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• Two parties compete in an election by nominating candidates as their strategies. • We assume a candidate to win more likely if she brings more utility for all. • We investigate the existence of Pure Nash equilibria of this game. • Price of anarchy is bounded if candidates never treat non-supporters better. In this paper, we propose a simple and intuitive model to investigate the efficiency of the two-party election system, especially regarding the nomination process. Each of the two parties has its own candidates, and each of them brings utilities for the people including the supporters and non-supporters. In an election, each party nominates exactly one of its candidates to compete against the other party's. The candidate wins the election with higher odds if he or she brings more utility for all the people. We model such competition as a two-party election game such that each party is a player with two or more pure strategies corresponding to its potential candidates, and the payoff of each party is a mixed utility from a selected pair of competing candidates. By looking into the three models, namely, the linear link, Bradley-Terry, and the softmax models, which differ in how to formulate a candidate's winning odds against the competing candidate, we show that the two-party election game may neither have any pure Nash equilibrium nor a bounded price of anarchy. Nevertheless, by considering the conventional egoism , which states that any candidate benefits his/her party's supporters more than any candidate from the competing party does, we prove that the two-party election game in both the linear link model and the softmax model always has pure Nash equilibria, and furthermore, the price of anarchy is constantly bounded. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Property testing is a rapid growing field in theoretical computer science. It considers the following task: given a function f over a domain D, a property ℘ and a parameter 0< ε<1, by examining function values of f over o(| D|) elements in D, determine whether f satisfies ℘ or differs from any one which satisfies ℘ in at least ε| D| elements. An algorithm that fulfills this task is called a property tester. We focus on tree-likeness of quartet topologies, which is a combinatorial property originating from evolutionary tree construction. The input function is f, which assigns one of the three possible topologies for every quartet over an n-taxon set S. We say that f satisfies tree-likeness if there exists an evolutionary tree T whose induced quartet topologies coincide with f. In this paper, we prove the existence of a set of quartet topologies of error number at least $c{n\choose 4}$ for some constant c>0, and present the first property tester for tree-likeness of quartet topologies. Our property tester makes at most O( n/ ε) queries, and is of one-sided error and non-adaptive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Let S be a set of n taxa. Given a parameter k and a set of quartet topologies Q over S such that there is exactly one topology for every subset of four taxa, the parameterized Minimum Quartet Inconsistency (MQI) problem is to decide whether we can find an evolutionary tree inducing a set of quartet topologies that differs from the given set in at most k quartet topologies. The best fixed-parameter algorithm devised so far for the parameterized MQI problem runs in time O(4 k n+ n4). In this paper, first we present an O(3.0446 k n+ n4) fixed-parameter algorithm and an O(2.0162 k n3+ n5) fixed-parameter algorithm for the parameterized MQI problem. Finally, we give an O*((1+ ε) k) fixed-parameter algorithm, where ε>0 is an arbitrarily small constant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]