Search

This study attempts to improve the understanding of how factors related to the board of directors in emerging countries from America determine a firm's sustainability performance. This paper examines the effect of board cultural diversity and the mediating effect of the existence of a corporate social responsibility (CSR) committee. To test our objectives, we carried out a sample analysis on data gathered between 2012 and 2018 from a group of firms located in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. The results suggest that board cultural diversity promotes a firm's commitment toward sustainability issues and leads to higher social and environmental performance. Moreover, the results show the mediating effect of the existence of a CSR committee, where a positive impact on sustainability performance appears to be linked to board cultural diversity.

This empirical research examines the effect of family control on firms' cash holding policy. Using a sample of Western European firms, we confirm the precautionary motive for holding cash as family-controlled firms' desire to perpetuate the family legacy for future generations motivates them to accumulate more cash than their non-family counterparts. We also show that, given family-controlled firms' long-term perspective, they focus on cash flow volatility rather than cash flow level. Finally, the relation between financing constraints and cash holdings is not homogeneous: financially constrained family-controlled firms hold higher levels of cash than financially constrained non-family firms. Overall, these results suggest that family firms' cash holding policy is the result not of a specific financial outcome but rather on the strategic objectives of the firm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given the predominance of family control in most European corporations, understanding how this type of ownership affects firms’ cash holding policy is important. The literature has yet to address this subject satisfactorily; therefore, we outline a way to model how family firms define their cash policy, specifically, the way in which they adjust their cash holding to an optimal level. We base our analysis on trade-off theory and the precautionary motive for holding cash. Our empirical results show that family firms adjust their cash holding level more aggressively than non-family firms, and, therefore, family firms are capable of achieving optimal cash holding faster and more efficiently than non-family firms. Further, we find that family firms have a heterogeneous cash policy; in particular, young family firms, financially constrained family firms, and family firms that operate in countries with strong investor protection adjust their cash holding more aggressively.

This paper investigates firms’ cash flow sensitivity of cash (CFSC) in a European setting. We examine the differing effects of financial constraints and income and substitution effects on CFSC in the context of the family ownership structure. When examining the shareholders’ behavior within the ownership structure of family firms, we find a positive CFSC level for our full sample. Our results show a significant connection between the family ownership structure and CFSC’s determinant factors: the higher (lower) sensitivity for the firms with more (less) financial constraints suggests that family firms are financially less constrained than non-family firms. Additionally, contrary to prior literature, we find income and substitution effects have a nonnegative effect on CFCS. We explain this finding from a productivity shocks perspective related to the financial crisis, which occurs during our analysis period.

This study analyses the role of ownership as a good corporate governance mechanism. We study cross-national differences between companies with different level of investor protection. In addition, we account for the type of owner (young family vs. non-young family businesses) and the owner’s relationship with a second significant shareholder (monitoring vs. collusion). When the main owner has effective control over the firm (i.e., absolute control or less than absolute control but without the control of a second significant shareholder), the relation between ownership concentration and firm value is U-shaped. Our findings also suggest that the conflicts between majority and minority shareholders are weaker for companies with higher investor protection and young family-owned businesses.

RESUMENEn el presente trabajo, se analiza el efecto de diversos mecanismos de control propuestos en la literatura para mitigar el conflicto de agencia asociado a la divergencia de intereses existente entre la propiedad y la direccion en un contexto de tomas de control empresariales. Dichos mecanismos pueden alinear los intereses de los directivos y accionistas en la empresa, de manera que contribuyan junto con la actuacion del mercado de control a la valoracion de la empresa en el mercado. Pero tambien la actuacion del mercado de control puede ser alter nativa al empleo de los restantes mecanismos de control. Los resultados muestran el empleo eficiente de la deuda por las empresas objetivo de oferta publica de adquisicion de valores, asi como el efecto alternativo de las mismas sobre los restantes mecanismos de control en la empresa.