Search

The Indian Buddhist Mādhyamika master Candrakīrti (ca. 7th century CE) grounds his philosophy in lokaprasiddhi / -prasiddha, "that which is common knowledge / generally accepted among people in the world." This raises the question of whether Candrakīrti accepts everything that is "common knowledge" or instead distinguishes and privileges certain justifiable beliefs within common knowledge. Tom J.F. Tillemans has argued that Candrakīrti advocates a "lowest common denominator" version of lokaprasiddhi instead of a model which promotes "in some areas at least, more of a qualitative hierarchy of opinions and thus criticism by optimally qualified, insightful individuals." In this way Candrakīrti is characterized as a "typical Prāsaṅgika" who advocates "a populist lokaprasiddha and global error theory," leading to "a dismal slough of relativism" in which Candrakīrti is compelled to uncritically acquise in the opinions of "average worldlings." I argue that Candrakīrti instead employs a version of lokaprasiddhi that distinguishes expert knowledge from the untutored notions of the hoi polloi. This argument is based upon a new interpretation of āgama Candrakīrti twice quotes, and Candrakīrti's usage of the terms lokaprasiddhi / -prasiddha, loka- / laukikavyavahāra, saṃvṛti and saṃvṛtisatya, and laukika paramārtha. I conclude that Candrakīrti presents himself as an expert in the determination of mundane affairs (laukikārthaviniścayanipuṇa), the foremost of which is the "mundane ultimate" (laukika paramārtha), the Buddha's teaching of the path to liberation. Candrakīrti illucidates this for those following "the Victor's path of reasoning" (jinasya yuktipathānuyāyin). He bases his philosophy in a position that is simply mundane (laukika eva pakṣe sthitvā), but which is nevertheless rationally demonstrable within the parameters of that which is common knowledge among people in the world (lokaprasiddhi). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kajiyama has argued that the basis for the concept of jāti (false rejoinder) as described in the Nyāyasūtra is the concept xiang ying (相応) as found in the Fangbian xin lun (方便心論). Kajiyama has also shown that the sophistic arguments called xiang ying are very similar to the prasaṅga arguments of Nāgārjuna, the founder of the Madhyamaka school. It thus seems worthwhile to investigate how later Mādhyamika philosophers treated the concept of jāti that originally appeared as the result of the Nyāyasūtra's criticism of the concept xiang ying and was later accepted by Buddhist logicians such as Dignāga. This paper shows that there were two entirely opposite Mādhyamika positions regarding the concept of jāti. In order to demonstrate this difference, this paper examines in detail statements about jātis that appear in various treatises, especially two works by Bhāviveka and three works by Candrakīrti. As the result, it becomes clear that the differences in the two positions correspond essentially to the differences in how Dignāgaʼs logic was evaluated by the so-called Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika within the Madhyamaka school. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is the third and final part of a study focused on the Madhyamaka accounts of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata so-called "wolf's footprint" stanza and tale, and "beautiful lady" stanza. In particular, this paper discusses Jayānanda's short account of the tale and the stanzas contained in his Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā on Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya. The Tibetan edition and English translation of Jayānanda's relevant passages are also provided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will philosophically engage the question of why or whether Mādhyamika philosophers are right to refute svasaṃvitti, which arguably amounts to refuting consciousness. Are there good Mādhyamika reasons for thinking this problematic? Candrakīrti, we know, wrote a lengthy refutation of some version of the svasaṃvitti doctrine, whereas Śāntarakṣita's more favorable inclination toward Yogācāra allowed him to embrace the idea; as some later Tibetan scholars understood, though, it's not clear that Candrakīrti was refuting and Śāntarakṣita embracing the same idea, and whether there is good reason for a Mādhyamika to oppose svasaṃvitti depends of course on just how that is understood. I will suggest that at least on one understanding of the idea, Mādhyamikas ought not to think svasaṃvitti particularly problematic. I will also suggest, though, that even the non-problematic understanding of svasaṃvitti raises deep questions about the basic intelligibility of the Buddhist project. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes roles for the notion of nonconceptuality in different types of arguments for viewing the mental states. Topics discussed include historical and contemporary arguments for nonconceptuality in the West, Abhidharma theories of perception and questions about the viability of the Abhidharmika project of securing perception and soteriological role of nonconceptuality.

This paper is a comparative study of two texts separated by a considerable temporal-spatial gap. The methodological approach is, as we would like to define it, a-philological. Five central concepts drawn from the Dàshèng qǐxìn lùn (大乘起信論, *Mahāyānaśraddhotpādaśāstra, QXL), traditionally associated with Aśvaghoṣa (1st-2nd cent. CE), Paramārtha (499–569 CE), and Śikṣānanda (652–710 CE), shall be examined against the related ideas found in Ratnākaraśānti's (970–1045 CE) Prajñāpāramitopadeśa (PPU). Our observations are the following: 1) The two dimensions of the single mind (一心二門, yīxīn èrmén) advocated in the QXL are doctrinally identical to the two forms (rūpa) of the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhāva) in the PPU. 2) The intermingling mind (和合識, héhé shí) which is taken as ālayavijñāna (阿梨耶識, ālíyē shí) in the QXL, corresponds to the imagination of the unreal (abhūtaparikalpa) in the PPU. 3) The mutual perfuming of the real and the unreal (真妄互熏, zhēnwàng hùxūn) is in essence the same as the false inseparability (tādātmya) of clear light (prakāśa) and image (ākāra) in the PPU. 4) The essence of perception (覺性, juéxìng) and its synonyms used in the QXL, its commentarial literature and other related texts, find equivalents such as prakāśamānatā, prakāśātmatā, saṃvedyatā, buddhilakṣaṇa, in the PPU. 5) The concept of activated perception (始覺, shǐjué) in the QXL sheds light on a puzzling word in the PPU, arvāk, which can be interpreted as the opposite of "suddenly" (忽然, hūrán) in the QXL. Our investigation reaffirms the philosophical value as well as the religious legitimacy of the QXL, and it underscores the significance of the late mādhyamika texts for Buddhist Studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A number of analytical philosophers have recently endorsed the view that the world itself is indeterminate in some respect. Intriguingly, ideas similar to the view are expressed by thinkers from Chinese Madhyamaka Buddhism, which may shed light on the current discussion of worldly indeterminacy. Using as a basis Chinese Madhyamaka thought, together with Jessica Wilson's account of indeterminacy, I develop an ontological conception of indeterminacy, termed ontic indeterminacy (OI), which centres on two complementary ideas—conclusive indeterminability and provisional determinability. I show that OI is well-equipped to tackle several issues of worldly indeterminacy. My overarching aim is to present a viable and sustainable perspective on the subject of indeterminacy to enrich analytical philosophers' insights into the intricate nature of reality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nāgārjuna (c. 150–250 CE), the famous founder of the Madhyamika School, proposed the positive catuṣkoṭi in his seminal work, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā: 'All is real, or all is unreal, all is both real and unreal, all is neither unreal nor real; this is the graded teaching of the Buddha'. He also proposed the negative catuṣkoṭi: '"It is empty" is not to be said, nor "It is non-empty," nor that it is both, nor that it is neither; ["empty"] is said only for the sake of instruction' and the no-thesis view: 'No dharma whatsoever was ever taught by the Buddha to anyone'. In this essay, I adopt Gricean pragmatics to explain the positive and negative catuṣkoṭi and the no-thesis view proposed by Nāgārjuna in a way that does not violate classical logic. For Nāgārjuna, all statements are false as long as the hearer understands them within a reified conceptual scheme, according to which (a) substance is a basic categorical concept; (b) substances have svabhāva, and (c) names and sentences have svabhāva. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the philosopher Taktsang Lotsawa Sherab Rinchen's Svātantrika Mādhyamikas, in their drive to furnish the two truths of appearance and emptiness with proper epistemic warrants, inadvertently end up committed to a contradictory doctrine of real illusions. It discusses the development of an extensive ontological and epistemological edifice.

Despite striking similarities, the connection between Madhyamaka Buddhism and Richard Rorty's philosophy has been almost entirely ignored. This article aims to correct this oversight by suggesting that much could be gained by exploring their connection. It does so, first, by establishing the similarities and differences between Rorty and Madhyamaka, and second, by demonstrating that Madhyamaka vocabulary can solve significant problems in Rorty's thought. In particular, the article will argue that Madhyamaka can alleviate the tension between irony and liberalism, by showing that internalisation of anti-essentialism induces liberal sentiments. This allows us to conceive of irony and solidarity as existing in harmony and mutual dependence, without attempting to reconcile them theoretically. In doing so, this article provides the basis for a cross-cultural conception of anti-essentialist ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is the second part of a three-part study dealing with the Madhyamaka accounts of, and commentaries on, the Cārvāka/Lokāyata so-called "wolf's footprint" stanza and tale, and "beautiful lady" stanza. Here Avalokitavrata's discussion of the tale and the stanzas is dealt with, together with the Tibetan edition and English translation of the corresponding passage from his Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to dissolve an apparent difficulty arising in the philosophy of language as discussed by the Indian Buddhist Madhyamaka school. On the one hand Madhyamaka seems to be claiming that every entity is fundamentally linguistic in nature, on the other hand it also asserts that language does not exist. I argue that the difficulty is to be dissolved by distinguishing two different senses of language appealed to by the Mādhyamikas. They argue that one specific understanding of language is deficient (and that therefore language thus understood does not exist), but this is not the same sense of language according to which everything is linguistic in nature. The apparent contradiction is thereby resolved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on truth and fiction of Madhyamaka school of Buddhist philosophy and theory posits the existence of two levels of reality and goal of Buddhist practice. It mentions conventional pose no problem for the eventual realization of the ultimate truth and relational fictionalism allows for certain perceptions to be considered correct from the perspective of ordinary persons. It also mentions relational fictionalism is based on his interpretation of Candrakīrti.

The article focuses on metaphysical anti-realism as a variety of thinkers and how tradition of Buddhist philosophy Mādhyamika stand in debates about metaphysical realism and metaphysical anti-realism. It mentions kind and degree of ontological independence and terms of conceptual dependence or imputation and subtle understanding of emptiness. It also mentions his discussion of conceptual dependence by contrasting metaphysical realism.

In this paper, I trace the influence that Buddhist texts had on the poetic design and philosophical orientation of T. S. Eliot’s Four Quartets. References to the “middle way” in the poems point us to texts from the very earliest moments of the Buddhist tradition, texts to which Eliot had access. More specifically, I develop the suggestion offered by Jeffrey Perl and Andrew Tuck that the work of Nagarjuna, the second-century founder of the Madhyamaka school of Buddhism (the so-called “Middle Way” school), could have played an important role in T. S. Eliot’s philosophical and poetic development. I employ Perl and Tuck’s assertion as a hermeneutical lens through which to analyze Eliot’s work. I suggest that Eliot’s allusions to the “middle way” in Four Quartets can usefully be understood through Nagarjuna’s causal analysis and linguistic theories, themselves codifications in part of the earlier Buddhist priorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this essay is to explore Ippolito Desideri's apologetic arguments in his Tibetan-language treatise Byun K'uns (The dawn), focusing on his critique of the notion of karma and codependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda). Desideri's theological vision can be seen as an instance of the partial fulfillment paradigm outlined by numerous recent scholars, such as Paul Knitter, for whom non-Christian religious traditions contain elements of truth while falling short of the fullness of the Christian revelation. In the Byun K'uns, Desideri deploys his Aristotelian and speculative formation to question the classical Madhyamaka rejection of a first cause or ground of being, and suggests that the Tibetans' awareness of the transitory character of the natural order finds its ultimate fulfillment in the acceptance of the Thomist arguments for the existence of God. After outlining and contextualizing Desideri's apologetic project, I turn to Jay L. Garfields's reading of Madhyamaka thought and offer a critique of Desideri's project, arguing that his overarching argument is vitiated by the assumption of the universality of specific metaphysical categories that mar what is otherwise a pioneering experiment in constructive comparative theology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Xaverian priest Giuseppe Toscano (1911–2003) translated Desideri's Tibetan corpus almost in its entirety, wrote critical introductions to each of the Jesuit's works, and identified hundreds of quotations in his Tibetan manuscripts. He also remains the only scholar to have attempted a synthetic account of Ippolito Desideri's Thomism. Toscano identified seven principal loci in the Jesuit's Thomistic-Aristotelian interpretation of Madhyamaka, addressing Desideri's treatment of: 1) Madhyamaka denials of a First Cause; 2) the compatibility of emptiness with a First Cause; 3) the sense in which Christian philosophers may accept emptiness; 4) Tibetan descriptions of intrinsic being; 5) the principle of non-contradiction; 6) the analogy of being; and 7) the necessity of a refuge. The present article outlines Toscano's understanding (and misunderstanding) of these seven loci. It demonstrates that the Tibetan term dgag bya is not—as Toscano interprets it—merely something "opposed to the truth," but the object to be negated by Madhyamaka dialectic. Consequently, it argues that scholars of Desideri will be in a far better position to understand the way in which he thought emptiness acceptable when we restore the proper meaning of dgag bya to Desideri's texts. Indeed, Desideri's attempt to develop a Thomist logic of analogy in response to Tsongkhapa's Madhyamaka depends upon his understanding of the object to be negated and whether it can rightly apply to God. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I explore the extent to which the dialectical approach of Śrīharṣa can be identified as skeptical, and whether or how his approach resembles that of the first century Mādhyamika philosopher Nāgārjuna. In so doing, I will be primarily reading the first argument found in Śrīharṣa's masterpiece, the Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍa-khādya (KhKh). This argument grounds the position that the system of justification ( pramāṇa) that validates our cognition to be true is not outside of inquiry. Closely adopting Śrīharṣa's polemical style, I am neither proposing a thesis in this paper that Śrīharṣa is a skeptic, nor am I denying such a possibility. I believe we can pursue our arguments on a neutral ground and let the facts speak for themselves. I will outline salient features that define skepticism in the mainstream philosophical discourse so that analyzing Śrīharṣa's first argument becomes easier. In so doing, I will introduce some of the arguments of Nāgārjuna in light of Śrīharṣa's position. This comparison, however, is restricted only to the salient features relevant to further the central argument of this paper and is therefore not aimed to encompass the overall positions of these two giants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Madhyamaka and Yogācāra are two Mahāyāna schools which have distinct systems. In the seventh century East Asia, the doctrinal distinction between the two schools was received as doctrinal contrast in the polemic circumstance of Emptiness-Existence (C.kongyou空有) controversy. In this context, Ji 基 (632–682), the putative founder of East Asian Yogācāra school, has been normally considered by scholars to have advocated ‘Existence’ (viz., Yogācāra) in opposition to ‘Emptiness’ (viz., Madhyamaka). It is problematic, however, to brand Ji’s Yogācāra position simply as anti-Madhyamaka. Although Ji evidently expresses evident criticism on such a Madhyamaka exegete as Bhāvaviveka (ca. 500–570) in some of his works, he also describes Bhāvaviveka in an amicable or even respective way in other works. By analyzing Ji’s extant works, this article argues that Ji’s scholastic attitude toward Madhyamaka changed from criticism to approval. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Majjhe sutta, which comes in The Book of the Sixes (chakka nipāta) of the A&1250;guttara-nikāya, incorporates six interpretations (by six different elder monks) of the Buddha's phrase 'the middle'. Later, they await the verdict of the Buddha to make it clear whose understanding was the most reliable. After hearing a report of their discussion, the Buddha consented to all six definitions and further drove away their doubts by explicitly confirming the first monk's version. The term 'majjhena', which means 'the middle' or 'Central Philosophy', occasionally appears in the Nikāya texts and is similar to the term 'majjhe' ([in] the middle). Furthermore, while the term 'majjhimā' symbolizes 'the middle path', the 'majjhe' of the Majjhe sutta stands for neither of these two meanings. However, by using the term 'majjhe', the sutta does present expositions akin to 'majjhena' as 'Central Philosophy'. Thus, this paper proposes to compare the similarities and dissimilarities between 'the middle' (majjhe) and 'Central Philosophy' (majjhena). In addition, it aims to question the possibility of the setting up of a different middle teaching in the Majjhe sutta, one which differs from the Kaccāyanagotta sutta. The scope of this paper addresses the "philosophical" aspect of 'the middle' in Buddhism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers a new iconographic reading of the sixth-century architrave of the gateway of the Mahādeva Temple at ancient Madhyamikā (Nagarī). It is argued that the eastern and western face of the architrave should be read in conjunction. The eastern face shows Śiva's entry as a naked mendicant into the Devadāruvana, while the western face depicts the Kirātārjunīya, a story that is foreshadowed in the panels of the eastern face. The motif that ties both stories together is the Brahmaśiras or 'Head of Brahmā,' which is simultaneously the skull that forms Śiva's begging bowl and the Pāśupata Weapon acquired by Arjuna. The theme of the winning of the Pāśupata Weapon may have had particular resonance for the Aulikara rulers in their troubled times. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Madhyamaka philosophy has been frequently characterized as nihilism, not just by its Buddhist and non-Buddhist opponents, but also by some contemporary Buddhologists. This characterization might well strike us as surprising. First, nihilism appears to be straightforwardly inconsistent ('if there is nothing, there is still the fact that there is nothing, so there is something'). It would be curious if a philosophical school holding such an obviously deficient view would have acquired the kind of importance Madhyamaka has acquired in the Asian intellectual landscape over the last two millenia. Second, Madhyamaka by its very name proclaims to tread the 'middle way', and what if anything would count as an extreme position but the view that there is nothing? This essay addresses both the systematic status of nihilist theories as well as the historical contexts in which Madhyamaka has been characterized as nihilistic, aiming to throw some light on plausible and implausible ways of understanding the Madhyamaka intellectual enterprise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past century Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (mmk) has been translated, in part and in its entirety, into an array of languages. Although a number of English translations have appeared, a philologically reliable yet readable English rendering of the mmk has remained a desideratum. A new translation by Mark Siderits and Shōryū Katsura now supersedes Jay Garfield's previously popular mmk translation, which, made in reliance on only the Tibetan version of the mmk, is often problematic (The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, Oxford, 1995). Siderits' and Katsura's attempt to improve upon previous translations of the mmk was recently acknowledged by the Khyentse Foundation, which at the 17th Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies awarded them its 2014 "Prize for Outstanding Translation." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an essay to examine the role of metaethics of Madhyamaka Buddhism in justifying for moral judgments. It mentions characterizations of Buddhologists including Tom Tillemans, Koji Tanaka and Bronwyn Finnigan on Prāsaá¹…gika and Svātantrika Madhyamaka. It mentions the approach of contextualizing and normatizing conventional truth for the same.

A central theme that structured Vedāntic-Buddhist dialectics was the definition of 'substance'. We shall argue that while certain forms of Vedānta and Madhyamaka Buddhism are shaped by the same set of presuppositions regarding 'substance', they derive opposed conclusions from this point of departure as they elaborate their conceptual universes. Further, while both Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta seek to defend against their Buddhist rivals the thesis that the phenomenal world is a 'dependent substance', in the sense that it derives its empirical being from the foundational Ground of Brahman, they disagree over this crucial question: 'precisely how real is this dependent substance?' Consequently, some of the central disputes between Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita can be traced to a basic divergence in their conceptualisations of 'substance', which informs their responses to questions such as whether the postulation of a plurality of metaphysically real substances can be logically defended, whether the concept of a 'dependent substance' is coherent, whether real relations between the ultimate substance and dependent substances can be explicated without inconsistency, and so on. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Buddhist theories of mind pivot between two distinct interpretative strands: (1) an epistemological tradition in which the mind, or the mental, is the foundation for valid knowledge and (2) a tradition of deconstruction, in which there is no privileged vantage point for truth claims. The contested status of these two strands is evident in the debates surrounding the relationship between epistemology (pramāna) and Madhyamaka that extend from India to Tibet. The paper will focus on two exemplars of these approaches in Tibet, those of Śākya Chokden (shākya mchog ldan, 1428–1507) and Tsongkhapa (tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa, 1357–1419). [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

One strategy Mādhyamikas use to support their claim that nothing has intrinsic nature ( svabhāva) is to argue that things with intrinsic nature could not enter into causal relations. But it is not clear that there is a good Madhyamaka argument against ultimate causation that understands causation in 'Humean' terms and understands dharmas as tropes. After exploring the rationale behind the intrinsic-nature criterion of dharma-hood, I survey the arguments Mādhyamikas actually give for their claim that anything dependently originated must be devoid of intrinsic nature, and suggest that none actually succeeds in ruling out this hypothesis about how ultimate causation might work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Seng Zhao's famous essay on Non-vacuum, using the interpretation method of Indian prajna knowledge, elaborated the true meaning of "empty". By criticizing three prajna knowledge, on "Yes" to say "no", stressing that "at that means really", and expressing truth between non-"yes" and non- "no", explained" non - really so empty", " non-really means empty, that is non-vacuum truth, reveals the fundamental wisdom of the empty intention. Seng Zhao absorbed rich nutrients from Chinese traditional philosophy, summarized questions of Metaphysics " yes", "no" and so on, adapted to the reality of confluence of Metaphysics and Buddha and deepen it further, marking the end of metaphysics and the real beginning of Chinese Buddhist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article supplements Jens Schlieter's discussion of the cognitive metaphor of a karmic bank-account, adding selected points on karma monetary/fiscal metaphors as preserved chiefly in Pāli and Sanskrit sources. It explores various strands of the history of South Asian religions where distinct economic metaphors for karma come closer to the late ‘bank-account of karma’: i.e., the Vedic ‘three debts,’ a Hindu concept of God as accountant, the varieties of weighing the (mis)deeds, the Buddhist monastic status of debt and fiscal transactions, the equivalence of karma and debt as discussed by Madhyamaka thinkers, and others. While endorsing Schlieter's point, it also takes into account such modern Western sources as early theosophical discourse and ‘Protestant Buddhism.’ [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The authors respond to the reflection of author Tom Tillemans to his article "How Do Madhyamikas Think?," which is a response to their earlier work, entitled "Nagarjuna and the Limits of Thought." The authors examine the three contradictions to which they argue Madhyamaka is committed, including the semantic paradox, the ontological paradox, and the expressibility paradox. They also comment on Tillemans' argument about the way that totality is discussed in the Madhyamaka tradition.

The author reexamines his article "How Do Madhyamikas Think," in response to the article "Nagarjuna and the Limits of Thought," by Jay Garfield and Graham Priest. The author explores whether or not there are any systemic advantages for Madhyamikas by interpreting them as diasletheists. The author describes Madhymikas to be quietists who remain quiet by suspending all beliefs and assertions. He argues that an endorsement of a contradiction violates the rejection of the third koti.

The author comments on the context of the article "The Way of the Dialetheist: Contradictions in Buddhism" by Yasuo Deguchi, Jay Garfield, and Graham Priest, particularly on the Buddhist tradition contradictions in the case of Madhyamaka of the Mulamadhyamakakarika of Nagarjuna (MMK). The author argues that the notions of emptiness of philosopher Nagarjuna and his fellow Madhyamika reject contradiction. He stresses the importance of textual exegesis as a component in the investigation.

The author presents a criticism of dialetheist readings of Madhyamaka based on the philosophy of Tibetan scholar Gorampa Sonam Senge, in relation to the article "The Way of the Dialetheist: Contradictions in Buddhism," by Yasuo Deguchi, Jay Garfield, and Graham Priest. The author believes that Garampa distinguishes between twofold contradictions (dilemma) and fourfold contradictions (tetralemma). The author also argues that parameterization is required for twofold contradictions.

The authors respond to a commentary made by author Mark Siderits on their article "The Way of the Dialetheist: Contradictions in Buddhism." The authors agree to the assertion of Siderits about the importance of exegesis as an element of understanding Buddhist contradiction. They discuss their observation regarding the presence of catuskoti in the dialectical landscape of Buddhism. They argue that Madhyamikas, including philosopher Nagarjuna, did not explicitly avow the truth of contradictions.

This paper engages with Johaness Bronkhorst's recognition of a 'correspondence principle' as an underlying assumption of Nāgārjuna's thought. Bronkhorst believes that this assumption was shared by most Indian thinkers of Nāgārjuna's day, and that it stimulated a broad and fascinating attempt to cope with Nāgārjuna's arguments so that the principle of correspondence may be maintained in light of his forceful critique of reality. For Bronkhorst, the principle refers to the relation between the words of a sentence and the realities they are meant to convey. While I accept this basic intuition of correspondence, this paper argues that a finer understanding of the principle can be offered. In light of a set of verses from Nāgārjuna's Śūnyatāsaptati (45-57), it is maintained that for Nāgārjuna, the deeper level of correspondence involves a structural identity he envisions between understanding and reality. Here Nāgārjuna claims that in order for things to exist, a conceptual definition of their nature must be available; in order for there to be a real world and reliable knowledge, a svabhāva of things must be perceived and accounted for. Svabhāva is thus reflected as a knowable essence. Thus, Nāgārjuna's arguments attacks the accountability of both concepts and things, a position which leaves us with nothing more than mistaken forms of understanding as the reality of the empty. This markedly metaphysical approach is next analyzed in light of the debate Nāgārjuna conducts with a Nyāya interlocutor in his Vigrahavyāvartanī. The correspondence principle is here used to highlight the metaphysical aspect of the debate and to point out the ontological vision of Nāgārjuna's theory of emptiness. In the analysis of the Vigrahavyāvartanī it becomes clear that the discussion revolves around a foundational metaphysical deliberation regarding the reality or unreality of svabhāva. In this dispute, Nāgārjuna fails to answer the most crucial point raised by his opponent-what is that he defines as empty? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

'Right words are like the reverse' is the concluding remark of chap. 78 in the Daoist classic Daodejing. Quoted in treatises composed by Seng Zhao (374-414), it designates the linguistic strategy used to unfold the Buddhist Madhyamaka meaning of 'emptiness' and 'ultimate truth'. In his treatise Things Do not Move, Seng Zhao demonstrates that 'motion and stillness' are not really contradictory, performing the deconstructive meaning of Buddhist 'emptiness' via the corresponding linguistic strategy. Though the topic of the discussion and the rhetoric are borrowed from Daoist sources, the point of view is rooted in the Buddhist understanding. The first section of this paper deals with the issue of exegetical methods in early Chinese Buddhism; the subsequent part explains both the Daoist background and the topics modified in Seng Zhao's discussions; the third part analyzes Seng Zhao's linguistic strategy and expounds its particular philosophical significance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the hermeneutics of Daoist scripture that was inspired by and borrowed from the Buddhist Madhyamika which was introduced in the fifth century in China. The Buddhist practice of sermonization was adopted by both the Confucians and the Daoists, in which the development of Daoist sermonization was coextensive with that of its Buddhist predecessor. Meanwhile, one of the popular Daoist scriptures, the Qingjing Jing had boasts eight different commentaries in the Daoist Canon.

The article offers information on the life and works of scholar Phya pa Chos Kyi Seng Ge in Tibet, China. It discusses general observations and basic topics in association with the "bDen gnyis 'grel ba" and "Shar gsum stong thun," a commentary to Satyadvaya-vibhaᩅga. It also raises the questions why Phya pa as an Mādhyamika has been especially forgotten by the tradition itself, and whether the critique commented against Phya pa by the authors of dGe lugs is justified.

This essay proposes a rigorously postmetaphysical integral praxis, defines what this means and how such an intervention may be premised, and demonstrates throughout some methodological and practical advantages this approach may have over extant metaphysically-oriented integral theories. Beginning with an interpretation of post-Hegelian historical and dialectical materialisms informed by the Buddhist dialectical tradition of Madhyamika, a series of coordinated and interrelated theses address problems proper to fields such as phenomenology, hermeneutics, semiotics, historiography, and subaltern studies. The claimed purpose of this project is to coordinate subjective (psychological, spiritual) and objective (social, political, economic) transformational imperatives into a coherent, non-ontological "counterproject." It takes as its aim the production of a radically democratized, responsible, and sane subjective and objective space, where responsibility is characterized as critical clarity, competence, creative consciousness, and compassion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the ontological deflationism in Madhyamaka Buddhism. It states that the main principle of Madhyamaka Buddhism is that all things are empty of essence, which particularly does not exist completely independent but simply in relation to other phenomena to the rule of people. It notes that Mãdyamika thinkers believe that ontology will lead to an assertion of the common sense world and to greater compassion and ethical engagement with other people.

Huntington (2007); argues that recent commentators (Robinson, 1957; Hayes, 1994; Tillemans, 1999; Garfield and Priest, 2002) err in attributing to Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti a commitment to rationality and to the use of argument, and that these commentators do violence to the Madhyamaka project by using rational reconstruction in their interpretation of Nāgārjuna's and Candrakīrti's texts. Huntington argues instead that mādhyamikas reject reasoning, distrust logic and do not offer arguments. He also argues that interpreters ought to recuse themselves from argument in order to be faithful to these texts. I demonstrate that he is wrong in all respects: Nāgārjuna and Candrakirti deploy arguments, take themselves to do so, and even if they did not, we would be wise to do so in commenting on their texts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay argues two main points by analyzing Sengzhao's contentions regarding several basic Buddhist concepts such as emptiness, being, and nonbeing. First, Sengzhao synthesizes Daoist methods of argumentation into his description of the middle path and other Buddhist concepts. Second, he revives Daoist concepts, giving them Buddhist meaning and expressing them in Buddhist terms. In the process, he consciously differentiates Madhyamika Buddhism from earlier Buddhism as understood from a Daoist perspective, such as the teachings of the School of Original Non-Being and the School of No-Mind. However, because his understanding of the middle path is not sufficiently deep, he wavers between Buddhist and Daoist understandings of terms such as prajñā and nirvāṇa, rest and movement, and name and reality. Despite these inconsistencies, his discourse, as the first attempt to differentiate Madhyamika from Daoism, is still a milestone in the development of Chinese Buddhism and has exerted a far-reaching influence on later generations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, the ontological similarities between the foundations of quantum mechanics and the emptiness teachings in Madhyamika–Prasangika Buddhism of the Tibetan lineage have attracted some attention. After briefly reviewing this unlikely connection, I examine ideas encountered in condensed-matter physics that resonate with this view on emptiness. Focusing on the particle concept and emergence in condensed-matter physics, I highlight a qualitative correspondence to the major analytical approaches to emptiness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how and why conventional truth is, in Tsong khapa's view, false and deceptive yet indeed truth that stands shoulder to shoulder with ultimate truth. The first part of the paper establishes the complementary nature of the two truths by responding to the question 'Why is conventional truth "truth" at all?' The discussion in the second part examines the uses of conventional discourse within the Mādhyamika philosophical framework - partly by discussing Tsong khapa's response to the question 'Why is conventional truth "false" and "deceptive"?', and partly by considering his views on the application of the worldly convention within the Prāsangika Mādhyamika system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper evaluates several recent efforts to interpret the work of Nāgārjuna through the lens of modem symbolic logic. An attempt is made to uncover the premises that justify the use of symbolic logic for this purpose. This is accomplished through a discussion of (1) the historical origins of those premises in the Indian and Tibetan traditions, and (2) how such assumptions prejudice our understanding of Nāgārjuna's insistence that he has no "proposition" (pratijñ ā). Finally, the paper sets forth an alternative interpretation that takes into account the literary dimensions of Nāgārjuna's writing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an exploration and overview of the differences between the doxography and philosophies of the Svatantrika and Prasangika schools of Tibetan Madhyamikas. A thorough analysis of the etymology of the terms is discussed along with a historical chronology of the development of both ideological camps.

The article reports on the semiotic approach to wisdom in Chinese Madhyamika Buddhism. Wisdom has strategic uses and would always be a reminder of power. A reliable source of knowledge may or may not be from the unsupported testimony of saints and sages. Buddhist wisdom has always been the interest of modern scholars along with other religio-philosophical systems.