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A fundamental feature of sacred values like environmental-protection, patriotism, and diversity is individuals' resistance to trading off these values in exchange for material benefit. Yet, for-profit organizations increasingly associate themselves with sacred values to increase profits and enhance their reputations. In the current research, we investigate a potentially perverse consequence of this tendency: that observing values used instrumentally (i.e., in the service of self-interest) subsequently decreases the sacredness of those values. Seven studies (N = 2,785) demonstrate support for this value corruption hypothesis. Following exposure to the instrumental use of a sacred value, observers held that value as less sacred (Studies 1-6), were less willing to donate to value-relevant causes (Studies 3 and 4), and demonstrated reduced tradeoff resistance (Study 7). We reconcile the current effect with previously documented value protection effects by suggesting that instrumental use decreases value sacredness by shifting descriptive norms regarding value use (Study 3), and by failing to elicit the same level of outrage as taboo tradeoffs, thus inhibiting value protective responses (Studies 4 and 5). These results have important implications: People and organizations that use values instrumentally may ultimately undermine the very values from which they intend to benefit. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Online reviews promise to provide people with immediate access to the wisdom of the crowds. Yet, half of all reviews on Amazon and Yelp provide the most positive rating possible, despite human behaviour being substantially more varied in nature. We term the challenge of discerning success within this sea of positive ratings the 'positivity problem'. Positivity, however, is only one facet of individuals' opinions. We propose that one solution to the positivity problem lies with the emotionality of people's opinions. Using computational linguistics, we predict the box office revenue of nearly 2,400 movies, sales of 1.6 million books, new brand followers across two years of Super Bowl commercials, and real-world reservations at over 1,000 restaurants. Whereas star ratings are an unreliable predictor of success, emotionality from the very same reviews offers a consistent diagnostic signal. More emotional language was associated with more subsequent success.

Expertise provides numerous benefits. Experts process information more efficiently, remember information better, and often make better decisions. Consumers pursue expertise in domains they love and chase experiences that make them feel something. Yet, might becoming an expert carry a cost for these very feelings? Across more than 700,000 consumers and 6 million observations, developing expertise in a hedonic domain predicts consumers becoming more emotionally numb—that is, having less intense emotion in response to their experiences. This numbness occurs across a range of domains—movies, photography, wine, and beer—and across diverse measures of emotion and expertise. It occurs in cross-sectional real-world data with certified experts, and in longitudinal real-world data that follows consumers over time and traces their emotional trajectories as they accrue expertise. Furthermore, this numbness can be explained by the cognitive structure experts develop and apply within a domain. Experimentally inducing cognitive structure led novice consumers to experience greater numbness. However, shifting experts away from using their cognitive structure restored their experience of emotion. Thus, although consumers actively pursue expertise in domains that bring them pleasure, the present work is the first to show that this pursuit can come with a hedonic cost.

Across eight studies, we tested whether people understand the time course of their own creativity. Prior literature finds that creativity tends to improve across an ideation session. Here we compared people’s beliefs against their actual creative performance. Consistent with prior research, we found that people’s creativity, on aggregate, remained constant or improved across an ideation session. However, people’s beliefs did not match this reality. We consistently found that people expected their creativity to decline over time. We refer to this misprediction as the creative cliff illusion. Study 1 found initial evidence of this effect across an ideation task. We found further evidence in a sample with high domain-relevant knowledge (study 2), when creativity judgments were elicited retrospectively (study 3), and across a multiday study (study 5). We theorized the effect occurs because people mistakenly associate creativity (the novelty and usefulness of an idea) with idea production (the ability to generate an idea). Study 4 found evidence consistent with this mechanism. The creative cliff illusion was attenuated among those with high levels of everyday creative experience (study 6) and after a knowledge intervention that increased awareness of the effect (study 7). Demonstrating the impact of creativity beliefs on downstream performance, study 8 found that declining creativity beliefs negatively influenced task persistence and creative performance, suggesting that people underinvest in ideation. This research contributes to work on prediction in the creative domain and demonstrates the importance of understanding creativity beliefs for predicting creative performance.

Sentiment analysis has fundamentally changed marketers’ ability to assess consumer opinion. Indeed, the measurement of attitudes via natural language has influenced how marketing is practiced on a day-to-day basis. Yet recent findings suggest that sentiment analysis's current emphasis on measuring valence (i.e., positivity or negativity) can produce incomplete, inaccurate, and even misleading insights. Conceptually, the current work challenges sentiment analysis to move beyond valence. The authors identify the certainty or confidence of consumers’ sentiment as a particularly potent facet to assess. Empirically, they develop a new computational measure of certainty in language—the Certainty Lexicon—and validate its use with sentiment analysis. To construct and validate this measure, the authors use text from 11.6 million people who generated billions of words, millions of online reviews, and hundreds of thousands of entries in an online prediction market. Across social media data sets, in-lab experiments, and online reviews, the authors find that the Certainty Lexicon is more comprehensive, generalizable, and accurate in its measurement compared with other tools. The authors also demonstrate the value of measuring sentiment certainty for marketers: certainty predicted the real-world success of commercials where traditional sentiment analysis did not. The Certainty Lexicon is available at www.CertaintyLexicon.com .

Research finds that creative ideas are generated by two cognitive pathways: insight and persistence. However, emerging research suggests people's lay beliefs may not adequately reflect both routes. We propose that people exhibit an insight bias, such that they undervalue persistence and overvalue insight in the creative process.

Persuasion is a foundational topic within psychology, in which researchers have long investigated effective versus ineffective means to change other people’s minds. Yet little is known about how individuals’ communications are shaped by the intent to persuade others. This research examined the possibility that people possess a learned association between emotion and persuasion that spontaneously shifts their language toward more emotional appeals, even when such appeals may be suboptimal. We used a novel quantitative linguistic approach in conjunction with controlled laboratory experiments and real-world data. This work revealed that the intent to persuade other people spontaneously increases the emotionality of individuals’ appeals via the words they use. Furthermore, in a preregistered experiment, the association between emotion and persuasion appeared sufficiently strong that people persisted in the use of more emotional appeals even when such appeals might backfire. Finally, direct evidence was provided for an association in memory between persuasion and emotionality.

Online reviews promise to provide people with immediate access to the wisdom of the crowds. Yet, half of all reviews on Amazon and Yelp provide the most positive rating possible, despite human behaviour being substantially more varied in nature. We term the challenge of discerning success within this sea of positive ratings the 'positivity problem'. Positivity, however, is only one facet of individuals' opinions. We propose that one solution to the positivity problem lies with the emotionality of people's opinions. Using computational linguistics, we predict the box office revenue of nearly 2,400 movies, sales of 1.6 million books, new brand followers across two years of Super Bowl commercials, and real-world reservations at over 1,000 restaurants. Whereas star ratings are an unreliable predictor of success, emotionality from the very same reviews offers a consistent diagnostic signal. More emotional language was associated with more subsequent success.

As social mammals, being in a group signals a state of relative security. Risk-taking behavior in other social mammals formed the basis for our prediction that the mere physical presence of others, absent any social interaction, would create a psychological state of security that, in turn, would promote greater risk-taking behavior. We investigated whether, why, and when the mere physical presence of others affects risk-taking behaviors in three contexts: acceptance of greater financial volatility, attitudes toward risky gambles, and actual gambling behaviors. Results indicate that people in the mere physical presence of others make riskier decisions than people making identical decisions alone, and that feelings of security were the psychological mechanism behind this effect. Our results also suggest that the effect is contingent on whether people are surrounded by others who belong to the same social group. A meta-analysis across all studies presented in this research reveals a highly reliable mere-presence effect. Together, these results demonstrate that the mere physical presence of others can have a potent impact on risk-taking behaviors. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Nations and organizations have become increasingly interested in using behavioral interventions or “nudges” to promote personal wellness and prosocial behavior. Interventions can powerfully alter b...

Across 7 studies, we investigated the prediction that people underestimate the value of persistence for creative performance. Across a range of creative tasks, people consistently underestimated how productive they would be while persisting (Studies 1-3). Study 3 found that the subjectively experienced difficulty, or disfluency, of creative thought accounted for persistence undervaluation. Alternative explanations based on idea quality (Studies 1-2B) and goal setting (Study 4) were considered and ruled out and domain knowledge was explored as a boundary condition (Study 5). In Study 6, the disfluency of creative thought reduced people's willingness to invest in an opportunity to persist, resulting in lower financial performance. This research demonstrates that persistence is a critical determinant of creative performance and that people may undervalue and underutilize persistence in everyday creative problem solving.

The rapid expansion of the Internet and the availability of vast repositories of natural text provide researchers with the immense opportunity to study human reactions, opinions, and behavior on a massive scale. To help researchers take advantage of this new frontier, the present work introduces and validates the Evaluative Lexicon 2.0 (EL 2.0)-a quantitative linguistic tool that specializes in the measurement of the emotionality of individuals' evaluations in text. Specifically, the EL 2.0 utilizes natural language to measure the emotionality, extremity, and valence of evaluative reactions and attitudes. The present article describes how we used a combination of 9 million real-world online reviews and over 1,500 participant judges to construct the EL 2.0 and an additional 5.7 million reviews to validate it. To assess its unique value, the EL 2.0 is compared with two other prominent text analysis tools-LIWC and Warriner et al.'s (Behavior Research Methods, 45, 1191-1207, 2013) wordlist. The EL 2.0 is comparatively distinct in its ability to measure emotionality and explains a significantly greater proportion of the variance in individuals' evaluations. The EL 2.0 can be used with any data that involve speech or writing and provides researchers with the opportunity to capture evaluative reactions both in the laboratory and "in the wild." The EL 2.0 wordlist and normative emotionality, extremity, and valence ratings are freely available from www.evaluativelexicon.com .

The current research investigates the conditions under which people are attracted to performance incentives. We propose that financial deprivation – the state of having less – is a key factor in de...

The current research examines how exposure to performance incentives affects one’s desire for the reward object. We hypothesized that the flexible nature of performance incentives creates an attentional fixation on the reward object (e.g., money), which leads people to become more desirous of the rewards. Results from 5 laboratory experiments and 1 large-scale field study provide support for this prediction. When performance was incentivized with monetary rewards, participants reported being more desirous of money (Study 1), put in more effort to earn additional money in an ensuing task (Study 2), and were less willing to donate money to charity (Study 4). We replicated the result with nonmonetary rewards (Study 5). We also found that performance incentives increased attention to the reward object during the task, which in part explains the observed effects (Study 6). A large-scale field study replicated these findings in a real-world setting (Study 7). One laboratory experiment failed to replicate (Study 3). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)

This article examines how cognitive capacity influences self-control. Two studies demonstrated a cognitive capacity by visceral state interaction. Study 1 found that cognitive load impaired self-control for satiated smokers but increased self-control for craved smokers. Study 2 replicated this effect in the context of dieting. Hungry dieters who were given the opportunity to deliberate selected more unhealthy snacks compared to hungry dieters who were forced to make an immediate choice. Study 2 also demonstrated the process driving this effect. The authors found that visceral states bias information processing in ways that promote impulsive behavior, thereby turning cognition into a vehicle for impulsive action.

Torture is prohibited by statutes worldwide, yet the legal definition of torture is almost invariably based on an inherently subjective judgment involving pain severity. In four experiments, we demonstrate that judgments of whether specific interrogation tactics constitute torture are subject to an empathy gap: People who are experiencing even a mild version of the specific pain produced by an interrogation tactic are more likely to classify that tactic as torture or as unethical than are those who are not experiencing pain. This discrepancy could result from an overestimation of the pain of torture by people in pain, an underestimation of the pain of torture by those not in pain, or both. The fourth experiment shows that the discrepancy results from an underestimation of pain by people who are not experiencing it. Given that legal standards guiding torture are typically established by people who are not in pain, this research suggests that practices that do constitute torture are likely to not be classified as such.

Item does not contain fulltext A meta-analysis was performed on the unconscious thought effect (UTE). All available published and unpublished data on unconscious thought were included. Our aims were to provide a statistically robust estimate of the effect size of the UTE, to identify significant moderators, and to discuss possible underlying processes of the UTE. To assess the UTE, performance of participants thinking unconsciously was compared to participants thinking consciously, and to immediate decision makers. Across a total of 92 studies, the overall aggregated effect size was g = .224, with a 95% confidence interval from .145 to .303. This result provides strong support for the existence of the UTE. However, as estimated from a random-effects model, about 66% of the variance in effect sizes was attributable to systematic differences between studies. This result indicates that although the UTE is a real effect, it does not always occur. Several moderators were identified that help to explain the mixed results across various studies. The findings are discussed with regard to the boundary conditions and potential underlying processes of the UTE. 25 p.

Punishment should be sensitive to the severity of the crime. Yet in three studies the authors found that increasing the number of people victimized by a crime actually decreases the perceived severity of that crime and leads people to recommend less punishment for crimes that victimize more people. The authors further demonstrate the process behind the scope-severity paradox—the victim identifiability effect—and test a strategy for overcoming this bias. Although Studies 1 and 2 document this phenomenon in the lab, in Study 3 the authors used archival data to demonstrate that the scope-severity paradox is a robust, real-world effect. They collected archival data of actual jury verdicts spanning a 10-year period and found that juries required defendants to pay higher punitive damages when their negligent behavior harmed fewer people.

Four studies examined how impulse-control beliefs—beliefs regarding one's ability to regulate visceral impulses, such as hunger, drug craving, and sexual arousal—influence the self-control process. The findings provide evidence for a restraint bias: a tendency for people to overestimate their capacity for impulse control. This biased perception of restraint had important consequences for people's self-control strategies. Inflated impulse-control beliefs led people to overexpose themselves to temptation, thereby promoting impulsive behavior. In Study 4, for example, the impulse-control beliefs of recovering smokers predicted their exposure to situations in which they would be tempted to smoke. Recovering smokers with more inflated impulse-control beliefs exposed themselves to more temptation, which led to higher rates of relapse 4 months later. The restraint bias offers unique insight into how erroneous beliefs about self-restraint promote impulsive behavior.

Objective: To determine how visceral impulses, such as hunger and drug craving, influence health beliefs.Design: The authors assessed smokers' self-efficacy and intentions to quit while in a randomly assigned state of cigarette craving or noncraving (Study 1), and assessed dieters weight-loss beliefs while hungry or satiated (Study 2).Main outcome measures: Self-efficacy, smoking cessation, weight-loss goals.Results: The authors found, in both the context of smoking and weight-loss, that participants in a cold (e.g., satiated) state had different health beliefs than participants in a hot state (e.g., hungry). Specifically, in Study 1, the authors found that smokers who experienced cigarette craving had lower self-efficacy than did satiated smokers. Consequently, smokers who craved a cigarette had less intention to quit smoking in the future compared with satiated smokers. In Study 2, the authors found that hungry dieters had less self-efficacy than did satiated dieters. This difference led hungry dieters to form less ambitious future weight-loss goals and view prior weight-loss attempts with more satisfaction.Conclusion: These findings contribute to our understanding of the nature of health beliefs and reveal that health beliefs are more dynamic than previously assumed.

In two studies, we examined the role of social comparisons in regret management. In the first study, participants received a (relatively) negative outcome after which they were presented with base-rate information about the performance of other participants in the experiment. Results showed that experienced regret decreased as a result of base-rate information showing that most others made even worse decisions than oneself. In the second study, we investigated whether people actively seek this kind of consensual information to validate their decision. After inducing regret by means of a manipulated outcome in a trivia quiz, participants could obtain information about the outcomes of previous participants or about the type of items used in the quiz.Participants’ preference was determined by whether or not they believed that they would be given a second chance. In case of a negative and final outcome, participants preferred information about the prevalence of others who had an even worse outcome. When the outcome was non-final, participants preferred information about the type of items used in the test. Both strategies were accompanied with a decrease in regret. Implications for research on regret and decision making are discussed.

Perception of control has been a fundamental construct in research on risk-taking behavior. It has been shown, for example, that people tend to underestimate risks that are under their control. Despite its importance, surprisingly, little attention has been paid to what is actually meant by control. In three studies, we argue that the common conceptualization of perceived control is too broad as it fails to distinguish between two distinct aspects of control ‘command over exposure to the risk itself (volition)’ and ‘command over the outcome (control)’. Thus, whether the risk is imposed or freely chosen likely differs from, and has different consequences for, the ability to exert influence over a risky behavior, once it has been initiated. Using a wide variety of risk behaviors (e.g., ecstasy use, unsafe sex), we demonstrate that volition and control exert opposing influence on risk perception: control decreases perceived risk while volition increases perceived risk. This latter prediction is counterintuitive and is explained in terms of the mediating role of anticipated regret: voluntary appraisals elicit anticipated regret, which, in turn, increases perceived risk. This work highlights the dynamic relationship between risk characteristics and anticipated emotion in guiding the perception of risk. Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Impulsive behavior is a common source of stigma. The authors argue that people often stigmatize impulsive behavior because they fail to appreciate the influence visceral impulses have on behavior. Because people tend to underestimate the motivational force of cravings for sex, drugs, food, and so forth, they are prone to stigmatize those who act on these impulses. In line with this reasoning, in 4 studies, the authors found that participants who were in a cold state (e.g., not hungry) made less favorable evaluations of a related impulsive behavior (impulsive eating) than did participants who were in a hot state (e.g., hungry). This empathy gap effect was tested with 3 different visceral states--fatigue, hunger, and sexual arousal--and was found both when participants evaluated others' impulsive behavior (Studies 12) and when participants evaluated their own impulsive behavior (Study 3). Study 3 also demonstrated that the empathy gap effect is due to different perceptions of the strength of the visceral state itself. Finally, Study 4 revealed that this effect is state specific: Hungry people, for example, evaluated only hunger-driven impulses, and not other forms of impulse, more favorably.

The current research found that participants who had previously endured an emotionally distressing event (e.g., bullying) more harshly evaluated another person's failure to endure a similar distressing event compared with participants with no experience enduring the event or those currently enduring the event. These effects emerged for naturally occurring (Studies 1, 3, and 4) and experimentally induced (Study 2) distressing events. This effect was driven by the tendency for those who previously endured the distressing event to view the event as less difficult to overcome (Study 3). Moreover, we demonstrate that the effect is specific to evaluations of perceived failure: Compared with those with no experience, people who previously endured a distressing event made less favorable evaluations of an individual failing to endure the event, but made more favorable evaluations of an individual managing to endure the event (Study 4). Finally, we found that people failed to anticipate this effect of enduring distress, instead believing that individuals who have previously endured emotionally distressing events would most favorably evaluate others' failures to endure (Study 5). Taken together, these findings present a paradox such that, in the face of struggle or defeat, the people we seek for advice or comfort may be the least likely to provide it.

Contains fulltext : 55863.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Closed access) We present a theory about human thought named the unconscious-thought theory (UTT). The theory is applicable to decision making, impression formation, attitude formation and change, problem solving, and creativity. It distinguishes between two modes of thought: unconscious and conscious. Unconscious thought and conscious thought have different characteristics, and these different characteristics make each mode preferable under different circumstances. For instance, contrary to popular belief, decisions about simple issues can be better tackled by conscious thought, whereas decisions about complex matters can be better approached with unconscious thought. The relations between the theory and decision strategies, and between the theory and intuition, are discussed. We end by discussing caveats and future directions. 15 p.

Two studies address the debate over whether conscious or unconscious mental processes best handle complex decisions. According to Unconscious Thought Theory (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006) both modes of thinking have particular advantages: conscious thought can follow strict rules, whereas unconscious thought is better suited for integrating numerous decision attributes. Because most complex decisions require both adherence to precise rules and the aggregation of information, we hypothesized that complex decisions can best be made by engaging in periods of both conscious and unconscious thought. In both studies we found that the sequential integration of conscious and unconscious thought solved complex choices better than conscious or unconscious thought alone. In Study 2 we examined whether the sequential order of the integration condition matters. In line with our prediction, we found that integration worked best when unconscious thought followed conscious thought.

The tendency to live in the here and now, and the failure to think through the delayed consequences of behavior, is one of the strongest individual-level correlates of delinquency. We tested the hypothesis that this correlation results from a limited ability to imagine one’s self in the future, which leads to opting for immediate gratification. Strengthening the vividness of the future self should therefore reduce involvement in delinquency. We tested and found support for this hypothesis in two studies. In Study 1, compared with participants in a control condition, those who wrote a letter to their future self were less inclined to make delinquent choices. In Study 2, participants who interacted with a realistic digital version of their future, age-progressed self in a virtual environment were less likely than control participants to cheat on a subsequent task.

Emotional perspective taking involves people's attempts to estimate the attitudes, preferences, and behaviors of other people who are in different emotional situations. We propose a dual judgment model in which perspective takers first predict what their own reactions would be to different emotional situations, and, second, adjust these self-predictions to accommodate perceived differences between themselves and others. Prior literature has focused on egocentric biases in the second judgment, perceived differences and similarities between the self and others. We propose that significant errors in emotional perspective taking often arise from the first judgment, people’s predictions of what their own attitudes, preferences, and behaviors would be in different emotional situations. Specifically, people exhibit “empathy gaps,” underestimating how much emotional situations influence their own attitudes, preferences, and behaviors. We review evidence that provides support for (a) the dual judgment model of emotional perspective taking, (b) the occurrence of empathy gaps in self-predictions, and (c) the occurrence of empathy gaps in social predictions that are mediated by empathy gaps in self-judgments. We discuss implications of empathy gaps in emotional perspective taking for social behavior, social judgment, and for other forms of perspective taking and affective forecasting.

This article examines how people respond to the emergence of temptation in their environment. Three studies demonstrated that how people respond to temptation depends critically on their visceral state—whether or not they are actively experiencing visceral drives such as hunger, drug craving, or sexual arousal. We found that when people were in a “cold,” nonvisceral state, the presence of temptation prompted cognition to support self-control. However, when people were in a “hot,” visceral state, temptation prompted the same cognitive processes to support impulsive behavior. Study 1 examined how heterosexual men’s level of sexual arousal influences their attention to attractive women. Study 2 examined whether satiated and craving smokers would engage in motivated reasoning in order to dampen (or enhance) the appeal of smoking when confronted with the temptation to smoke. Study 3 tested the boundaries of the interaction between visceral state and temptation.

In 5 studies, the authors examined the hypothesis that people have systematically distorted beliefs about the pain of social suffering. By integrating research on empathy gaps for physical pain (Loewenstein, 1996) with social pain theory (MacDonald & Leary, 2005), the authors generated the hypothesis that people generally underestimate the severity of social pain (ostracism, shame, etc.)--a biased judgment that is only corrected when people actively experience social pain for themselves. Using a social exclusion manipulation, Studies 1-4 found that nonexcluded participants consistently underestimated the severity of social pain compared with excluded participants, who had a heightened appreciation for social pain. This empathy gap for social pain occurred when participants evaluated both the pain of others (interpersonal empathy gap) as well as the pain participants themselves experienced in the past (intrapersonal empathy gap). The authors argue that beliefs about social pain are important because they govern how people react to socially distressing events. In Study 5, middle school teachers were asked to evaluate policies regarding emotional bullying at school. This revealed that actively experiencing social pain heightened the estimated pain of emotional bullying, which in turn led teachers to recommend both more comprehensive treatment for bullied students and greater punishment for students who bully.

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"It has long been assumed that people experience evaluative conflict or ambivalence as unpleasant. In three studies we provide direct evidence for the assumption that ambivalence is unpleasant, but only when one has to commit to one side of the issue. In those situations ambivalence will be related to outcome uncertainty and feelings of discomfort. We examined this prediction using both self-reports and physiological measures. In a first study we manipulated ambivalence and whether or not participants had to take a clear stand vis-a vis the attitudinal issue and choose a position for or against it. Results indicate ambivalence was only related to physiological arousal when a choice had to be made. Feeling ambivalent about an issue without the necessity to choose did not result in higher levels of arousal. A second study replicated and extended these findings by including a measure of subjective uncertainty about the decision. Results showed the same pattern as in Study 1, and indicate that the relation between ambivalence and arousal is mediated by uncertainty about decisional outcomes. In the third and final study these findings are corroborated using self-report measures; these indicated that ambivalence-induced discomfort is related to specific (negative) emotions." [author's abstract]

Contains fulltext : 77301.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access) In five experiments we found that deliberation reduces preference consistency. In experiments 1 and 2, participants who deliberated on their preferences were less consistent in their evaluations compared to those who did not deliberate. Experiment 3 demonstrated that this effect is due to the impediment of deliberation and not to the benefit of nondeliberation. We hypothesized that deliberation leads to the inconsistent weighting of information, especially when the information is complex. As such, we predicted and found in experiments 4 and 5 that the extent to which deliberation decreases preference consistency depends upon the complexity of the information.

Creativity, the generation of novel and useful ideas, is central to organizational activity and performance. When trying to encourage creativity in others, a common piece of advice is to “think out...

The present research demonstrates that the extent to which people appreciate the influence past visceral states have had on behavior (e.g., the influence hunger has had on food choice) depends largely on their current visceral state. Specifically, we found that when people were in a hot state (e.g., fatigued), they attributed behavior primarily to visceral influences, whereas when people were in a cold state (e.g., nonfatigued), they underestimated the influence of visceral drives and instead attributed behavior primarily to other, nonvisceral factors. This hot-cold empathy gap was observed when people made attributions about the past behavior of another person or themselves, and proved difficult to overcome, as participants could not correct for the biasing influence of their current visceral state when instructed to do so. These different attribution patterns also had consequences for people's satisfaction with their performance. Those who attributed their poor performance to visceral factors were more satisfied than those who made dispositional attributions.

In two studies we examined the nature and consequence of ambivalent attitudes. In the Wrst study, we assessed whether holding ambivalent attitudes was aversive, and tested whether this aversion was resolved through biased information processing. To do this we manipulated participants’ attributions of the discomfort associated with an ambivalent message through a pill manipulation (tense vs. relaxed). Participants who attributed their discomfort to their ambivalence reported more negative emotions and generated more one-sided thoughts than participants who attributed their discomfort to the pill. In the second study, we examined the conditions necessary for ambivalence reduction. Results suggest that people spontaneously engage in biased information processing in order to resolve their ambivalence.  2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Five studies examined the impact of self-regulatory capacities on defensive information processing—the tendency to deny, distort, or avoid diagnostic self-threatening information. Across domains, we found that people low in trait (Studies 1 and 5) and state (Studies 2, 3, and 4) self-regulatory capacities were more likely to deny the validity and importance of negative feedback, and were less willing to seek improvement based on this information. Alternative explanations based on self-esteem and competence-based deficits were ruled out. Moreover, we demonstrated a boundary condition of this effect: For participants high in self-improvement motivation, reduced self-regulatory capacities did not affect defensive processing (Studies 4 and 5). Taken together, these results suggest that trait and state levels of self-regulatory capacities are a key factor in determining whether people engage in defensive information processing.

Can how you get paid decide how much you value money? Our study examines the effect of reward systems on subjective valuation of the reward. Specifically, we suggest that even when people receive a...

Recent research on institutional logics and complexity has advanced what was once considered a top-down perspective on organizational behavior by articulating how individual actors wield their agen...

Music has long been suggested to be a source of power and power-related experiences. The current research investigated whether music can evoke an implicit sense of power and produce power-related c...