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Introduction COVID-19 showed that countries must strengthen their operational readiness (OPR) capabilities to respond to an imminent pandemic threat rapidly and proactively. We conducted a rapid scoping evidence review to understand the definition and critical elements of OPR against five core sub-systems of a new framework to strengthen the global architecture for Health Emergency Preparedness Response and Resilience (HEPR).Methods We searched MEDLINE, Embase, and Web of Science, targeted repositories, websites, and grey literature databases for publications between 1 January 2010 and 29 September 2021 in English, German, French or Afrikaans. Included sources were of any study design, reporting OPR, defined as immediate actions taken in the presence of an imminent threat, from groups who led or responded to a specified health emergency. We used prespecified and tested methods to screen and select sources, extract data, assess credibility and analyse results against the HEPR framework.Results Of 7005 sources reviewed, 79 met the eligibility criteria, including 54 peer-reviewed publications. The majority were descriptive reports (28%) and qualitative analyses (30%) from early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic. Definitions of OPR varied while nine articles explicitly used the term ‘readiness’, others classified OPR as part of preparedness or response. Applying our working OPR definition across all sources, we identified OPR actions within all five HEPR subsystems. These included resource prepositioning for early detection, data sharing, tailored communication and interventions, augmented staffing, timely supply procurement, availability and strategic dissemination of medical countermeasures, leadership, comprehensive risk assessment and resource allocation supported by relevant legislation. We identified gaps related to OPR for research and technology-enabled manufacturing platforms.Conclusions OPR is in an early stage of adoption. Establishing a consistent and explicit framework for OPRs within the context of existing global legal and policy frameworks can foster coherence and guide evidence-based policy and practice improvements in health emergency management.

Introduction Much is known around public health preparedness and response phases. However, between the two phases is operational readiness that comprises the immediate actions needed to respond to a developing risk or hazard. Currently, emergency readiness is embedded in multiple frameworks and policy documents related to the health emergency cycle. However, knowledge about operational readiness’ critical readiness components and actions required by countries to respond to public health eminent threat is not well known. Therefore, we aim to define and identify the critical elements of ‘operational readiness’ for public health emergencies, including COVID-19, and identify lessons learnt from addressing it, to inform the WHO Operational Readiness Framework.Methods and analysis This is a scoping review following the Joanna Briggs Institute guidance. Reporting will be according to the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses Extension for Scoping Reviews (PRISMA-ScR) checklist. MEDLINE, Embase and Web of Science databases and grey literature will be searched and exported into an online systematic review software (eg, Rayyan in this case) for review. The review team, which apart from scoping review methodological experts include content experts in health systems and public health and emergency medicine, prepared an a priori study protocol in consultation with WHO representatives. ATLAS.ti V.9 will be used to conduct thematic data analysis as well as store, organise and retrieve data. Data analysis and presentation will be carried out by five reviewers.Ethics and dissemination This review will reveal new insights, knowledge and lessons learnt that will translate into an operational framework for readiness actions. In consultation with WHO, findings will be disseminated as appropriate (eg, through professional bodies, conferences and research papers). No ethics approvals are required as no humans will be involved in data collection.Protocol registration This rapid scoping review has been registered on Open Science Framework (doi:10.17605/OSF.IO/6SYAH).

The International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005) are an essential vehicle for addressing global health security. Here, we report the IHR capacities in the WHO African from independent joint external evaluation (JEE). The JEE is a voluntary component of the IHR monitoring and evaluation framework. It evaluates IHR capacities in 19 technical areas in four broad themes: ‘Prevent’ (7 technical areas, 15 indicators); ‘Detect’ (4 technical areas, 13 indicators); ‘Respond’ (5 technical areas, 14 indicators), points of entry (PoE) and other IHR hazards (chemical and radiation) (3 technical areas, 6 indicators). The IHR capacity scores are graded from level 1 (no capacity) to level 5 (sustainable capacity). From February 2016 to March 2019, 40 of 47 WHO African region countries (81% coverage) evaluated their IHR capacities using the JEE tool. No country had the required IHR capacities. Under the theme ‘Prevent’, no country scored level 5 for 12 of 15 indicators. Over 80% of them scored level 1 or 2 for most indicators. For ‘Detect’, none scored level 5 for 12 of 13 indicators. However, many scored level 3 or 4 for several indicators. For ‘Respond’, none scored level 5 for 13 of 14 indicators, and less than 10% had a national multihazard public health emergency preparedness and response plan. For PoE and other IHR hazards, most countries scored level 1 or 2 and none scored level 5. Countries in the WHO African region are commended for embracing the JEE to assess their IHR capacities. However, major gaps have been identified. Urgent collective action is needed now to protect the WHO African region from health security threats.

Preventing zoonotic diseases requires coordinated actions by government authorities responsible for human and animal health. Constructing the frameworks needed to foster intersectoral collaboration can be approached in many ways. We highlight 3 examples of approaches to implement zoonotic disease prevention and control programs. The first, rabies control in Ethiopia, was implemented using an umbrella approach: a comprehensive program designed for accelerated impact. The second, a monkeypox program in Democratic Republic of the Congo, was implemented in a stepwise manner, whereby incremental improvements and activities were incorporated into the program. The third approach, a pathogen discovery program, applied in the country of Georgia, was designed to characterize and understand the ecology, epidemiology, and pathogenesis of a new zoonotic pathogen. No one approach is superior, but various factors should be taken into account during design, planning, and implementation.