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Problem definition: Clients and service providers alike often consider one-on-one service delivery to be ideal, assuming, perhaps unquestioningly, that devoting individualized attention best improves client outcomes. In contrast, in shared service delivery, clients are served in batches and the dynamics of group interaction could lead to increased client engagement, which could improve outcomes. However, the loss of privacy and personal connection might undermine engagement. The engagement dynamics in one-on-one and shared delivery models have not been rigorously studied. To the extent that shared delivery may result in comparable or better engagement than one-on-one delivery, service providers in a broad array of contexts may be able to create more value for clients by delivering service in batches. Methodology/results: We conducted a randomized controlled trial with 1,000 patients who were undergoing glaucoma treatment over a three-year period at a large eye hospital. Using verbatim and behavioral transcripts from more than 20,000 minutes of video recorded during our trial, we examine how shared medical appointments (SMAs), in which patients are served in batches, impact engagement. On average, a patient who experienced SMAs asked 33.3% more questions per minute and made 8.6% more nonquestion comments per minute. Because there were multiple patients in an SMA, this increase in engagement at the individual patient level resulted in patients hearing far more comments in the group setting. Patients in SMAs also exhibited higher levels of nonverbal engagement across a wide array of measures (attentiveness, positivity, head wobbling, or "thalai aattam" in Tamil: a South Indian gesture to signal agreement or understanding, eye contact, and end-of-appointment happiness), relative to patients who attended one-on-one appointments. Managerial implications: These results shed light on the potential for shared service delivery models to increase client engagement and thus enhance service performance. Funding: This work was supported by the Wheeler Institute at London Business School (WIBAD Ramdas_Sonmez CFP19), the Institute of Entrepreneurship and Private Capital at London Business School (IIE_3432_2019), Aravind Eye Hospital, and Harvard Business School. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2021.0012. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Problem definition: The paper focuses on an innovative bank-intermediated trade finance contract, which we call dynamic trade finance (DTF, under which banks dynamically adjust loan interest rates as an order passes through different steps in the trade process). We examine the value of DTF, the impact of process uncertainties, and the associated information frictions on this value and the strategic interaction between DTF and FinTech. Academic/practical relevance: As more than 30% of global trade involves bank-intermediated trade finance, examining contract innovation in trade finance (DTF) and its strategic interaction with FinTech is of practical importance. Also, analyzing trade finance in the presence of process dynamics and information frictions complements the existing academic literature. Methodology: We construct a parsimonious model of a supply chain process consisting of two steps. The duration of each step is uncertain, and the process may fail at either step. Information delay may also occur when verifying the process passing a step. The seller borrows from a bank to finance this two-step process either through uniform financing (the interest rate remains constant throughout the process) or DTF (the interest rates are adjusted according to a precommitted schedule as the process passes each step). When lending, the bank faces a regulatory capital requirement (the bank is required to hold capital reserve when issuing risky loans) or information asymmetry (the seller/borrower possesses more accurate information about the trade process than the bank). Results: The value of DTF lies in its ability to reduce transactional deadweight loss (under the regulatory capital requirement) and screening (separate high-quality borrowers from the low-quality ones under information asymmetry). This value is greater for more reliable or lengthier trade processes, yet DTF's ability to screen is stronger when the process is less reliable. The severity of information delay hurts the value of DTF convexly. FinTech that expedites information transmission and verification and enables automatic execution complements DTF, and those that segment customers more efficiently could substitute DTF. Managerial implications: Our results shed light on how the underlying trade process dynamics and the type of information frictions involved affect the optimal deployment of contract innovations (DTF) and FinTech in trade finance. History: This paper has been accepted for the Manufacturing & Service Operations Management Special Section on the Interface of Operations, Finance and Technology. Funding: This work was supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant 72201060], London Business School, the University of Hong Kong, and the University of International Business and Economics. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.1102. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Trade credit is an important source of short-term financing and an integrated part in supply contracts. Although a number of theories have been proposed on how trade credit could improve supply chain efficiency, causal studies on the impact of trade credit on operational decisions are scarce. In this study, we examine the impact of trade credit on inventory decisions using an empirical strategy that leverages (i) an exogenous shock imparted by the French government's intervention to impose a ceiling on trade credit duration, (ii) a triple difference-in-differences identification strategy, and (iii) synthetic controls (SCs). By considering the 60-day ceiling coverage and SC construction requirements, we identify four French retail sectors as our main sample. Among them, in the postregulation period, the hardware retail sector firms on average exhibited a significant 16% decline in trade credit usage. Correspondingly, these firms also displayed a significant 11% decline in inventory level. In the remaining three sectors, we found mixed results in the main sample. All the four sectors, however, show consistent support for a causal link between trade credit and inventory in a subsample compiled using a stringent 90-day ceiling criterion. Collectively, our findings offer direct evidence that trade credit is an indispensable financing source for inventory procurement. Finally, in the postregulation period, the hardware retailers exhibited a 15.5% decline in revenue and 3.5% reduction in gross profit. This cautions policy makers that regulations limiting the use of trade credit may have unintended consequences on downstream firms, and may harm overall supply chain efficiency. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management. Funding: This work was supported by Indiana University Bloomington and the London Business School. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4600. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our paper shows that in contexts where formal ownership of productive assets is limited, informal leasing has a strong positive impact on innovation in marketing practices. Microentrepreneurs represent the most common type of business in the world, and marketing is a primary means by which they earn their livelihoods. They are especially numerous in emerging markets, and many live precarious lives characterized by poverty and potentially devastating exogenous shocks. This paper examines the marketing practices of microentrepreneurs by studying grocery retailers in a large slum in Cairo, Egypt. Employing detailed data on the marketing practices of these retailers, the paper examines why some microentrepreneurs engage in innovation in their marketing practices (and perform better), whereas others fail to do so. We highlight the causal effect of an important, but rarely studied, factor—informal property rights—on innovation in marketing practices among microentrepreneurs. Because few microentrepreneurs in the context we study have access to formal property rights, the threat of expropriation looms large in their lives. We show that those microentrepreneurs who possess their stores (without actually owning them) are substantially less likely to innovate in their marketing practices than those who lease their stores. We make use of an exogenous shock to property-rights laws to assess the causal impact of informal property rights on innovation in marketing practices. History: K. Sudhir served as the senior editor for this article. Funding: Financial support from the Private Enterprise Development in Low Income Countries Program [Grant 1435], the Deloitte Institute of Innovation and Entrepreneurship (London Business School), Cambridge Judge Business School–Middle East Research Centre, the STARS Foundation, the Gallifrey Foundation, the Wheeler Institute for Business and Development (London Business School), and the Tony and Maureen Wheeler Chair in Entrepreneurship (London Business School) is gratefully acknowledged. Supplemental Material: The data and online appendix files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2022.1379. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior research in management and economics has predominantly focused on how managers or policymakers can shape workers' allocation of effort using output-based or effort-based incentives. In many settings, however, managers may seek to influence workers' effort choices through resource allocation—that is, changing the cost of securing resources for different projects or activities. In this paper, we develop a formal model to investigate how a worker changes the allocation of a fixed amount of effort across different projects in response to changes in the cost of securing resources for each project. Our model shows how cutting resources available to one project, under certain circumstances, can inadvertently reduce the share of effort allocated to other projects and vice versa. We use the insights from the model to explore the effectiveness of funding strategies designed to influence the research direction of academic scientists. We specifically examine how U.S. scientists working in stem cell research responded to a 2001 policy change that restricted access to federal funding for research in the human embryonic stem cell (hESC) area. In line with our model's predictions, we find that cutting resources for hESC research inadvertently reduced U.S. scientists' output in non-hESC areas of stem cell research—an effect that is strongest among the highest-ability scientists. Our findings highlight the complexities of incentivizing effort allocation using resource-based incentives. In particular, we show how altering resource-based incentives in one area can have unforeseen spillover effects on effort allocation in other areas. Funding: Financial support from the London Business School is gratefully acknowledged. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2021.1565. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A central theoretical premise is that firms internalize transactions that are not suited for formal contracting. Yet, there is growing evidence that firms rely on formal contracts to govern some of their transactions within the firm. This paper discusses why firms use formal contracts between units within the firm and develops propositions for when formal contracts arise. Internalization does not eliminate transactional problems, and informal agreements for transactions between units often suffer from problems in understanding what the other unit will do and whether it will do what it promises. We argue that many of the features that make formal contracts valuable tools for market exchange are beneficial within firms, even if court enforcement of the contract is not possible. We suggest that formal contracts between units serve as communication and commitment devices that address coordination and incentive problems within the firm by providing clarity and credibility on the rights allocated to the units in the transaction. Funding: Support for this research comes from the London Business School. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2021.1536. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent scholarship has established several ways in which external hiring—versus filling a role with a comparable internal candidate—is detrimental to firms. Yet, organizational learning theory suggests that external hires benefit firms: by importing knowledge that is unavailable or obscured to insiders and applying it toward experimentation and risky recombination. Accordingly and consistent with studies of learning by hiring and innovation, we predict that external hires are at greater risk of intrapreneurship than internal hires. We test this prediction via a study of product managers in large technology companies. We use machine learning to operationalize intrapreneurship by comparing product manager job descriptions with the founding statements of venture-backed technology entrepreneurs. Our research design employs coarsened exact matching to balance pretreatment covariates between product managers who arrived at their roles internally versus externally. The results of our analysis indicate that externally hired product managers are substantially more intrapreneurial than observably equivalent internal hires. However, we also find that intrapreneurial product managers have a higher turnover rate, an effect that is primarily driven by external hires. This suggests that hiring for intrapreneurship may be a difficult strategy to sustain. Funding: The authors acknowledge financial support from London Business School, the National University of Singapore [Grant WBS R-313-000-128-133], and a dissertation grant from the Ewing Kauffman Foundation, Kansas City, Missouri. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2021.1530. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article titled "Editorial Statement—Healthcare Management" invites submissions that contribute to the understanding of how to organize and manage healthcare services in various economies and improve the health and well-being of populations and workforces. The papers should address challenges in healthcare management, such as improving patient access, outcomes, and experience, reducing costs and errors, managing demand and patient flow, and leveraging technology. The department encourages submissions that engage with current industry trends, including digitization of patient records, genomics, value-based healthcare, and patient empowerment. The criteria for publication include the potential for practical impact, strong analysis and evidence, and original insights. The department prefers short and focused papers with a concise executive summary. [Extracted from the article]