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We exploit a data disclosure project by the Italian government (OpenCivitas) which allowed mayors to view each other’s detailed expenditure data through a dedicated website. We interpret views on the website as generating a directed network. Mayors in the network are on average younger, more educated, they are more likely to come from larger cities which more often are in the northern regions and are more likely to be affiliated to traditional parties, although populist parties usually rely more on the web for communication and political activities. Using directed dyadic models we find that mayors tend to form links with mayors of similar age who manage similar-sized cities and most often in their same region. However, links are more likely to be formed when mayors don’t share the same gender, education and party affiliation. Mayors in this network do not engage in yardstick competition with neighbouring municipalities while all the other mayors do, and rather compete with each other, despite the physical distance. We show that this network existed before the website opened, but we find that after data disclosure yardstick competition within the network becomes strongly driven by mayors who are up for re-election. This was not the case before data disclosure. For the other municipalities, yardstick competition between neighbours remains uncorrelated with mayors’ term limits.

We study the impact of commercial property taxation on vacancy rates and rents in the UK, using a new data-set, and exploiting exogenous variations in property tax rates from reliefs in the UK system: small business rate relief (SBRR), retail relief and empty property relief. We estimate that the retail relief reduces vacancies by 85%, and SBRR relief by up to 49%, while empty property exemption increases them by up to 89%. The effect of retail relief on clusters of urban properties (the "High St") is no different to its overall effect. SBRR increases (decreases) the likelihood that a property is occupied by a small (large) business. We also use data on asking prices for rental properties to study the effect of reliefs on rental rates. Rental rates move in the opposite direction to vacancy rates, except in the case of empty property relief. All these findings are consistent with a novel model of directed search in the commercial property market, also presented in the paper.

We exploit the introduction of an open data online platform - part of a transparency program initiated by the Italian Government in late 2014 - as a natural experiment to analyse the effect of data disclosure on mayors’ expenditure and public good provision. First, we analyse the effect of the program by comparing municipalities on the border between ordinary and special regions, exploiting the fact that the latter regions did not participate in the program. We find that mayors in ordinary regions immediately change their behaviour after data disclosure by improving the disclosed indicators, and that the reaction depends also on their initial relative performance, a yardstick competition effect. Second, we investigate the effect of mayors’ attention to data disclosure within treated regions by tracking their daily accesses to the platform, which we instrument with the daily publication of newspaper articles mentioning the program. We find that mayors react to data disclosure by decreasing spending via a reduction of service provision, resulting in an aggregate decrease inefficiency. Overall, mayors seem to target variables that are disclosed on the website at the expense of variables that are less salient.