Search

Abstract Anti-corruption efforts are inherently political. Corruption charges can be levied against political opponents as an instrument of repression; they can also be used against troublesome allies in the same [...]

What is the effect of minority co-ethnic employment on income? While the business organizations literature argues diversity allows for knowledge accumulation, optimal labour allocation, and efficient interactions, absent is any consideration of language – e.g. language competency or language ideology. We argue when co-ethnic minorities work together, this shared language allows for bounded trust to develop; it also ensures there are preference similarities – factors that can increase firm productivity and individual wages. Using survey data of minority Hungarians in three Central and Eastern European countries (Romania, Slovakia, and Serbia), we find (1) diversity has no positive effect on income; and in fact, (2) co-ethnic employment increases wages in Southern Slovakia and Vojvodina. Additionally, we confirm that co-ethnic employment is not happening simply because of demographics. Instead, with one exception, the proportion of Hungarians in the workplace is significantly higher than in the areas where these jobs are located – suggesting a strategic behaviour by minority Hungarians. The implication is not that we endorse homogeneous workplaces per se, but that we remain cognizant of how asymmetric linguistic competencies and the underlying linguistic ideologies can shape power hierarchies – thereby limiting the benefits of diversity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can linguistic diversity in the media impede state language proficiency? In this paper, we test the extent to which the availability of minority languages in the media affects state language proficiency for ethnic minorities. We take advantage of an exogeneous development: The rapid expansion of Budapest-originating media outside Hungary in the mid-2000s transformed the media landscape in neighbouring states. Using an original survey data of ethnic Hungarians in minority regions in four Central-Eastern European states over two waves, we find (1) the availability of minority language media means minorities are consuming less media in the state language, which in turn induces low levels of state language proficiency – i.e. through an exogeneous exposure mechanism; and (2) minorities with weaker state language proficiency choose to consume minority language media – i.e. through an endogenous selection mechanism. The results suggest a strong relationship between the language of media consumption and linguistic proficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What explains public attitudes towards a former aggressor state? Conventional wisdom would suggest the prevalence of negative sentiments rooted in historical hatred. In this article we contend that when individuals are proficient in a foreign language--e.g. a lingua franca--they have an alternative channel through which they are exposed to positive narratives put forth by other parties regarding the former aggressor state. And as a result, their attitudes towards the former aggressor state are more positive than those held by their linguistically limited counterparts. To test our argument, we focus on public attitudes towards the Japanese in Mainland China, Singapore, and Taiwan--three Chinese-ethnic majority political units that experienced Japanese aggression leading up to and during World War n. Using survey data, we demonstrate that individuals who are proficient in the English language are much more likely to hold positive attitudes of the Japanese. These results are robust even when we consider whether some individuals are predisposed to being cosmopolitan; whether some individuals have more opportunities to learn English; and whether the linguistic effects are symptomatic of American soft power. Keywords attitudes, English, Japan, language, When the Japanese government surrendered to the United States at the end of World War II (1945), it left behind a lasting legacy in East Asia. During the War, as [...]

https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2019.41, published by Cambridge University Press, 11 February 2020. In the initial publication of this article (Hu and Liu 2020), the labeling of some figures was inconsistent with the text [...]

While authoritarian regimes are often characterized by their civil liberty restrictions, some dictatorships acknowledge the ethnolinguistic diversity of their population. Are minorities in multiethnic authoritarian states more likely to trust the government when their language is recognized? In this paper, we argue while recognition of a group's language improves trust in democracies through a substantive representation mechanism, the same cannot be said in authoritarian regimes. Instead, recognition is a mere symbolic gesture. Such window-dressing efforts call attention to the horizontal inequality between hegemon and minority groups—and such, minority language recognition is associated with negative political trust. We test our argument with the World Values Survey. By identifying which minority groups have been afforded linguistic recognition, we find evidence of a significant—but negative—link between recognition and political trust. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the need of departments and colleges to recognize and reward faculty engaged in their efforts, and mentions taskforce created by the Government Department of the University of Texas to identify challenges of the department in respect to diversity and inclusion.

How can the growing personalization of power be identified and measured ex ante? Extant measures in the authoritarian literature have traditionally focused on institutional constraints and more recently on individual behaviour – such as purging opposition members from (and packing allies into) government bodies. This article offers a different strategy that examines leaders' individual rhetoric. It focuses on patterns of pronoun usage for the first person. The author argues that as leaders personalize power, they are less likely to use 'I' (a pronoun linked to credit claiming and blame minimizing) and more likely to use 'we' (the leader speaks for – or with – the populace). To test this argument, the study focuses on all major, scheduled speeches by all chief executives in the entire Chinese-speaking world – that is, China, Singapore and Taiwan – since independence. It finds a robust pattern between first-person pronouns and political constraints. To ensure the results are not driven by the Chinese sample, the rhetoric of four other political leaders is considered: Albania's Hoxha, North Korea's Kim Il Sung, Hungary's Orbán and Ecuador's Correa. The implications of this project suggest that how leaders talk can provide insights into how they perceive their rule. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How can leaders recover public trust and approval when government performance is low? We argue politicians use speeches evoking images of deceased predecessors to reactivate support temporarily. This distracts supporters from the poor performance and arouses empathy and nostalgia among them, causing them to perceive the current leader more favorably. We test this argument by scraping for all speeches by Argentine president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. We identify all instances when she referenced Juan Perón—the charismatic founder of the Justice Party. We find that as Kirchner's approval rating decreases, the number of Perón references increases. To identify the causal mechanism and to ensure that endogeneity is not a concern, we employ text analysis and a natural experiment—courtesy of LAPOP. The results provide robust evidence that leaders reference their dead predecessors to evoke positive feelings. However, while doing so can improve public opinion, the effects manifest only in the short term and among supporters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given the importance of language for state building, many governments undertake language planning efforts to ensure their citizens can speak an – if not, the – official language. Yet the mere act of designating a language as official is not sufficient for the language to be widely spoken across the population. In this paper we ask, what explains official language spread? We argue whether citizens can speak an official language – either as a first or second language – depends on how much the government prioritizes the education ministry. Governments that allocate more resources – financial, political, and human capital – to the education ministry are more likely to spread the official language. We assess this argument first with a case study of Singapore 1965−1985. We intentionally pick a successful case to elucidate the mechanisms linking education prioritization to language spread. To demonstrate the mechanisms are not Singapore-specific, we run a second test. The statistical analysis employs original cross-national, over-time (1978–2009) measures of budget allocation ranks, minister ranks, and ministry cabinet ranks. The results suggest a strong effect between education prioritization and language spread. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]