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The main objective of this research is to investigate whether corporate governance can reduce firms' information asymmetry associated with intangibles by encouraging more intangibles-related voluntary disclosures. While prior literature suggests that firms investing heavily in internally-developed intangibles tend to experience significant information asymmetry, there is limited research studying the mechanisms that help mitigate this problem. Since intangibles are recognized to be a significant competitive advantage for many firms, studying firms' disclosure behavior about their intangibles investments would be fruitful for corporate managers in understanding the consequences of these disclosures. Using content analysis of the 10-Ks of a sample of 203 high-tech firms operating in pharmaceutical, electronics and software industries, I find that the sample firms provide a variety of voluntary disclosures about their R and D/innovation but provide much less information about advertising/brand, human capital and goodwill. In addition, R and D-related disclosures tend to be descriptive while non-R and D-related disclosures tend to convey numerical information. The findings suggest that managers may refrain from disclosing more precise information about R and D because of the higher proprietary costs associated with R and D activities than with other intangibles.The results show that a firm's corporate governance is positively related to its voluntary disclosures about intangibles and that such positive relationship exists for both R The main objective of this research is to investigate whether corporate governance can reduce firms' information asymmetry associated with intangibles by encouraging more intangibles-related voluntary disclosures. While prior literature suggests that firms investing heavily in internally-developed intangibles tend to experience significant information asymmetry, there is limited research studying the mechanisms that help mitigate this problem. Since intangibles are recognized to be a significant competitive advantage for many firms, studying firms' disclosure behavior about their intangibles investments would be fruitful for corporate managers in understanding the consequences of these disclosures. Using content analysis of the 10-Ks of a sample of 203 high-tech firms operating in pharmaceutical, electronics and software industries, I find that the sample firms provide a variety of voluntary disclosures about their R and D/innovation but provide much less information about advertising/brand, human capital and goodwill. In addition, R and D-related disclosures tend to be descriptive while non-R and D-related disclosures tend to convey numerical information. The findings suggest that managers may refrain from disclosing more precise information about R and D because of the higher proprietary costs associated with R and D activities than with other intangibles.The results show that a firm's corporate governance is positively related to its voluntary disclosures about intangibles and that such positive relationship exists for both R and D and non-R and D disclosures. I also find evidence that intangibles-related voluntary disclosures have a negative relationship with information asymmetry. However, such a negative association does not exist for non-R and D disclosures. Moreover, I find that the negative effect of intangibles-related voluntary disclosures on information asymmetry is strengthened by corporate governance quality.The findings of this research have implications for both financial standard setting and corporate policies. In the wave of the debate about whether investments in intangibles should be capitalized to meet investors' information demands, this study provides evidence that voluntary disclosures can be an alternative way to reduce the information asymmetry generated from intangibles, in particular R and D activities. In addition, since voluntary disclosures are not audited, the empirical results suggest that in the absence of auditor assurance, higher governance quality can serve as an alternative mechanism to enhance the credibility of a firm's voluntary disclosures.D and non-R and D disclosures. I also find evidence that intangibles-related voluntary disclosures have a negative relationship with information asymmetry. However, such a negative association does not exist for non-R and D disclosures. Moreover, I find that the negative effect of intangibles-related voluntary disclosures on information asymmetry is strengthened by corporate governance quality.The findings of this research have implications for both financial standard setting and corporate policies. In the wave of the debate about whether investments in intangibles should be capitalized to meet investors' information demands, this study provides evidence that voluntary disclosures can be an alternative way to reduce the information asymmetry generated from intangibles, in particular R and D activities. In addition, since voluntary disclosures are not audited, the empirical results suggest that in the absence of auditor assurance, higher governance quality can serve as an alternative mechanism to enhance the credibility of a firm's voluntary disclosures.