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There is a debate in the literature about the arguments of utility in expected utility theory. Some implicitly assume utility is defined on final wealth whereas others argue it may be defined on initial wealth and income separately. I argue that making income and wealth separate arguments of utility has important implications that may not be widely recognized. A framework is presented that allows the unified treatment of expected utility models and anomalies. I show that expected utility of income models can predict framing induced preference reversals, a willingness to pay-willingness to accept gap for lotteries, and choice-value preference reversals. The main contribution is a theorem. It is proved that for all utility functions where initial wealth and income enter separately, either there will be preference reversals or preferences can be represented by a utility function defined on final wealth alone

This paper reports results from a series of laboratory experiments designed to evaluate the impact of exposure risk on market performance. Exposure risk arises when there are complementarities between trades, e.g. when the purchase of a new house requires selling the old one. The continuous double auction (CDA), which has proven to be remarkably effective in a wide variety of settings, performs poorly in a treatment with high exposure risk: overall market efficiency is only 20% and there are many instances of no trade. In a parallel treatment with lower exposure risk, efficiency under the CDA is higher (55%) but is dominated, for instance, by a top-trading-cycles procedure that uses no money. The CDA's poor performance does not depend on whether house values are private information or common knowledge, indicating that exposure risk is due to strategic uncertainty not objective uncertainty about others' preferences. We introduce a simple package market and show that it effectively resolves exposure risk: efficiency levels are 82% and 89% respectively for the low and high exposure treatments. The proposed package market is a simple extension of the CDA and could potentially be applied in a variety contexts.

We employ laboratory methods to study stability of competitive equilibrium in Scarf's economy (International Economic Review, 1960). Tatonnement theory predicts that prices are globally unstable for this economy, i.e. unless prices start at the competitive equilibrium they oscillate without converging. Anderson et al. (Journal of Economic Theory, 2004) report that in laboratory double auction markets, prices in the Scarf economy do indeed oscillate with no clear sign of convergence. We replicate their experiments and confirm that tatonnement theory predicts the direction of price changes remarkably well. Prices are globally unstable with adverse effects for the economy's efficiency and the equitable distribution of the gains from trade. We also introduce a novel market mechanism where participants submit demand schedules and prices are computed using Smale's global Newtonian dynamic (American Economic Review, 1976). We show that for the Scarf economy, submitting a competitive schedule, i.e. a set of quantities that maximize utility taking prices as given, is a weakly dominant strategy. The resulting outcome corresponds to the unique competitive equilibrium of the Scarf economy. In experiments that employ the schedule market, prices do not oscillate but instead converge quickly to the competitive equilibrium. Besides stabilizing prices, the schedule market is more efficient and results in highly egalitarian outcomes.

This note briefly summarizes the consequences of adding correlated individual differences to the best baseline model in the Games competition, I-SAW. I find evidence that the traits of an individual are correlated, but refining I-SAW to capture these correlations does not significantly improve the model’s accuracy when predicting average behavior.

The first chapter introduces the thesis and reviews the literature on loss aversion, the endowment effect and the willingness to pay/willingness to accept gap, and the effects of experience. The second chapter reports an extended version of Knetsch's exchange of goods experiment to explore how different types of experience influence the endowment effect. The experiment has four treatments, which compare the behaviour of subjects with experience of consuming, owning, and choosing goods to a control group. The results are consistent with earlier studies in that an endowment effect is observed; however, the strength of the effect is less than in earlier studies and differs between treatments. In particular, there is a significantly stronger endowment effect in the treatments in which the endowment is acquired in two steps rather than one step. The third chapter reports a repeated market experiment in which subjects buy and sell lotteries under symmetric and asymmetric information. Buying and selling bids and prices are compared. A gap between buying and selling prices decays under symmetric information but persists under asymmetric information. Furthermore, there are spillover effects. When the regime switches between symmetric and asymmetric information, subjects do not immediately adjust their behaviour. The results are interpreted as evidence that behaviour is driven by heuristics. The fourth chapter reports another repeated market experiment in which subjects buy and sell lotteries. How the lotteries’ odds are presented and whether the lottery gets resolved after each trial vary between treatments. Among the findings is that the gap between buying and selling bids decays when lotteries are not resolved each trial but persists when they are. The final chapter summarises the findings of the three experiments and identifies common patterns. Directions for future experimental and theoretical research are suggested. Finally, implications for policy are discussed.

We report experiments investigating how experience influences the endowment effect. Our experiments feature endowments which are bundles of unfamiliar consumption goods. We examine how a subject’s willingness to swap items from their endowment is influenced by prior experiences of tasting the goods in question and by prior experiences of choosing between them. We do not find a statistically significant endowment effect in our baseline treatment and, because of this, we are unable to test for an effect of consumption experience. We do find an endowment effect when the endowment is acquired in two instalments and, in this setting, we find some evidence that choice experience increases trading. In a follow up experiment, we find evidence that the absence of an endowment effect in our baseline treatment is due to subjects being more willing to swap when they do not have to give up the last unit of their endowment.

The first chapter introduces the thesis and reviews the literature on loss aversion, the endowment effect and the willingness to pay/willingness to accept gap, and the effects of experience. The second chapter reports an extended version of Knetsch's exchange of goods experiment to explore how different types of experience influence the endowment effect. The experiment has four treatments, which compare the behaviour of subjects with experience of consuming, owning, and choosing goods to a control group. The results are consistent with earlier studies in that an endowment effect is observed; however, the strength of the effect is less than in earlier studies and differs between treatments. In particular, there is a significantly stronger endowment effect in the treatments in which the endowment is acquired in two steps rather than one step. The third chapter reports a repeated market experiment in which subjects buy and sell lotteries under symmetric and asymmetric information. Buying and selling bids and prices are compared. A gap between buying and selling prices decays under symmetric information but persists under asymmetric information. Furthermore, there are spillover effects. When the regime switches between symmetric and asymmetric information, subjects do not immediately adjust their behaviour. The results are interpreted as evidence that behaviour is driven by heuristics. The fourth chapter reports another repeated market experiment in which subjects buy and sell lotteries. How the lotteries’ odds are presented and whether the lottery gets resolved after each trial vary between treatments. Among the findings is that the gap between buying and selling bids decays when lotteries are not resolved each trial but persists when they are. The final chapter summarises the findings of the three experiments and identifies common patterns. Directions for future experimental and theoretical research are suggested. Finally, implications for policy are discussed.

The first chapter introduces the thesis and reviews the literature on loss aversion, the endowment effect and the willingness to pay/willingness to accept gap, and the effects of experience. The second chapter reports an extended version of Knetsch's exchange of goods experiment to explore how different types of experience influence the endowment effect. The experiment has four treatments, which compare the behaviour of subjects with experience of consuming, owning, and choosing goods to a control group. The results are consistent with earlier studies in that an endowment effect is observed; however, the strength of the effect is less than in earlier studies and differs between treatments. In particular, there is a significantly stronger endowment effect in the treatments in which the endowment is acquired in two steps rather than one step. The third chapter reports a repeated market experiment in which subjects buy and sell lotteries under symmetric and asymmetric information. Buying and selling bids and prices are compared. A gap between buying and selling prices decays under symmetric information but persists under asymmetric information. Furthermore, there are spillover effects. When the regime switches between symmetric and asymmetric information, subjects do not immediately adjust their behaviour. The results are interpreted as evidence that behaviour is driven by heuristics. The fourth chapter reports another repeated market experiment in which subjects buy and sell lotteries. How the lotteries’ odds are presented and whether the lottery gets resolved after each trial vary between treatments. Among the findings is that the gap between buying and selling bids decays when lotteries are not resolved each trial but persists when they are. The final chapter summarises the findings of the three experiments and identifies common patterns. Directions for future experimental and theoretical research are suggested. Finally, implications for policy are discussed.

The first chapter introduces the thesis and reviews the literature on loss aversion, the endowment effect and the willingness to pay/willingness to accept gap, and the effects of experience. The second chapter reports an extended version of Knetsch's exchange of goods experiment to explore how different types of experience influence the endowment effect. The experiment has four treatments, which compare the behaviour of subjects with experience of consuming, owning, and choosing goods to a control group. The results are consistent with earlier studies in that an endowment effect is observed; however, the strength of the effect is less than in earlier studies and differs between treatments. In particular, there is a significantly stronger endowment effect in the treatments in which the endowment is acquired in two steps rather than one step. The third chapter reports a repeated market experiment in which subjects buy and sell lotteries under symmetric and asymmetric information. Buying and selling bids and prices are compared. A gap between buying and selling prices decays under symmetric information but persists under asymmetric information. Furthermore, there are spillover effects. When the regime switches between symmetric and asymmetric information, subjects do not immediately adjust their behaviour. The results are interpreted as evidence that behaviour is driven by heuristics. The fourth chapter reports another repeated market experiment in which subjects buy and sell lotteries. How the lotteries’ odds are presented and whether the lottery gets resolved after each trial vary between treatments. Among the findings is that the gap between buying and selling bids decays when lotteries are not resolved each trial but persists when they are. The final chapter summarises the findings of the three experiments and identifies common patterns. Directions for future experimental and theoretical research are suggested. Finally, implications for policy are discussed.

We report experiments investigating how experience influences the endowment effect. Our experiments feature endowments which are bundles of unfamiliar consumption goods. We examine how a subject’s willingness to swap items from their endowment is influenced by prior experiences of tasting the goods in question and by prior experiences of choosing between them. We do not find a statistically significant endowment effect in our baseline treatment and, because of this, we are unable to test for an effect of consumption experience. We do find an endowment effect when the endowment is acquired in two instalments and, in this setting, we find some evidence that choice experience increases trading. In a follow up experiment, we find evidence that the absence of an endowment effect in our baseline treatment is due to subjects being more willing to swap when they do not have to give up the last unit of their endowment.

The first chapter introduces the thesis and reviews the literature on loss aversion, the endowment effect and the willingness to pay/willingness to accept gap, and the effects of experience. The second chapter reports an extended version of Knetsch's exchange of goods experiment to explore how different types of experience influence the endowment effect. The experiment has four treatments, which compare the behaviour of subjects with experience of consuming, owning, and choosing goods to a control group. The results are consistent with earlier studies in that an endowment effect is observed; however, the strength of the effect is less than in earlier studies and differs between treatments. In particular, there is a significantly stronger endowment effect in the treatments in which the endowment is acquired in two steps rather than one step. The third chapter reports a repeated market experiment in which subjects buy and sell lotteries under symmetric and asymmetric information. Buying and selling bids and prices are compared. A gap between buying and selling prices decays under symmetric information but persists under asymmetric information. Furthermore, there are spillover effects. When the regime switches between symmetric and asymmetric information, subjects do not immediately adjust their behaviour. The results are interpreted as evidence that behaviour is driven by heuristics. The fourth chapter reports another repeated market experiment in which subjects buy and sell lotteries. How the lotteries’ odds are presented and whether the lottery gets resolved after each trial vary between treatments. Among the findings is that the gap between buying and selling bids decays when lotteries are not resolved each trial but persists when they are. The final chapter summarises the findings of the three experiments and identifies common patterns. Directions for future experimental and theoretical research are suggested. Finally, implications for policy are discussed.

We report experiments investigating how experience influences the endowment effect. Our experiments feature endowments which are bundles of unfamiliar consumption goods. We examine how a subject’s willingness to swap items from their endowment is influenced by prior experiences of tasting the goods in question and by prior experiences of choosing between them. We do not find a statistically significant endowment effect in our baseline treatment and, because of this, we are unable to test for an effect of consumption experience. We do find an endowment effect when the endowment is acquired in two instalments and, in this setting, we find some evidence that choice experience increases trading. In a follow up experiment, we find evidence that the absence of an endowment effect in our baseline treatment is due to subjects being more willing to swap when they do not have to give up the last unit of their endowment.

We report experiments investigating how experience influences the endowment effect. Our experiments feature endowments which are bundles of unfamiliar consumption goods. We examine how a subject’s willingness to swap items from their endowment is influenced by prior experiences of tasting the goods in question and by prior experiences of choosing between them. We do not find a statistically significant endowment effect in our baseline treatment and, because of this, we are unable to test for an effect of consumption experience. We do find an endowment effect when the endowment is acquired in two instalments and, in this setting, we find some evidence that choice experience increases trading. In a follow up experiment, we find evidence that the absence of an endowment effect in our baseline treatment is due to subjects being more willing to swap when they do not have to give up the last unit of their endowment.

There is a debate in the literature about the arguments of utility in expected utility theory. Some implicitly assume utility is defined on final wealth whereas others argue it may be defined on initial wealth and income separately. I argue that making income and wealth separate arguments of utility has important implications that may not be widely recognized. A framework is presented that allows the unified treatment of expected utility models and anomalies. I show that expected utility of income models can predict framing induced preference reversals, a willingness to pay-willingness to accept gap for lotteries, and choice-value preference reversals. The main contribution is a theorem. It is proved that for all utility functions where initial wealth and income enter separately, either there will be preference reversals or preferences can be represented by a utility function defined on final wealth alone