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The proposed naming of a new geological era, the Anthropocene, has not only enlivened the notoriously placid waters of geology, but has sparked artistic, political, anthropological, historical and philosophical imagination. Global warming challenges the imagination because it tests sensitive perception with its distribution on micro and macro scales in time and space, presenting itself as an accumulation effect and at the same time as geographically scattered. The limits of everyday language are great, despite the literary and poetic efforts to express the unprecedented experience of a nature that has become unnatural, of a world that has rotated on its axis. In question, even before language, is sensitive perception. In a data and visual culture, do the models, the diagrams, the satellite images, the statistics, the "numbers" that flood the media, make us "see" and "feel" something? The visual arts and the exhibitions dedicated in recent years to the Anthropocene have become an important source of experience and knowledge of the phenomena of the climate crisis. They manage to make the invisible visible, to provoke shock by intensifying sensitivity, favoring through an emotional-sensitive experience the knowledge of an elusive reality. The work of the photograph Edward Burtynsky is discussed as a striking example of representation of the Anthropocene., Altre Modernità, 2019: NUMERO SPECIALE: Scrivere la terra, abitare l’utopia tra comunità e migranza

The subject of this dissertation is a comparison between the historical approaches of Hans Blumenberg and Michel Foucault, in order to demonstrate a similarity between the philosophical paths of the two Autors: from the critic of the modern rationality to its defense. For this purpose the development of their historical thought is interpreted as gradual distancing from Heidegger’s History of Being with her critic of the modern age and as convergence to Nietzsche’s Standpoint on history in his so called middle period, to which corresponds a re-re-evaluation of the Enlightenment and of the modern science in comparison to his early works. The thesis is divided in four chapters. The first one examines the early work of Nietzsche, Foucault and Blumenberg, which criticized the modern rationality as impoverishment of an original human experience of reality. The second chapter focuses on Nietzsche’s Critique to the nineteenth-century historicism as well as on those one of Foucault und Blumenberg. The third chapter compared Blumenberg’s and Foucault’s early historical Models with Heidegger’s History of Being in order to show a similarity between them, in particular as regards the absence of the human subject in their historical considerations. The fourth chapter investigate the development of such models by Blumenberg and Foucault and their reevaluation of the role of the human actors, which lead them to a commitment to the Enlightenment.

Il presente lavoro, intitolato Il razionale e l’irrazionale: la psicologia del volere in Hegel, ha alla propria base l’intento di indagare le forme limitate del volere finito e il loro possibile superamento nella dimensione della libertà. Per far ciò si è scelto di prendere in considerazione da vicino il concetto hegeliano di “volontà” per come viene presentato da Hegel nelle sezioni interne alla Psicologia enciclopedica e nell’Introduzione ai Lineamenti di filosofia del diritto. I due perni concettuali sui quali ruota la presente analisi sono quelli di “formalismo” e di “volontà libera”. Da una parte, il “formalismo” viene individuato come elemento caratterizzante tutte le forme finite e limitate dello spirito pratico. In questo senso, l’opposizione tra razionale e irrazionale esprime tutta la conflittualità interna ai soggetti finiti tra la dimensione della loro naturalità e immediatezza (impulsi, inclinazioni, passioni, ecc.) e quella della razionalità a loro immanente, ma ancora non effettivamente compresa. Tale razionalità, partendo dal tentativo di controllo arbitrario del soggetto, conduce infine al superamento dello stesso arbitrio umano. Ogni passaggio interno alle singole forme finite della volontà può essere infatti letto attraverso la chiave ermeneutica di un progressivo autodeterminarsi razionale della volontà stessa, che progressivamente diviene sempre più consapevole dei limiti irrazionali, naturali e immediati della sua condizione finita a livello psicologico. Dall’altra, la “volontà libera” rappresenta invece quel momento dello sviluppo dello spirito, nel quale la consapevolezza dei limiti psicologici del singolo volere porta alla necessità del superamento degli stessi in una nuova dimensione dello spirito. I risultati ai quali giunge una tale analisi possono essere così riassunti: a) il“formalismo” esprime una caratteristica propria del volere del singolo soggetto psicologico. Esso si mostra ai nostri occhi come l’opposizione continua tra l’irrazionale, costituito dagli elementi ancora naturali e immediati del volere umano, e il razionale, proprio della dimensione universale di autodeterminazione e autocomprensione dello spirito; b) l’analisi delle forme limitate dello spirito pratico conduce tanto alla comprensione della necessità del loro porsi psicologico nello sviluppo dello spirito, quanto al loro finale superamento in virtù di tale comprensione; c) la volontà libera rappresenta quella dimensione, nella quale il formalismo viene compreso come condizione propria del singolo soggetto finito a livello psicologico. Essa determina il superamento del formalismo, ma, allo stesso tempo, apre alla problematizzazione della nozione di “libertà”, come eccedente la stessa psicologia umana.

The main subject of this dissertation is the relationship of consciousness with the world. Consciousness is extremely familiar and mysterious at the same time, and it is considered one of the most complex phenomena to describe and explain. Recently, cognitive science and neuroscience have assumed a significant role in the search for the fundamental structures of consciousness, investigating the neuronal basis that allows the emergence of our experience. For this reason, the present work is not only aimed at philosophical and phenomenological analysis but also at the latest results of neuroscience on the relationship between consciousness and brain. The first chapter outlines the main topics of contemporary consciousness studies (first-, second-, third-person perspective, the nature of qualia, phenomenal contents, the hard problem and the meta-problem of consciousness, etc.). After presenting a provisional model for the phenomenological (Sartre) and logical (Kripke) structure of consciousness, represented by intentionality, phenomenality and self-awareness (Chapter 2), I will critically discuss reductive approaches that are influential both in neuroscience and in philosophy of mind. Some of them support the possibility to conceptually and ontologically reduce experience to brain activity (neuro-centrism; Chapter 3), while others perform the hypostatization of numerous mental states within the mind/brain (mento-centrism; Chapter 4). In this regard, it is possible to identify a common paradigm, that is, the distinction between reality and appearance that occurred especially during modern philosophy (in particular Descartes) and after the modern scientific revolution (in particular Galilei). This has led to the reduction of experience to a mind- or brain-related quality/property, as we can see nowadays (Chapter 4). Given the perspectival, multifaceted structure of experience and following the analysis of several non-reductive approaches, I will argue for an ontologically and epistemologically pluralist account of consciousness, that it can be developed only through an interdisciplinary approach, by philosophy, phenomenology and neuroscience together (Chapter 5). This will allow me to address the issue of consciousness from the so-called non-reductive neurophilosophical approach, through which I will analyse the way we experience the world from both a phenomenological and a neuroscientific perspective. Supported by Sartre's phenomenological analyses of consciousness in relation to world and body, I argue that experience is not given without the embodied-being-in-the-world condition, a condition that will then be connected to the neuroscientific concept of environment-body-brain alignment (adapted from Northoff’s world-brain relation), that is, a necessary predisposition for the maintenance of consciousness (Chapter 6). In conclusion, the concept of consciousness-in-the-world will be tested through neurophilosophical experiments regarding the Locked-in syndrome and the dreaming state, suggesting the need to reconsider consciousness not merely in terms of brain- or mind-relation, but intrinsically as world-related.

I castelli di Yale online, Numeri a stampa 1996-2012

I castelli di Yale online, Numeri a stampa 1996-2012

Submitted by Maicon Juliano Schmidt (maicons) on 2022-09-21T13:19:02Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Márcia Rosane Junges_.pdf: 2475748 bytes, checksum: ec39689efa1e796e269bda31448db43b (MD5) Made available in DSpace on 2022-09-21T13:19:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Márcia Rosane Junges_.pdf: 2475748 bytes, checksum: ec39689efa1e796e269bda31448db43b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-09-19 CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior L'oggetto centrale di questa tesi è la categoria di potere in Friedrich Nietzsche e Giorgio Agamben e come le loro concezioni si traducono in critiche convergenti alla democrazia liberale e sulle diverse possibilità riguardo alla politica. Abbiamo esaminato il senso in cui la volontà di potenza e il potere del-non aprono lo spazio per farci ripensare ai limiti della democrazia rappresentativa liberale a partire dalla grande politica e dalla politica-che-viene. La nostra ipotesi è che ci sia un equilibrio tra le critiche che realizzano ai modelli politici ed alle democrazie liberali, anche se da diverse prospettive teoriche. Esiste un legame organico tra le nozioni di potere e le opinioni della politica, anche se la prospettiva di una possibile politica dipenda in gran parte dalla visione del potere che ogni filosofo ha disegnato. Abbiamo esplorato l'ipotesi che questa differenza riguardo al potere illustra le diverse posizioni in relazione alle possibilità della democrazia come regime di governo. Nel caso di Nietzsche, dal potere della natura, il filosofo conclude che la democrazia è un regime che nega questo tipo di potere rivendicando un'isonomia di soggetti che non esiste nel mondo immanente. Tuttavia, riteniamo che la sua trasvalutazione dei valori offra la possibilità di una rivitalizzazione politica attraverso l'elevazione della cultura e l'aristocrazia dello spirito, così come il prospettivismo considera l'agon uno spazio per le dispute democratiche. Nel caso di Agamben, quando si pensa al potere aristotelico come il potenzadi-non come possibilità di rottura, non nega l'ipotesi della democrazia come un regime di autogestione collettiva dei soggetti nella politica-che-viene. Tuttavia, crediamo che ci sia una tensione quando il pensatore equipara la politica-che-viene con la inoperosità e con la potenza destituente, dal momento che questi possono tra l’altro portare ad altre forme politiche che non sono necessariamente sovranedemocratiche o rappresentative. Le diverse concezioni riguardanti al potere e alla democrazia indicano i loro limiti e indicano altre forme di politica aperte alla sperimentazione e alla costruzione, non necessariamente quelle già note e sostenute dalla sovranità classica. O objeto central desta tese é a categoria de potência em Friedrich Nietzsche e Giorgio Agamben e como suas concepções resultam em críticas convergentes à democracia liberal e em possibilidades diversas acerca da política. Examinamos em que sentido a vontade de potência e a potência-do-não abrem espaço para repensarmos os limites da democracia representativa liberal a partir da grande política e da política-que-vem. Nossa hipótese é que há uma sintonia entre as críticas que realizam aos modelos políticos e às democracias liberais, ainda que a partir de perspectivas teóricas diferentes. Há um nexo orgânico entre as noções de potência e as visões da política, sendo que a perspectiva da política possível depende, em grande parte, da visão de potência que cada filósofo elaborou. Exploramos a hipótese de que essa diferença acerca da potência ilustra as diferentes posições em relação às possibilidades da democracia como regime de governo. No caso de Nietzsche, a partir da potência da natureza, o filósofo conclui que a democracia é um regime que nega esse tipo de potência ao pretender uma isonomia dos sujeitos que não existe no mundo imanente. Contudo, pensamos que sua transvaloração dos valores oferece a possibilidade de uma revitalização política através da elevação da cultura e da aristocracia do espírito, assim como o perspectivismo vislumbra o agon como espaço para as disputas democráticas. No caso de Agamben, ao pensar a potência aristotélica como potência-do-não enquanto possibilidade de ruptura, não recusa a hipótese da democracia como regime de autogestão coletiva dos sujeitos na política-que-vem. Contudo, acreditamos haver um tensionamento quando o pensador iguala a política-que-vem à inoperosidade e à potência destituinte, pois estas podem resultar, inclusive, em outras formas políticas que não sejam necessariamente soberano-democráticas ou representativas. As distintas concepções em relação à potência, bem como à democracia indicam seus limites e apontam para outras formas de política que estão abertas à experimentação e construção, que não necessariamente aquelas já conhecidas e lastreadas na soberania clássica. The main work of this thesis is the category of potency in Friedrich Nietzsche and Giorgio Agamben and how these conceptions results in convergent critics to liberal democracy and various possibilities on politics. We examined in which way the “Will to Power” and “Potency-of-not” open space to rethink liberal representative democracy limits from the great politics and coming-politics. Our hypothesis is that is a gap between the critics they realized to political models and to liberal democracies, even though from diferent teorical perspectives. There is an organic link between the potency notions and political views, being that the policy perspective depends, in a large part, on potency vision that each philosopher elaborated. We explored the hypothesis that this difference about potency illustrates the different positions in relation to possibilities of democracy as a government regime. In Nietzsche’s case, from the “Potency of nature”, the philosopher concludes that democracy is a regime that denies this kind of potency when pretends an isonomy of subjects that didn’t exists on imanent world. However, we think his transvaluation of values offers the possibility of a political revitalization beyond a cultural elevation and the aristocracy of spirit, even so the perspectivism glimpses the agon as a space to democratic disputes. In Agamben’s case, when he thinks the aristotelic potency as potency-of-not as a possibility of rupture, it doesn’t denies the hypothesis of democracy as a regime of collective self-management of people in coming-politics. However, we believe that is a tensioning when the thinker equals to coming-politics to inoperosity and to destituint potency, because these can result, including, in another political forms that aren’t necesserely sovereign-democratical or representatives. The distinct conceptions in relation to potency and democracy indicates their limits and point to anther political forms which are opened to experimentation and construction, which are not necessarely that ones based on classic sovereignt

This study aims to discuss why there is a problem of ethical obligation toward the environment in the developing countries. The main argument is how the contemporary environmental ethics paradigm is not adequate to provide an active ethical relationship between humans and their environment in developing nations. Many aspects are to support this claim. The first aspect analyzes that developing countries have their own specificity that cannot be reduced to general environmental ethics. The second aspect illustrates the necessity to analyze environmental politics within the paradigm of environmental ethics. The third aspect focuses on the obstacles of normative ethics that formulate contemporary environmental ethics. Descriptive ethics paradigm is a suggested alternative ethical paradigm that can provide hybrid environmental ethics account for developing countries. In the final section of the study, an application of this suggested ethical paradigm. This application analyzes water ethics in Egypt to show the overlapping relationship between environmental politics and general ethical system. The conclusion of this study formulates a paradigm where ethical relationship toward the environment is more reachable.

Se il compito che si prefiggeva Benjamin in Per la critica della violenza era l’esposizione dei rapporti che intercorrono tra violenza, diritto e giustizia, situare la relazione che lega questi tre concetti in un contesto storico-politico è lo scopo del presente lavoro. Il contesto storico-politico scelto è quello delle moderne democrazie occidentali. Nel primo capitolo, viene portato alla luce il rapporto tra il filosofo ebreo-tedesco Benjamin e il giurista Carl Schmitt, entrambi critici della breve – e travagliata – parentesi di parlamentarismo liberale che la Germania si era data con la Repubblica di Weimar. Si è individuato come luogo privilegiato attraverso il quale esaminare le divergenze e, in un senso molto peculiare, le somiglianze tra i due pensatori, nello stato di eccezione quale concetto-limite del diritto. L’ipotesi che si è provato ad avanzare nel corso del secondo e terzo capitolo è che il diritto, pur mantenendo la sua funzione inalterata – che è, per Benjamin, quella di essere strumento di oppressione –, ha, nelle sue realizzazioni concrete, delle peculiarità diverse a seconda delle fasi storiche e politiche in cui viene esercitato. Per analizzare i modi diversi in cui il diritto, a seconda della fasi storiche e dalle forme politiche in cui viene esercitato, fa presa sul vivente, si è partiti dalla cosiddetta «preistoria» del diritto, illustrata da Benjamin nel saggio dal titolo Franz Kafka. Per il decimo anniversario della sua morte, e, passando per Destino e carattere e per i saggi dedicati al linguaggio (Sulla lingua in generale e sulla lingua dell’uomo e Il compito del traduttore), si è arrivati ad analizzare le specificità prettamente moderne del diritto espresse in Per la critica della violenza. Non avendo Benjamin dedicato alcuno scritto alla successione temporale di sistemi giuridici, né avendo mai dichiarato di volerne delineare una storia, è con estrema cautela che abbiamo rilevato le caratteristiche delle diverse fasi del diritto (o temporalità giuridiche, come si è voluto chiamarle nel secondo capitolo) nella sua opera, senza giungere a tracciare un susseguirsi lineare da una all'altra, e evidenziandone, anzi, le sovrapposizioni e i rimandi. L’analisi della violenza giuridica – e della violenza pura che ha per compito la dissoluzione del legame tra quella e l’uomo – è stata riportata alla questione del monopolio della violenza da parte del diritto, tratto che Benjamin rinveniva nelle legislazioni europee a lui contemporanee. Nel secondo capitolo, si è cercato di rinvenire i riferimenti precisi alla situazione politica in cui Benjamin si trovava al momento della stesura del saggio, quindi alla Repubblica di Weimar e alla legislazione a lui contemporanea, oltre ad alcuni rimandi alla democrazia come orizzonte interpretativo della forma politica di riferimento. Sin dalle prime pagine del saggio, Benjamin riconosce di basare la sua Critica sulle legislazioni europee moderne. Secondo Benjamin, infatti, per essere compresa, la finalità della violenza deve essere posta in relazione con una fattispecie determinata di rapporti giuridici, ed egli dichiara che, «per semplicità», nel corso del saggio farà riferimento «alle presenti legislazioni europee». A partire dai rapporti giuridici moderni, Benjamin rintraccia una loro «massima generale», che riassume nella tendenza all’onnipervasività del diritto, riscontrabile anche nelle legislazioni attuali, oltre a citare esempi di violenza squisitamente moderni (la lotta di classe, i differenti tipi di sciopero, il servizio militare obbligatorio, le critiche ad esso – risalenti al periodo della Prima guerra Mondiale –, la polizia come istituzione moderna, i parlamenti). Una delle novità della concettualità politica moderna che abbiamo individuato è rappresentata dal fatto che, nella modernità, il potere politico non trova alcuna opposizione di fronte a sé, in quanto i singoli hanno riconosciuto come loro proprie le azioni di colui che detiene il potere supremo. È così legittimato il monopolio della Gewalt, in quanto fondato sulla volontà di tutti. Conseguentemente ha acquisito grande rilievo la preferenza accordata da Benjamin nel testo Per la critica della violenza alla polizia monarchica rispetto a quella democratica. In tale passaggio, Benjamin afferma che la polizia «nelle democrazie […] testimonia la massima degenerazione pensabile della violenza» – una presa di posizione che non può non sbalordire, e che rappresenta una scossa nei confronti dell’ordine di concetti attraverso i quali la società democratica si autointerpreta. Provare a darne ragione è stata l’occasione per testare la percorribilità di un’interpretazione del saggio volta ad individuare, in esso, i tratti specifici della modernità giuridico-politica, ma anche per tematizzare il monopolio della Gewalt da parte dello stato moderno e, coerentemente con gli obiettivi dichiarati del presente lavoro, per fuoriuscire dall’autoreferenzialità della forma politica democratica. Attraverso l’interpretazione di Jacques Derrida del passo, ma soprattutto nella mancata adesione alle sue conclusioni, si è tentato di dare ragione della posizione benjaminiana in termini di filosofia politica. Individuate le specificità del diritto e della forma politica moderni, abbiamo cercato di analizzare il concetto-limite di ogni teoria della sovranità, ovvero il concetto di guerra civile. Lo si è fatto a commento dell’ottava tesi sul concetto di storia, considerata l’ultimo atto della battaglia teorica che ha visto contrapporsi Carl Schmitt e Walter Benjamin intorno allo statuto della legge nello stato di eccezione. In essa, Walter Benjamin contrappone a uno «stato di eccezione in cui viviamo» che «è la regola» un «vero stato di eccezione». Assunto questo punto di partenza, si è tentato, nel quarto capitolo, di elaborare una concezione della guerra civile che fosse utile per illuminare i rapporti tra Stato e diritto, in un’ottica di sostanziale continuità della guerra civile con l’esercizio del potere costituito: la guerra civile come stato di eccezione. Si è pervenuti a una concezione della guerra civile non nei termini dell’avvenuta perdita di controllo da parte del sovrano sulla società civile, o della dissoluzione della civitas, bensì come di uno dei modi del gerere rem publicam, una tecnica di esercizio del potere sovrano. Si è quindi aderito a una concezione dello stato di eccezione opposta a quella classica e vicina a quella tradizione che, da Marx, a Benjamin, a Korsch, individua in essa una condizione permanente. Abbiamo visto come la guerra civile non sia mai del tutto esclusa dalla vita politica e come il moderno Stato rappresentativo possa essere definito come l’ente che informa il conflitto civile, che definisce le parti in gioco, che sanziona le vittorie delle parti tramite il diritto e che può, in ogni caso, sospenderlo, ma che non ha interesse a mettervi fine. In questa ottica, il saggio giovanile Per la critica della violenza trova il suo epilogo nell'ottava delle Tesi sul concetto di storia, ultimo testo scritto da Benjamin prima della morte. Di più, l’individuazione nel rapporto mezzi-fini dell’architrave dell’ordine giuridico consente di fare della nozione di Aufgabe, che ritorna più volte nell'opera benjaminiana, un termine tecnico del lessico del filosofo tedesco che indica una prassi libera dalla strumentalità e dalla finalità, e, quindi, una prassi messianica.

Prenatal diagnosis is undergoing rapid development due to the increasingly widespread introduction of non-invasive prenatal genetic testing of cffDNA on peripheral maternal blood (NIPT) in clinical practice. The test is simple and can be carried out in a very early gestational period, which avoids the slightest risk of miscarriage as a result of invasive techniques. Moreover, it is found to be more sensitive and more specific than prenatal tests currently in use, and can be applied more extensively. An analysis of the current debate, however, raises several ethical questions. Of particular importance are those relating to reproductive autonomy, proportionality and distributive justice. The aim of this work is to analyse these issues in the light of a particular anthropological category, parenting. The broadening of technological applications in the context of unborn life challenges this category in its constituent parts: responsibility and unconditional love. The aim of this thesis is to conclude with a proposal of legal and ethical criteria to evaluate choices in prenatal diagnosis within the area of meaning created by these two components.

The subject of this dissertation is the chapter on the idea of the good in Hegel’s Logic. In order to develop my interpretation, I try to demonstrate three main mutually related hypotheses: a) that the idea of the good concerns the relation between practical normativity and reality; b) that it is possible to read it as a metaethics, namely as an ontological, epistemological and methodological reflection about the domain of free agency; c) that it can successfully engage with the contemporary metaethical reflection. The dissertation is divided in four chapters. The first one provides the main coordinates to read and understand the idea of the good. The purpose of this chapter is most of all to show the relevance of the Hegelian analysis for a theory of practical normativity. Starting from this point, the thesis engages those that can be considered the three fundamental coordinates of the normativity: objectivity (in chapter 2), reality (in chapter 3), and truth (in chapter 4). The second chapter focuses on Hegel’s definition of the idea of the good as self-determination. The core of these pages is the comparison between Hegel’s text and the metaethical example of Kantian constructivism (Korsgaard). The third chapter examines the definition of the idea of the good as realization, by developing a comparison with the ethical position of projectivism (Mackie). The arrival point of both these analyses is the critics to ethical antirealism, namely to the conception for which reality has no moral charge and the domain of values and duties is restricted within the boundaries of the subjectivity. The fourth chapter lastly deals with the idea of the good under a double perspective: on one side, in relation to the idea of the true, on the other side, to its transition to the absolute idea. This analysis refers mainly to the ethical debate on non-cognitivism. According to Hegel’s affirmation that the practical idea can fulfil itself only if it assimilates the theoretical idea, we can read in an original way the relation between knowledge and will and, more generally, between normativity and reality.

The thesis is concerned with use of the philosophical categories of substance and relation in the trinitary theology of St. Augustine of Hippo. The starting point is two passages: Conf. 4,16; De Trin. 5,2,3. In Conf. 4,16, St. Augustine explains that God is not included in the category of substance as God is simple and unchangeable. In De Trin. 5,2,3 on the other hand, St. Augustine states that God is with- out doubt substance or essence, ousia. Because God is not included in the category of substance; yet God certainly is substance. How can the two statements be reconciled? Is there an aporia here? We will attempt to clear up this somewhat paradoxical circumstance. In Chap. 1 we see how it relates to the possibility of talking about God, as God has to be ineffable at the same time. We identify a number of rules St. Augustine applied to theological discourse. An affirmative theology emerges which is nonetheless capable of ensuring that God cannot be mentioned and cannot be understood. Chap. 2 is dedicated to the theme of essence (substance). We note two definitions: 1) quod est; 2) qua est. We see that both coincide in God, because ʻGod is that which He hasʼ (quod habet hoc est). In Chap. 3 we reflect on the fact that God is a Trinity. This circumstances significantly complicates the theological picture. In Chap. 4 we attempt a final reflection and discuss ʻaporiaʼ in St. Augustine.

The thesis analyses the concept of jurisprudence in the thought of Gilles Deleuze. Even if Deleuze has never dedicated lots of pages to this notion, the reflections he has done on it enable the emergence of a constellation of concepts (for example, the concept of law, institution, case, singularity) which rotate around the jurisprudence and which allow us to reconstruct the political role that Deleuze assigned to the practice of right. According to the author of Difference and Repetition, in fact, the jurisprudence is a practice which invents new rights and which respects concrete cases and the singularity of a life (in the words of the last Deleuzian text Immanence: a life...). Right is conceived as the creation of new relations, new balances of power and new institutions. Nevertheless, these latter are produced by the inventive and exceeding force of a life, rather than by the power of governments. Creating new rights means for Deleuze to fight for life and to oppose the power and the different images of thought that it imposes. The jurisprudence invents a new people and a new earth, in the attempt of creating new processes of subjectivation which escape from the strategies of control imposed by Capitalism. In order to achieve this political task, the jurisprudence could be, therefore, the future of philosophy. This doesn't mean that philosophy will be replaced by the practice of right, but rather than the creativity of philosophy could help the jurisprudence to make right a war machine, which a life can use in order to open new possible forms of communities.

In focusing on the theology of God's power, this dissertation neither presents an exhaustive historical biography of political theology nor exalts its career in the Western history of ideas. Rather, it attempts to determine the degree to which the modern fate of this field depended on the dialectic of the distinction between two separate types of God's power. To this end, I explore employments and embodiments of this power over a number of centuries. The mediaeval investigation into God's attributes was originally concerned with the problem of divine almightiness, but underwent a slow but steady displacement from the territory of theology to the freshly emerging proceedings of legal analysis. Here, based on the distinction between potentia Dei absoluta and ordinata (God's absolute and ordered power), late-mediaeval lawyers worked out a new terminology to define the extent of the power-holder's authority. This effort would give rise, during the early modern era, to the gradual establishment of the legal-political framework represented by the concepts of the prince and sovereignty. In covering the time from Peter Damian (d. 1072) to Alberico Gentili (d. 1608), I demarcate the limits of this evolution as well as its thematic direction. Damian illustrates how mediaeval theologians' introduction of the distinction potentia Dei absoluta/ordinata extended the horizon of what is feasible for God, while Gentili confronts us by placing the most spectacular consequences of the emerging question in the normative realms of law and politics. I conclude that the question of potentia Dei finally emerges as the Archimedean point from which the account of the history of the European legal tradition is supplemented with its structuring twofoldness - through, for example, such binomial conceptual tensions as centralism/authonomy, legislative/judicial authority, and written/unwritten law.

The research project is based upon the reconstruction of Aldo Capitini’s philosophical and political work with a specific consideration for the theoretical space where connections between ethics and politics, individual and society, ontology and existence intersect, with also reference to Augusto del Noce thought. The work is composed of two sections. The first one examines Capitini’s thought categories which enable to define his philosophical and political proposal as philosophy of action and communication. The second section concerns Augusto del Noce ethical and political thought and, in particular, the unpublished epistolary with Aldo Capitini and the elements of contiguity and separation between the two intellectuals. The epistolary consists of eighteen letters from Augusto del Noce to Aldo Capitini (1948-1966) and it discloses the hardships, the moment of crisis, of intellectual and moral revolution at the time of their friendship. The epistolary reveals not only the remarkable significance of the debated topics in order to retrace the relationship between the two intellectuals, but also a way to interpret their thought as a fundamental bequest to the ethical and political culture of our time. The theoretical crux of their ethical and political thought is to be found in the importance they ascribe to the practical act and enables to include Del Noce and Capitini among the most important philosophers of Italian twentieth century who considered the fulfilment of freedom the aim and continuous power of individual active conscience.

This research is focused on the analysis and commentary of the main textual places where Giovanni Gentile dealt with the concept of death and his twin: the concept of immortality. The dissertation is based on mainly four Gentile's works, corresponding to the four chapters: General Theory of the Spirit as Pure Act – Teoria generale dello spirito come atto puro (1916) –; System of Logic as Theory of Knowing – Sistema di logica come teoria del conoscere (1917-22) –; The Philosophy of Art – La filosofia dell’arte (1931) –; Genesis and Structure of Society – Genesi e struttura della società (1946). The philosopher's study of meditatio mortis is one of the most prominent and paradigmatic point in which it is possible to illuminate both the fundamental terms, disconnected from its further consideration, both the radical questions of the actualism. As regards the conceptual elements of Gentile argument, they may be schematically listed as follows: the "concrete" (ie the thinking act which constitutes the transcendental horizon of reality); the "abstract concretely conceived" (determination meant by the concrete); the "abstract abstractly conceived"(the nothingness beyond the eternal circle of the concrete). Precisely the relationship between these terms and the attempt to understand their primary ontological status leads to the deepest aporia in actualism: if the concrete is defined from the outset as "eternal", and if the abstract abstractly conceived, being nothing, is designed as what is "always dead", the question becomes more complex as regards the existence of the abstract concretely conceived, namely the thought of that object which, while realizing the life of the concrete (eternal), it seems to swing between existence and non-existence. Through the analysis of some of the most complex and intricate speculative places spring from the philosopher's "meditatio mortis", this study is committed to register the many conceptual oscillations contained in the reflection of Gentile and to show the most implicit and obscure aspects of actualism.

My aim, in this work, is to analyze Alasdair MacIntyre’s theoretical system. MacIntyre (1929-) is a Scottisch born and American ‘adopted’ philosopher. Critics usually framed his moral position as representative of current normative ethics of virtue inspired from Aristotle, and his political thought as conservative, seeing as how they consider MacIntyre as neo-comunitarian thinker. But, as I have tried to show, this is a misunderstanding of his political position. Anyway critics omits methodological aspect of macintyrean thought. For this reason, re-writing the history of modernity, exposed not only in After Virtue but also in others papers, this work show the theoretical path that drove Scottish philosopher, also through comparison with the philosophy of science, to build a new method of enquiry that is opposed to the explanatory-predictive method pursued by the ‘academic orthodoxy’. Indeed, this methodology, according to MacIntyre, omits history from philosophical enquiry and so brought our contemporary culture into a state of abysmal crisis: the ‘disquieting suggestion’. Since following efforts to provide a solution for the moral disagreement have failed, it was necessary to pinpoint another philosophical outlook to solve moral disagreement. In this perspective should be read processing of his historicist method that begin by acknowledgement of narrative character of reality. However this approach, developed by MacIntyre to give an appropriate answer to the problems of relativism and perspectivism, has resulted criticism of inconsistency: his position would remain entangled in a vicious circle. MacIntyre’s answer to the Enlightenment project failure has been labeled itself as a form of relativism by some critics, according to which, if the MacIntyre’s aim was to find a solution to the ‘disquieting suggestion’, he would have failed. He would not reply carefully to relativism and perspectivism. He would not be able to build a convincing theory that escapes relativism and perspectivism, ‘the protagonist of post–Enlightenment’: he would be a relativist thinker. How can this mistake be avoided? Answering to this challenge, in his later writings, MacIntyre does appeal to Aristotelian-Thomism’s synthesis and improves a concept of tradition as a intellectual inquiry. This is the deep meaning of the macintyrean tradition–constituted and tradition–constitutive method of enquiry, whose application on every level of investigation (epistemological, ethical and social and anthropological) allows the full intelligibility of philosophical and ethical concepts because far away from hypostatizing those concepts it gives a rational account by inserting them in the respective contexts of reference and treating them as part of a whole. The MacIntyre’s effort is thereby to connect his historical inquiry with the Aristotelian-Thomism’s metaphysics.

It is well known that among cultural anthropologists and philosophers there is always a historical gap and a difference of interests, language and method, which often causes a rivalry between the two disciplines that ends to stiffen anthropology in a collection of descriptions without universal principles and philosophy in a reflection of noble ambitions but unable to consider the individual human cases. The main aim of this thesis is to read the complete works of the philosopher and anthropologist Ernesto de Martino (Naples 1908 - Rome 1965) as a point of union, isolated and sui generis, between anthropology and philosophy. The goal is to obtain, from the reading of his works, a true anthropology of the person who somehow bring order to his unsystematic work, searching in it a common thread: the person, based on the overcoming of life in value , synthesis of necessity and freedom, of transcendental truths and cultural variety. Therefore our aim is not to reconstruct philologically the work and the figure of de Martino or investigate from a historical point of view on the originality of the sources present in it. De Martino is not here treated as an end but as an instrument of knowledge of the human person in its essential aspects, moral and ethical. Thus, the aim of this work is theoretical and moral, that is: with the attempt to restore unity to the work of de Martino, we consider the ultimate and overarching meaning of his anthropology, rather than those moments of dialogue between ethnology, politics and philosophy in his work certainly present; then we wonder not so much who was de Martino as a scholar (problem still treated in this work) but what kind of scientific-philosophical proposal is his and if this proposal, given its ethical and epistemological complexity, can become the foundation for an organic human study that so far neither ethnology nor philosophy can, independently of each other, to ensure.

The present research work will focus on two morally relevant issues: the nature of the experience of a moral agents and a possible account of the concept of supererogation. Even if, at a preliminary stage, these two subjects look to be unrelated, it will become clear how they both are expressions of the complexity typical of the moral domain. I will endorse, as a starting point, the approach of moral phenomenology as defined by Maurice Mandelbaum. A phenomenological study is then intended as the analysis of what it is like to perform a given act from the perspective of the first-person. Accordingly, the experience of the moral agent appears to be manifold and heterogeneous. On a normative level, the best moral account that allows the management and the comprehension of such complexity seems to be moral pluralism. In particular, I will distinguish between two sorts of pluralism: methodological pluralism (about the different ways of moral reasoning) and axiological pluralism (about the different values that we take to have ultimate relevance). These denominations represent two ways of understanding morality in virtue of its complexity. As such, the approach of moral complexity relies on the acknowledgment of the manifold structure of morality. In this regard, I will consider the account offered by Charles Larmore in his Patterns of Moral Complexity. His admission of different and equally valid moral principles does not only explain something essential about our moral experience, but it will also become particularly helpful as I will try to apply his theory to the justification of supererogatory acts. Supererogation, as I will highlight, is a moral concept that relies on the existence of the many levels of morality and on the many possible achievements of the good. In this way, a clear distinction between the Right and the Good will provide the theoretical space for this category of acts. I will define this as the need of complexity, that is, the need of a multilevel theoretical structure that resembles the distinction between precepts and concepts that gave birth to the concept in the Christian tradition. I will try to show how the loss of moral complexity is the first responsible of the theoretical struggles that the major monist theories (in particular Utilitarianism and Kantian Ethics) face when confronted with the justification of supererogatory acts. These theoretical approaches usually tend to be anti-supererogationists for a clear reason. When the level of the Right and the level of the Good merge into the same category there is no easy way to give an account of morally good acts that go beyond the call of duty. I believe that the endorsement of a pluralist system will solve the so-called problem of supererogation by reestablishing a clear distinction between the two faces of morality: the deontic and the evaluative. This is why, in the final chapter, I will introduce the Multiple Sources Dynamics as possible explanation, on a normative level, of how supererogatory acts can be performed. A system that provides multiple sources of the good has the tools to explain the establishment of our moral obligations and, at the same time, it can explain how we are able to see and foster some other good that lies beyond the level of requirements. In the present work, moral pluralism will be taken to be a sort of inference to best explanation of different morally relevant issues. This claim will be warranted by highlighting how moral pluralism can explain why our moral experience is so essentially complex (to the point of facing true moral dilemmas) and by showing how it can provide a satisfactory account of the concept supererogation. If these two subjects (which will be considered, at this point, directly related) are proved to hold true, the endorsement of a pluralist system will be considered the preferable option over the other normative systems.

Il presente lavoro si propone di indagare il tema dell'incivilimento e più in generale della storia a partire dalla prospettiva filosofica di Antonio Rosmini. Il filosofo di Rovereto risponde alle moderne teorie dello stato di natura, del perfettismo, del socialismo contrapponendo una antropologia che è propriamente antropologia filosofica. Con i grandi Agostino, Tommaso, Bonaventura ripropone nella modernità il tema fondamentale del peccato originale come nodo teologico e filosofico per comprendere l'uomo, il cittadino, il credente. La filosofia di Rosmini, basata sulla teoria del sintesismo delle tre forme dell'essere, mostra come il cristianesimo sia il vero incivilitore dei popoli. L'uomo è ontologicamente fondato in Cristo, l'umanità è per essenza cristiana. In questo modo, poiché la storia è da leggersi come storia sacra, storia della Chiesa-Società teocratica, anche la riflessione sul suo andamento non è più pensabile nel termine politico-sociale di "incivilimento", ma più propriamente in quello teologico di "cristificazione".

The aim of this research is to delineate, within the Sartrian thought of the Sixties, the mobile perimeter inside which to define ethics as the overcoming possibility for a critical thought. In other words: as the subjective assumption of its political dimension. The shift of Sartre’s historical-political thought follows a development not yet studied enough by scholars. The manuscripts of the Sixties about dialectical ethics appear as the fundamental completion of the dialectical experience of the Critique de la Raison dialectique (1960). Sartre was not able to publish the second part of the book during his life: indeed, the bloquage of that work is the result of the structural limit of every attempt to conceptualize historical experience. In the Critique, the possibility to make a single history intelligible depends on a refoundation of dialectics as research method for concrete historical reality. Starting by such refoundation, it becomes possible to define the epistemological basis of a historical structural anthropology, and the conditions for the insurgence of human collective action at the same time. In our interpretation, this approach is out of a future perfect’s logic that means out of the core of the modern sovereignty’s system. Once fixed those points, the research moves around two principal problematic axis. The first evaluates the methodological and epistemological accuracy of Sartre’s attempt to formulate a theory of knowledge for Marxism, considering this one as a theoretical-practical experiment yet to be done. At this point, Sartre’s regressive-progressive method is compared to Marx’s method of critique of political economy, evaluating affinity aspects and overcoming lines. Around the second axis, transverse to the first, the more properly historical-political plexus finds its profile: the dialectical comprehension of events connoting subjectively (that means politically) historical time’s flow isn’t detachable from questioning about the historicity of subjects involved in this flowing. For this reason, in the Sartrian thought of the Sixties the subjectivity’s status is analyzed questioning the normative disposition of social sphere: focusing on normativity allows to understand the mutual implication of subjectification and objectification, in addition to locating basis for a Marxist axiology. Moreover, this perspective allows to improve historical effectiveness of praxis’s ethical dimension. This one is the lens by which Sartre analyzes both Stalinism and colonial liberation struggles, but also the point of clarification of the torsion he imposes to the notion of longing. Materialistically, with the longing Sartre discovers the root of an ethics as the necessary step for every politics.

This work is dedicated to the study of Jean-Paul Sartre’s earlier philosophy, in the years between 1933 and 1943, namely between his first philosophical work, The Transcendence of the Ego, and Being and Nothingness. Its aim is to demonstrate how the suggestions related to his own studies on speculative mysticism influenced the same philosopher during this period. The issue about how to reconcile the level of the religious experience of mysticism with the one of the phenomenological analysis of his early works finds a solution in Sartre himself: in fact, he justifies his adhesion to phenomenology as the possibility of speaking about life itself, and for this reason his quasi-religious experience (an expression coined here in relation to analogous forms used by Sartre) finds the form of philosophic expression. The first part of this thesis shows how the stages that Sartre goes examines in his analysis of human consciousness resemble those which characterize the path of speculative mysticism (phases of the mystic process are always the same even though they refer to authors who differ for their historical collocation, nationality and religious experience). These stages are: 1. The death of the ego; 2. Separation; 3. The emerging of a will which appears external to the subject; 4. The tendency towards nothingness and the discovery of the subject as nothingness; 5. The abandonment to be hetero-directed; 6. Freedom as a necessity; 7. The non existence of value; 8. Anguish; 9. The experience of silence; 10. Apophatic speech; 11. The identification with the absolute (although Sartre sees it as a failure); 12. The morality of commitment. In the second chapter the relationship between being and entity in Sartre is analyzed, thus showing how the Eckartian concept of the relationship between divinity and creature is put forward again. In particular, the “solution” to the problem suggested by Sartre mirrors the one which fills, in his mysticism, the abyss between Man and the Absolute; in fact, only by taking the difference to extremes, for which man becomes absolutely nothing, God can make him divine; equally in Sartre, the subject, the absolute nothing, can know the object without modifying it. In the third chapter M. Eckahrt's mysticism of the image is related to Sartre's metaphysics of the image, thus demonstrating that Sartre's theses on the nature of the image derive from speculative mysticism: in fact, the image is not an opaque object, the degradation of perception, but a way in which the human consciousness presents itself in its creative activity. Finally, in the Conclusion, the aim is to go beyond the period 1933-43, to see if the search key on mysticism could be suitable for a new possible interpretation of the entire Sartrian work.

The heated debate over the conflict between ethics and economics is often described as an epochal issue, an expression of present-day fragility, resulting from the implosion of the development model, which has characterised western society. The debate, however, exposes a paradox. Whilst, on the one hand, the neoclassical economic theory is radically criticized, on the other such criticism does not appear to delineate any solid, practicable alternative. Thus, the mainstream economic theory is still taught, practised by individuals as well as institutions, and further developed by the prevailing academic research. For this reason, a viable alternative needs to be sought, along with a new research methodology, which would allow to apply novel and more coherent theoretical assumptions into effective research and real cases. The theoretical instruments by which to create the models for human behaviour need to take into account the biological foundation of behaviour, expressed in evolutionary genetics terms. The aim of this paper is to establish whether our moral knowledge of economics may claim any scientific objectivity in light of advances in subject areas that differ in their scope and methods: moral philosophy, economics, cognitive neuroscience and artificial intelligence, each of which makes a specific contribution to understanding the operation of the human mind and towards forming the moral values onto which economic choice and action are founded. Given that the object of the study of economic science is the analysis of complex systems, nowadays the most efficient method seems to be artificial life simulation.

2009 - 2010 The research aims to cross the thought of George Bataille, using three conceptual pairs: 1) SUBJECT - INDIVIDUAL 2) SOVEREIGNTY '- SIGNORIA 3) EXCESS - RESIDUAL Individual is a word that does not occur in Bataille’s texts, but is assumed here to emphasize something which is also very present in the work of the French. Under the name of Ipse, Bataille indicates in fact the subject, agent and simultaneously acted, that the consciousness of his singularity, and then of his death, he leans towards the infinite. The IPSE is then the actor of a movement, but not a party in the traditional sense. In it go hand in hand the desire for knowledge, the recognition of the constitutional inadequacy of knowledge, and the ineliminabilità of desire. The Ipse immersed in the flow of this movement is the one who makes experience of ecstasy, when undergoing the failure of its motion more precisely, what precisely towards knowledge. Ecstasy is an affirmation empty, devoid of a positive quality, which can not be inserted in the duration, has no stability or no reference to something known: Ecstasy is not a "state"; as does the voltage between known and unknown, it is a risky move, which is not subject to much repetition, as the possession. The subject is rather more specifically the "bearer" of selfhood, who beyond the epistemological question, lives materially as a tragedy impossible to be around. Merging the panic is inaccessible, but equally inaccessible is the quiet, where death does not stop for a moment to remind him of his finitude; finiteness is what the subject individual, can not stand. So far we have used the pronoun he, in reference to ipse and the subject; is not correct. In their vagueness and dynamism, these two terms are not very personal, perhaps even human. A fortiori, it must be recognized as they are neither opposite nor contradictory, but they are useful tools to mimic the knowledge, partial signs of recognition, that continually fall on each other... [edited by Author] IX n.s.

The dissertation discusses the issues related to the multiculturalism in Charles Taylor, with particular reference to the close connection between identity, context and recognition, as well as to the issue of incommensurability between different cultural traditions. Through the reconstruction of the general principles of the communitarian movement and those that have inspired the French liberal tradition, one summarizes the complex Taylorian philosophical perspective as an attempt to mediate between the two orientations.

This research has as its object the figure of Renato Solmi and focuses in particular on his work as translator of Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer. The main subject of the thesis is the events that preceded and accompanied the translation of Minima Moralia and Dialectic of Enlightenment. After drawing a short introductory framework on early Solmi’s intellectual and editorial experiences, the thesis presents an exhaustive overview of the intense confrontation that took place in Italy on the convenience of translating Adorno and focuses, in its main part, on the discussions that were the background and followed the publication of the two mentioned translations. In addition to rebuilding on the basis of the publications of the time and subsequent studies, the polemic notes related to the cuts and the alterations that characterized the Italian versions of both works, the thesis, thanks to the consistent use of unpublished archival material, is able to shed a new, original light on some aspects of the events in question that are not minor. Particular attention was paid to the part of the thesis devoted to the reconstruction of the detailed critical investigation aimed at assessing the reliability of introduction and translation of Minima Moralia, which Stefan Burger held on behalf of Adorno shortly after the publication of the Italian edition of this work. No less important is the question of the modifications made to the text of Dialectic of Enlightenment on the occasion of the Italian translation.

La présente étude vise la problématisation du lien ontologique de la phénoménalité et de la finitude développée par Michel Henry dans L’essence de la manifestation, au fil d’une discussion serrée avec des thèses caractéristiques de la pensée de Heidegger et de Kant concernant la question du temps et de l’auto-affection principalement.

Scopo di questa ricerca è interrogarsi sulla storia del campo di problematizzazione dell'etica professionale e sulle condizioni di possibilità per il darsi di un tale campo, nella convinzione che ciò consenta di riflettere da una prospettiva critica meno usuale sulla rilevanza politica del lavoro, che funge indubbiamente - nella società occidentale contemporanea - da elemento essenziale di inclusione esplicandosi come funzione normata di produzione di identità politico-sociale. Dopo aver reso conto dell'attuale dibattito in materia di etica e deontologia professionale, dei suoi immediati antecedenti e della sua relazione di affinità rispetto al contesto socioeconomico in cui esso matura, l'attenzione si concentra pertanto su una ricostruzione storica del concetto di professione che – ragionando non tanto sul versante weberiano del Beruf quanto su quello latino della professio, con speciale riferimento alla professio census e alla tematizzazione de officiis – muove dal diritto romano e dal pensiero patristico risalendo fino all'esperienza medievale, alla trattatistica della Controriforma e al graduale emergere di un'etica professionale in senso stretto sul finire del Settecento, per provare a chiarire nei termini di “inclusione nell'ordine” quell'intreccio tra radice teologica, politica ed economica che aiuta a comprendere il rilievo che alla professione è stato via via riconosciuto sul piano etico e politico-sociale.

This research is dedicated to the concept of «naturalization of the man, humanization of the nature» in Ernst Bloch’s philosophy. This proposition is a chiasmus coined by Karl Marx in the Economic Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. Bloch quotes this chiasmus in a lot of his works because he considers it a structural element of the Marxism, even if often disregarded by the critics. This work is articulated in three parts: In the first part we investigate the philosophical bases of chiasmus in western philosophy, from Aristotle to Feuerbach. The goal is to rebuild the history and the sense of this concept, to which it hasn’t been dedicated yet specific analysis. In particular we are going to analyse the qualitative materialism that is the oldest origin of the «naturalization of the man and the humanization of the nature». Indeed, the qualitative materialism is a part of the ancient philosophy that regards the matter like a mother who generates all the thinks and not like a deposit of resources to be consumed. The second part of this work is dedicated to the meanings of the chiasmus in Bloch’s works. We have found twelve particular acceptations of this polyhedric and indeterminate sentence: ontological, gnoseological, working, materialistic historical and dialectical, historical-philosophical, ethic, theological, ecological and geographical, artistic-pictorial, artisitc-musical, juridical, linguistic. In the third and last part we analyse the role of the chiasmus in the particular model of Bloch’s utopian thought. Indeed Bloch’s utopia is different by classical utopias, in which we can find accurate descriptions of the future. The Blochian concrete utopia is an iconoclastic utopia, that describes the present by the criticism of present injustices. In this iconoclastic background, in which the future can’t be prescribed, the Marxian chiasmus offers to Bloch some important words that break the edge of ineffable, prefiguring the utopian destination.

The present research has been focused on a reading of the categories related to the concept of authority and freedom, prepared by the legal political and philosophical thought of Giuseppe Capograssi. The analysis moves from the essay of 1921, “Reflections on the authority and its crisis”, and focuses on Capograssi essays later, in order to make a comprehensive survey of his thought. The research work has required a reconstruction of the historical and cultural context of the first half of the last century, characterized by a moral and political crisis, which reveals the denial of human individuality as a substantial reality as the center of the lasting sense of existence. We examined both the traditional view of the concept of authority and the practical implications that this concept has had on society, the state and law. Capograssi has clearly realized that the crisis of the liberal state was not so much a crisis of the ideal of freedom, but rather a crisis of moral authority of the state. The crisis of the liberal state is considered as a crisis of values, and so the authorities of the State is to be weakened or dissolved. For the philosopher in the error of modern ethics in the lack the moral value of individuals, the error also lies in the fact that you have identified the authority with the power of the state. The problem of the crisis of authority is to be understood as the process by which the authority disappears because it is reduced to an empty form. The crisis of authority in in the lack of if.

The present work wonders about the Jean-Luc Marion’s reworking of the method of the phenomenological reduction and analyses its role in the field his proposal. Furthemore it investigates the relationship between the phenomenology, the aesthetic and the theology and in particular, the given of Revelation. The first chapter tries to execute a remake of the theological theme in L’idole et la distance and in Dieu sans l’être in comparison with the swiss theologian Hans Urs Von Balthasar. The second chapter wants to retake Husserl’s interpretation in Réduction et donation and then in comparison with Derrida. The third chapter examines the polemic known as Le tournant théologique de la phénoménologie française with reference to Marion’s“Reduction to givenness”. In the fourth chapter this work deals with the issue of the gift from Derrida’s critic. The fifth chapter conducts an analysis about the theme of the painting from the first book of Étant donné. In this book Marion wants not only to argue about his thesis of Réduction et donation but also to elaborate a pars construens of Dieu sans l’être. Finally, the last chapter analyses the événement topic and the «phénomènes saturés», to arrive at the «phenomena of Revelation» with the aim to show the congruence development respect to the needs affirmed in Dieu sans l’être.

Since the publication of Carol Gilligan’s “In a Different Voice” (1982), the ethics of care has been the subject of considerable debate among moral philosophers and bioethicists. Despite the criticism, the possibility of grounding ethics on the concept of care still appeals to many, especially in the field of clinical bioethics. Focusing on the potential that the concept of care shows when applied to the healthcare setting, this work aims at outlining a model of clinical ethics based on such notion. The starting point is an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the ethics of care as a moral theory. This assessment consists of three parts: a critical analysis of the feminist ethics of care; a historical and genealogical contextualization of the concept of care; the investigation of the main anthropological dimensions revealed by the experience of care. Despite the limits of the ethics of care as a comprehensive moral theory, the concept of care is very relevant from a moral point of view. In addition, it has a remarkable potential for application, mainly due to the practical nature of care and to its anthropological implications. This potential is particularly noteworthy when the concept of care is applied to clinical practice, since it is able to make explicit the relational nature of such a practice and its profound humane value. Moreover, because it underlines the importance of two essential traits of every human being, i.e. vulnerability and its constitutive relational character, a care-centred approach offers useful resources to medicine and healthcare, especially when addressing the unprecedented healthcare needs originated by contemporary epidemiological trends.

Questo saggio racconta una storia in gran parte dimenticata: quella dei rapporti di Bergson con la filosofia tedesca del suo tempo. Da L’evoluzione creatrice (1907) a Le due fonti della morale e della religione (1932) Bergson ridefinisce profondamente la propria filosofia, arricchendola di nuovi temi antropologici nei quali sono riconoscibili gli echi del dibattito tedesco sulla filosofia della vita. Attraverso l’analisi delle polemiche «tedesche» che in quegli anni riguardarono o coinvolsero Bergson, viene qui studiata non soltanto la ricezione dell’opera bergsoniana in Germania ma anche l’impatto durevole di questo intenso dialogo, sia sulla filosofia del pensatore francese (Le due fonti) che su quella di autori del calibro di Eucken, Simmel, Driesch, Windelband e Scheler. Le quattro tappe in cui il libro articola questo incontro filosofico (corrispondenti alle città di Jena, Berlino, Heidelberg e Gottinga) ci consegnano un profilo nuovo del pensiero bergsoniano, che si dimostra perfettamente all’altezza del dibattito contemporaneo sui temi brucianti della tecnica, della storia e della guerra.

Questa ricerca propone una lettura comparata degli scritti di Bernard Mandeville. L'intento è di porre in relazione gli argomenti morali, etici e politici con le "gandi voci" dell'epoca: primi fra tutti Hobbes e Locke. L'impianto interpretativo è strutturato in modo da delineare il metodo adottato nelle riflessioni filosofiche mandevilliane e da qui, mantenendo una divisione di piani, rintracciare i concetti di riferimento sia dal punto di vista metafico sia da quello ontologico. Si ritiene, allora, che il metodo basato sull'uomorismo, come forma oggettivante del fenomeno – sociale e non – porti alla definizione della nozione di natura umana a partire da una conzione di natura in sé corrotta metafisicamente. Ciò trova nel paradigma di "naturalismo fisiologico" un riferimento da cui muovere l'analisi antropologica e morale degli uomini in società. Un'indagine che rintraccia nell'"etica del male minore" un modello con cui valutare le scelte e le azioni in ambito collettivo e pubblico. La lettura dei vari testi, allora, mostra come la politica sia influenzata da questo modello nello strutturare istituzioni che stimolino la produzione e l'incremento della ricchezza, seppur questo non sia alla portata di tutti. La sperequazione economica, allora, a fronte di un benessere collettivo elevato appare come un "male minore"., This research provides a comparative reading of the writings of Bernard Mandeville. The aim is to relate moral, ethic and political arguments to the “great thinkers” of his historical period: first of all, Hobbes and Locke. The epistemological framework is structured to draft the method utilized in Mandeville’s philosophical reflections and, from here, keeping a level division, to trace the main concepts in reference to booth metaphysical and ontological point of view. So the method based on humorism, as a form of objectifying phenomena – social and not social – leads to the definition of the notion of human nature from a conception of corrupt nature metaphysically in itself. This finds in the paradigm of “physiological naturalism” a reference by which the anthropological and moral analysis paints the picture of men in society. An inquiry that finds in the “ethics of lesser evil” a model by which it's possible to evaluate the choices and actions in collective and public fields. The reading of various texts, then, shows how the politics will be influenced by this model in structuring institutions that stimulate the production and the increase of wealth, although this is not for everyone. Economic inequality, then, creating a high collective well-being or benefits, appears as a "lesser evil".

2010 - 2011 VIII n.s.

The objective of the thesis is to focus on the conceptual issues of the debate that took place during the first 30 years of 900 between the Milanese noescolastic movement and Gentile’s Actualism. The neo-Scholastic accusations -theologically based- of athesim agiainst Giovanni Gentile are brought back on a theoretical and speculative level and are teated as accusations of reductionism (monism) and contravention of the priniciple of non-contradiction. Once the unsustainability of Gustavo Bontadini´s proposal has been justified the result will be the acquittal of the condemanation of Gentile (with will introduce a further proposed interpretation of the "neo" in his neo-Hegelism).

The doctoral dissertation, concerning moral values and personal motivation among critical consumers, is structured into two parts and lays on philosophical and economical basis in order to understand the dynamics of values construction. The aim of this work is to provide an innovative perspective in the specific field of consumption of eco friendly products, cruelty free and sustainable goods. Our fundamental goal is to “understand moral consumption” and, in order to reach this objective, we started by reviewing the literature both in moral philosophy and economics. At first, we analyzed the characteristics of contemporary society in terms of postmodernism and global movements, in order to asset a theoretical framework useful to understand the mechanisms of consumption in fragmented markets. Then, we studied Kant’s Critique of Practical reason and Amartya Sen’s thought and its importance in the debate among ethics and economics. Finally we reviewed the papers and books from consumer behavior literature. We conducted an empirical work among a group of 8 informants, who were asked to describe their lives, their consumption practices and the motivations underpinned. The interviews were treated as in- depth single case studies and their interpretation guided by an integrative review of the literature on idiographic analysis and grounded theory. Results of this study show, firstly, the role of critical consumption in the lives of our informants and secondly, the emergence of new moral subjects towards which people drive their interest.

The thesis analyses Giuseppe Rensi’s work (1871-1941) one of the most problematic thinkers of the italian philosophy in the twentieth century. We focus two basic subjects about this very prolific philosopher: the History and the Religion. Rensi reflected upon them for about forty years. His interest on History was entirely natural because of his political militancy. Rensi was indeed the first Socialist deputy in Ticino. His Philosophy of History is basically characterized by two stages. In the first one there is a belief in the human Development and in the glorious destiny of the universal History. The other one is subsequent to the sceptical turning point of his thought, when he loses confidence in History considered as cruel, absurd and the fruit of chance. The Religion is present all over Rensi’s production though with very different tones. To a first stage of idealistic mysticism followed a second one characterised by a hard criticism culminating in the Apology of Atheism. Finally there was a third stage of sceptical spiritualism expressed in Spiritual Letters. The author asks himself if there is a connection between the Philosophy of History and that one of Religion and how one could have influenced on the other one. The research founded on the critical literature so far expressed, points out some pages almost unknown of the Venetian Philosopher and calls into question forms and judgements uncritically repeated over the years.

I castelli di Yale online, Numeri a stampa 1996-2012

I castelli di Yale online, Numeri a stampa 1996-2012

I castelli di Yale online, Numeri a stampa 1996-2012

2008 - 2009 La tesi è articolata in due parti, la prima delle quali è di carattere storico, e restituisce il contesto in cui matura l’opera filosofico-teologica di Seripando, la seconda contiene invece un’analisi della struttura speculativa del trattato inedito De summo bono. In particolare, la prima parte prende in esame da un lato l’ambiente tardo umanistico napoletano, nel quale oramai l’eredità di Pontano e Sannazaro si congiunge ad una profonda inquietudine religiosa, dall’altro la ricca “scuola agostiniana” del Cinquecento, nella quale la “teologia affettiva” di Egidio Romano viene riletta attraverso gli strumenti teorici del neoplatonismo rinascimentale. L’ultima sezione della prima parte analizza il rapporto di Egidio da Viterbo, maestro di Seripando, con Marsilio Ficino. Nella seconda parte viene analizzata la struttura generale del De summo bono. Dopo una descrizione del manoscritto, viene esaminato il rapporto con la tradizione platonica e con Ficino in particolare. Vengono esaminati i temi centrali della costruzione speculativa seripandiana: il primato dell’unum-bonum, il rapporto scientia-sapientia, la concezione della trascendenza di Dio, il tema della dignitas hominis. In appendice è collocato il testo trascritto del De summo bono.[a cura dell'autore] VIII n.s.