middle powers, from a systemic perspective of global security dynamics and the reconfiguration of the current international system.

Senator Fawcett notes the challenge posed by great-power competition in the Indo-Pacific region. He explores the role that Australia, a middle power, might play in this context, drawing on lessons from the Dam Dusters, President Theodore Roosevelt, General Omar Bradley and Dr ‘Weary’ Dunlop. He considers the deterrence value of military capability, the ‘big stick’; the importance of logistics, supply chains and procurement; and the provision of medical aid to nations of the Southwest Pacific. He concludes that we need to make sure that we are willing to defend our democratic freedoms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Alliance strategies are considered as part of the grand strategy of each state. These strategies represent different ways of political interactions of a state with other international actors in order to safeguard and promote its national interests. As a result, alliances are one of the most important features of international politics and play an influential role in the foreign policy decision-making of any state. The origin and theoretical basis of alliance theories can be found in the literature on realism and realist theories of international relations. The realist theories, regardless of the power differences between the states, consider them as similar units and similar actors which are security seekers (defensive realism) or power seekers (offensive realism). Thus, no distinction is made between different types of alliance strategies of different states in the international system. The main purpose of this paper is to compare different types of alliance strategies of the states in the international system in a manner conforming with their relative power and position in the world system. The primary research question is that, “what are the most important points of difference and similarities between the alliance strategies of states?” In the research hypothesis, the author claims that the relative power position of states will influence the types of alliance strategies which they formulate and adopt. For hypothesis-testing, qualitative data are collected for a comparative analysis of the theoretical assumptions, viewpoints and research findings presented by the prominent theorists in this field. Using the method of conceptual analysis of data, the author attempts to answer the research question. The comparative method is useful because it increases the researcher’s understanding of different political systems or political phenomena and prevents undue generalizations in the research. In this method, a political phenomenon is compared in different countries or institutions, and therefore it is different from the case study method. By comparing the alliance strategies of superpowers, great powers, middle powers and small states, the author finds that there are the greatest similarities between the alliance strategies of two sets of states: a) the satisfied great powers and the satisfied middle powers; b) the dissatisfied great powers and dissatisfied middle powers. In the discussion of the conceptual framework, the unequal structure of power distribution in the international system and the positional rank of each state in this system are discussed. Then, the existing power structure in the international system are examined. One of the important features of the structure of the current international system that should be taken into account is the unequal distribution of power among states, which has led to the classification of states into superpowers, great powers, middle or secondary powers, regional powers, and small states. In the theoretical literature in this field, it can be seen that superpowers and great powers are systemdetermining states. In sum, some key findings of the research are as follows: 1. The difference in the states’ relative power and positional rank in the international system is the most significant explanatory variable in the adoption of different alliance strategies by all types of states. 2. In the alliance strategies of the middle powers, the structure of the region and the type of patterns governing the region in which the middle powers are located are very important. 3. The power structure of the international system (e.g., the polarity of the system) is an important variable for determining the types of alliance strategies of each state. In the unipolar structure, for instance, the issue of which state is the superpower or what policies it follows will greatly affect types of alliance strategies of other states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Korea and India have had a Special Strategic Partnership in place from 2015 and the India-Korea diplomatic relations have entered its 50th year, but still the full potential of the relationship has not been tapped into by both sides. Korea's New Southern Policy and India's Act East Policy did provide some momentum and some significant progress in the cultural, people-to-people links were seen, but when it came to strategic and hard security issues, this relationship fell short. Even in the economic sphere, the two sides signed the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement in 2009, but still there are talks underway for updating the CEPA. But now with Korea devising its new Indo-Pacific strategy and India being one of the strong advocates of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept, there is scope that this relationship will now delve into strategic issues that are haunting the geo-political climate of the Indo-Pacific region. Finally it seems the time is opportune for the two countries to develop a credible strategic and security partnership. This article after tracing the trajectory of the India-Korea relations from 2015 onwards, analyses if now with Korea unveiling its Strategy for a Free, Peaceful and Prosperous Indo-Pacific, will India finally figure in its strategic calculus? If India will also perceive Korea as an important partner for furthering its ambitions in the Indo-Pacific region? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides an Indian perspective on the evolution of South Korea's New Southern Policy (NSP-K) and its implications for the two countries' bilateral relations. It argues that, amid the intensification of regional great power geopolitics, NSP-K manifests Korea's assertion of middle power agency, featuring a quest for regional influence and autonomy. As an instrument intended to strengthen relations with India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), NSP-K was driven by a desire to reduce Korea's great power dependence and promote its image as a bilateral partner through an agenda of economic and diplomatic diversification. The evolution of NSP-K as Korea's regional approach and its ambiguous position on the Indo-Pacific concept manifested the Moon administration's prioritisation of 'balanced diplomacy' and the pursuit of 'strategic autonomy' in regional affairs. NSP-K, with its emphasis on the upgrading of India's status in Korean foreign policy, has significantly contributed to the visibility and prospects of India-Korea bilateral relations. However, Korea's ambiguity on the Indo-Pacific concept and its neglect of geostrategic and security issues, which New Delhi sees as critical in building a stable regional order, has become a limitation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Republic of Korea's New Southern Policy (NSP-K), introduced in 2017, and its New Southern Policy Plus (NSP-K+), introduced in 2020, were regarded as highlights of former President Moon Jae-in's foreign policy initiatives. Building upon the three pillars of 'People, Prosperity and Peace', South Korea strengthened diplomatic and economic ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as part of its effort to elevate the organization as one of its main diplomatic partners. While the benefits of the NSP-K and NSP-K+ were very much focused on its external partners, the authors argue that the policy also elevated South Korea's middle power presence and ambition in the region, albeit with an unequal impact on various ASEAN member countries. This paper examines the concept of middle power and in doing so, looks at previous initiatives undertaken by South Korea in advancing its middle power strategy. It will then evaluate whether the NSP-K and NSP-K+ could be regarded as successful tools which contributed to enhancing South Korea's middle power diplomacy and presence among ASEAN member states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Middle powers" is an academic term that encompasses the external manifestations of a state actor, such as spatial scale, resource volume, economic strength, geostrategic position, and international influence. Research on middle powers has gradually progressed from area studies to governance research on specific development fields. This article begins by providing the theoretical definition of middle powers and reviewing the practices of state actors, then applies the concept of middle powers to the space field. By reviewing the new theoretical concept of "space middle powers" and designing the "Space Power Ladder" model in methodology, this article summarizes the development-related factors and analyzes comparative cases, highlighting the similarities and differences in the background and implementation paths of South Korea and Indonesia in the space field, which are middle powers in a general sense. By demonstrating the causal relationship between the space development of different middle powers and related influencing factors, this article proposes theoretical supplements and innovations for both typology and general research of global middle powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Huawei, the telecommunications company based in the People's Republic of China (PRC), has presented the governments of several middle powers with a policy dilemma. On the one hand, Huawei's affordable 5G network technology is attractive to telecommunications operators in these countries, which do not have domestic producers of this equipment. On the other hand, the U.S. government and intelligence agencies in other countries maintain that Huawei gear presents intolerable network security risks, a charge that the PRC government and Huawei forcefully reject as they insist Huawei merits access to foreign markets. Facing the question of whether and how to allow the installation of Huawei's 5G equipment in their domestic networks, the governments of Japan, the United Kingdom, and Germany have been caught between the competing demands of the two rivalrous superpowers and faced internal divisions among communities of government experts. At first glance, Japan, the UK, and Germany each appear to have responded to the Huawei dilemma in a different way. The Japanese government moved quickly and without formal announcement to exclude Huawei from its market, while publicly denying a ban. The UK government initially allowed Huawei to supply some of its national 5G infrastructure, but then reversed itself to ban the company's equipment outright after a U.S. regulatory change. The German government has yet to officially ban Huawei, but has taken successive steps to curtail the PRC company's continued involvement in its domestic networks. In spite of their apparent differences, the three national responses to the Huawei dilemma share a fundamental commonality: all amount to 'non-decision decisions' on the question of whether and how to allow Huawei to supply domestic 5G networks. In one way or another, each government avoided making policy decisions that were either explicit, definitive, or singular on the issue, but nonetheless reduced the likelihood of Huawei's participation in its domestic 5G infrastructure. After developing the concept of a 'non-decision decision,' we explain why these maneuvers are not isolated responses to a specific policy conundrum, but may presage a mode of middle power coping with competing demands from two increasingly rivalrous superpowers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The premise of Global IR for greater pluralism and inclusivity allows for reconsidering the relevance of established concepts in the IR discipline. This article discusses how Global IR can contribute to rethinking the question of agency in the middle power concept. While the concept has been used in a Western and non-Western context, there is a tendency to adopt a binary distinction between Western middle powers that are conformist in their approach to the liberal international order and Southern middle powers that adopt a reformist stance. The article argues that a Global IR approach can help overcome this dichotomy and open up the study of Western and Southern middle powers to new agential possibilities. To demonstrate this, the article discusses how the cases of Australia and Brazil are not limited to conformist and reformist middle power agencies respectively. The discussion shows how the two states have undergone periods of ambivalence to gradually project new forms of middle power agency that alter and redefine their roles within the liberal international order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The emerging middle powers in the Global South increasingly seek to produce domestic defence technologies. Drones in particular have become an important feature of middle power activism. The existing literature heavily focuses on the outcomes of the diffusion of drone technologies for regional and global politics. Yet not much has been written on the domestic impact of home-grown military technologies in middle powers. Therefore, we ask how the manufacture, export and use of drones promote regime survival, focusing on the case of Turkey. Turkey is a critical case because of its demonstrated middle power status and heavy investment in the development of armed drone platforms. Turkey's drone programme and warfare have considerably raised the international profile of the country's burgeoning defence sector. Yet we argue that the use of military tech also has boosting effects on domestic regime survival. This happens in three ways: promoting techno-nationalism and pride, strengthening border security and shaping regional order, and contesting global dynamics on the basis of national interests, security and self-sufficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are those who argue that a state embodying good international citizenship (GIC) must actively seek to improve the world around it, thereby making a positive contribution to overcoming global challenges. A good international citizen (state) must also be a proponent of multilateral cooperation, usually manifesting in global platforms such as the United Nations (UN). Scholars refer to middle power states being ideally situated in the power rankings of international affairs, respected by major and minor powers, to become custodians of emerging international norms and to pave a pathway forward for the community of states. Both South Africa and Sweden are seen as pivot countries in their respective regions and have a long history of shared desires and supports for freedom. This article will explore the notion of GIC and its desirability, and applicability, in relation to South Africa and Sweden. It employs a case study methodology approach in its research design and interrogates the extent to which South Africa and Sweden qualify as good international citizens according to four characteristics, drawn from the literature. The article finds that both Sweden and South Africa demonstrate elements of good international citizenship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As China and the United States standoff in strategic competition, many observers predict that middle powers will play a pivotal role in determining the Indo-Pacific's future. This research attempts to shed light on attributes that define the foreign policy behaviors of middle powers vis-à- vis China. It bridges qualitative and quantitative methods in examining the economic, defense, and political characteristics of Australia, the Philippines, and Indonesia, in particular. The research suggests that for the Indo-Pacific, it is advantageous for middle powers to coalesce multilaterally as doing so not only minimizes economic vulnerabilities but also presents China with a united political front that advances fair and equitable policies in the region. Additionally, middle powers are more likely to embrace the West in pursuit of a stronger military arsenal and improved military capabilities should diplomacy fall short. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For forty years, the East Asian regional order has delivered widespread peace and prosperity. That order faces possible upending by an economically and militarily more powerful China and a decreasingly robust and engaged United States. While accepting the possibility that such structural shifts could upend the regional order, this paper contends that three powerful counterweights are working to counter disruptive conflicts and to foster peaceful change, namely strong and rising economic interdependence, expanding institutionalization, and active preservation efforts by number of other Asian states, particularly the region's middle powers. This article analyzes the contribution of these three forces to creating the existing order and to their roles in its continuation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that amid intensifying Sino-U.S. rivalry, middle powers in East Asia have contributed towards regional peaceful change through the exercise of good regional citizenship, a concept which draws on and modifies from the more commonly known good international citizenship which is closely associated with middle powers. Specifically, good regional citizenship involves proactively strengthening inclusive multilateralism, enhancing the rules-based order, and contributing to bridging efforts in East Asia. The paper examines the good regional citizenship of two middle powers, namely Australia and Indonesia. It finds that while both countries have exercised good regional citizenship, their specific strategies or the outcomes of their initiatives on regional dynamics have varied as a result of their relations with the respective major powers and their general foreign policy approaches. Australia's good regional citizenship has supported the preservation of U.S. leadership in East Asia vis-à-vis the rise of other regional powers, while Indonesia's good regional citizenship has helped to narrow the gaps among regional actors through mechanisms led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Global cyber governance is characterised by a West vs. non-West paradigm that glosses over a significant body of states that exhibit more nuanced positions. Such dichotomy has gained greater traction in the midst of geopolitical tensions between the United States on the one hand and China and Russia on the other. Examining the roles and limitations of middle powers, such as Singapore and South Korea, in their efforts to shape global cyber governance allows moving beyond the West vs. non-West paradigm. By employing a range of middle-power behaviours, Singapore and South Korea have been able to carve out a unique role as middle powers and, to some extent, shape the arena in which debates on global cyber governance take place, although not without constraints. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]