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When individuals eat while distracted, they may compensate by consuming more afterwards. Here, we examined the effect of eating while driving, and explored potential underlying mechanisms. Participants (N = 116, 73.3% female) were randomly allocated to complete a driving simulation (distraction condition) or to watch someone else drive (control condition) while consuming 10g (50.8 kcal) of potato chips. Afterwards, participants rated the taste intensity and hedonic experience, reported stress levels, and were then given the opportunity to eat more chips. As hypothesized, participants consumed more chips after the driving simulation. Stress levels were higher in the driving compared to control condition, but were inversely related to consumption amount, ruling out stress as explanatory mechanism. Saltiness ratings differed between the driving and passive viewing condition, only when controlling for stress. The current findings converge with earlier work showing that distracted eating can drive overconsumption, which in turn can lead to long-term health implications. Limitations, implications and potential directions are discussed.

In the past decades, affective science has overwhelmingly demonstrated the unique properties of affective information to bias our attention, memory, and decisions. At the same time, accumulating evidence suggests that neutral and affective representations rely on the same working memory substrates for the selection and computation of information and that they are therefore restricted by the same capacity limitations that these substrates impose. Here, we integrate these insights into a working memory model of affective processing (WMAP). Drawing on competitive access models of working memory, we discuss its role in the various stages of affective processing, from attentional selection to maintenance and memory storage, and resulting feelings and actions. We end our overview with some open questions and future directions.

Using longitudinal data before and during the first six months of the COVID-19 pandemic for a representative sample of Dutch households, we examined the role of financial stress, defined as the subjective experience of lacking financial resources to cope with demands, in mental health changes. Also, we examined financial stress and mental health relations with households’ income, savings, and debts. The data revealed that average mental health did not change during the first six months of the pandemic but showed considerable underlying heterogeneity. Results showed that financial stress changes significantly explained this heterogeneity. Increases in financial stress predicted decreases in mental health, whereas decreases in financial stress predicted increases in mental health. While income did not explain financial stress changes, fewer savings and more debts were related to increased financial stress, which was, in turn, negatively related to mental health. We discuss the implications of our findings for mental health care and financial security policy and provide suggestions for future research.

Recent advances in the computational neuroscience of reward learning have produced a new perspective on happiness as an inference mechanism. According to this perspective, happiness serves to signal an increase in the overall availability of reward in one’s environment, and helps adjust expectations accordingly. Here we discuss how this normative perspective on happiness can help ground other key concepts within the realm of positive affect which to date have lacked precise definitions. In particular, we propose a distinction between happiness as an emotion and happiness as a mood. Then, we define the respective roles of happiness and pleasure and explain how each contributes to anticipatory and consummatory affective responses. Finally, we examine how different types of positive affect might reflect inferences about different types of reward and punishment. The implications and proposals highlighted offer fertile grounds for future research into the function and dynamics of positive affect.

Approach and avoidance tendencies have helped explain phenomena as diverse as addiction (Mogg, Field, & Bradley, 2005), phobia (Rinck & Becker, 2007), and intergroup discrimination (Bianchi, Carnaghi, & Shamloo, 2018; Degner, Essien, & Reichardt, 2016). When the original approach-avoidance task (AAT; Solarz, 1960) that measures these tendencies was redesigned to run on regular desktop computers, it made the task much more flexible but also sacrificed some important behavioral properties of the original task—most notably its reliance on physical distance change (Chen & Bargh, 1999). Here, we present a new, mobile version of the AAT that runs entirely on smartphones and combines the flexibility of modern tasks with the behavioral properties of the original AAT. In addition, it can easily be deployed in the field and, next to traditional reaction time measurements, includes the novel measurement of response force. In two studies, we demonstrate that the mobile AAT can reliably measure known approach-avoidance tendencies toward happy and angry faces both in the laboratory and in the field.

The rapidly increasing prevalence of overweight and obesity has heightened the need for a better understanding of obesity-related eating patterns and dietary behaviours. Recent work suggests that distracted eating is causally related to increased immediate and later food, pushing the need for a better understanding of the prevalence of distracted consumption and how this relates to body weight. To extract insights in the relationship between demographics, daily consumption settings, and BMI, we performed secondary data analyses on data from 1011 individuals representative of the Dutch population (adults, 507F, BMI 17–50 kg/m2). The most commonly reported distractions were talking to others (32.7%) and watching television (21.7%). Only 18.4% of respondents reported no distractions during meals. To examine how different distractions related to BMI, we performed OLS regression which showed, among other things, that watching tv while eating lunch (η2 = 0.37) and working during dinner were associated with a higher BMI (η2 = 1.63). To examine the robustness of these findings, machine learning techniques were used. A random forest analysis (RMSE = 4.09) showed that next to age and education level, distraction during lunch and snack was amongst the largest predictors of BMI. Multiple linear regression with lasso penalty (RMSE = 4.13) showed that specifically watching tv while eating lunch or snacks was associated with a higher BMI. In conclusion, our analyses confirmed the assumption that people are regularly distracted during their daily meals, with distinct distractors relating to BMI. These findings provide a starting point for evidence-based recommendations on which consumption settings are associated with healthier eating patterns and body weight.

Rising student debt, overborrowing among Dutch students, and the complexity of students’ loan decisions signal the need for interventions that evoke more thoughtful loan decisions among Dutch students. In a large field experiment (N= 48,700) we addressed this need by testing interventions that encourage them to recalibrate their monthly loan amount. We compared a control condition to four interventions, in which we provided students with different kinds of personalised information about the future costs of their student loan and about how easily the height can be adjusted. Although all interventions increased recalibration, the intervention that provided students with the most elaborate personalised information about the future costs of their student loan yielded the most stable effects. These students were more likely to decrease their monthly loan amount (OR=1.28 [95% CI: 1.08, 1.52]), and when they did, they decreased it to a larger extent (B=−4.28 [95% CI: −7.99, −0.57]) than students in the control condition. Limitations and policy implications will be discussed.

Social welfare aims to support financially vulnerable households by protecting them from financial shocks and providing them with a basic standard of living. Many eligible households, however, do not take up social welfare. We present the results of in-depth interviews with 31 members of financially vulnerable households in two large Dutch cities about their experiences with welfare. We examined the role that money played in their lives, what inhibited them from taking up social welfare, and how they sought support. For many interviewed households, money was a source of stress. We found that the fear of reclaims and mistrust in government institutions were the main inhibitors for participating in welfare programs. Whereas the experience of shame and stigma were substantial inhibitors for claiming local welfare benefits, they were not for participating in national welfare programs. Both formal and informal help promoted welfare participation, but many participants lacked access to both forms of help. We discuss policies that could decrease the uncertainty associated with benefits receipt and give directions for future research.

Financial well-being is a desirable state as it benefits individuals, families, organizations, and society, and these benefits reach beyond the financial domain. We assessed financial well-being as two components (current financial stress and expected future financial security) and used data from a representative sample of adults in the United Kingdom (n = 411). Our study provides novel insights based on preregistered hypotheses, method, and analysis plan on the Open Science Framework. We hypothesized that both executive functioning and financial self-efficacy are positively related to financial well-being via positive financial behaviors. We also hypothesized that executive functioning moderated the indirect relation of financial self-efficacy with financial well-being, and that financial self-efficacy moderated the indirect relation of executive functioning with financial well-being. As predicted, results showed that financial self-efficacy was strongly positively related to financial well-being via positive financial behaviors. Our results did not show that executive functioning was related to financial well-being via positive financial behaviors, nor that executive functioning or financial self-efficacy operated as moderators. This study provides possible strategies for financial practitioners and service providers, among others, to help individuals and families better their financial behaviors and their financial well-being.

When do children, adolescents, and adults decide to punish fairness violations? Two studies with 9‐year‐old children, 13‐year‐old adolescents, and adults investigated whether the link between unfairness and punishment was mediated by negative emotional reactions (measured through galvanic skin responses and emotion ratings). Study 1 (N = 117) examined this question in the context of second‐party punishment, where the punisher is a direct victim of the violation. Study 2 (N = 119) assessed third‐party punishment, where the punisher is an observer, unaffected by the violation. In each study, participants were presented with seven distributions of points, which differed in how fairly the points were allocated between a proposer and receiver, and had to decide whether to punish these distributions. While the unfairness of the distribution strongly influenced second‐ and third‐party punishment in all age groups, the mediating role of emotional appraisals (i.e., galvanic skin responses vs. emotion ratings) depended on whether or not the punisher was personally affected by the violation and age. Thus, negative emotions primarily motivate costly punishment when the punisher is affected by the violation or when an unaffected third‐party punisher takes the perspective of the victim of a violation, an ability that develops between childhood and adolescence.

Do people in need share less with others? And what if the recipient is in need too? In two experiments, we addressed these questions by testing whether fasting-induced and self-rated hunger influence allocations in a dictator game in which allocators distribute food (cookies) between themselves and a recipient. In line with rational choice theory, which posits that a deprived good should increase in value (Smith, 1759; Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944), findings from the current studies consistently showed that participants shared fewer cookies when they were, and/or perceived themselves to be, in a food-deprived state. Across studies, participants moreover seemed to project their own hunger onto the recipient's state, as emotional perspective taking accounts propose, but this did not vary between fasting and control conditions, and did not translate into actual sharing differences, suggesting that these formed no basis for other-regarding decisions. Whether or not participants accounted for the recipient's hunger when redistributing foods, depended on whether they possessed actual knowledge of the recipient's deprivation state, such that participants engaged in greater sharing when they knew the recipient had been fasting (Study 2), but not in the absence of such knowledge (Study 1). Taken together, the results involving the need state of the recipient seem to provide most support for the need principle, that suggests that people share out of distributive justice considerations, where they take into account the recipient's need (Deutsch, 1975).

Recent research on choice architecture has highlighted the role of external aspects such as stimulus proximity or availability on consumption. How such external factors interact with internal, intraindividual factors, however, is very poorly understood. Here we show how the wanting for palatable food emerges from the interplay of one key external factor, availability, and two key internal factors central to motivation science, need state and learning history. Across three experiments in the food domain, we find converging evidence for a main effect of stimulus availability which is qualified in theoretically predicted ways by a three-way interaction such that food desire peaks when the availability of tempting food stimuli is accompanied by high need states and a positive learning experience. A pooled analysis across the three studies supported this general conclusion. We conclude that nudging effects are strongest when external factors of choice architecture synergize with internal factors in critical ways.

The present research examined whether cognitive load modulates the neural processing of appetitive, high-calorie food stimuli. In a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, participants quickly categorized high-calorie and low-calorie food pictures versus object pictures as edible or inedible while they concurrently performed a digit-span task that varied between low and high cognitive load (memorizing six digits vs. one digit). In line with predictions, the digit-span task engaged the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) when cognitive load was high compared to low. Moreover, exposure to high-calorie compared to low-calorie food pictures led to increased activation in the nucleus accumbens (NAcc), but only when cognitive load was low and not when it was high. In addition, connectivity analyses showed that load altered the functional coupling between NAcc and right DLPFC during presentation of the high-calorie versus low-calorie food pictures. Together, these findings indicate that loading the cognitive system moderates hedonic brain responses to high-calorie food pictures via interactions between NAcc and DLPFC. Our findings are consistent with the putative cognitive nature of food motivation. Implications for future research are discussed. Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (10.3758/s13415-018-0579-3) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Financial problems have a large negative impact on people’s lives. It is therefore important that they engage in healthy financial behavior, for example, putting money aside in savings to cover unexpected and necessary expenses. Saving money, however, does not come easy for many people and they can need some help with it. In the present chapter, we address two behavioral interventions that aim at increasing people’s savings. First, we address an intervention that is very effective in increasing retirement savings by successfully bypassing or exploiting several psychological hurdles that usually withhold people from saving. Next, we discuss an intervention that aims at increasing savings for a specific goal by facilitating goal progress monitoring. Together, these interventions show that using theoretically derived insights from social psychology and behavioral economics is very valuable in helping people to make healthy financial decisions.

In the present research we examined whether the psychological meaning of people's categorisation goals affects facial muscle activity in response to facial expressions of emotion. We had participants associate eye colour (blue, brown) with either a personality trait (extraversion) or a physical trait (light frequency) and asked them to use these associations in a speeded categorisation task of angry, disgusted, happy and neutral faces while assessing participants' response times and facial muscle activity. We predicted that participants would respond differentially to the emotional faces when the categorisation criteria allowed for inferences about a target's thoughts, feelings or behaviour (i.e., when categorising extraversion), but not when these lacked any social meaning (i.e., when categorising light frequency). Indeed, emotional faces triggered facial reactions to facial expressions when participants categorised extraversion, but not when they categorised light frequency. In line with this, only when categorising extraversion did participants' response times indicate a negativity bias replicating previous results. Together, these findings provide further evidence for the contextual nature of people's selective responses to the emotions expressed by others.

Contains fulltext : 168789.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Closed access) People derive their sense of belonging from perceptions of being a moral person. Research moreover suggests that social cues of rejection rapidly influence visual scanning, and result in avoidant gaze behavior, especially in socially anxious individuals. With the current eye-tracking experiment, we therefore examined whether moral integrity threats and affirmations influence selective avoidance of social threat, and how this varies with individual differences in social anxiety. Fifty-nine participants retrieved a memory of a past immoral, moral, or neutral act. Next, participants passively viewed angry, happy, and neutral faces, while we recorded how often they first fixated on the eyes. In addition, we administered the Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (1987). Participants first fixated less on angry eyes compared to happy or neutral eyes when their moral integrity was threatened, and this selective avoidance was enhanced with increasing social anxiety. Following a moral affirmation, however, participants no longer selectively avoided the eyes of angry faces, regardless of individual differences in social anxiety. The results thus suggest that both low and high socially anxious people adjust their social gaze behavior in response to threats and affirmations of their moral integrity, pointing to the importance of the social context when considering affective processing biases. 8 p.

Social neuroscience aims to understand the biological systems that underlie people’s thoughts, feelings and actions in light of the social context in which they operate. Over the past few decades, social neuroscience has captured the interest of scholars, practitioners, and experts in other disciplines, as well as the general public who more and more draw upon the insights and methods of social neuroscience to explain, predict and change behavior. With the popularity of the field growing, it has become increasingly important to consider the validity of social neuroscience findings as well as what questions it can and cannot address. In the present review article, we examine the contribution of social neuroscience to economics, health, and law, three domains with clear societal relevance. We address the concerns that the extrapolation of neuroscientific results to applied social issues raises within each of these domains, and we suggest guidelines and good practices to circumvent these concerns.

Traditionally, self-control research has put a strong focus on the mechanisms that support the control of behavior in the face of temptation. This emphasis in the field has led to some neglect of desire as an impelling force that needs to be controlled. However, the focus appears to be shifting, as recent research has led to novel insights into the nature of desire. In this review, we integrate these insights into how desire emerges, how it operates, and how it may best be controlled. Drawing on competitive-access models of working memory and dynamical reprocessing models, we highlight, among other factors, the role of top-down attentional resources in preventing the early conscious processing and subsequent escalation of desire.

In the present study we examined the role of four specific forms of reappraisal in people's overestimation of their future experiences of anger and sadness. Results show that forecasters predicted to experience more intense anger and sadness following social exclusion than experiencers actually felt. This impact bias was shown in both the overall intensity of these emotions and their associated response tendencies. Results also show that forecasters indicated less reappraisal of the situation than experiencers actually employ. Moreover, for experiencers, reappraisal (i.e., relativisation) of social exclusion decreased their experience of anger, whereas forecasters' predicted reappraisal was not related to their forecasted experience of anger. These findings add importantly to earlier research by indicating how a specific emotion regulatory process (i.e., reappraisal) is related to the impact bias in affective forecasting.

Item does not contain fulltext Research has shown that social exclusion has devastating psychological, physiological, and behavioral consequences. However, little is known about possible ways to shield individuals from the detrimental effects of social exclusion. The present study, in which participants were excluded during a ball-tossing game, examined whether (reminders of) secure attachment relationships could attenuate neurophysiological pain- and stress-related responses to social exclusion. Social exclusion was associated with activation in brain areas implicated in the regulation and experience of social distress, including areas in the lateral and medial prefrontal cortex, ventral anterior cingulate cortex, and hypothalamus. However, less activation in these areas was found to the extent that participants felt more securely attached to their attachment figure. Moreover, the psychological presence (i.e., salience) of an attachment figure attenuated hypothalamus activation during episodes of social exclusion, thereby providing insight into the neural mechanisms by which attachment relationships may help in coping with social stress.

The present research demonstrates that the attention bias to angry faces is modulated by how people categorize these faces. Since facial expressions contain psychologically meaningful information for social categorizations (i.e., gender, personality) but not for non-social categorizations (i.e., eye-color), angry facial expression should especially capture attention during social categorization tasks. Indeed, in three studies, participants were slower to name the gender of angry compared to happy or neutral faces, but not their color (blue or green; Study 1) or eye-color (blue or brown; Study 2). Furthermore, when different eye-colors were linked to a personality trait (introversion, extraversion) versus sensitivity to light frequencies (high, low), angry faces only slowed down categorizations when eye-color was indicative of a social characteristic (Study 3). Thus, vigilance for angry facial expressions is contingent on people's categorization goals, supporting the perspective that even basic attentional processes are moderated by social influences.

Whereas attentional interference of negative information has previously been assumed to be automatic, the present research hypothesised that this effect depends on the availability of working-memory resources. In two experiments, participants judged the gender of angry versus happy faces. Working-memory load was manipulated by the presence or absence of a math task (Study 1) or mental rehearsal of a one- versus 8-digit number (Study 2). The results showed that angry faces interfered more with gender naming than happy faces, but only when working-memory load was low. As such, attentional interference of negative stimulus features can be modulated by top-down attentional control processes.

People who are sensitive to food temptations are prone to weight gain and obesity in food-rich environments. Understanding the factors that drive their desire to eat is key to limiting their reactions to available food. This study tested whether individual differences in sensitivity to hedonic food cues are cognitively based and, accordingly, can be regulated by blocking cognitive resources. To this end, one lab study (Study 1; N = 91) and one field study (Study 2; N = 63) measured sensitivity to hedonic food cues using the Power of Food Scale (PFS; Lowe et al., 2009) and assessed participants' appetitive responses to high-calorie food options. To test the role of cognitive elaboration of food cues, participants completed a menu-selection task to induce food cravings and then were free to elaborate those cravings (control group) or were blocked from doing so by cognitive distraction (playing Tetris, solving puzzles; experimental group). Compared to non-sensitive participants, sensitive participants displayed a greater attentional bias to high-calorie food (Study 1), reported stronger cravings (Study 2), and more often chose an unhealthy snack (Studies 1 & 2), but only when they had not been distracted. When distracted, all participants were similarly unresponsive to high-calorie food. This finding suggests that temptation can be effectively controlled by blocking people's cognitive resources, even for people highly sensitive to hedonic food cues.

Costly third-party interventions have been regarded as hallmarks of moral behavior, because they are unlikely to be motivated by self-interest. This research investigated the cognitive and emotional processes underlying two types of costly third-party interventions by manipulating incidental emotions and attention focus. In Study 1, we investigated the effect of incidental anger on third-party punishment decisions. Study 2 addressed the effect of incidental anger on third-party compensation decisions. In both studies, participants were induced to either an angry or neutral emotion and then had to wait or were distracted before engaging in third-party interventions. In Study 1, angry participants punished highly unequal distributions significantly more than those in the neutral emotion condition. In Study 2, angry participants compensated highly unfair distributions significantly less than those in a neutral emotion. In both studies, the effect of incidental anger was only significant in the wait, not the distraction condition. Study 3 again focused on third-party compensation decisions. Participants were induced to either a self-focused anger or an other-focused anger emotion, and attention focus (wait, distraction) was manipulated experimentally. Those in the other-focused anger condition compensated significantly more than participants in the self-focused anger condition. These results indicate that (self-focused) incidental anger led to antagonistic responses. Incidental anger was only associated with higher third-party compensation when it included a focus on a suffering other. For incidental emotions to bias subsequent decisions requires attentional resources.

The present research examined whether and how loading working memory can attenuate negative mood. In three experiments, participants were exposed to neutral, weakly negative, or strongly negative pictures followed by a task and a mood scale. Working memory demands were varied by manipulating task presence (Study 1), complexity (Study 2), and predictability (Study 3). Participants in all three experiments reported less negative moods in negative trials with high compared to low working memory demand. Working memory demands did not affect mood in the neutral trials. When working memory demands were high, participants no longer reported more negative moods in response to strongly negative pictures than to weakly negative pictures. These findings suggest that loading working memory prevents mood-congruent processing, and thereby promotes distraction from negative moods. © 2007 American Psychological Association.

In the present study, we examined the impact of emotion regulation on the intensity bias in guilt and shame. Fifty-two undergraduates either forecasted their emotions and emotion regulation following a guilt- and shame-eliciting situation or reported their actual experienced emotions and employed emotion regulation. Results showed a clear intensity bias, that is, forecasters predicted to experience more guilt and shame than experiencers actually experienced. Furthermore, results showed that forecasters predicted to employ less down-regulating emotion regulation (i.e. less acceptance) and more up-regulating emotion regulation (i.e. more rumination) than experiencers actually employed. Moreover, results showed that the intensity differences between forecasted and experienced guilt and shame could be explained (i.e. were mediated) by the differences between forecasted and actually employed emotion regulation (i.e. acceptance and rumination). These findings provide support for the hypothesis that the intensity bias can—at least in part—be explained by the misprediction of future emotion regulation.

Item does not contain fulltext In recent years, people have tended to pay less attention to their meals, often consuming them while engaging in other activities. At the same time, foods have become increasingly sweet and salty. We therefore investigated how performing concurrent activities affects taste perception and how this relates to actual consumption. Participants tasted sour, sweet, and salty substances in various concentrations under differing task loads. Our results demonstrated that under high task load (relative to low task load), participants rated the substances as less intense, consumed more of the substances, and preferred stronger tastants. Our findings suggest that increased task load reduces people’s taste perception by limiting attentional capacity to assess taste intensity and that people adjust their consumption accordingly. 8 p.

The present study tested the hypothesis that facilitated processing of threatening faces depends on working memory load. Participants judged the gender of angry versus happy faces while event-related brain potentials were recorded. Working memory load was manipulated within subjects by the mental rehearsal of one- versus eight-digit numbers. Behavioral results showed that the relative slow-down to angry compared to happy faces in the gender-naming task (i.e., the negativity bias) was eliminated under high working memory load. Under low (but not high) load, N2 amplitudes were smaller to angry compared to happy faces. Moreover, high load reduced LPP amplitude and eliminated the enhanced LPP to angry compared to happy faces that were present under low load. These results suggest that working memory load improves attentional control, and reduces sustained attention for distracting negative expressions. Taken together, these findings demonstrate that facilitated processing of threatening cues may be contingent on cognitive resources.

Item does not contain fulltext The emotion of disgust can influence people’s moral judgments, even if this emotion objectively is unrelated to the moral judgment in question. The present work demonstrates that attentional control regulates this effect. In three studies, disgust was induced. In an unrelated part of the studies, participants then judged a moral transgression. Disgust resulted in more severe moral judgments when attentional control (either measured by means of individual predisposition or manipulated with experimental control) was weak as opposed to strong (Studies 1-3). Findings further showed that attentional control mediated the positive relation between the intensity of participants’ disgust responses and the severity of their moral judgments (Study 2). Moreover, attentional control has its effects through the regulation of affective processing (Study 3). Taken together, the findings suggest that unrelated influences of disgust on moral judgments are contingent on the attention system. 10 p.