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Do income shocks locally affect internal conflicts To address this question, this paper employs a meta-regression analysis of 2,464 infranational estimates from 64 recent empirical studies on conflicts and income-related shocks in developing countries. After accounting for publication selection bias, the analysis finds that, on average, wealth-increasing shocks in the agriculture sector are negatively associated with the local risk of conflict. Nonetheless, the analysis finds no average effect of wealth-decreasing shocks in the agriculture sector or wealth-increasing shocks in the extractive sector on the local risk of conflict. The paper also shows that studies that fail to uncover empirical effects that conform to researchers’ expectations on the theoretical mechanisms are less likely to be published. Differences in the geographical area of study, the choice of control variables, and the way shocks are measured substantially explain the heterogeneity among estimates in the literature.

This paper analyzes the procyclicality of fiscal policy on the tax and spending sides in a sample of 116 developing countries between 2000 and 2016. About 20 percent of the countries in the sample switched from procyclical to countercyclical policy stance. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 30 of 39 countries remained caught in the procyclicality trap and the region has the highest degree of procyclicality. The Middle East and North Africa region switched from a countercyclical policy stance to a procyclical one over time. The Europe and Central Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean regions significantly reduced the degree of procyclicality. The main economic variables that affect procyclicality are financial depth, tax base variability, and natural resource dependence. In line with the political economy literature, the perception of corruption, social fragmentation, and inequality in resource distribution are positively associated with procyclicality. The findings also show that the quality of fiscal institutions is associated with procyclicality; countries with fiscal rules have smaller procyclical bias, but the effect is not homogeneous; and higher degrees of expenditure rigidity are associated with lower procyclical bias. The study finds asymmetric policy stances along the business cycle, with procyclicality being more pronounced during recessions. Similarly, the political cycle affects procyclicality, as procyclical bias increases in electoral years. From the tax management perspective, procyclical bias is still present, but there are significant changes: most of the political economy variables lose significance; the resource-dependence variable is not significant; external credit availability reduces procyclicality; tax base variability increases procyclical bias; and expenditure rigidity is no longer significant, but fiscal space becomes determinant of procyclical bias.

Meta-analysis on the electoral cycles, starting in November 2014, forthcoming.

This article is the first to renews the old debate of "rules versus. discretion" by introducing propensity score matching methods in macro analysis, such as Tapsoba (2012), and by using instrumental methods, to consider the national stability culture. By taking into account, at the same time, the self-selection problem and the omitted unobserved factor bias, in a sample of 126 countries of all level of development over the period 1985-2010, we provide strong evidence about the positive causal effect of fiscal rules adoption on the reduction of fiscal policy procyclicality. We find an asymmetrical impact, since fiscal rules adoption contributed to upgrade budget balance in periods of expansion, while it doesn't increase budget deficit in periods of recession. Furthermore, we show that the budget balance rules and the debt rules are more effective to dampen procyclicality than expenditure rules. We also provide evidence that the coverage of fiscal rules is not a critical issue to strength against procyclicality. Empirical results also displays the positive impact of the adoption of flexible rules, but also the adoption of fiscal rules combined to improve policy responsiveness. Finally, we find that FRs are effective when taking into account the national stability culture. This positive impact of fiscal rules adoption on fiscal policy cyclicality comes from an improvement of fiscal policy disciplinary, by ensuring a sustainable path of deficit and debt, or by smoothing business cycles.

Despite a long history of research on political budget cycles, their existence and magnitude are still in question. By conducting a systematic analysis of the existing literature we intend to clarify the debate. Based on data collected from over 1; 700 regressions and 57 studies, our meta-analysis suggests that leaders do manipulate fiscal tools in order to be re-elected but to an extent that is significantly exaggerated by scholars. However, we show the incumbents' strategy differs depending on which tools they leverage. Finally, we discuss in further details how authors' methodological choices and country institutions affect political budget cycles.

Despite a long history of research on political budget cycles, their existence and magnitudeare still in question. By conducting a systematic analysis of the existing literature we intendto clarify the debate. Based on data collected from over 1,700 regressions and 58 studies, our meta-analysis suggests that leaders do manipulate fiscal tools in order to be re-elected but to an extent that is significantly exaggerated by scholars. However, we show the incumbents' strategy differ depending on which tools they leverage. Finally, we discuss in further details how authors' methodological choices and country institutions affect political budget cycles.

Etudes & documents; In this paper we provide empirical evidence of the complementarities between the geographical approach of Diamond (1997) and the institutional approach of Acemoglu et al. (2002) to explain gaps in economic performance worldwide since 11, 000 BC until today. While the biogeographical endowments of Diamond are suitable to explain development paths until 1500 AD, the reversal of fortune of Acemoglu et al. (2002) is able to explain gaps in economic performance since 1500 AD. Those results display the positive impact of institutional framework on economic development, and focus on the complementary of two different fields of literature on long-run development.

Dans cet article nous montrons que la théorie des dotations biogéographiques de Diamond (1997) et que la théorie du renversement de la fortune d’Acemoglu, Johnson et Robinson (2002), loin d’être substituables, sont complémentaires pour expliquer les écarts de développement économique dans le monde, depuis le début de l’holocène, en 11000 av. J.-C., jusqu’à aujourd’hui. Empiriquement, nous montrons la complémentarité de ces deux approches théoriques à l’aide d’un modèle structurel et de l’emploi de l’estimateur des triples moindres carrés, à information complète, sur un échantillon le plus large possible de pays de tout niveau de développement et sur un échantillon d’anciennes colonies Européennes. Ces résultats, relativement optimistes, confirment que les institutions agissent sur le niveau de développement. Par ailleurs ces résultats insistent sur l’aspect complémentaire de théories du développement qui sont trop souvent jugées concurrentes, à première vue.

Etudes & documents; The empirical literature on the political economy of finance emphasizes the importance of political institutions as crucial determinants of financial development and shows that democratic regimes are positively and robustly correlated with financial development. By using a three years periodic panel of 140 countries over 1984-2007, we show that democratic regimes appear to be significantly and positively correlated with financial development, but the opposition between democracies and dictatorships is not sufficient to account for differentials in financial development between countries. Indeed, our results highlight a significant and highly heterogeneous relationship between democratic regimes and financial development since the positive effect induced by democracies on financial development is explained by the presence of specific democratic political institutions, namely: parliamentary form of government and to a lesser extent federal state form. Thus, democracies seem to better foster financial development if its constitutional arrangement allows horizontal flexibility and vertical stability in the political decision-making process.