3,015 results on '"METAETHICS"'
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2. Dissolving the moral-conventional distinction.
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Sackris, David C.
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MORAL judgment , *PHILOSOPHERS , *COGNITIVE science , *PSYCHOLOGY , *METAETHICS , *JUDGMENT (Psychology) - Abstract
One way in which philosophers have often sought to distinguish moral judgments from non-moral judgments is by using the “moral-conventional” distinction. I seek to raise serious questions about the significance of the moral-conventional distinction, at least for philosophers interested in moral judgment. I survey recent developments in the fields of philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science that have led many to the conclusion that moral judgment is not a distinctive kind of judgment or the result of a specific, identifiable cognitive process. I argue that if this conclusion is largely correct, the moral-conventional distinction loses significance. If moral judgment does not correspond to a distinctive cognitive process, it is unclear how distinguishing between types of norms tracks anything of significance to human judgment formation. I then discuss the implications of abandoning the distinction for research in the field of moral psychology and tentatively propose a more modest way of conceiving of norm significance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2024
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3. Counterfactual genealogy and metaethics in Pettit's The Birth of Ethics.
- Author
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McPherson, Tristram and Plunkett, David
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DILEMMA , *COUNTERFACTUALS (Logic) , *REALISM , *ETHICS , *GENEALOGY - Abstract
One of the primary goals of Pettit's The Birth of Ethics is to offer a novel defense of a form of naturalistic realism in metaethics, drawing on a kind of "counterfactual genealogy" for ethical thought and talk, in a community he dubs "Erewhon". We argue that Pettit's argument faces a deep dilemma. The dilemma begins by noting the reasonable controversy about which metaethical view is true of our ethical thought and talk. We then ask: is the thought and talk in Pettit's Erewhon apt for the same reasonable controversy? If so, this raises doubts about Pettit's case for naturalistic realism about Erewhonian "ethical" thought and talk. If not, this disanalogy between Erewhonian "ethical" thought and talk and our ethical thought and talk renders it difficult to argue smoothly from Erewhonian premises to conclusions about our own ethical thought and talk. We then consider an alternative use that someone might make of Pettit's discussion of Erewhon: as part of a conceptual ethics argument that we should use "ethical" concepts that are relevantly similarly to the ones described in Erewhon. We conclude by reflecting on the broader methodological significance of the sort of dilemma that we have posed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2024
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4. The normativity objection and the coloring strategy.
- Author
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Zhao, Xinkan
- Abstract
The normativity objection challenges normative naturalism by arguing that we have a distinctive cognitive experience when making normative judgements, finding ourselves in touch with some action-guiding authority issuing demands from outside, and that this cannot be explained naturalistically. An increasing number of naturalists have defended their position by adopting the coloring strategy, which aims to explain away the need for positing a special property and contends that the normative feel results from the intricate work of our mind which colors the world. In this paper, I critically review the extant strategies and consider what the most plausible form of the strategy would look like. I further argue that even the strategy in its most plausible form faces serious problems, that it lacks positive motivation, that it is self-defeating, and that it may well be unnecessary in the first place. As a result, the coloring strategy as a response to the normativity objection should be rejected, though it may have merits in intramural debates among naturalists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2024
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5. Can Moral Anti-Realists Theorize?
- Author
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Zhao, Michael
- Subjects
MORAL judgment ,VIRTUES ,SIMPLICITY (Philosophy) ,METAETHICS ,MORAL realism - Abstract
Call 'radical moral theorizing' the project of developing a moral theory that not only tries to conform to our existing moral judgments, but also manifests various theoretical virtues: consistency, simplicity, explanatory depth, and so on. Many moral philosophers assume that radical moral theorizing does not require any particular metaethical commitments. In this paper, I argue against this assumption. The most natural justification for radical moral theorizing presupposes moral realism, broadly construed; in contrast, there may be no justification for radical moral theorizing if moral anti-realism is true. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2024
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6. Experience and naturalism.
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Zweber, Adam
- Subjects
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NATURALISM , *METAETHICS , *PHILOSOPHERS , *NATURALISTS - Abstract
Much of contemporary metaethics revolves around the issue of “naturalism.” However, there is little agreement on what “naturalism” is or why it should be of significance. In this paper, I aim to rectify this situation by providing a set of necessary conditions on what positions ought to count as “naturalistic.” A metaethical view should count as an instance of naturalism only if it claims that there can be evidence for normative claims that is both public and spatiotemporal. I argue that, unlike other characterizations of “naturalism,” this view shows a clear difference between many metaethical positions and the sciences. The view thereby renders debates about naturalism philosophically significant: the division between naturalists and non‐naturalists is that between philosophers who hold that ethics is relevantly similar to the sciences and those who deny this. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2024
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7. Non-factualism and evaluative supervenience.
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Franzén, Nils
- Subjects
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METAETHICS , *HARES , *TRADE secrets - Abstract
Supervenience in metaethics is the notion that there can be no moral difference between two acts, persons or events without some non-moral difference underlying it. If St. Francis is a good man, there could not be a man exactly like St. Francis in non-evaluative respects that is not good. The phenomenon was first systematically discussed by R. M. Hare (1952), who argued that realists about evaluative properties struggle to account for it. As is well established, Hare, and following him, Simon Blackburn, mistakenly took the relevant phenomenon to be weak rather than strong supervenience, and the explanations they offered for it are accordingly outdated. In this paper, I present a non-factualist account of strong supervenience of the evaluative and argue that it fares better than competing realist views in explaining the conceptual nature of the phenomenon, as well as in offering an account of the supervenience of the evaluative in general, rather than more narrowly the moral. While Hare and Blackburn were wrong about the specifics, they were right in that non-factualists can offer a plausible account of the supervenience of the evaluative, that in certain respects is superior to competing realist explanations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2024
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8. The Duty to Accept Apologies.
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Fabre, Cécile
- Subjects
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GESTURE , *APOLOGIZING , *CONVERSION therapy , *EXPRESSIVISM (Ethics) , *METAETHICS - Abstract
The literature on reparative justice focuses for the most part on the grounds and limits of wrongdoers' duties to their victims. An interesting but relatively neglected question is that of what – if anything – victims owe to wrongdoers. In this paper, I argue that victims are under a duty to accept wrongdoers' apologies. I claim that to accept an apology is to form the belief that the wrongdoer's apologetic utterance or gesture has the requisite verdictive, commissive and expressive dimensions; to communicate as much to him; and to recognise that his apology changes one's normative status in relation to him, and to comport oneself accordingly. I then offer a Kantian argument for the duty to accept and qualify that argument in the light of some hard cases. I end the paper by addressing the objection that victims do not owe it to wrongdoers to engage in any form of reparative encounter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2024
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9. The Moral Duty Not to Confirm Negative Stereotypes.
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Smilansky, Saul
- Subjects
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STEREOTYPES , *PHILOSOPHY , *SOCIAL interaction , *PSYCHOLOGY , *METAETHICS - Abstract
Social interaction is laden with stereotypes. Throughout history negative stereotypes have been immensely harmful, leading to hatred, vilification, and direct harm such as discrimination, and they continue to be so in almost all societies. It is widely accepted that we ought not to view members of other groups negatively in stereotypical ways, and also ought not to apply negative stereotypes to members of our own group (or even to ourselves). However, is there any special moral obligation on the targets of such negative stereotypes to take care not to confirm them? May one even be blameworthy for not doing so? The very thought seems outrageous. Yet I will argue that it is plausible to think that, in fact, the victims, too, have pro tanto obligations to prevent stereotype confirmation (henceforth SC), in many central contexts. I am not aware of any sustained philosophical discussion making this claim. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2024
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10. 'Taking politics seriously: A prudential justification of political realism'.
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Favara, Greta
- Subjects
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POLITICAL realism , *METAETHICS , *REALISM , *ARGUMENT - Abstract
Political realists have devoted much effort to clarifying the methodological specificity of realist theorising and defending its consistency as an approach to political reasoning. Yet the question of how to justify the realist approach has not received the same attention. In this article, I offer a prudential justification of political realism. To do so, I first characterise realism as anti-moralism. I then outline three possible arguments for the realist approach by availing myself of recent inquiries into the metatheoretical basis of realism: The metaethical, the ethical and the prudential arguments. I explain that the prudential argument offers the most solid basis for political realism because it relies on the least controversial premises. Still, I delve into the metaethical and ethical arguments for two reasons: The prudential argument takes advantage of the theses defended by the rival arguments and elaborating the other arguments shows the comparative strengths of the prudential argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2024
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11. Epistemic Partiality and the Nature of Friendship.
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Warman, Jack
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FRIENDSHIP , *PHILOSOPHY , *METAETHICS , *LOVE , *INTERPERSONAL relations - Abstract
The debate around epistemic partiality in friendship presents us with several tough philosophical puzzles. One of these has been articulated in two objections to the view that friendship can require epistemic partiality on the grounds it is incompatible with the nature of friendship. The first, owed to Crawford, argues that you should not treat your friends with epistemic partiality because your beliefs about your friends should be responsive to the facts about them, and epistemic partiality is incompatible with this demand. The second, owed to Mason, draws on a Murdochian account of love to argue that loving relationships—such as friendship—are 'epistemically rich states', which means that they are constituted by a drive towards ever greater and more intimate knowledge of our loved ones. In this paper, I shall argue that epistemic partiality may indeed limit what we know about our friends, but not in ways that diminish the quality of our love for them, and certainly not in ways that block us from being friends with them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2024
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12. Metaethics as Dead Politics? On Political Normativity and Justification.
- Author
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Cross, Ben
- Subjects
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METAETHICS , *NORMATIVITY (Ethics) , *PRACTICAL politics , *REALISM , *IDEOLOGY - Abstract
Many political realists endorse some notion of political normativity. They think that there are certain normative claims about politics that do not depend on moral premises. The most prominent moralist objections to political normativity have been metaethical: specifically, that political normativity is not genuinely normative; and that it is incapable of justifying normative claims. In this article, I criticize the latter metaethical objection. I argue that the objection presupposes a notion of 'justification' that renders it something that is no longer necessarily valuable to realists. I then extend this argument to show that all metaethical objections to political normativity are unsuccessful. Furthermore, insofar as these metaethical objections purport to constrain the types of politics that realists endorse, realists should regard them as another expression of what Raymond Geuss calls 'dead politics'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2024
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13. Metaethical Deflationism, Access Worries and Motivationally Grasped Oughts.
- Author
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Berry, Sharon
- Subjects
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METAETHICS , *COINCIDENCE , *THEORY of knowledge , *PLURALISM , *PHILOSOPHY - Abstract
Mathematical knowledge and moral knowledge (or normative knowledge more generally) can seem intuitively puzzling in similar ways. For example, taking apparent human knowledge of either domain at face value can seem to require accepting that we benefited from some massive and mysterious coincidence. In the mathematical case, a pluralist partial response to access worries has been widely popular. In this paper, I will develop and address a worry, suggested by some works in the recent literature like (Clarke-Doane, 2020) , that connections between ought facts and action prevent us from giving a similarly pluralist response to moral access worries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2024
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14. The intrapersonal normative twin earth argument.
- Author
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Hambly, Jesse
- Subjects
ARGUMENT ,METAETHICS - Abstract
In this paper I develop an argument against applying a causal theory of mental content to normative concepts. This argument—which I call the Intrapersonal Normative Twin Earth Argument—is inspired by Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons' Moral Twin Earth Argument. The focus of Horgan and Timmons' argument is showing that causal theories of mental content conflict with plausible claims about interpersonal normative disagreement. The Intrapersonal Normative Twin Earth Argument, by contrast, is focused on showing that such theories struggle to vindicate plausible claims concerning whether two of an agent's token normative thoughts have the same or distinct content. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2024
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15. Türk Halk Felsefesinde Kültürel Ergonomik Süreç Bağlamında Etik Kodların Olumsuz Dönüşümü.
- Author
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Çobanoğlu, Sacide
- Abstract
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- 2024
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16. Metaethics and the Nature of Properties.
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Sinclair, Neil
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MORAL realism ,METAETHICS ,RESEMBLANCE (Philosophy) ,NOMINALISM ,REALISM ,ETHICS - Abstract
This paper explores connections between theories of morality and theories of properties. It argues that (1) moral realism is in tension with predicate, class and mereological nominalism; (2) moral non-naturalism is incompatible with standard versions of resemblance nominalism, immanent realism and trope theory; and (3) the standard semantic arguments for property realism do not support moral realism. I also raise doubts about trope-theoretic explanations of moral supervenience and argue against one version of the principle that we should accept theories that maintain neutrality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2024
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17. Metaethics and the Nature of Properties.
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Suikkanen, Jussi
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METAETHICS ,NOMINALISM ,REALISM - Abstract
This paper explores the connection between two philosophical debates concerning the nature of properties. The first, metaethical debate is about whether normative properties are ordinary natural properties or some unique kind of non-natural properties. The second, metaphysical debate is about whether properties are sets of objects, transcendent or immanent universals, or sets of tropes. I argue that nominalism, transcendent realism and immanent realism are not neutral frameworks for the metaethical debate but instead lead to either metaethical naturalism or non-naturalism. We can therefore investigate the metaethical question on its own terms only within the framework of trope theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2024
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18. Constructive Ethics or Metaethical View in Environmental Impact in European Touristic Public Organizations?
- Author
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Balla, Vassiliki, Koskeridi, Archontoula, Ballas, Panagiotis, Katsoni, Vicky, editor, and Cassar, George, editor
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- 2024
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19. A Buddhist approach to moral knowledge without god.
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Jones, Nicholaos
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BUDDHISM , *THEORY of knowledge , *METAETHICS , *THEISM , *NATURALISM - Abstract
Noah McKay provides a novel argument for theism over naturalism. The argument is novel because it connects metaphysical issues to issues regarding moral epistemology. The connection concerns the power of theism and naturalism, respectively, to explain the human capacity to obtain correct beliefs about the domain of morality. The gist of McKay's argument is that theism provides a much more plausible account of this capacity than naturalism. The reason for this superiority, according to McKay, is that theism secures an intimate connection between human moral intuitions and truths within the domain of morality while naturalistic explanations sever the connection between human moral intuitions and truths within the domain of morality. A central contention of McKay's argument is that there are exactly two plausible and naturalistic explanations for the content of human moral intuitions—one appealing to evolutionary considerations, the other appealing to social conventions. I argue that this contention is incorrect. Some Buddhist traditions locate veridical moral intuitions in a kind of experience available to those who achieve freedom from ignorance and attachment. This explanation is naturalistic (as McKay understands that term) and no less plausible than the theistic explanation that McKay considers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2024
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20. When is a concept a priori?
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Ordóñez Angulo, Emmanuel
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A priori , *HUMAN beings , *NATURALISM , *METAETHICS - Abstract
According to Michael Thompson's defence of neo‐Aristotelian naturalism in meta‐ethics, (i) '[t]he concept life‐form is a pure or a priori, perhaps a logical, concept', and (ii) '[t]he concept human, as we human beings have it, is an a priori concept' (p. 57). Here I show Thompson's argument for (ii) to be unsound, hoping thereby to shed light on the neglected subject of the a prioricity of concepts more generally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2024
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21. Neo‐Humean rationality and two types of principles.
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Strandberg, Caj
- Subjects
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DELIBERATION , *MORAL reasoning , *METAETHICS - Abstract
According to the received view in metaethics, a Neo‐Humean theory of rationality entails that there cannot be any objective moral reasons, i.e. moral reasons that are independent of actual desires. In this paper, I argue that there is a version of this theory that is compatible with the existence of objective moral reasons. The key is to distinguish between (i) the process of rational deliberation that starts off in an agent's actual desires, and (ii) the rational principle that an agent employs in such a process. I maintain that it is the latter which explains why it is rational for an agent to have a certain desire, not the former. As a result, there might be two types of principles. The second type of principle leaves room for objective moral reasons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2024
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22. Mâtürîdî’de Ahlaki Mükellefiyet ve Tabiî Hukuk.
- Author
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ÖZAYKAL, Kayhan
- Abstract
This article attempts to determine the source of moral obligation in al-Māturīdī’s thought. First of all, a classification of concepts of morality in his writings is presented. These concepts are found to be three in number: Utility, Virtue and Right. However, of these, the concept of right is found to be the ultimate representative of moral obligation, since it alone offers us the idea of a categorical imperative which is essential for morality to be objective. Thereafter, two main sources of moral obligation are noted. One is revelation and the other is reason. Revelation presents the notions of divine lordship and sovereignty together with the divine command and prohibition. Yet, at the same time, reason determines our moral understanding with objective principles and supports revelatory teachings. This means that the findings of reason in the field of morality are usually in accord with revelation; where they differ, it is often because humanity lacks access to the necessary knowledge, which makes it impossible for them to reach the correct conclusions. Hence, al-Māturīdī also notes that revelation is especially needed in regards to areas of morality that are obscure and controversial, since it offers answers that humans would not otherwise be able to know with certainty. At the same time, it is understood that reason is a source of obligation in accordance with natural law theory, and therefore this latter theory is a basic way to categorize al-Māturīdī’s thought. The natural world offers guidance to reason and is a source of knowledge from which moral conclusions can be derived that are in line with basic human needs and desires. Al-Māturīdī, in particular, cites peace and prosperity as fundamental aims for humanity that can only be ensured by a guiding foundation. However, since God is the creator and designer of the world, the principle that ultimately determines the form of morality is divine wisdom. In the third section of this article, the topic of moral motivation is addressed. This is the key to understand how people can behave morally, and it is concluded that al-Māturīdī shows that we can act for objective reasons and judge actions morally without only taking into consideration their consequences. This is because reason allows one to judge actions according to criteria that are not based only on contingent and subjective aspects of reality but also on categorical principles and imperatives. In the last part of this study, it is suggested that al-Māturīdī views reason as independently bringing moral obligations. This allows us to overcome the gap that David Hume presented between is- and ought- statements. Thus, it is concluded that for al-Māturīdī the source of moral obligation is not simply based on revelatory commands, but also derived from the principles of reason. These principles are to a significant degree the result of derivations made from observations on human nature and the natural world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2024
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23. Phenomenal Socialism †.
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Chappell, Sophie Grace
- Subjects
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SOCIALISM , *PERCEPTION (Philosophy) , *NATURALISM , *PHENOMENALISM , *METAETHICS , *NIHILISM , *THEORY of knowledge - Abstract
Phenomenal socialism says that what we actually, directly, literally perceive is only or primarily instances of high-level phenomenal properties; this paper argues for phenomenal socialism in the weaker, primarily version. Phenomenal socialism is the philosophy of perception that goes with recognitionalism, which is the metaethics that goes with epiphanies. The first part states the recognitionalist manifesto. The second part situates this manifesto relative to some more global concerns, about naturalism, perception, the metaphysics of value, and theory vs. anti-theory in ethics. The third part rehearses two familiar views about the possible contents of perceptual experience, Phenomenal Conservativism and Phenomenal Liberalism. It notes that the usual catalogue omits two other theoretical possibilities, Phenomenal Socialism and Phenomenal Nihilism, and it defends a watered-down form of Phenomenal Socialism from four main objections. The fourth part makes some connections with the epistemology of modality and with the role of the imagination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2024
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24. ÉTICA(S) DE LA INTELIGENCIA ARTIFICIAL Y DERECHO CONSIDERACIONES A PROPÓSITO DE LOS LÍMITES Y LA CONTENCIÓN DEL DESARROLLO TECNOLÓGICO.
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LLANO ALONSO, FERNANDO H.
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DIGNITY , *APPLIED ethics , *TRUST , *SOCIAL services , *METAETHICS , *ARTIFICIAL intelligence - Abstract
This paper focuses on the ethics of AI and the principles behind it. Prior to the rules governing AI, it is necessary to understand the ethical issues related to the development, implementation and responsible use of AI systems. These ethical foundations are necessary to protect the rights and dignity of individuals, ensure fairness in data access and processing, minimise biases and risks associated with algorithms, promote transferability in automated decisions, and promote trustworthiness in technology, human benefit and social welfare. It is also proposed to study the ethics of AI from an all-encompassing point of view that integrates both applied ethics and metaethics of AI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2024
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25. The Normative, the Practical, and the Deliberatively Indispensable.
- Author
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Stewart, Andrew
- Subjects
PRACTICAL reason ,REALISM ,EVOLUTIONARY psychology ,DEVELOPMENTAL psychology ,SOCIAL theory ,METAETHICS - Abstract
The article explores David Enoch's argument for the existence of irreducibly normative truths in the context of the deliberative project. It presents a counterargument to Enoch's position, suggesting that the two desiderata for the deliberative project may be incompatible. However, the article encourages further investigation into the question of whether a need can justify belief in normative truths. It discusses the distinction between normative reasoning and practical reasoning, providing examples to illustrate the difference. The article also examines the role of normative concepts and truths in second-order practical reasoning and explores different approaches to understanding the deliberative project. It concludes by acknowledging the need for further exploration and deliberation on this topic. [Extracted from the article]
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- 2024
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26. Empirical evidence for moral Bayesianism.
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Cohen, Haim, Nissan-Rozen, Ittay, and Maril, Anat
- Subjects
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METAETHICS , *PHILOSOPHERS , *MORAL reasoning , *MORAL judgment - Abstract
Many philosophers in the field of meta-ethics believe that rational degrees of confidence in moral judgments should have a probabilistic structure, in the same way as do rational degrees of belief. The current paper examines this position, termed "moral Bayesianism," from an empirical point of view. To this end, we assessed the extent to which degrees of moral judgments obey the third axiom of the probability calculus, $${\rm{if\,P}}\left({{\rm{A}}\mathop \cap \nolimits {\rm{B}}} \right) = 0{\rm{\,then\,P}}\left({{\rm{A}}\mathop \cup \nolimits {\rm{B}}} \right) = {\rm{P}}\left({\rm{A}} \right) + {\rm{P}}\left({\rm{B}} \right)$$ if P A ∩ B = 0 then P A ∪ B = P A + P B , known as finite additivity, as compared to degrees of beliefs on the one hand and degrees of desires on the other. Results generally converged to show that degrees of moral judgment are more similar to degrees of belief than to degrees of desire in this respect. This supports the adoption of a Bayesian approach to the study of moral judgments. To further support moral Bayesianism, we also demonstrated its predictive power. Finally, we discuss the relevancy of our results to the meta-ethical debate between moral cognitivists and moral non-cognitivists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2024
- Full Text
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27. What Makes an Ethical Account a Natural Law Ethical Account? Contemporary Ethics, Metaethics, and Normative Ethics.
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O'Connor, John D.
- Subjects
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METAETHICS , *NATURAL law , *NORMATIVITY (Ethics) , *CONSEQUENTIALISM (Ethics) , *ANTI-realism - Abstract
What makes ethical accounts natural law ethical is, I argue, commonly misrepresented in teaching within much of the philosophical academy. Yet those immersed in the field of natural law and ethics rarely give definitions/brief characterisations of what makes ethical accounts natural law ethical. I suggest theoretical reasons for the lack. I argue that bringing natural law into ethics is best understood as leading to theoretically unitary accounts, not simply collections of positions detachable from each other: an overlooked and significant point when defending natural law ethical accounts. My arguments throughout rely on the metaethical/normative ethical distinction, which is relatively little used in the natural law literature. I argue that the distinction helps clarify what is distinctive of natural law ethical accounts in general, especially to the secular contemporary philosophical academy, where appreciation of natural law ethical accounts is commonly appreciably lower than in philosophical contexts with a religious ethos. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2024
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28. No Point of View Except Ours?
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Elson, Luke
- Subjects
INTERNALISM (Theory of knowledge) ,NORMATIVITY (Ethics) ,NIHILISM ,DESPAIR ,METAETHICS - Abstract
I argue that it's quite comprehensible to get upset about metaethical nihilism, to indulge what I call nihilistic despair. When we lose the objective moral or normative point of view, we lose the promise of luck-immune guidance and categorical importance, things many of us hope for. This is all quite Williams-friendly, but I reject his puzzling but suggestive remarks that nihilistic despair must be a self-pitying muddle. Finally, I argue that internalism about reasons is even more depressing than outright nihilism, in one way at least. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2024
- Full Text
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29. Psychology, Equality, and the Forgetting of Motivations.
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Vincent, Michael
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MORAL realism ,ERROR analysis in mathematics ,MOTIVATION (Psychology) ,METAETHICS - Abstract
I hope to demonstrate the value of a close reading Williams's 'Internal and External Reasons', and to provide a theory of error regarding the substantial body of work which seeks to, in various ways, defang the essay. I do this by providing some historical context for the paper, and sketching where, historically, internalism and certain sorts of moral realism became separated. It will likely not surprise the reader when I suggest that the modern scientific worldview has an important place in the discussion of the notion of external reasons. As mind, motivation, and perception have become less opaque to us, certain avenues for explaining our reasons have come closer to relying on hypotheses which may turn out to be falsifiable, and have thus been abandoned. What may come as more of a surprise is my suggestion that modern egalitarianism is an important factor as well. I suggest that impersonal reason has been used as an (implausible, but perhaps well-intentioned) alternative to the practice of some inflicting their reasons on others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2024
- Full Text
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30. Evolutionary Debunking and the Folk/Theoretical Distinction.
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Scarfone, M.
- Subjects
MORAL judgment ,METAETHICS ,NATURAL history ,ETHICS ,THEORY of knowledge - Abstract
In metaethics, evolutionary debunking arguments combine empirical and epistemological premises to purportedly show that our moral judgments are unjustified. One objection to these arguments has been to distinguish between those judgments that evolutionary influence might undermine versus those that it does not. This response is powerful but not well understood. In this paper I flesh out the response by drawing upon a familiar distinction in the natural sciences, where it is common to distinguish folk judgments from theoretical judgments. I argue that this in turn illuminates the proper scope of the evolutionary debunking argument, but not in an obvious way: it is a very specific type of undermining argument that targets those theories where theoretical judgments are inferred merely from folk judgments. One upshot of this conclusion is that it reveals a verboten methodology in metaethics. The evolutionary debunking argument is therefore much less powerful than its proponents have supposed, but it nevertheless rules out what is perhaps a common way of attempting to justify moral judgments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2024
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31. Taking Morality Directly
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Molina, Yohan
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- 2024
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32. The Logical Possibility of Moral Dilemmas in Expressivist Semantics: A Case Study
- Author
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Ryo Tanaka
- Subjects
expressivism ,moral dilemmas ,metaethics ,semantics ,deontic logic ,Philosophy (General) ,B1-5802 - Abstract
In this paper, using Mark Schroeder’s (2008a) expressivist semantic framework for normative language as a case study, I will identify difficulties that even an expressivist semantic theory capable of addressing the Frege-Geach problem will encounter in handling the logical possibility of moral dilemmas. To this end, I will draw on a classical puzzle formulated by McConnell (1978) that the logical possibility of moral dilemmas conflicts with some of the prima facie plausible axioms of the standard deontic logic, which include obligation implies permission. On the tentative assumption that proponents of ethical expressivism should be generally committed to securing the logical possibility of moral dilemmas in their semantic theories, I will explore whether and how expressivists can successfully invalidate obligation implies permission within the framework developed by Schroeder. The case study eventually reveals that this can indeed be a hard task for expressivists. Generalizing from the case study, I will suggest that the source of the difficulty ultimately lies in the mentalist assumption of the expressivist semantic project that the logico-semantic relations exhibited by normative sentences should be modeled in terms of the psychological attitudes that speakers express by uttering them. My final goal will be to show that the difficulty expressivists face in dealing with the logical possibility of moral dilemmas is a reflection of the more general problem that their commitment to the mentalist assumption prevents them from flexibly adopting or dropping axioms in their semantic theories to get the right technical results.
- Published
- 2024
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33. تقلیل گرایی اخلاقی ذات گرایانه آخوند خراسانی.
- Author
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بهروز محمدی منفر
- Abstract
The present research seeks to explain and clarify the ontology of ethics and the existence of moral attributes such as good and bad based on the fundamental views of Aakhund Khorasani. At first glance, the opinions of Khorasani Aakhund use a kind of essentialist moral reductionism, in such a way that moral attributes such as good and bad are reduced to the compatibility of the act with the power of reason, and of course, this compatibility is because the act has expediency and existence and good effects are compatible with the inherent beauty and ugliness of his consideration. With some reflections on the discussions of Aakhund Khorasani, it is possible to present an amendment to his first opinion and distinguish between the truth of the act and the performance of the act. In this case, to act, the element of intention must be added to the expediency and existence capacity and compatibility with the intellectual power. The implications of Aakhund's moral reductionism include 1) Posterior moral knowledge, 2) absolutism, 3) Lack of moral independence, and 4) Inference of must and value from being. In this research, first, the moral reductionism of Aakhund is explained and analyzed, and then its implications are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
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34. THE PROCEDURE OF MORALITY.
- Author
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Herstein, Ori J. and Malcai, Ofer
- Subjects
DELIBERATION ,ETHICS ,SOCIAL theory ,RUMOR ,METAETHICS ,MORAL norms ,POLITICAL ethics ,PROCEDURAL justice ,OBJECTIVISM (Philosophy) - Abstract
"The Procedure of Morality" is an article that examines the concept of procedural norms in moral discourse. The authors argue that procedural norms, similar to those found in law, also exist in morality. Procedural norms are second-order norms that guide how to engage with other norms, and they are outcome neutral. The article addresses objections to the existence of procedural moral norms and provides examples to support its argument. It aims to offer insights into the structure and tensions within moral discourse. [Extracted from the article]
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- 2024
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35. TOWARD A JAMESIAN CONSTRUCTIVISM.
- Author
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IVORY, JUSTIN
- Subjects
METAETHICS ,ETHICAL problems ,PLEASURE ,CONSCIENCE ,ETHICS ,JUSTICE - Abstract
This article explores the work of philosopher William James and his contribution to moral thought. It discusses James's views on moral philosophy and his belief in constructivism. The article compares James's constructivism to that of other philosophers, such as Sharon Street, and highlights the unique features of a Jamesian constructivism. It also discusses James's views on moral motivation and the role of religious beliefs in achieving it. Overall, the article provides insights into James's philosophical perspective and its implications for moral theory. [Extracted from the article]
- Published
- 2024
36. Problems for Moral Debunkers: On the Logic and Limits of Empirically Informed Ethics, written by Peter Königs.
- Author
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Risberg, Olle
- Subjects
LOGIC ,ETHICS ,MORAL realism ,METAETHICS ,REALISM - Abstract
Peter Königs's book, "Problems for Moral Debunkers: On the Logic and Limits of Empirically Informed Ethics," explores debunking arguments in moral philosophy. Königs examines the arguments put forth by utilitarians like Peter Singer and Joshua Greene, as well as moral anti-realists like Richard Joyce and Sharon Street. He concludes that these debunking arguments fail to achieve their intended goals. Königs also discusses the "backfiring problem," which suggests that these debunking arguments challenge the proponents' own moral or metaethical positions. While the book primarily focuses on problems for moral debunkers, it does not address the non-dialectical epistemological issues that debunking arguments raise. Additionally, Königs criticizes arguments that rely on higher-order evidence, claiming that they are sloppy and imprecise. However, this criticism does not warrant a general ban on higher-order evidence-based arguments in academic discourse. [Extracted from the article]
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- 2024
- Full Text
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37. Pragmatism and Associative Political Obligations.
- Author
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Lefkowitz, David
- Subjects
- *
POLITICAL obligation , *PRAGMATISM , *POLITICAL ethics , *METAETHICS , *ETHICS - Abstract
Proponents of an associative account of political obligation maintain that individuals bear certain moral duties simply in virtue of their membership in a particular political community. I defend this thesis by interpreting it as a metaethical claim that expresses or implicitly relies on a pragmatist account of the nature of normativity, justification, and knowledge. Such a defense has a number of virtues. First, it offers a compelling rationale for the strategy commonly employed to defend the associative thesis. Second, a pragmatist reading provides the resources necessary to rebut a number of objections advanced against the associative thesis, such as the criticism that associative theorists cannot distinguish actually having political obligations from merely believing or feeling that one has political obligations. Third, a pragmatist metaethics entails a particular model of practical reasoning, namely constructive interpretation, that helpfully illuminates our actual practice of attributing or contesting political obligations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
38. The disunity of moral judgment: Evidence and implications.
- Author
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Sackris, David and Larsen, Rasmus Rosenberg
- Subjects
- *
MORAL judgment , *INTERNALISM (Theory of knowledge) , *METAETHICS - Abstract
We argue that there is significant evidence for reconsidering the possibility that moral judgment constitutes a distinctive category of judgment. We begin by reviewing evidence and arguments from neuroscience and philosophy that seem to indicate that a diversity of brain processes result in verdicts that we ordinarily consider "moral judgments". We argue that if these findings are correct, this is plausible reason for doubting that all moral judgments necessarily share common features: if diverse brain processes give rise to what we refer to as "moral judgments", then we have reason to suspect that these judgments may have different features. After advancing this argument, we show that giving up the unity of moral judgment seems to effectively dissolve the internalism/externalism debate concerning motivation within the field of metaethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
39. NONNATURALISM, THE SUPERVENIENCE CHALLENGE, HIGHER-ORDER PROPERTIES, AND TROPE THEORY.
- Author
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Suikkanen, Jussi
- Subjects
SOCIAL theory ,METAETHICS ,PHILOSOPHY of religion ,ETHICS ,NORMATIVITY (Ethics) ,MORAL realism ,NATURALISM - Abstract
This document is a list of references and citations for various philosophical works on topics related to metaethics, moral realism, and ontology. The works cover a range of perspectives and arguments, including discussions on supervenience, tropes, nonnaturalism, and the nature of universals. The document provides a comprehensive list of sources for library patrons conducting research on these topics, allowing them to explore the underlying texts further. [Extracted from the article]
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- 2024
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40. Rights Talk and Constitutional Emotivism.
- Author
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Loehndorf, Alexander
- Subjects
JURISPRUDENCE ,EMOTIVISM ,METAETHICS - Abstract
This paper builds on the work of several exceptional scholars from the disciplines of philosophy, law, and history. My central aim is to introduce and explicate an idea closely related to (and derivative of) the concept of rights talk, a concept I call 'constitutional emotivism'. By drawing upon scholars including Mary Ann Glendon, Jamal Greene, A.J. Ayer, and Alasdair MacIntyre, I aim to gather the conceptual threads that I trace through their work which together form the idea of constitutional emotivism. In a sentence, constitutional emotivism is the conflation of moral disagreements with constitutional rights grievances. When this conflation occurs, rights conflicts that never needed to occur in the first place reinforce rights talk and its uncompromising nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
41. Metaethics and the conceptual ethics of normativity.
- Author
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McPherson, Tristram and Plunkett, David
- Subjects
- *
METAETHICS , *NORMATIVITY (Ethics) - Abstract
This paper argues for the value of distinguishing two projects concerning our normative and evaluative thought and talk, which we dub "metanormative inquiry" and "the conceptual ethics of normativity" respectively. The first half of the paper offers a substantive account of each project and of the relationship between them. Roughly, metanormative inquiry aims to understand actual normative and evaluative thought and talk, and what (if anything) it is distinctively about, while the conceptual ethics of normativity engages in normative or evaluative reflection on normative and evaluative thought and talk. We explore how certain theories of content determination complicate the distinction between these projects, but argue that both the distinction and its significance survive these complications. The second half of the paper argues that attention to the distinction between these projects can promote progress in both projects in three ways. First, it can transform our understanding and evaluation of views that are routinely classified as part of "metaethics". Second, it can help us to identify important theoretical options that otherwise tend to remain obscure. And, third, it can help us to avoid tempting but fallacious arguments which can easily arise if the projects are not distinguished. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
42. Expressivism and moral independence.
- Author
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Salinger, Elliot
- Subjects
- *
EXPRESSIVISM (Ethics) , *METAETHICS , *COGNITIVE psychology , *MORAL judgment , *NORMATIVITY (Ethics) - Abstract
Metaethical expressivism faces the perennial objection that its commitment to non‐cognitivism about moral judgment renders the view revisionary of our ordinary moral thought. The standard response to this objection is to say that since the expressivist's theoretical commitments about the nature of moral judgment are independent of normative ethics, the view cannot be revisionary of normative ethics. This essay seeks to evaluate the standard response by exploring several senses of independence that expressivism might enjoy from normative ethics. I develop a taxonomy on which, at least by the expressivist's own lights, normative ethics is not dependent on non‐cognitivism about moral judgment in a way that might render that claim itself normative ethical. The argument will require us to formulate a theory of moral subject matter according to the expressivist, a matter of independent interest. Although this discussion will essentially vindicate the standard response to the perennial objection, it will also highlight a major limitation thereof. This is that even for the expressivist, the taxonomic independence of non‐cognitivism about moral judgment from normative ethics does not guarantee its moral independence from normative ethics; that is, showing that non‐cognitivism about moral judgment is not a moral claim is not itself to show that it is not a morally relevant claim. I conclude by arguing that the question of moral dependence, usually discussed under the heading of objectivity, is ultimately first‐order moral rather than taxonomic, and so can only be resolved on first‐order moral grounds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
43. Why bother with so what?
- Author
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Cannon, N. D.
- Subjects
- *
METAETHICS , *MORAL realism , *ANTI-realism , *DIVINE commands (Ethics) , *DILEMMA - Abstract
I address a family of objections I label the So What? objection to robust non-naturalist realism (or, just non-naturalism). This objection concludes that non-naturalism fails to identify the moral properties in virtue of failing to explain why non-natural properties would have all the features we expect moral properties to have and can be extended to provide the conclusion that the non-naturalist is therefore immoral. I argue that So What? is question-begging because it disallows non-naturalists their central theoretical claim: there are ethical properties iff they are fundamental properties (and, in virtue of that, non-natural). I then diagnose the error anti-non-naturalists make explicitly: those who object to non-naturalism along the lines of So What? either fail to understand precisely what the theory claims or fail to understand non-naturalist motivations for going in for that theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
44. Is Moore’s Moral Objectivist Argument Sufficient Against Moral Relativism?
- Author
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Başarslan, Burhan
- Subjects
- *
MORAL realism , *ETHICS , *MORAL relativism , *CODES of ethics , *METAETHICS , *OBJECTIVISM (Philosophy) - Abstract
This study aims to expose certain weaknesses in Moore’s moral objectivist argument against moral relativism and subjectivism. It suggests that a moral objectivist argument has to explain moral diversity against moral relativism. Moral relativism is one of the most critical debates in metaethics, and it can be interpreted in two different ways: one as moral realism and the other as moral anti-realism. Moral realism, when reduced to moral objectivism, excludes moral relativism and subjectivism beyond moral realism. I will refer to this interpretation as narrowed moral realism. But moral realism can be extended in an inclusive way such as moral subjectivism and relativism. I will refer to this as extended moral realism. Due to the focus of the study, I will introduce both extended moral realism and narrowed moral realism in the introduction section. Then, I will address G. E. Moore's narrowed moral realism. I will criticize his arguments for their failure to explain the diversity of moral codes. Finally, I suggest that moral subjectivism and moral relativism can be appropriately addressed within extended moral realism. Contrary to Moore's claims, I contend that moral relativism and moral subjectivism would be claims within moral realism. I also evaluate the two main claims from a moral realist perspective. Moral subjectivism claims that moral reality is constructed by an individual’s mental state. Moral relativism argues that social codes of human conduct completely determine moral reality. In the first section of the study, I discussed moral relativism from a Moorean perspective, which asserts that there are self-evident and indefinable truths at the foundation of objective morality. The second section contends that if Moore is correct, however, it necessitates an explanation for why different cultures accept different moral codes. The third section argues the fact that Moore fails to provide any explanation for this. In the conclusion part, I claim that moral relativism and moral subjectivism can be viewed as moral realist theories based on the failure of Moore's arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
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45. DIVINE COMMAND THEORY-POTENTIALITY AND LIMITS.
- Author
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Máhrik, Tibor and Králik, Roman
- Subjects
- *
MORAL realism , *ETHICS , *METAETHICS , *REALISM , *LOVE of God , *MORAL reasoning , *REDUCTIONISM - Abstract
Thesis. Divine Command Theory (hereafter DCT) is a metaethical theory belonging to the category of moral realism of the non-cognitive type, whose popularity is growing. In this thesis, we show some of the reasons that have triggered the need to address the normativity of ethical concepts, because of which DCT receives its justification. Concept. Our argument begins with an analysis of a critical moment in contemporary ethical discourse, the question of normativity, relating Hume's law to the contemporary problem of solipsism, philosophical pluralism, and epistemic reductionism in moral philosophy. We show the strengths of the moral reasoning offered by Divine Command Theory and point out its weaknesses, which have to do with the fact that God is not a perfect system of moral axioms, but a being who acts morally and perfectly. Results and conclusion. Divine Command Theory is an important metaethical approach that offers a solid space for the establishment of different ethical frameworks with normativity weights, but on the other hand harbours question marks that should not be overlooked. These are questions of justice and love in terms of God's model of reasoning, since both aspects are paradoxical from a theological point of view and, moreover, run the risk of a self-referential fallacy on the part of the interpreter of God's commandments. The problematic aspects of this theory that we point out do not in any way undermine its validity, but rather anticipate an even deeper level of reflection on ethical realism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
46. A Moral Fine-Tuning Argument.
- Author
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Jakobsen, Martin
- Subjects
- *
ARGUMENT , *WATERMARKS , *NATURAL theology , *METAETHICS , *NATURALISM - Abstract
This paper develops Mark D. Linville's brief description of "a sort of moral fine-tuning argument". I develop the argument in four ways: I unpack the argument and give it a clear formulation, I unpack the theistic explanation of why a somewhat reliable moral capacity is expected, I point to the significance of not seeking to explain a perfect moral capacity, and I put the argument up against the recent work on non-theistic moral epistemology by Derek Parfit, David Enoch, and Erik Wielenberg. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
47. A Thomistic account of natural understanding of the human good and practical truth
- Author
-
Van Dyke, James William, Biggar, Nigel, and Wood, William
- Subjects
Theological ethics ,Practical epistemology ,Metaethics ,Moral philosophy ,Moral cognition ,Practical reason ,Thomism - Abstract
In this study I examine how the human being naturally comes to understand the human good and practical truth according to a Thomistic perspective. I begin with a claim that St. Thomas Aquinas draws from the Christian tradition as my starting premise: that the human being is created by God with an intellectual nature and natural intellectual aptitude to participate in God's understanding and loving. In Part I, which includes chapters 1 and 2, I examine, broadly speaking, what are two poles of contemporary Thomistic discourse on natural understanding of the human good and practical truth, namely, the theories of John Bowlin and John Finnis. After concluding that each author articulates an overly determinative account of practical truth, I consider in Part II the implications of Aquinas' claim that practical thinking depends on speculative thinking. My approach in Part II takes three turns. First, I turn in chapter 3 to the topic of simple truth. I recognize that a Thomistic theory of practical truth relies on a clear account of how simple judgment of affirmation (i.e., natural assent) arises distinctly in act. I observe both a need for clarity in Aquinas' account and a tendency in Thomistic interpretations to conflate the operation's logical and natural species. Second, I turn in chapter 4 to consider Robert Sokolowski's descriptive account of human engagement in truth. In dialogue with Sokolowski, I realize that to explain how simple judgment arises, I need to distinguish it from another species of assent that is already a practical activity, namely, judgment of affirmation by inductive inference. Therefore, third, I turn in chapter 5 to clarify a Thomistic speculative account of simple judgment in terms of its natural causal principles, and then to articulate the beginnings of an account of natural understanding of the human good and practical truth in terms of this.
- Published
- 2022
48. Demystifying normativity : morality, error theory, and the authority of norms
- Author
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Gerritsen, Eline, Streumer, Bart, and Hurtig, Kent
- Subjects
Normativity ,Norms ,Morality ,Error theory ,Metaethics - Abstract
We are subject to many different norms telling us how to act, from moral norms to etiquette rules and the law. While some norms may simply be ignored, we live under the impression that others matter for what we ought to do. How can we make sense of this normative authority some norms have? Does it fit into our naturalist worldview? Many philosophers claim it does not. Normativity is conceived to be distinct from ordinary natural properties, making it mysterious. The mystery fuels a radical yet prominent scepticism about the existence of normative properties: if they are too strange to actually exist, there is nothing we ought to do. Some take this to mean, moreover, that nothing is morally right or wrong. We must critically examine the ideas behind these theories, which put both morality and normativity in general on the line. The aim of this thesis is to unravel the mystery of normativity. It uncovers and objects to the influential non-natural conception of it, arguing that we can capture normativity with natural properties. In particular, it explores how the authority of norms can be explained by the commitments of the people subject to them. In connection to this, it challenges the conceptual claim behind the view that all moral judgements are mistaken. Finally, it reveals that treating morality as a mere fiction has revolutionary practical implications. This emphasises the importance of the overall conclusion: we need not conceive of either moral or normative properties as too mysterious to exist.
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
49. Nietzsche's will to power : a naturalistic account of metaethics based on evolutionary principles and thermodynamic laws
- Author
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Curtis, Paul and Huskinson, Lucy
- Subjects
Nietzsche ,will-to-power ,metaethics ,naturalistic evolution ,thermodynamics - Abstract
This thesis attempts to answer the question of what morality actually is, as well as judgements of 'good', 'bad/evil' from a scientific perspective. I review scientific literature and extract what I think is the best explanation for the foundations of moral judgements, how it evolved and what is judged. Essentially, I derive a fully naturalistic metaethical theory from the scientific literature. This I have called 'The Power Theory of Morality' as it shows that morality and judgements of good and bad are based on and can be reduced to power relational evaluations. From this the thesis naturally flows from the findings of a power-based morality, psychology and metaphysics, to an exploration of Nietzsche's philosophy, particularly his stance on metaphysics and ethics and its relationship to science. Importantly, Nietzsche relied on the empirical findings and theories of the late nineteenth century, and these have been significantly updated in our time. My thesis goes some way to critiquing his ideas in relation to contemporary understandings of the nature of power and its relationship to morality-a notion vital to Nietzsche's philosophy. This analysis should provide new perspectives for evaluating Nietzschean ideas, particularly the 'will to power' and 'master/slave' morality origins. This thesis provides support for the 'will to power' as a description of the metaphysical principle underpinning nature, life and psychology and that power is at the heart of 'moral', 'good', 'bad/evil' evaluations, but it argues that Nietzsche's 'genealogy' is implausible and that the 'master/slave' distinction requires modification in light of scientific findings since his day.
- Published
- 2022
50. What does it mean to be good? The normative and metaethical problem with ‘AI for good’
- Author
-
Stenson, Tom
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
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