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Das Problem einer ausschließlich „idealistischen“ oder „realistischen“ Position ist es, dass sie die Bedingungen ihrer Analyse nur einseitig einfangen und nicht hinreichend begründen kann, weil sie das begriffliche und evaluative Theoriedesign ihrer Position immer schon voraussetzen muss, und damit in der Beantwortung ihrer Frage stets normativ Stellung bezieht. Diesem Desiderat einer Begründung möchte die vorliegende Studie abhelfen. Die vorliegende Studie beschäftigt sich mit den kategorialen Begriffen von Realität und Wirklichkeit innerhalb der historischen Diskussionsstadien um 1800. Die Autorin liefert dabei jenseits des Dualismus von Idealismus und Realismus eine Begründung des Realen innerhalb ihrer Vermittlung. Sie fragt danach, wie wir um diese Vermittlung wissen können, und erkundet anhand der Hegelschen Wesenslogik in kritischer Absetzung zu dessen Vorläufern (Kant, Jacobi, Fichte) die argumentative Basis dafür, welche kategorialen Grundbedingungen ein Begriff von Realität erfüllen muss: nämlich Realität immer schon als immanent verbunden mit einer bestimmten Art von fundamentaler Begrifflichkeit zu verstehen.

This book addresses the hasty development of modern logic, especially its introducing and embracing various kinds of artificial languages and moving from the study of natural languages to that of artificial ones. This shift seemed extremely helpful and managed to elevate logic to a new level of rigor and clarity. However, the change that logic underwent in this way was in no way insignificant, and it is also far from an insignificant matter to determine to what extent the'new logic'only engaged new and more powerful instruments to answer the questions posed by the'old'one, and to what extent it replaced these questions with new ones.Hence, this movement has generated brand new kinds of philosophical problems that have still not been dealt with systematically. Philosophy of Logical Systems addresses these new kinds of philosophical problems that are intertwined with the development of modern logic. Jaroslav Peregrin analyzes the rationale behind the introduction of the artificial languages of logic; classifies the various tools which were adopted to build such languages; gives an overview of the various kinds of languages introduced in the course of modern logic and the motifs of their employment; discusses what can actually be achieved by relocating the problems of logic from natural language into them; and reaches certain conclusions with respect to the possibilities and limitations of this'formal turn'of logic.This book is both an important scholarly contribution to the philosophy of logic and a systematic survey of the standard (and not so standard) logical systems that were established during the short history of modern logic.

Karen Ng sheds new light on Hegel's famously impenetrable philosophy. She does so by offering a new interpretation of Hegel's idealism and by foregrounding Hegel's Science of Logic, revealing that Hegel's theory of reason revolves around the concept of organic life. Beginning with the influence of Kant's Critique of Judgment on Hegel, Ng argues that Hegel's key philosophical contributions concerning self-consciousness, freedom, and logic all develop around the idea of internal purposiveness, which appealed to Hegel deeply. She charts the development of the purposiveness theme in Kant's third Critique, and argues that the most important innovation from that text is the claim that the purposiveness of nature opens up and enables the operation of the power of judgment. This innovation is essential for understanding Hegel's philosophical method in the Differenzschrift (1801) and Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), where Hegel, developing lines of thought from Fichte and Schelling, argues against Kant that internal purposiveness constitutes cognition's activity, shaping its essential relation to both self and world. From there, Ng defends a new and detailed interpretation of Hegel's Science of Logic, arguing that Hegel's Subjective Logic can be understood as Hegel's version of a critique of judgment, in which life comes to be understood as opening up the possibility of intelligibility. She makes the case that Hegel's theory of judgment is modelled on reflective and teleological judgments, in which something's species or kind provides the objective context for predication. The Subjective Logic culminates in the argument that life is a primitive or original activity of judgment, one that is the necessary presupposition for the actualization of self-conscious cognition. Through bold and ambitious new arguments, Ng demonstrates the ongoing dialectic between life and self-conscious cognition, providing ground-breaking ways of understanding Hegel's philosophical system.

Lotzes Logik gilt als einer der folgenreichsten philosophischen Texte im Übergang vom 19. in das 20. Jahrhundert. Lotzes Einfluß auf den englischen Neuhegelianismus und den amerikanischen Pragmatismus wird besonders bei Bradley und Bosanquet sowie bei James und Dewey deutlich. In der deutschen Philosophie ist die Logik zu einem Grundbuch der neukantianischen Tradition geworden. Aus phänomenologischer Sicht berief sich Husserl insbesondere auf das Buch Vom Erkennen und noch Heidegger erhielt hier wesentliche Impulse.

Die »Logik« des Philosophen Hermann Lotze (1817–1881) gilt auch nach internationalem Maßstab als einer der folgenreichsten philosophischen Texte im Übergang vom 19. in das 20. Jahrhundert. Lotzes Einfluss auf den englischen Neuhegelianismus und den amerikanischen Pragmatismus wird besonders bei Bradley und Bosanquet sowie bei James und Dewey deutlich. In der deutschen Philosophie ist die »Logik« zu einem Grundbuch der neukantianischen Tradition geworden. Aus phänomenologischer Sicht berief sich Husserl insbesondere auf das Buch »Vom Erkennen«; und noch Heidegger erhielt hier wesentliche Impulse.

Propositions has two main goals. The first is to show that there are propositions. The second is to defend an account of their nature. While pursuing these goals, Trenton Merricks draws a variety of controversial conclusions about related issues, including, among others, supervaluationism, the nature of possible worlds, truths about non-existent entities, and whether and how logical consequence depends on modal facts. An argument is modally valid just in case, necessarily, if its premises are true, then its conclusion is true. Propositions begins with the assumption that some arguments are modally valid. Merricks then argues that the premises and conclusions of modally valid arguments are not sentences. Instead, he argues, they are propositions. So, because there are modally valid arguments, there are propositions. Merricks defends the claim that propositions are not structured and are not sets of possible worlds. He thereby presents arguments against the two leading accounts of the nature of propositions. Those arguments are intended not only to oppose those accounts, but also to deliver conclusions about what a satisfactory account of the nature of propositions should say. Of particular importance in this regard are arguments concerning the alleged explanations of how a set of possible worlds or a structured proposition would manage to represent thing as being a certain way. Merricks then defends his own account of the nature of propositions, which says only that each proposition is a necessary existent that essentially represents things as being a certain way.

In diesem Buch wird der Begriff der Zustimmung in seinen unterschiedlichen Ausprägungen in drei Teilen herausgearbeitet (Teil I: Zustimmung in der Philosophie der Neuzeit und in der traditionellen Logik, Teil II: Zustimmung in der modernen Philosophie, Teil III: Die logische Analyse der Zustimmung). Der neuzeitlichen Tradition in der Verwendung des Zustimmungsbegriffs folgend, erfolgt seine Analyse in Verbindung mit epistemischen und sprechakttheoretischen Begriffen wie Glaube und Überzeugung, Fürwahrhalten, Urteil, Akzeptation und Behauptung. Im Hauptteil des Buchs wird im Rahmen der Unterscheidung zwischen der Logik innerer Zustimmung und der Logik äußerer Zustimmung das Verhältnis von Zustimmung, Widerspruch und Folgerung sowie von Zustimmungsfolgerung und Relevanz dargestellt. Hier erfolgt die Behandlung der Zustimmung in formalisierten Sprachen, wodurch sich eine präzise und die logischen Konsequenzen klar umfassende Explikation des Zustimmungsbegriffs ergibt. Die Studie verfolgt das Ziel, Anwendungen der epistemischen Logik in der Philosophie des Geistes, der Erkenntnistheorie, der Argumentationstheorie und der künstlichen Intelligenz zu fördern.

The essays in this volume are based on addresses presented during a colloquium on free logic, modal logic and related areas held at the University of California at Irvine, in May of 1968. With the single exception of Dagfinn F011esdal, whose revised address is included in a recent issue of Synthese honoring W. V. Quine, all of the speakers at the Irvine colloquium are contributors to this volume. Thanks are due to Professor A. I. Melden, Chairman of the Department of Philosophy at Irvine, for his enthusiastic support of the colloquium, and to Drs. Gordon Brittan and Daniel Dennett for their help in the administration of the colloquium. Finally. I should also like to thank Professor Ralph W. Gerard, Dean of the Graduate Division of the University of California at Irvine, for the financial support which made the colloquium possible. KAREL LAMBERT Laguna Beach, California, 1969 TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE V KAREL LAMBERT and BAS C. VAN FRAASSEN/ Meaning Relations, Possible Objects, and Possible Worlds 1 JAAKKO HINTIKKA / Existential Presuppositions and Uniqueness Presuppositions 20 RICHMOND H. THOMASON / Some Completeness Results for Modal Predicate Calculi 56 H. LEBLANC and R. K. MEYER / Truth-Value Semantics for the Theory of Types 77 J. M. VICKERS / Probability and Non Standard Logics 102 PETER W. WOODRUFF / Logic and Truth Value Gaps 121 DANA SCOTT / Advice on Modal Logic 143 INDEX OF NAMES 175 KAREL LAMBER T AND BAS C.

Logic has attained in our century a development incomparably greater than in any past age of its long history, and this has led to such an enrichment and proliferation of its aspects, that the problem of some kind of unified recom­ prehension of this discipline seems nowadays unavoidable. This splitting into several subdomains is the natural consequence of the fact that Logic has intended to adopt in our century the status of a science. This always implies that the general optics, under which a certain set of problems used to be con­ sidered, breaks into a lot of specialized sectors of inquiry, each of them being characterized by the introduction of specific viewpoints and of technical tools of its own. The first impression, that often accompanies the creation of one of such specialized branches in a diSCipline, is that one has succeeded in isolating the'scientific core'of it, by restricting the somehow vague and redundant generality of its original'philosophical'configuration. But, after a while, it appears that some of the discarded aspects are indeed important and a new specialized domain of investigation is created to explore them. By follOwing this procedure, one finally finds himself confronted with such a variety of independent fields of research, that one wonders whether the fact of labelling them under a common denomination be nothing but the contingent effect of a pure historical tradition.

The field of modern logic is too extensive to be worked through by open­ cast mining. To open it up, we need to sink shafts and construct adits. This is the method of most text books: a systematic exposition of a number of main topics, supplemented by exercises to teach skill in the appurtenant techniques, lays a secure foundation for subsequent dis­ cussion of selected questions. Compared with this, the present treatment is more like a network of exploratory drillings to show that it would be worthwhile to start mining operations, or to work the existing shafts and adits, as the case may be. Within this metaphor we may also describe the inherent weakness of this conception: once a cavity is pierced, the duct's capacity will in general not be sufficient to carry away the discovered riches. But whether we are concerned with a new or an already worked mine - at any rate, the experience should stimulate us into either reviving an existing system of shafts or even, in particularly fortunate cases, designing a new ap­ proach.

Brimming with visual examples of concepts, derivation rules, and proof strategies, this introductory text is ideal for students with no previous experience in logic. Symbolic Logic: Syntax, Semantics, and Proof introduces students to the fundamental concepts, techniques, and topics involved in deductive reasoning. Agler guides students through the basics of symbolic logic by explaining the essentials of two classical systems, propositional and predicate logic. Students will learn translation both from formal language into English and from English into formal language; how to use truth trees and truth tables to test propositions for logical properties; and how to construct and strategically use derivation rules in proofs. This text makes this often confounding topic much more accessible with step-by-step example proofs, chapter glossaries of key terms, hundreds of homework problems and solutions for practice, and suggested further readings.

In her innovative take on G.W. F. Hegel's The Encyclopaedia Logic, Julie E. Maybee uses pictures and diagrams to cut through the philosopher's dense, difficult writing. Picturing Hegel: An Illustrated Guide to Hegel's Encyclopaedia Logic utilizes diagrams in order to rehabilitate Hegel's logic for serious consideration by showing how each stage develops step-by-step from earlier stages according to definite, logical patterns. This interpretation makes Hegel's work accessible and understandable for new and experienced readers alike. Because Hegel uses the same logic in all of his works, Maybee's analysis and defense of the logic will capture the attention of those readers interested in Hegel's ethics, politics, history, philosophy of religion, and phenomenology. Through the included diagrams, Maybee is able to define central Hegelian concepts such as'being-in-itself,'and'being-in-and-for-itself'with a new level of precision. Maybee argues that Hegel's logic does not include the one logistical pattern most often attributed to him; namely, the pattern'thesis-antithesis-synthesis.'Rather, Hegel's model of logic was more scientific than formalistic in nature, as the philosopher himself pointed out. Hegel considered himself an encyclopedic culmination of Western philosophy in some ways, and indeed his work summarizes many of the presuppositions of Western philosophy. By picturing Hegel's logic, we can gain a greater understanding of ourselves.

Proof and Disproof in Formal Logic is a lively and entertaining introduction to formal logic providing an excellent insight into how a simple logic works. Formal logic allows you to check a logical claim without considering what the claim means. This highly abstracted idea is an essential and practical part of computer science. The idea of a formal system--a collection of rules and axioms which define a universe of logical proofs--is what gives us programming languages and modern-day programming. This book concentrates on using logic as a tool: making and using formal proofs and disproofs of particular logical claims. The logic it uses--natural deduction--is very small and very simple; working with it helps you see how large mathematical universes can be built on small foundations. The book is divided into four parts: · Part I'Basics'gives an introduction to formal logic with a short history of logic and explanations of some technical words. · Part II'Formal syntactic proof'show you how to do calculations in a formal system where you are guided by shapes and never need to think about meaning. Your experiments are aided by Jape, which can operate as both inquisitor and oracle. · Part III'Formal semantic disproof'shows you how to construct mathematical counterexamples to show that proof is impossible. Jape can check the counterexamples you build. · Part IV'Program specification and proof'describes how to apply your logical understanding to a real computer science problem, the accurate description and verification of programs. Jape helps, as far as arithmetic allows. Aimed at undergraduates and graduates in computer science, logic, mathematics, and philosophy, the text includes reference to and exercises based on the computer software package Jape, an interactive teaching and research tool designed and hosted by the author that is freely available on the web.

Die vorliegende Studie interpretiert Hegels Schlußlehre aus ihrem historischen und systematischen Zusammenhang. Der Beitrag der Schlußlehre besteht in dem Nachweis, daß die gängigen Theorien von der Natur des Begriffs - verstanden als ein Merkmal oder eine Klasse von Gegenständen - die Funktion des mittleren Terms nicht zu erklären vermögen. Mit der Schlußlehre verfolgt Hegel keine formallogische Zielsetzung, sondern bewegt sich ganz im Rahmen seiner spekulativen Metaphysik.

This clear, accessible account of Hegelian logic makes a case for its enormous seductiveness, its surprising presence in the collective consciousness, and the dangers associated therewith. Offering comprehensive coverage of Hegel's important works, Bencivenga avoids getting bogged down in short-lived scholarly debates to provide a work of permanent significance and usefulness.