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Telecommunications companies (telcos) provide infrastructure essential to the delivery of digital content. The competitiveness of European Union businesses is presently seen as critically dependent on expansion of next-generation communication technologies. Yet, EU telcos are displaying returns on capital that disappoint private investors, leading in some cases to depressed share prices, and potentially making them vulnerable to takeovers bids by financial investors. Given their essential role, the prospect of EU telcos falling into mostly foreign-owned, fiercely profit-maximizing, and/or cost-cutting investors is unappealing for policy makers, at both the national and the European level. One solution suggested by the telcos themselves is that they be allowed to consolidate. Economic theory does not provide a clear answer to how such concentration might affect investment in infrastructure. In this paper, we provide a comparative empirical analysis of the relationship between market concentration and investment in infrastructure in the telco sector. First, we compare investment rates in infrastructure by major telco companies in both the EU and the more concentrated US market. We find more value being returned to customers in the form of infrastructure investment in the less-concentrated EU market. Second, we compare telcos' profitability with that of other corporations involved in the information or ``eye-ball'' value chain. We find operating profits of telcos on both sides of the Atlantic are broadly in line with other companies of the value chain, with the notable exception of the highly concentrated digital ad exchange business. This evidence suggests that lack of incentives rather than lack of ability explains the larger portion of profits invested into infrastructure in the EU compared to the US. Rather than allowing market concentration, which could raise consumer prices and lower infrastructure investment incentives, EU regulators might consider other fund-raising mechanisms, such as redistributing profits from digital ad exchanges.

The ‘internet’—familiar shorthand for information and communication technologies (ICT)—is built on a physical infrastructure owned by a variety of state and private actors, foreign and domestic, with multiple interests. It has not only driven change on a global scale; its spread also had a profound impact on the social sciences. However, our understanding of how its architecture, and especially its owners, influence its political and economic impact is still in its infancy. This paper presents the Telecommunications Ownership and Control (TOSCO) dataset on ownership of internet service providers (ISPs) that allows to recognize the internet as strategically built and used by governments and corporations. Along with a thorough discussion of the conceptualization and operationalization of ownership as a variable, the TOSCO dataset enables comparative large-N analysis of the determinants and effects of varying ownership structures and identities in the transforming context of 49 African countries, 2000–2019. We demonstrate its usefulness with descriptive statistics and regression analyses using replication data from research on the internet’s democratizing and corruption-reducing effects. In allowing for a more realistic account, TOSCO supports scholars and practitioners concerned with the determinants and effects of internet service provision, use and control in Africa and beyond.

While scholars have already identified and discussed some of the most urgent problems in content moderation in the Global North, fewer scholars have paid attention to content regulation in the Global South, and notably Africa. In the absence of content moderation by Western tech giants themselves, African countries appear to have shifted their focus towards state-centric approaches to regulating content. We argue that those approaches are largely informed by a regime’s motivation to repress media freedom as well as institutional constraints on the executive. We use structural topic modelling on a corpus of news articles worldwide (N = 7′787) mentioning hate speech and fake news in 47 African countries to estimate the salience of discussions of legal and technological approaches to content regulation. We find that, in particular, discussions of technological strategies are more salient in regimes with little respect for media freedom and fewer legislative constraints. Overall, our findings suggest that the state is the dominant actor in shaping content regulation across African countries and point to the need for a better understanding of how regime-specific characteristics shape regulatory decisions. publishedVersion

Following the fast spread of the coronavirus (Covid-19) across Europe and North America in March 2020, many people started stockpiling commodities like toilet paper. Despite the high relevance for public authorities to adequately address stockpiling behavior, empirical studies on the psychological underpinnings of toilet paper stockpiling are still scarce. In this study, we investigated the relation between personality traits, perceived threat of Covid-19, and stockpiling of toilet paper in an online survey (N = 996) across 22 countries. Results suggest that people who felt more threatened by Covid-19 stockpiled more toilet paper. Further, a predisposition towards Emotionality predicted the perceived threat of Covid-19 and affected stockpiling behavior indirectly. Finally, Conscientiousness was related to toilet paper stockpiling, such that individuals higher in Conscientiousness tended to stockpile more toilet paper. These results emphasize the importance of clear communication by public authorities acknowledging anxiety and, at the same time, transmitting a sense of control.

Our study examines the effects of drought on livelihoods and human migration in the rural highlands of northern Ethiopia, one of the most affected regions during the 2015 drought. We conducted a household survey contextualized by focus group discussions in two rural sending areas. Drought intensity was similar in both areas, but drought impacts and farmer’s response strategies differed. Overall, we observed significant strategy changes, including a drastic shift from subsistence crop production to livestock sale among farmers being dependent on the March–June rainfall (belg season). Our results suggest that drought increases mobility, primarily through triggering short-term migration to closer destinations to cover immediate needs like food shortages. Four out of ten households in both regions engaged in migration. Nonetheless, migration tends to be context specific with respect to barriers and opportunities for participation, with distance, duration, and perceptions of migration as well as the underlying motives being region-specific. We conclude that understanding livelihood strategy changes requires an embedding in a larger context rather than focusing on one particular driver. Migration—one important livelihood strategy in northern Ethiopia—is the result of a complex interplay of factors, drought perhaps being only one of them. Based on our finding, we reason the decision to migrate is strongly moderated by the drought rather than it is directly driven by it.