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This article reconsiders one of the most important theories of romantic love in contemporary philosophy, the theory of love as union. Drawing on observations from transpersonal research, the article raises the question whether it is not worthwhile to accept, at least partially, a strong sense of union in the context of love. Thus the article takes a position that is not taken by anyone in contemporary philosophy. In this context, the article also briefly analyses one of the most important variants of love as union, a union with God. At the end, the suggestion is made that it makes more sense to talk about connections rather than relations in the case of fulfilled love.

This article not only mentions spiritual anarchism nominally, as do so many previous articles, but tries to define it as precisely as possible. The definition assumes that the self itself can be a source of unjustifiable authority and a limitation to freedom, and that spiritual anarchism is nothing more than being open to that which transegoically transcends our narrow perspective. The article critically revisits previous overviews of spiritual anarchism, and itself proposes to take into account traditions that have been neglected. Finally, the article reverses the approach; that is, it considers how some of our spiritual practices can be made more anarchistic, including meditation, the psychedelic experience and the mystical experience.

This article analyzes Quentin Meillassoux’s concept of cessation. First, the article argues that this concept plays a decisive role in Meillassouxian philosophy. Second, by taking into consideration medieval and early modern debates on annihilation, it critically examines the conclusions elaborated in After Finitude. After that, it conceptualizes the relation between absolute time and absolute contingency, keeping in mind the critical reception of Meillassoux’s philosophy. Finally, the article turns to his insights into death and resurrection, and it confronts them with phenomenological theories of mortality. The conclusion is that Meillassoux faces several essential difficulties with regard to the concept of cessation that seem to be unsalvageable.

This chapter looks at the authoritarian regimes led by Viktor Orbán in Hungary and Aleksandar Vučić in Serbia. We examine not only the obvious similarities but also the significant differences between them. In terms of the interpretative framework adopted here, we will analyse political and economic changes as mutually related processes. In other words, the transformations in the general behaviour of political elites are addressed in conjunction with the underlying social structures. Particular attention is paid to these regimes’ predecessors, i.e. the background to the Orbán and Vučić governments’ rise to power. Specifically, in the 2000s, both the Hungarian and the Serbian governing parties pursued policies that were both pretty undemocratic and socially disastrous. Thus, the authoritarian so-called solutions offered by both Orbán and Vučić during the 2010s were very much a supposedly necessary response to the crisis of the 2000s. We place a great deal of emphasis on the special methods used by the Orbán and Vučić governments to cling to power. Following an analysis of economic issues, a section is devoted to their divergent relationships with the European Union, set against the backdrop of a broader international context. In spite of the fact that both Hungary and Serbia are receiving considerable development assistance and financial support for innovation (a substantial share of Hungary’s GDP comes from the EU), both countries have tense relations with their Western partners, and they are also facing severe criticism for their authoritarian policies. The chapter concludes that the EU’s contradictory, paternalistic carrot-and-stick approach is partly responsible for the deterioration of the situation. Finally, some cautious predictions are made about what the future might hold for Hungary and Serbia’s authoritarian regimes, taking into account the potential drivers of emancipatory change.

This article deals with the problem of cessation in Whitehead’s philosophy. By focusing on his Process and Reality, but also on his other works, different temporal, mereological and other aspects of perishing are analyzed, with special attention to the annihilation of subjective directness. The article also focuses on the complementary character of creation and cessation, by taking into consideration the various (subjective, objective, superjective or divine) layers of cessation. By relying upon the critical reception of Whitehead, the article formulates certain dilemmas with regard to the status of ceased events or entities, and also in relation to the general possibility and the discreet character of perishing., Članak se bavi pojmom nestajanja u Vajthetodovoj filozofiji. Fokusirajući se na njegovo delo Proces i stvarnost, ali i na neke druge radove, analiziraćemo različite temporalne, mereološke i druge aspekte prestanka, sa posebnim osvrtom na anihilaciju subjektivne usmerenosti. Takođe, posvećujemo posebnu pažnju komplementarnom karakteru stvaranja i nestajanja, uzimajući u obzir različite (subjektivne, objektivne, superjektivne ili božanske) slojeve prestanka. Oslanjujući se na kritičku recepciju Vajtheda, pokušaćemo da formulišemo neke dileme u pogledu statusa prekinutih događaja ili entiteta, sa osvrtom na opštu nužnost i diskretni karakter nestajanja.

Our presentation will consist of two parts. The first part will focus on the ambivalences of Rousseau's republican freedom and critique the interpretation of Rousseau offered by Isaiah Berlin. Berlin's interpretation ignores essential aspects, including the fact that the social contract itself, as the preservation of citizens, does not simply manifest positive freedom. Similarly, the more obviously republican thought, that freedom is not being subjected to the arbitrary will of other agents, embodies a complex concept of freedom. The complexity of the Rousseauian republican concept of freedom, with its multiplex combination of positive and negative aspects, is revealed when we take into consideration the various layers of Rousseau's quadrotomy of freedom (natural freedom, civil freedom, democratic freedom, moral freedom), without resorting to reductionist interpretative strategies. Rousseau will also be analyzed as an advocate of freedom as non-domination and in the role of watching over and critiquing the government. Based on this analysis and in light of the discussion about the positive and negative aspects of Rousseau’s conception of republican freedom, the second part will examine Hegel's critique of Rousseau. It will be demonstrated that while Hegel does indeed resolve some of the paradoxes of republican freedom, which he implicitly identified through his criticism of Rousseau, he introduces new ones within his political philosophy. At the same time, it will be shown that when the negative aspect of Rousseau's conception of republican freedom is taken into account some of Hegel's criticisms directed at Rousseau’s ‘general will’ have merit and cannot be reduced to a mere misreading as is often done.

This paper looks at Thomas Szanto’s theory of hatred that suggests that hatred has an indeterminate affective focus and that it derives its intensity from the commitment to the attitude itself. Contrary to Szanto’s theses, this paper claims that the hated properties are not necessarily fuzzy. On the contrary, in many cases we can clearly reconstruct the quasi-rational genesis of hatred, by relying on the deep structures behind the social dynamics (as demonstrated by the example of anti-Semitism). Furthermore, the paper states that even though in certain cases hatred is a truly empty of content, these cases are marginal in comparison to other, more important forms of hatred., Članak se fokusira na teoriju mržnje kod Tomasa Santa koja sugeriuše da mržnja nema jasan afektivni fokus, te da njen intentizet proističe iz zalaganja za sam intencionalni stav mržnje. Za razliku od Santove teze, članak trvrdi da omražena svojstva nisu nužno nejasna. Naprotiv, u mnogim slučajevim se precizno može rekonstruisati kvazi-racionalna geneza mržnje, oslanjajući se na duboke strukture iza društvene dinamike (kao što pokazuje primer antisemitizma). Nadalje, članak konstatuje da iako je istina da je u izvesnim slučjavima mržnja bez sadržaja, ovi slučajevi su marginalni u odnosu na druge, značajnije forme mržnje

This article is a review of the contemporary ‘leftist’ republican project. The project stands on two legs, and we examine them both in turn. The first leg is a novel reading of history. This reading suggests, on the one hand that, contrary to some popular assumptions, republicanism does have a leftist, even a radical stream. But on the other hand, it also suggests that several authors and movements that did not self-identify as republicans actually did, in fact, employ a characteristically republican thinking. The second leg of the project is a normative one. It is essentially an attempt by political philosophers to demonstrate that there is something in republican theory from which all these leftist, even radical streams spring forth. Primarily, it is suggested that it is republicanism’s sensitivity to the freedom-restricting role of great inequalities of power that provides the normative resource for the development of a characteristically republican critique of capital and capitalism. We briefly review the main arguments in favor of these claims, and also, as a conclusion, raise a few challenges that the ‘leftist’ republican project potentially faces.

This chapter analyzes self-governing Yugoslavia in the context of capitalism. Regarding the problem of capitalism in socialist world, the practice of the former Yugoslavia cannot be ignored. The socialist Yugoslavia was predetermined to be qualified as capitalist. The Yugoslav leadership developed: (a) self-government, (b) elements of market-biased socialism, and (c) openness to the international economy or the integration in the world market. Its economy achieved remarkable results by the mid-1960s. Some notable economists compliment the results and suggest that the model is sustainable. However, since the mid-1960s, regressive tendencies have emerged that perpetuate significant social dissatisfaction. In 1968, students protested against the state of Yugoslav socialism, believing that it had absorbed capitalism. Others felt that Yugoslav socialism had not sufficiently developed market-based socialism. There were authors that argued that Yugoslav socialism had become capitalist but without capitalist rationality. In the 1970s, the de iure existing federation became a de facto confederation with closed national economies. The chapter discusses the presence of elements of capitalism in this form of socialism based on (a) dependence on the world market, (b) banks as the institutionalization of “financial mode of capital,” and (c) the existence of perpetuated unemployment.

Retrospection and transformation of the phenomena of criticism and crisis in social theory in recent decades have led to the weakening and even “illegitimate” renunciation of the said doublet. The paper presents an analysis of the renewal of discourse on criticism/crisis and its effects with special consideration of the possibilities of structural criticism. We included several authors of recent analyses as well as the viewpoints that have led to reconsideration of historical and analytical dynamics of two categories, structure and conjuncture, as a form of analysis of current structural processes in terms of structural analysis and criticism. The paper comprises three parts. The first part is a reflection on the reason criticism and crisis have been subjected to different processes of derogation despite their original connection. In the second part, we show the effects of different ways that crisis has manifested itself in capitalism and explain its dispersive and “non-punctual” modalities. The third part raises the question of chances of reuniting the crisis and “immanent criticism” based on structural criticism, and we further articulate its connections with immanent criticism. Structural criticism is viewed as a connection between immanent criticism and transcendent orientation that is focused on the reconnection between crisis and criticism, the elements related to capitalism., Preispitivanje i transformacija fenomena kritike i krize u društvenoj teoriji su poslednjih de cenija doveli do slabljenja pa i do delegitimacijskog osporavanja navedenog dubleta. U radu se razmatraju mogućnosti obnove diskursa o kritici/krizi s mogućim delatnim učincima, uz poseban osvrt na mogućnosti strukturalne kritike.Različiti autori recentnih analiza se uzima ju u obzir, te se razmatraju stanovišta koja vode do ponovnog razmatranja istorijskog i ana litičkog dinamizma kategorija strukture i konjunkture kao razrade aktuelnih strukturalnih procesa u terminima strukturalne analize i kritike. Rad se sastoji iz tri dela. U prvom delu razmatramo zbog čega su kritika i kriza koje su izvorno spojene podvrgnuti različitim proce sima derogiranja. U drugom delu pokazujemo efekte promene načina ispoljavanja krize u kapitalizmu, tačnije osvetljavamo njenu disperzivne i ne-punktualne modalitete. U trećem delu postavljamo pitanje o šansama ponovnog spajanja krize i kritike na osnovu navigacije strukturalne kritike, nadalje artikulišemo njene veze sa „imanentnom kritikom“. Strukturalna kritika se analizira kao spoj između imanentne kritike i transcendentnog usmerenja koji radi na reconnections between crisis and critique as the elements of relationship to capitalism.

Članak se bavi pojmom želje u Levinasovoj filozofiji, sa posebnim osvrtom na pitanje njenog metafizičkog karaktera. Oslanjajući se i na rane radove Levinasa, autor pokušava da dekonstruiše pojam želje ukazujući na njegov protivrečni odnos prema konceptu potreba. Posebna pažnja je posvećena nekim drugim fenomenološkim interpretacijama (Huserl, Hajdeger, Sartr, Mišel Anri) i dijalektičkom shvatanju želje (Hegel), a to omogućava da se zahvati specifičnost Levinasove perspektive. Na kraju članka autor se bavi mogućnošću etike koja bi polazila od responzivne želje, u okviru fenomenologije alteriteta., This paper deals with the notion of desire in Lévinas’ philosophy, with special attention to the question of its metaphysical character. By relying upon the early works of Lévinas as well, the author deconstructs the notion of desire by pointing at its contradictory relationship to the concept of needs. Attention is devoted to certain phenomenological interpretations (Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Michel Henry) and to the dialectical understanding of desire (Hegel) that enables us to seize the specificity of Lévinas’ viewpoint. At the end of the paper the author discusses the possibility of an ethics of responsive desire within the phenomenology of alterity.

Članak se na komparativan način bavi pojmom pažnje u Bergsonovoj i Husserlovoj filozofiji. Posebna pažnja posvećena je njihovoj konfrontaciji sa psihološkim tumačenjima pa­ žnje, kao i metodološkim aspektima njihovih teorija. Analizira se vitalnost, intencionalnost i temporalnost pažnje, imajući u vidu složenu terminološku pozadinu i kod Bergson i kod Husserla. Autor smatra da ih povezuje to što pažnju određuju kao dinamičnu unutrašnju modifikaciju, s različitim dimenzijama sadašnjosti, prošlosti i budućnosti. Istovremeno su uzete u obzir sličnosti i razlike u pogledu najvažnijih dilema.

Članak se fokusira na pojam vanrednog stanja, uzimajući u obzir njegova pravna i politička značenja. Raspravljajući s Agambenovom analizom vanrednog stanja, članak nudi alternativno objašnjenje geneze vanrednog stanja, sa posebnim osvrtom na ulogu liberalizma, nuklearnog rata i izvora vanrednog stanja koje je bilo uvedeno u SAD nakon terorističkih napada 11. septembra. U članku se naglašava da vanredno stanje ne treba opisati kao „anomično stanje” koje suspenduje pravo, već je reč o mnogo kompleksnijim odnosima u kojima se ono pravno i nepravno „organski” prepliću. Članak se završava analizom neoliberalnog odnosa prema vanrednom stanju.

This article focuses on the notion of the state of exception, accounting for its legal and political meanings. In discussing Agamben’s analysis of the state of exception, the article provides an alternative genesis of the state of exception, with a special focus on the role of liberalism, nuclear war, and the sources of the state of exception that was instituted in the U.S.A. after the terrorist attacks on September 11. The article stresses that the state of exception should not be described as an “anomic state” that suspends the law, but that the relationships are much more complex, wherein the legal and non-legal “organically” intertwine. The article ends with an analysis of the neoliberal relationship to the state of exception.

Az elköteleződés, az angazsáltság tanulmányozása fogalomtörténeti kutatásokat is magával von, nem csupán Sartre, Adorno, Gehlen és mások örökségének vizsgálatát, hanem a 20. századnál korábbi előzményeket is figyelembe véve. (...) Először is úgy tűnik, hogy az angazsáltságnak a kötelességek felől tekintve speciális státusza van. Mondhatni, többletszerű erőfeszítésként, az elvártakon túlmutató vállalásként működik, mint „az állampolgároknak a törvényi és szerződéses kötelezettségeken fölüli elkötelezettsége” (Tamás Gáspár Miklós), amely ugyanakkor a kötelességek korábban ismeretlen távlatait teheti lehetővé. Ehhez kapcsolódóan merül fel, hogy az elköteleződésnek a társadalmi normákat és szabályokat újragondoló értékracionális gyakorlatnak kell lennie, a higher-order megfontolások konzisztenciára szert tevő terepének. Más szóval, valamely megnyilvánulás és tett mindaddig nem tekinthető elköteleződésnek, míg egy merőben egyedi probléma megoldásáért száll síkra, anélkül, hogy megkérdőjelezné az alapjául szolgáló mintákat. Vagyis ami az elköteleződés tartalmát illeti, nem elegendő, ha pusztán elszigetelt és érdektelített esetekre mutat rá, hanem valamiképpen a közjóra és a vele összefüggő elvekre kell irányulnia. Ám az angazsáltságnak nemcsak tartalmában, hanem formájában is meg kell tartania „közjellegét”. Amiképpen a – wittgensteiniánus és egyéb – nyelvfilozófiák azt sugallták, hogy privát nyelv nem létezik, úgy az elköteleződés elmélete is arra a következtetésre juthat, hogy a privát elköteleződés tulajdonképpen képtelenség.

The paper deals with Aristotle’s concept of corruption. First, it reconstructs Aristotle’s debate with the pre-Socratics and then it focuses on the candidates for entity that can perish: form, matter, and substance. The text argues against the widely accepted thesis according to which substance is a corruptio simpliciter without further ado. The paper intensely relies upon ancient and medieval commentators of Aristotle. Finally, special attention is devoted to the dimension of time and the problem of actuality., Ovaj rad tematizuje Aristotelov pojam nestajanja. Prvo, rekonstruiše Aristotelovu raspravu da predsokratcima, zatim se fokusira na pojedine kandidate za entitete koji mogu da nestanu: formu, materiju i supstanciju. Tekst pruža argumente protiv široko prihaćene teze da je supstancija corruptio simpliciter bez ikakvih rezervi. Rad se o velikoj meri oslanja i na antičke i srednjovekovne komentatore Aristotela. Na kraju, uzima se u obzir i dimenzija vremena, odnosno aktualnosti.

There are productive material connections beyond mere internal or external relations. The concept of connection enables a creative reinterpretation of certain historical questions and, accordingly, the essay stresses the importance of the concepts of connection, nexus, and fusion in many philosophies, from Aristotle to Deleuze.

Članak se bavi pojmom prazne intencionalnosti, imajući u vidu ne samo Husserlov opusnego i posthuserlovske – klasične i suvremene – fenomenologije. Posebna pažnja usmjerena je na tipologiju prazne intencionalnosti te se razlikuju četiri aspekta: 1. prazna reprezenta - cija; 2. prazni perceptivni horizonti; 3. prazna temporalizacija; 4. prazna svijest. Pokazuje se da je pojam prazne intencionalnosti relevantan ne samo za razumijevanje povijesti feno - menologije nego i za kontekst mnogih suvremenih filozofskih rasprava

Even though Belgrade student protests emerged and ended abruptly after only seven days in June of 1968, they came as a cumulative point of a decade-long accumulated social dissatisfaction and antagonisms, as well as of philosophical investigations of the unorthodox Marxists of the Praxis school (Praksisovci). It surprised the Yugoslav authorities as the first massive rebellion after WWII to explicitly criticize rising social inequality, bureaucratization and unemployment and demand free speech and abolishment of privileges. This article focuses on the intellectual destiny and legacy of the eight professors from the Faculty of Philosophy close to the Praxis school, who were identified as the protests’ instigators and subsequently expelled from the University of Belgrade due to their “ethico-political unsuitability”. Under both international and domestic pressure, they were later reemployed in a separate research unit named the Centre for Philosophy and Social Theory, where they kept their critical edge and argued for political pluralism. From the late 1980s onwards, they and their colleagues became politically active and at times occupied the highest positions in Serbia – Dragoljub Mićunović as one of the founders of the modern Democratic Party and the Speaker of the Parliament, former Serbian President and Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica and former Prime Minister late Zoran Đinđić. Still, while some members became strong anti-nationalists and anti-war activists, other embraced Serbian nationalism, therefore pivoting the intellectual split into the so called First and Second Serbia that marked Serbian society during the 1990s and remained influential to this day., Drugog svetskog rata koja je eksplicitno kritikovala rastuću društvenu nejednakost, birokratizaciju i nezaposlenost, i zahtevala slobodu govora i ukidanje privilegija. Ovaj članak fokusira se na sudbinu osmoro profesora sa Filozofskog fakulteta u Beogradu bliskih Praksis idejama, koje je režim identifikovao kao podstrekače protesta i kasnije ih proterao sa fakulteta zbog njihove „moralno-političke nepodobnosti“. Nakon međunarodnih i unutrašnjih pritisaka, oni su kasnije ponovo zaposleni u zasebnoj istraživačkoj jedinici nazvanoj Centar za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, gde su zadržali svoju kritičku oštricu i zagovarali politički pluralizam. Od kraja osamdesetih godina prošlog veka, oni i njihove kolege iz Centra postaju politički aktivni, nalaze se među osnivačima i kasnije liderima Demokratske Stranke i povremeno zauzimaju najviše položaje u Srbiji – Dragoljub Mićunović kao predsedavajući Narodne skupštine, bivši srpski predsednik i premijer Vojislav Koštunica i nekadašnji premijer Zoran Đinđić. Međutim, dok su neki članovi osmorke i Centra postali čvrsti anti-nacionalisti i antiratni aktivisti, drugi su prigrlili srpski nacionalizam, tako predvodeći intelektualni razdor na Prvu i Drugi Srbiju koji je obeležio srpsko društvo devedesetih godina prošlog veka, i ostao uticajan do danas.

This essay discusses engagement against state secrecy and engagement for secrecy, free from interference. By exploring divisions introduced by state secrecy (through exclusion, subjection and oppression), it identifies the distortions of equal participation in political communities. The author introduces the notion of pata-politics in order to describe the false relation to the secrecy effect. Furthermore, the text examines key issues of today’s intelligence studies (such as democratic intelligence oversight and the balance of powers doctrine), with special emphasis on the possible limits of a liberal approach. Additionally, the author elaborates a metacritique of the framework in which the private sphere is one-sidedly described as a victim of wrong interference by state institutions.