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One prominent criticism of luck egalitarianism is that it requires either shameful revelations or otherwise problematic declarations by the state toward those who have had bad brute luck. Relational egalitarianism, by contrast, is portrayed as an alternative that requires no such revelations or declarations. I argue that this is false. Relational equality requires the state to draft anti-discrimination laws for both state and private action. The ideal of relational egalitarianism requires these laws to be asymmetric, that is to allow affirmative action for disadvantaged groups while prohibiting affirmative action for advantaged groups. Hence, the state needs to make a public declaration on which groups are privileged and which are underprivileged; and individuals need to reveal whether they belong to groups officially declared underprivileged. These declarations are no more problematic in this case than in the case of luck egalitarianism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The arrival of “big data” promises new degrees of precision in understanding human behavior. Could it also allow drawing a finer line between “choice” and “circumstances”? In a culture in which individual responsibility continues to be celebrated, this raises questions about new opportunities for institutional design with a stronger focus on individual responsibility. But what is it that can be learned from big data? In this paper I argue that we should not expect a “god’s eye view” on choice versus circumstances from big data. “Responsibility” is a social construct that depends on the logic of different social situations, as well as our epistemic access to certain counterfactuals (e.g., whether an agent “could have acted differently”). It is this epistemic dimension that changes with the arrival of big data. But while this might help overcome some epistemic barriers, it might also create new problems, e.g., because of polluted and hence biased data. This is not just a theoretical problem; it is directly connected to the regulation of insurance. The new developments force us to directly confront questions about mutualist versus solidaristic forms of insurance, and more generally about how much weight to ascribe to individual responsibility, given all we know about unequal background circumstances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a large and growing body of empirical work on people's intuitions about distributive justice. In this paper, we investigate how well luck egalitarianism and desertism—the two normative approaches that appear to cohere well with people's intuitions—are supported by more fine-grained findings in the empirical literature. The time is ripe for a study of this sort, as the positive literature on justice has blossomed over the last three decades. The results of our investigation are surprising. In three different contexts (good option luck, good brute luck, and bad brute luck) in which the demands of luck egalitarianism and those of a mainstream desert-based view come apart, the latter carries the day. One ramification of these findings is that people's intuitions about justice are moralized; that is, they appeal to particular conceptions of the good. Luck egalitarians must decide whether to embrace these moralized intuitions by adopting desertism—or to resist them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What do we owe to the lazy? On the assumption that the lazy are a paradigmatic case of people who are worse off, when they are through a fault, or choice, of their own, one might suspect that the answer is: not very much. This article shows that this suspicion is simple-minded. Four notions of laziness are distinguished. It is then shown that these notions differ – even from a luck egalitarian perspective – in ways bearing on the question of what is owed to the lazy. It is claimed that in some – but not all – cases, being lazy grounds a claim to compensation rather than forming a ground for withholding it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Luck egalitarianism assigns a central role to personal responsibility in egalitarian justice. In the context of healthcare, luck egalitarianism is the view that the distribution of medical and healthcare resources—or common resources in general—should respond to the (im)prudence of individuals. Recently, Joar Björk, Gert Helgesson, and Niklas Juth have argued that it is impractical to use luck egalitarianism as a normative framework in healthcare because it has no reasonable way of dealing with the imprudent. In response to their argument, this paper first suggests that the epistemic problems of applying luck egalitarianism to the healthcare context raised by Björk et al. can be circumvented by using the exemption system as a policy application of luck egalitarian healthcare justice. This paper then shows that an ex ante policy, a tax system with refunds, can reasonably be adopted as a luck egalitarian institutional design of healthcare policy. We argue that the proposed conception of luck egalitarianism can deal with the problem of differential option luck. Finally, we show that the threshold problem for the definition of imprudence does not refute the proposed ex ante policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Luck egalitarianism is a responsibility-sensitive theory of distributive justice. Its application to health and healthcare is controversial. This article addresses a novel critique of luck egalitarianism, namely, that it wrongfully discriminates against those responsible for their health disadvantage when allocating scarce healthcare resources. The philosophical literature about discrimination offers two primary reasons for what makes discrimination wrong (when it is): harm and disrespect. These two approaches are employed to analyze whether luck egalitarian healthcare prioritization should be considered wrongful discrimination. Regarding harm, it is very plausible to consider the policies harmful but much less reasonable to consider those responsible for their health disadvantages a socially salient group. Drawing on the disrespect literature, where social salience is typically not required for something to be discrimination, the policies are a form of discrimination. They are, however, not disrespectful. The upshot of this first assessment of the discrimination objection to luck egalitarianism in health is, thus, that it fails. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Egalitarianism is a social and political philosophy propounding that all mankind should have equal rights and treatment on the premise that everyone is born equal. Although the philosophy dates back to Stoicism in Ancient Greece, it reached its apogee with the American Declaration of Independence (1776) and the French Revolution (1789). Impelled by the egalitarian concepts of equality, fraternity, and liberty as well as the revolutionary ideas of English intellectuals such as William Godwin and Mary Wollstonecraft, English romantic poets expressed a deep concern for injustice and inequality in English society. Although their starting point is the same, the romantic poets’ notion of egalitarianism diverges from each other due to socio-political conditions of their era. This paper outlines two sides of egalitarianism in specific works from two different generations romantic poets, Wordsworth and Shelley, to show that Wordsworth’s egalitarian concern is based on luck egalitarianism that attributes inequality to an individual’s either natural endowments or responsibility; whereas, Shelley adopts political egalitarianism regarding “equality of rights” as a prerequisite to building an egalitarian system. Thus, the paper aims to reveal that Wordsworth primarily detects the problem of inequality by attributing it to ‘luck’, whereas, Shelley due to the heat of current politics offers political solutions to this problem twenty years later.

This paper argues that there are good reasons to limit the scope of luck egalitarianism to co‐existing people. First, I outline reasons to be sceptical about how "luck" works intergenerationally and therefore the very grounding of luck egalitarianism between non‐overlapping generations. Second, I argue that what Kasper Lippert‐Rasmussen calls the "core luck egalitarian claim" allows significant intergenerational inequality which is a problem for those who object to such inequality. Third, luck egalitarianism cannot accommodate the intuition that it might be required to leave future generations better off than we are, even if it would come at no cost to ourselves. Finally, I argue that following another, broader, version of luck egalitarianism would require us to level down future generations and possibly even ourselves, which is a problem for those persuaded by the levelling‐down objection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whether or not luck egalitarians must be committed to basic equality I qua i luck egalitarianism is a question we cannot settle here[4]; but we would certainly expect luck egalitarians to share this basic commitment, even if it is not, strictly speaking, required by luck egalitarianism. Keywords: egalitarianism; equality; ethos; luck egalitarianism; self-respect; shame; talent EN egalitarianism equality ethos luck egalitarianism self-respect shame talent 41 58 18 03/15/23 20230301 NES 230301 INTRODUCTION A recurring concern about luck egalitarianism is that it violates core egalitarian commitments because its implementation would make some individuals, in particular those who lack marketable talents, experience shame. So our response focuses on shame, rather than neighboring phenomena, and asks to what extent shame that occurs in a broadly (rather than ideal) luck egalitarian society can be imputed to luck egalitarian commitments and is inimical to egalitarian values at the same time. This type of respect is a central commitment of any egalitarian view so if the critics can show that the shame felt in a luck egalitarian society leads to unequal recognition respect they would have a strong argument against luck egalitarianism. [Extracted from the article]

For Martin, the right to free higher education may be claimed only by those ready and willing pursue autonomy supporting higher education. The unready and unwilling, among whom may be counted carers, disabled, and devout, are excluded. This is unjust. I argue that this injustice follows from a tension between three elements of Martin's argument: (1) a universal right to autonomy supporting higher education; (2) qualifications on entitlements to access this right in order to preserve the value of higher educational goods; (3) luck egalitarian motivations in Martin's distributive ethics. I consider options for avoiding such injustices and their implications for Martin's argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Covid-19 pandemic resulted in school closures around the world, leaving lasting negative impacts on many children. Given that such closures are justified public health measures, this raises the question of compensating children for school closures. In this article I address the question of compensation from the perspective of a popular theory of justice: luck egalitarianism. In doing so, I examine a problem with applying luck egalitarianism to children, called the agency assumption. I then argue this assumption results in a dilemma for luck egalitarianism and suggest how this dilemma can be overcome. I argue that the resulting form of luck egalitarianism reveals something interesting about compensating children for school closures: luck egalitarianism requires us to address all bases of justice-relevant inequality among children—Covid-19-related and beyond. Although much of the current discussion of compensating children for such closures has focused narrowly on the need to make up for lost instruction time or to prevent reductions in educational achievement, I argue that a luck egalitarian conception of justice requires us to go beyond merely compensating children for educational losses and instead aim for radical equality in education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last decades, there has been a huge debate on the transformations of the European Welfare State. The issue of its financial sustainability together with the emergence of new social risks has put under pressure the traditional model of social protection and created the conditions for a change in the gist of the welfare state provisions. In this context, the social investment approach has become an emerging reference paradigm to tackle new social risks and meet the need to recalibrate the European welfare state and ensure its economic sustainability. However, despite this success, social investment still seems to be a rather ambiguous concept, too vague to result in precise and univocal policy prescriptions and open to the risk of a stretch of its interpretation by neoliberal politics, to erode social rights. In this paper we propose a theoretical framework to better clarify the normative ground, the moral foundation and political justification of the social investment approach and to understand whether it can avoid the risk of the erosion of social rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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I offer two objections to luck egalitarianism. The no-adequate-account objection takes note of the egalitarian insistence that the disvalue of inequality is only one of a plurality of values or disvalues that needs to be considered in arriving at a judgment about the ranking of alternative distributions of welfare. This turn to pluralism places a reasonable demand upon luck egalitarianism to provide an account of how the different sorts of values or disvalues that are supposed to attach to available distributions of welfare are to be aggregated or weighed against one another in that ranking procedure. I contend that the prospects for developing such an account are dim and that some salient responses to this objection misfire. The churlishness-envy objection against luck egalitarianism is that this doctrine countenances envy directed toward the faultless good fortune of others. This objection places a reasonable demand on luck egalitarians to formulate a version of their doctrine that does not underwrite envious responses toward those who gain through brute good luck. I contend that the most auspicious path toward satisfying the demand not to underwrite churlish envy advances a luck egalitarianism that asymmetrically affirms the badness of arbitrary disadvantage rather than the badness of both arbitrary disadvantage and arbitrary advantage. Since this is the strategy pursued in Shlomi Segall's Why Inequality Matters, I offer critiques of Segall's initial and revised versions of asymmetrical egalitarianism in support of my conclusion that luck egalitarianism seems unable to rebut or sidestep the churlishness-envy objection. I conclude that luck egalitarianism seems unable to satisfy either of the two reasonable demands upon it that I raise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are three distinct forces that conspire to produce a great deal of economic misery. We can refer to them, for convenience, as misfortune, unfairness, and improvidence. Political philosophers have often shown an interest in one or another of these, but seldom all three. Furthermore, those who do acknowledge all three have often felt driven to collapse them into one root cause of inequality. My goal in this essay will be to argue that the three are independent of one another, but more importantly, that they each require distinct remedies. This is important for egalitarians because it defeats any attempt to develop a "one-size-fits-all" policy aimed at creating a more equal society. This analysis helps us to understand several of the tensions that arise in our attempts to combat inequality that are often obscured by an overemphasis on the power of redistributive taxation as well as generalized inattention to the way that successful welfare states achieve meaningful progress in promoting greater equality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The theory of justice in health is a theory of justice developed around the distribution of limited medical resources. The theory of justice in health was also strongly influenced by John Rawls’ theory of justice, which is considered the pillar of contemporary justice theories. Accordingly, several theories formed around the idea of the just healthcare system, among which was the egalitarian just healthcare theory. Egalitarian theory has evolved from strict egalitarianism into several theories, one of which is luck egalitarianism. Founded upon a moral intuition that individuals’ shares of the distribution should not be unfairly influenced by luck beyond their control, luck egalitarianism suggests a way to offset the differential effects of luck in distribution. In particular, luck egalitarians advocate for eliminating the effects of brute luck, not all luck. However, luck egalitarianism faces harsh objections by insisting on the responsibility of patients who have not adequately cared for their health. Critics regard the luck egalitarianism’s view on patients’ responsibility for their own illness as harsh and unjust. In defense of justice in healthcare according to luck egalitarianism, Segall proposes a new concept of brute luck as an outcome that would be unreasonable to expect the agent to avoid. This adjusts the scope of personal responsibility to allow for a more persuasive application of luck egalitarianism in the healthcare field. Meanwhile, relational egalitarianism, a school of thought that explores equal relations among citizens, added to the discussions of justice in health and expanded its paradigm. Relational egalitarianism purports that the just health paradigm should shift from the equal distribution of medical resources to equal relations among citizens as equals. Relational egalitarianism focuses on the quality of social relations among citizens and the ways in which medical institutions treat citizens. Relational egalitarians call for eliminating unjust social relationships, such as domination, oppression, and discrimination, in health and healthcare. They regard members of society as citizens that can relate to others as equals, not only as entities distributed with equal amounts of medical resources. Relational egalitarianism pursues the ideal of equalizing relations between citizens in health and healthcare. Relational egalitarianism can manifest itself when these ideals are reflected in the healthcare system. Egalitarian theories provide an opportunity to examine the problem of inequalities in health, a subject heretofore dominated by liberalism, through a new lens, and contribute to establishing a new egalitarian model of justice in health and healthcare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The harshness objection is the most important challenge to luck egalitarianism. Very recently, Andreas Albertsen and Lasse Nielsen provided a scrupulous analysis of the harshness objection and claim that only the inconsistency objection—the objection that luck egalitarianism is incompatible with the ideal of basic moral equality—has real bite. I argue that the relevantly construed incoherence objection is not as strong as Albertsen and Nielsen believe. In doing so, first, I show that the deontological luck egalitarian conception of equal treatment does not endorse harsh policies such as excessive responsibility-sensitive healthcare that would be disrespectful to the imprudent. Second, I demonstrate that deontological luck egalitarianism is not troubled by the case that involves a lack of respect for the prudent, which vexes Anderson's relational egalitarianism that Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen's argument highlights. I thus claim that the harshness objection is not a truly decisive objection against the luck egalitarian project. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Przeglad Sejmowy is the property of Kancelaria Sejmu and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

According to relational egalitarians, equality is not primarily about the distribution of some good but about people relating to one another as equals. However, compared with other theorists in political philosophy – including other egalitarians – relational egalitarians have said relatively little on what role personal responsibility should play in their theories. For example, is equality compatible with responsibility? Should economic distributions be responsibility-sensitive? This article fills this gap. I develop a relational egalitarian framework for personal responsibility and show that relational equality commits us to responsibility. I develop two sets of arguments. First, I draw on relational theories of moral responsibility – particularly Strawsonian views – to show that valuable egalitarian relationships require responsibility. Second, I show why relational equality sometimes requires that economic distributions be sensitive to responsibility and choice. I also defend a seemingly paradoxical result: being committed to responsibility, relational egalitarianism not only justifies some distributive inequalities but some relational inequalities too. Overall, relational egalitarianism gives a nuanced and coherent answer as to why and how responsibility matters from within egalitarianism. That it does should be an important argument in its favour. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although equality of opportunity is a fundamental idea of the egalitarian project, there is a continuing controversy about the effective distributive implications of the notion. This paper focuses on this controversy, and maintains that when equality of opportunity is correctly understood, it entails strong distributive implications. In this way, this paper intends to reject the notion that equality of opportunity is associated with a non-institutional idea of meritocracy: an idea which is often used as an ideological tool to make unacceptable inequalities seem acceptable. This paper defends the argument that only an ‘institution-dependent’ conception of equality of opportunity, such as Rawls’ fair equality opportunity, is the most adequate interpretation for a liberal democratic society. Nonetheless, it does not mean that individual merit has no place in liberal democratic societies. Fair equality of opportunity – if correctly understood – is deeply relevant and might contribute to a significant reduction of economic inequality, much more so than is currently perceived in the public debate.

Two recent collections of papers—Social Equality: On What It Means to Be Equals, edited by Carina Fourie, Fabian Schuppert, and Ivo Wallimann-Helmer (Fourie et al. 2015) and The Equal Society: Essays on Equality in Theory and Practice, edited by George Hull (Hull 2015)—demonstrate well the wide diversity of perspectives on egalitarianism within political theory today. But there are unifying themes amidst all this diversity. In particular, these collections make plain the extent to which contemporary egalitarianism in all forms is indebted to Rawls. This debt is reflected, for example, in the luck egalitarianism/social egalitarian debate which plays a central role in both books. It is also reflected in the concern so many contemporary egalitarians have for respect and its social basis. But while egalitarianism today owes much to Rawls, this does not mean that Rawls has nothing left to contribute to the conversation. This essay will argue that a return to Rawls can help contemporary egalitarians avoid taking their debates in certain unproductive directions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Luck egalitarians contend that, while each person starts out with a claim to an equal quantity of advantage, she can forfeit this claim by making certain choices. The appeal of luck egalitarianism is that it seems to satisfy what this paper calls the moral tyranny constraint. According to this constraint, any acceptable theory of justice must preclude the possibility of an agent unilaterally, discretionarily, and foreseeably leaving others with less advantage under conditions of full compliance with the theory. This paper argues that claim forfeiture is built into luck egalitarianism specifically to preclude such moral tyranny. However, it contends that the dominant interpretation of luck egalitarianism fails to fully satisfy the moral tyranny constraint. It offers an alternative interpretation that both eliminates the possibility of moral tyranny and rescues the position from two other prominent objections that have been directed against luck egalitarianism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article carves out a new path between the two dominant wings of contemporary egalitarianism. The luck egalitarian emphasis on choice and personal responsibility is misplaced because individuals differ so deeply, and arbitrarily, in their choice-making capacities. Allowing inequalities to result from 'choice' is akin to allowing inequalities to stem from the possession of any other morally arbitrary factor – such as skin colour or gender. The move towards relational egalitarianism has been a case of two-steps forward, one-step back. While the shift away from the focus on choice is salutary, the concurrent rejection of luck is problematic, given the prevalence and importance of luck-based discrepancies in opportunities to lead a good life. A new conceptual framework is presented: good life egalitarianism. The guiding idea is that given the unavoidable arbitrariness of human capacities, the foundation for a good life should be assured for people regardless of the actual choices that they make. The essential goods necessary for leading a good life – such as the opportunities to self-determine and to enjoy non-dominating social relationships – should be guaranteed to all. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the philosophy of explanation can help inform core debates in value theory. Specifically, it argues that there is a consistent parallelism between the properties of explanation and the properties of justification such that one can reasonably infer that any property of explanation has a counterpart property of justification. Thus, by appealing to facts about the nature of explanation, one can derive various conclusions about the justifications offered by normative theorists. The paper illustrates this point by considering a debate within political philosophy over whether inequality requires justification in a way that equality does not. Egalitarians typically presume an affirmative answer to this question. However, libertarian critics note that this justificatory asymmetry cannot be simply assumed without argument. This paper argues that, by appealing to the explanation-justification parallelism, one can resolve this debate in favor of the egalitarians, as there are two properties of explanation, the justificatory analogs of which vindicate the egalitarian presumption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In addition to having an institutional site or scope, a theory of distributive justice might also have an institutional 'reach' or currency. It has the first when it applies to only social (and not natural) phenomena. It has the second when it distributes only socially produced (and not naturally occurring) goods. One objection to luck egalitarianism is that it has absurd implications. In response, Tan has defended a luck egalitarian account that has a strictly institutional reach. I argue, first, that Tan's view contains two fatal ambiguities and, second, that, to be sound, it requires an institutional currency. This second argument implies that virtually all extant luck egalitarian currencies are incompatible with his approach. I argue, third, that the alleged absurd implications often have little to do with the extent of luck egalitarianism's reach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that influential contemporary models of market socialism fail to do justice to traditional socialist concerns about exploitation and, by implication, about workplace oppression. More precisely, neither pure public ownership models (such as Roemer's), nor hybrid models of public ownership plus worker control (such as Schweickart's) suffice individually to attenuate exploitation and workplace hierarchy. Quite independently of alienable capital, these theories fail to account for the labour epistocracy, a class of workers who, by dint of higher marketable epistemic credentials and talents, can subjugate the labour of those with lower epistemic credentials. An improved model of market socialism would, I argue, account for the labour epistocracy by combining universal worker control with a strongly predistributive form of public ownership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this essay I develop a critique of Will Kymlicka's model of multicultural justice, with the purpose of laying down the foundations for a critical multiculturalism. The argument is ordered in the following way. In the first section I analyse Kymlicka's theory of special rights and identify the central liberal value to which they respond: individual autonomy. In the second section I examine the luck egalitarian foundations of Kymlicka's theory of special rights. In the third section, I elaborate a general critique to liberal multicultural justice, developing an argument to politicize the claims of indigenous peoples to access to their culture. Basically I argue that the just treatment of indigenous minorities requires recognizing their political self-determination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Luck egalitarianism has been criticized for (1) condoning some cases of oppression and (2) condemning others for the wrong reason—namely, that the victims were not responsible for their oppression. Oppression is unjust, however, the criticism says, regardless of whether victims are responsible for it, simply because it is contrary to the equal moral standing of persons. I argue that four luck egalitarian responses to this critique are inadequate. Two address only the first part of the objection and do so in a way that risks making luck egalitarianism inconsistent. A third severely dilutes the luck egalitarian doctrine. A fourth manages to denounce some instances of oppression for the right reason, but at the same time permits other instances of oppression and condemns yet others for the wrong reason.

Luck egalitarianism, a theory of distributive justice, holds that inequalities which arise due to individuals' imprudent choices must not, as a matter of justice, be neutralized. This article deals with the possible application of luck egalitarianism to the area of health care. It seeks to investigate whether the ethos of luck egalitarianism can be operationalized to the point of informing health care policy without straying from its own ideals. In the transition from theory to practise, luck egalitarianism encounters several difficulties. We argue that the charge of moral arbitrariness can, at least in part, be countered by our provided definition of "imprudent actions" in the health area. We discuss the choice for luck egalitarianism in health care between ex ante and ex post policy approaches, and show how both approaches are flawed by luck egalitarianism's own standards. We also examine the problem of threshold setting when luck egalitarianism is set to practise in health care. We argue that wherever policy thresholds are set, luck egalitarianism in health care risks pampering the imprudent, abandoning the prudent or, at worst, both. Furthermore, we claim that moves to mitigate these risks in turn diminish the normative importance of the ethos of luck egalitarianism to policy. All in all, our conclusion is that luck egalitarianism cannot be consistently applied as a convincing and relevant normative principle in health care policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many policies hinge on determining whether someone's situation is due to luck or choice. In political philosophy, this prevalence is mirrored by luck egalitarian theories. But overemphasizing the distinction between luck and choice will lead to tensions with the value of moral agency, on which the distinction is grounded. Here, we argue that the two most common contemporary critiques of luck egalitarianism, holding it to be harsh and disrespectful are best understood as illustrating exactly this tension. Elaborating on this conflict, we argue that it should lead us to modify how luck and choice are used in theories of justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Children of prisoners are often negatively affected by their parents' incarceration, which raises issues of justice. A common view is that the many negative effects associated with parental imprisonment are unjust, simply because children of prisoners are impermissibly harmed or unjustly punished by their parents' incarceration. We argue that proposals of this kind have problems with accounting for cases where it is intuitive that prison might create social injustices for children of prisoners. Therefore, we suggest that in addition to the question of whether children of prisoners are impermissibly harmed, we should ask whether the inequalities that these children endure because of their parent's incarceration are objectionable from a social justice perspective. To answer this latter question, we examine the negative effects associated with parental imprisonment from the perspective of luck egalitarianism. We develop a luck egalitarian account that incorporates insights from the philosophy of childhood. On our account, children of prisoners might endure two different types of objectionable inequalities, since they are often deprived of resources that are important for ensuring fair equality of opportunity in adulthood, but also because they are likely to suffer inequalities in terms of childhood welfare. After defending this account, we explore its implications for policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Allocating health care resources based on personal responsibility is a prominent and controversial idea. This article assesses the plausibility of such measures through the lens of luck egalitarianism, a prominent responsibility-sensitive theory of distributive justice. This article presents a framework of luck egalitarianism in health, which integrates other concerns of justice than health, is pluralist, and is compatible with a wide range of measures for giving lower priority to those deemed responsible. Applying this framework to oral health, the allocation of livers among potential transplant recipients and travel insurance demonstrates that this version of luck egalitarianism is a much more attractive and flexible theory than much of the contemporary discussion allows. This also pertains to its ability to provide plausible answers to two prominent critiques of harshness and intrusiveness. The discussion also shows that the luck egalitarian commitment to eliminating the influence of luck on people's lives is likely to require substantial redistribution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The idea of using responsibility in the allocation of healthcare resources has been criticized for, among other things, too readily abandoning people who are responsible for being very badly off. One response to this problem is that while responsibility can play a role in resource allocation, it cannot do so if it will leave those who are responsible below a "sufficiency" threshold. This paper considers first whether a view can be both distinctively sufficientarian and allow responsibility to play a role even for those who will be left with very poor health. It then draws several further distinctions that may affect the application of responsibility at this level. We conclude that a more plausible version of the sufficientarian view is to allow a role for responsibility where failure to do so will leave someone else who is not responsible below the sufficiency threshold. However, we suggest that individuals must exhibit "sufficient responsibility" in order for this to apply, involving both a sufficient level of control and an avoidable failure to respond adequately to reasons for action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Relational Egalitarianism focuses on the construction of equal social relationships between persons. It strongly opposes luck egalitarianism, which understands equality as a distributive ideal. In Cohen's theory of justice, luck egalitarianism and relational egalitarianism simultaneously exist, and Cohen provides arguments corresponding to each. In this paper, we explore the manifestation of tension between these two forms of egalitarianism in his theory. In addition, we also reconstruct some possible solutions provided by Cohen to soften this tension, including the three approaches of market mechanism, egalitarian ethos and value pluralism, and find them to be unsuccessful. This tension is a serious challenge that needs to be addressed in Cohen's theory of justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper begins with a simple illustration of the choice between individual and population strategies in population health policy. It describes the traditional approach on which the choice is to be made on the relative merits of the two strategies in each case. It continues by identifying two factors—our knowledge of the consequences of the epidemiological transition and the prevalence of responsibility-sensitive theories of distributive justice—that may distort our moral intuitions when we deliberate about the choice of appropriate risk-management strategies in population health. It argues that the confluence of these two factors may lead us to place too much emphasis on personal responsibility in health policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]