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Purpose Nigeria needs to improve its national identification coverage to support improved anti-money laundering and combating of financing of terrorism and proliferation (AML/CFT) measures. This study aims to examine its ongoing identification harmonization project, which seeks to create a central database for digital identification across designated entities. It identifies the key stakeholders in the project, progress to date as well as key challenges, especially relating to the inclusivity and privacy and data protection concerns of the current scheme to provide national identification numbers. Design/methodology/approach The authors apply a doctrinal research methodology and use the Principles on Identification for Sustainable Development to identify and reflect on key challenges. Findings The national identification harmonization project and the ongoing drive to register National Identity Numbers for Nigerians could provide valuable support for more effective and efficient AML/CFT identity verification and authentication. The project and processes, however, hold significant risks in relation to data protection. These are exacerbated by the absence of a comprehensive data protection framework. National identity data can be vulnerable to political abuse and targeting by bad actors. National identity data systems must, therefore, be protected by clear, fair and comprehensive privacy and data protection rules and appropriate and accountable governance mechanisms. While Nigeria is adopting and implementing the relevant framework, the NIMC can do more to advance data protection by supporting informed consent and compliance by all participants and publishing this information to build public trust in the system. It can also be disciplined about only collecting minimal and necessary personal data and printing only basic personal details such as name and age on the general multi-purpose ID card. The NIMC should furthermore improve access to the national identification number by streamlining the process of registration, including supporting same day registration and on-the-spot card printing; setting up more registration points as well as mobile registration to cut down queues; and increasing the range of registration agents and points to include schools, police stations and health facilities. Consideration for social, cultural and religious norms is also vital to appropriately accommodate the variety of groups and cultures in Nigeria. Research limitations/implications Research materials include government policy documents as well as newspaper articles and reports on more recent developments and experiences that are not yet reflected in more formal documents. The research materials, however, reflect both the intention of the government and the reported experiences of those registering for a National Identification Number. Practical implications This study identifies the practical steps that can be taken to enhance data protection and increase the inclusivity of the measures to provide Nigerians with National Identification Numbers. Social implications The recommendations that are made are aimed at increasing the inclusivity of the National Identification Number scheme and at providing improved protection of personal data of applicants for, and holders of, these numbers. Originality/value This study contributes to the policy discussion around the national identification harmonization project by applying as a lens key elements of the Principles on Identification for Sustainable Development that are relevant from a financial integrity perspective.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to analyze the Vietnamese laws and practices concerning the confiscation of proceeds of crime, especially in view of Vietnam’s obligations to meet the international standards on money laundering and terrorist financing, set by the Financial Action Task Force and relevant international conventions that Vietnam ratified. To limit the scope of this paper, the analysis focuses on the confiscation of proceeds of domestic crimes that do not require international legal assistance. This paper concludes with recommendations for improving the legal framework on criminal asset recovery in Vietnam. Design/methodology/approach This is a doctrinal study that considers the applicable legal framework. This study is supported by brief case studies of major cases involving the confiscation of proceeds of crime. Findings Vietnam has a functioning asset confiscation regime but gaps in the law, lack of financial investigation expertise and lack of focused investigative attention on asset preservation and confiscation are hampering its effectiveness. The key gaps can easily be closed with appropriate amendments to the law. These reforms should be combined with a dedicated skills development program to produce sufficient number of financial investigation experts and criminal asset management experts to support the regime. The training should extend to judicial officers to ensure an appropriate understanding of the asset confiscation law. Reforms such as these should follow on a comprehensive review of Vietnam’s law and practices relating to the confiscation and forfeiture of criminal assets. This review should extend to assets linked to the financing of terrorism and proliferation to ensure that Vietnam has a comprehensive regime to deal with criminal assets. Research limitations/implications This paper draws on publicly available information regarding the confiscation of proceeds of crime in Vietnam. Little data is available on asset confiscation and that prevents an in-depth assessment of the regime. Originality/value This paper highlights gaps in the current asset confiscation regime and proposes reforms and approaches that will ensure a more effective asset confiscation regime for Vietnam.

Financial regulators are challenged to respond to the innovation opportunities presented by financial technology (fintech). Current rules are not necessarily sufficient or effective to adequately regulate new business models and new products relating to innovations such as crypto assets or digital financial services. Regulators that fail to respond in a timely manner may drive innovation offshore and deprive their markets and consumers of appropriate, new services. To respond to new financial innovation, regulators have been establishing innovation hubs and regulatory sandboxes. Innovation hubs enable them to engage innovators more effectively. Sandboxes allow the products to be tested in a controlled environment and enable to regulator to consider whether existing laws are appropriate to regulate such products and, of not, what measures may be required. Sandboxes are however resource intensive and they hold a number of risks. Financial regulators are, of course, not alone in having to address the regulatory challenges of innovation. This article therefore also considers other non-financial regulatory experiences of innovative products and services, namely automated vehicles; emissions trading in China; and Uber and its clones, to consider whether those experiences hold lessons for financial regulators.

The Web of Data, the Internet of Things, and Industry 4.0 are converging, and society is challenged to ensure that appropriate regulatory responses can uphold the rule of law fairly and effectively in this emerging context. The challenge extends beyond merely submitting digital processes to the law. We contend that the 20th century notion of ‘legal order’ alone will not be suitable to produce the social order that the law should bring. The article explores the concepts of rule of law and of legal governance in digital and blockchain environments. We position legal governance from an empirical perspective, i.e., as an explanatory and validation concept to support the implementation of the rule of law in the new digital environments. As a novel contribution, this article (i) progresses some of the work done on the metarule of law and complements the SMART middle-out approach with an inside-out approach to digital regulatory systems and legal compliance models; (ii) sets the state-of-the-art and identifies the way to explain and validate legal information flows and hybrid agents’ behaviour; (iii) describes a phenomenological and historical approach to legal and political forms; and (iv) shows the utility of separating enabling and driving regulatory systems.

Purpose This study aims to consider the anti-money laundering/combating of financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime that applies to microfinance institutions (MFIs) and microfinance programmes and projects (MFPs) in Vietnam to identify ways in which to improve the alignment between financial inclusion and financial integrity objectives in relation to this sector. Design/methodology/approach This doctrinal study is informed by the Financial Action Task Force mutual evaluation methodology. Findings The AML/CFT regulatory framework for MFIs/MFPs is inadequate but improving. The money laundering and terrorist financing risks posed by microfinance are low and so is the capacity of many providers to comply with AML/CFT obligations. Given the low risk, there is space to simplify AML/CFT requirements for this sector in a manner that will better align financial inclusion and financial integrity policy objectives. Research limitations/implications This paper considers the implementation of AML/CFT obligations of MFIs/MFPs based on existing studies as well as own research relating to compliance and supervisory practices. Further empirical studies to determine for the whole microfinance sector could provide a more granular understanding of crime risks and compliance capacities in the sector. Practical implications AML/CFT regulators in Vietnam can take concrete steps to simplify the AML/CFT due diligence obligations of MFIs/MFPs and support these institutions to formalise and implement appropriate AML/CFT measures. Social implications MFIs/MFPs play a vital socio-economic role by providing financial services to the poor. Appropriate AML/CFT control measures can enable these providers to continue providing these services while strengthening economic formalisation and integrity goals of the government. Originality/value The paper provides novel supervisory perspectives on the AML/CFT regime in relation to MFIs/MFPs.

© 2020, Springer Nature Switzerland AG. We discuss how to use Defeasible Deontic Logic to provide a formal representation of the Commonwealth of Australia spent conviction schema (Part VII C of the Crimes Act (1914)). The formalisation is directly written and implemented in Turnip (a modern implementation of Defeasible Deontic Logic).

This article encapsulates selected themes from the Australian Data to Decisions Cooperative Research Centre’s Law and Policy program. It is the result of a discussion on the regulation of Big Data, especially focusing on privacy and data protection strategies. It presents four complementary perspectives stemming from governance, law, ethics, and computer science. Big, Linked, and Open Data constitute complex phenomena whose economic and political dimensions require a plurality of instruments to enhance and protect citizens’ rights. Some conclusions are offered in the end to foster a more general discussion.

Traditionally the integration of data from multiple sources is done on an ad-hoc basis for each analysis scenario and application. This is a solution that is inflexible, incurs high costs, leads to “silos” that prevent sharing data across different agencies or tasks, and is unable to cope with the modern environment, where workflows, tasks, and priorities frequently change. Operating within the Data to Decision Cooperative Research Centre (D2D CRC), the authors are currently involved in the Integrated Law Enforcement Project, which has the goal of developing a federated data platform that will enable the execution of integrated analytics on data accessed from different external and internal sources, thereby providing effective support to an investigator or analyst working to evaluate evidence and manage lines of inquiries in the investigation. Technical solutions should also operate ethically, in compliance with the law and subject to good governance principles Refereed/Peer-reviewed

This article encapsulates selected themes from the Australian Data to Decisions Cooperative Research Centre’s Law and Policy program. It is the result of a discussion on the regulation of Big Data, especially focusing on privacy and data protection strategies. It presents four complementary perspectives stemming from governance, law, ethics, and computer science. Big, Linked, and Open Data constitute complex phenomena whose economic and political dimensions require a plurality of instruments to enhance and protect citizens’ rights. Some conclusions are offered in the end to foster a more general discussion. This article contends that the effective regulation of Big Data requires a combination of legal tools and other instruments of a semantic and algorithmic nature. It commences with a brief discussion of the concept of Big Data and views expressed by Australian and UK participants in a study of Big Data use in a law enforcement and national security perspective. The second part of the article highlights the UN’s Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy interest in the themes and the focus of their new program on Big Data. UK law reforms regarding authorisation of warrants for the exercise of bulk data powers is discussed in the third part. Reflecting on these developments, the paper closes with an exploration of the complex relationship between law and Big Data and the implications for regulation and governance of Big Data.

Purpose – This paper aims to investigate the purpose, reach and effectiveness of the customer identification framework of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Design/methodology/approach – The article draws on relevant research and documents of the FATF, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the Alliance for Financial Inclusion to determine whether compliance with the standards and practices of the FATF would prevent anonymous usage of financial services. Findings – The FATF’s identification principles, guidance and practices resulted in processes that are largely bureaucratic and do not ensure that identity fraud is effectively prevented. Strict identification requirements on the other hand may impact on financial inclusion, leaving the FATF with little leeway to raise its standards. There are potential solutions, but they are longer-term and partial in nature. Originality/value – Current identification and verification practices affect the lives of millions of people around the globe. The measures are being enforced to ensure that users are appropriately identified. This article informs the debate by highlighting the weaknesses of the current approach.

Summary The Financial Action Task Force embraces financial inclusion as complementary to anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing, as it enhances transparency. This support is based on the premise that the increased use of formal financial services leads to a reduction of usage of informal services. We present evidence on eight African countries that both are not negatively associated. Moreover, informal employment and cash preference reduce the inclination to use mobile financial services. If an increase in transparency acts as disincentive to use formal services, the alignment of financial inclusion and integrity will fail.

Anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF) measure focus on the abuse by criminals of technology and new payment systems to hide the flows of illicit funds. The AML/CTF system itself, however, uses technology to monitor transactions, identify potential suspicious and unusual transactions and report them to the authorities. This chapter considers the AML/CTF framework, technology and ethical implications relating to customer monitoring and reporting. The AML/CTF framework, especially in relation to new payment methods such as mobile money, gives rise to privacy risks. Mobile money systems are capable of collecting and storing large amounts of data on clients. In countries that are subject to rule of law, this data is shared with the state within a legal framework. Many mobile money models are, however, operating in countries where the rule of law is weak. The ethical implications of providing access to the client data in both types of jurisdictions are often neglected by AML/CTF practitioners. This chapter discusses risk and risk management in the context of mobile money and highlights some of the complexities that face compliance officers who need to ensure compliance but also appropriate protection of legitimate interests of clients. With increasing international consensus that millions of socially vulnerable people should be included in the formal financial system, appropriate balancing of potentially competing interests is of increasing importance.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to identify key questions that should be addressed to enable the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to provide guidance regarding the alignment of anti‐money laundering, combating of financing of terror and financial inclusion objectives.Design/methodology/approachThe paper draws on relevant research and documents of the FATF to identify questions that are relevant to consider when it formulates guidance regarding the alignment between financial integrity and financial inclusion objectives.FindingsThe FATF advises that its risk‐based approach enables countries and institutions to further financial inclusion. It is, however, not clear what the FATF means when its uses the terms “risk” and “low risk”. It is also unclear whether current proposals for financial inclusion regulatory models will necessarily limit money laundering as well as terror financing risks to levels that can be described as “low”. The FATF will need to clarify its own thinking regarding low money laundering and low terror financing risk before it will be able to provide clear guidance to national regulators and financial institutions.Originality/valueThis paper was drafted to inform current FATF discussions regarding guidance on financial inclusion. The questions are relevant to all stakeholders in financial regulation.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate the level and nature of criminal abuse of financial products that are classified as posing a low anti‐money laundering/combating of financing of terrorists (AML/CFT) risk in South Africa to determine the effectiveness of the simplified due diligence measures that apply to these products.Design/methodology/approachThe paper presents empirical research on the views of bank officials and law enforcement officials regarding the criminal abuse of South African financial products that are subject to simplified customer due diligence controls.FindingsSouth Africa's AML/CFT laws allow certain deposit‐taking institutions and money remitters to implement simplified customer due diligence measures in relation to specific low‐risk products that are mainly designed to allow previously unbanked persons to access financial services. The paper finds that the products have been abused by criminals but that the incidence of such abuse and the amounts involved are low. The paper investigates possible weaknesses in the current system that allow limited criminal abuse to occur. It concludes with a number of guidelines that emerge from the study and are of value to regulators that wish to implement a similar system.Originality/valueThe South African AML/CFT scheme in relation to low‐risk products is of interest to many international regulators that are grappling with the interplay between effective AML/CFT controls and the impact of strict controls on the ability of socially and economically excluded persons to access appropriate financial services. This paper provides evidence that appropriately designed controls can facilitate financial inclusion while limiting the risk of criminal abuse.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate Financial Action Task Force (FATF)'s risk‐based guidance to combat money laundering and terrorist financing to determine its approach to the identification and management of low‐risk providers, products and transactions.Design/methodology/approachThe paper analyses the relevant FATF recommendations and its guidance notes and reflects on key questions for regulators and financial institutions.FindingsFATF has not defined “risk” for purposes of the risk‐based approach. The absence of a clear definition complicates the identification of low‐risk products. FATF do provide an example of a risk matrix that can be used to identify low‐risk banks, but the example is based on assumptions and generalisations that are not sustainable. In addition, it identifies certain low‐value transactions as “low risk” transactions. The paper reflects on the role of value as an indicator of risk and concludes with a number of suggestions to clarify the conceptual framework.Originality/valueLow‐risk products and transactions are often overlooked because the risk‐based approach focuses attention on high‐risk matters. Low‐risk products are however crucial to the efforts to increase financial inclusion. The paper identifies gaps in the current conceptual framework and indicates ways in which they can be addressed.

During the 1990s economic crime began to spiral in South Africa. This phenomenon coincided with the country's transition to a democratic state. The article outlines a number of steps that South Africa took to align its laws with international standards and to improve the legal tools of law enforcement to address the crime wave. A number of successes, for instance the improvement in tax morality, are pointed out but it is argued that co-ordination and co-operation between law enforcement agencies require more attention.

RESEARCH HANDBOOKS IN FINANCIAL LAW Series Editor: Rosa Lastra, Queen Mary, University of London, UK This important new Handbook series presents high quality, original reference works that cover a range of subjects within the ...

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between anti‐money laundering (“AML”) and combating of financing of terrorism (“CFT”) customer due diligence (“CDD”) measures in the financial services industry, and exclusion from financial services.Design/methodology/approachAn introduction to the concept of financial exclusion is provided as well as an overview of international AML/CFT CDD standards. The paper highlights a softening of national CDD measures in South Africa and the UK to lessen the impact on financial exclusion.FindingsCountries should consider the impact that CDD requirements may have on financial exclusion when they design their AML/CFT systems.Research limitations/implicationsMulti‐discilinary research is required to improve the understanding of the broader interaction between AML/CFT objectives, financial exclusion and economic development, especially in countries with a large informal economy.Practical implicationsCDD requirements may unnecessarily exacerbate financial exclusion if they are not formulated with care to reflect the reality of the particular country setting.Originality/valueThe paper offers insights into the international standards resulting to the identification of clients and the experiences in the UK and South Africa regarding the implementation of these standards on financial exclusion.

Reports a study by the Centre for the Study of Economic Crime at Rand Afrikaans University into the characteristics of money laundering schemes in South Africa; these were discussed at a workshop on December 5 2001. Outlines the 1998 Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA), the 1992 Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act and their general money laundering provisions, including negligence and intent, defence and penalties; also the racketeering provisions of POCA. Moves on to the reporting of suspicious transactions, where the POCA provisions will be repealed by the new Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA); this covers general obligations, secrecy and confidentiality, penalties, preventing tipping‐off, and reporting statistics. Gives examples of the schemes themselves, which fall into broad themes: purchase of goods and properties, abuse of businesses and financial institutions, cash and currency, and the informal sector; case studies include S v Dustigar, Motsepe v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, S v Van Zyl, S v Caswell, and Director of Public Prosecutions: Cape of Good Hope v Bathgate.

Outlines the Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA) 38 of 2001, which completes the broad legislative framework for money laundering in South Africa. Describes the functions of the Financial Intelligence Centre, including its liaison with the South African Revenue Service, and the Money Laundering Advisory Council; both of these bodies were established by FICA. Reviews the existing legislation such as the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992, and the 1996 Proceeds of Crime Act, which was repealed by the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998. Points out the gaps in the legislative framework before FICA; however, over 2,500 suspicious transaction reports have been filed with the police since 1997, and South Africa has had strict exchange control for some time, with gambling, the stock exchange and banking all locked into compliance.