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Reassessing the reasons for the German military success over France in War of 1870 up to the Battle of Sedan, we rely on publications of contemporary artillery generals, such as Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen and put the topic into the broader context of warfare since the 1866 German War. We reject the idea of success, being simply based on armament or a special 'soldierly spirit', but argue that the main reason for military success was based on reorganization of the Prussian artillery, which paved the way to the future 'battle of combined arms' and the dominance of fire over thrust. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the discipline of military history in the German speaking realm, noting that since the close of World War II, it has focused heavily on presenting multiple perspectives, and on the holocaust, to the exclusion of the history of battles themselves. Offering an example of what the history of a battle would be, the author considers the battle of Königgrätz which took place in 1866, and involved the Austrian Third Corp under the command of Ernst von Österreich. The author uses this example to show that larger questions of war and politics can be better answered through a careful examination of battles.

The article discusses the military tactics in the Battle of Königgrätz fought between June 22-July 3, 1866. It describes the weapon superiority of the Prussian armies due to the sparking pin rifles, allowing them to defeat the armies of Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The battle tactics employed by Prussian field marshal general Helmuth von Moltke are discussed in contrast to those of Austro-Hungarian general Ludwig von Benedek. Other subjects under discussion include flanking maneuvers, muzzle-loader artillery and Lorenz Rifles, and the tactics of cavalry divisions.