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Over the course of the last decade the West's collective proficiency in coalition warfare has greatly advanced. As we wind down operations in Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan, this proficiency may be lost in an era of budget reductions and concomitant strategic contraction. With the volatility of the international security environment, there will continue to be a demand for military interventions, and coalitions will probably be the structure of choice, not only to share the burden but moreover to garner international and domestic legitimacy. To be prepared for these operations, like-minded Western nations must internalize the coalition warfare lessons of the past decade, understand the form coalition warfare will take for future discretionary interventions, and with that understanding wisely invest scarce resources into those capabilities that will facilitate integration with coalition partners. As the militaries of like-minded nations become smaller and more resource-constrained, they must counter-intuitively reach out and form closer bonds with each other., Strategy Research Project.

This monograph offers some practical solutions to building unity of effort between Special Operations Forces (SOF) and conventional forces using operations in Afghanistan from 2001 until 2009 as a case study. In researching U.S. legal code and U.S. Armed Forces doctrine, it is clear that both the U.S. Congress and the various services intended all forces to work together towards a common end during operations. In the case of Afghanistan, it is apparent that three things complicated unity of effort between SOF and conventional forces: the lack of an Afghanistan campaign plan by USCENTCOM, the assignment of SOF under the operational control of the conventional force Joint Task Force from 2002 until 2006, and the difficulties of a transition to a NATO command structure in 2006. These complications affected both activities on the battlefield and the synchronization of operational and strategic plans. This led to problems that included an atmosphere of mistrust and misunderstanding, conventional forces struggling to command and control SOF, unneeded restrictions on SOF, and personality conflicts that affected operations and synchronization. Several possible solutions to improving unity of effort exist. They are changing the command and control structure between SOF and conventional forces, nesting SOF operations and plans with the overall campaign plan, attempting to align the proper personalities with certain tasks and positions, educating and integrating SOF and conventional forces, aligning and empowering liaison officers more appropriately, and aligning SOF headquarters with conventional force headquarters as appropriate., The original document contains color images.

"Eyewitness to War. The U.S. Army in Operation AL FAJR: An Oral History" is a unique publication for the Combat Studies Institute (CSI). It is their first publication to make exclusive use of oral history. The study is a derivative of the CSI Operational Leadership Experiences (OLE) project, a program that collects and archives first-person experiences from the Global War on Terrorism. It also can be considered a companion to the recently published CSI Occasional Paper No. 20: "Operation AL FAJR: A Study in Army and Marine Corps Joint Operations." Interviews collected for the OLE project formed the basis for that occasional paper and were so compelling, CSI felt a need to publish those interviews in a book series. In November 2004, the second battle for Fallujah was a brutal and bloody fight so characteristic of urban terrain. Under the overall command of the 1st Marine Division, four Marine infantry and two U.S. Army battalions (Task Forces 2-2 Infantry and 2-7 Cavalry) were committed to the streets of Fallujah. At this same time, the Army's 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, formed a cordon to hold and isolate the insurgents in the city. Using the firepower and mobility of the Army's heavy armor and mechanized units to full effect, the Marine Regimental Combat Teams were successful in destroying the enemy and securing Fallujah in 10 days. "Eyewitness to War" interviews span a wide spectrum of participants, from commanders and senior non-commissioned officers at all levels to the first-hand accounts of combat and combat service support personnel on the battlefield. CSI makes no claim that this history is a comprehensive work, as these 37 people are but a fraction of the thousands who took part in the operation. This is primarily an Army oral history, though one of the Marine Regimental Commanders agreed to provide his story. The USMC bore the brunt of fighting in Fallujah, and this study does not attempt to overlook their tremendous accomplishments., ISBN 0-16-077465-9.

This Nation has fought every conflict since World War II either unilaterally or as a member of an ad hoc coalition. No military action has been conducted as the combined effort of a standing alliance in which the United States was a member. Even though the United Nations played a major role in both the Korean and Persian Gulf Wars, the forces that fought in those conflicts operated as ad hoc coalitions under U.N. authorization. There have been many other operations carried out by the United States as part of an ad hoc organization. Even the war on drugs has been prosecuted by a coalition. When America has been involved in multinational operations it has been as a member of ad hoc coalitions. What follows are some considerations intended to help coalition commanders of the future plan and execute operations in support of such coalitions., Published in Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ), p40-46, Winter 1993-94.

In the wake of the Cold War, peacekeeping -- or, more appropriately, peace enforcing -- is becoming an increasingly important role for military forces around the world. Because of the many other missions it has been responsible for, the U.S. Army has not participated significantly in United Nations peacekeeping missions in the past. That situation will almost certainly change in the future. Indeed, President George Bush's December 1992 decision to commit U.S. forces to a humanitarian peacekeeping role in Somalia may be indicative of the future use of our military forces. In 1991, two U.S. Army officers, Major George Steuber and Major James Faust, and a U.S. Marine, Major John Dill, were sent on a dual mission as liaison officers with the United Nations Advanced Mission to Cambodia and as part of the United Nations Transition Authority in Cambodia. The experiences of these officers offer a number of valuable lessons on the pitfalls and frustrations of being part of an international peacekeeping force. In this interview, Major Steuber shares with us a number insights he gained during his tour in Cambodia. Officers who are themselves preparing to join peacekeeping missions will find Major Steuber's experiences and ideas particularly interesting. And those officers who perhaps never expect to participate in such missions will find much in Steuber's words to reflect upon., Combat Studies Institute Report No. 15.

This study was prepared in response to a request to conduct a historical study of commanders' use of aides, liaison officers, observers, and other representatives in the course of campaigns and battles. Investigative questions studied included: What functions did such personnel perform during combat? In what ways did such personnel enhance the command and control of units, generate initiative, create agility and depth, and contribute toward the synchronization of combat power? What special preparation and training did these personnel receive? What qualities, attributes, competencies, and capabilities did these personnel possess? For whom did these personnel work? How did these personnel go about performing their duties? How were these personnel selected? Who used these personnel? What are the similarities and differences between the battlefield effectiveness of units that used such personnel versus units that did not? What authority did these personnel possess? Within these guidelines, this study proceeds from a general description of aide and liaison systems of the prenineteenth century to a more detailed assessment of those of the Napoleonic and modern periods of military history.

This monograph asks the question, How can the command and control system best support the AirLand Battle commander, i.e., what mix of technology and people are appropriate? By tracing the historical evidence of liaison and liaison officers, and some of the current and proposed technological command and control aids, the study presents examples of how a commander has been successfully supported by his command and control system, and what some of the problems have been with both human and technological command and control aids. This monograph proposes a solution to the continuing problem facing commanders - how to have a clear picture of the battlefield and simultaneously transmit his intent to his subordinates. Liaison officers equipped with high technology equipment can serve the commander as a directed telescope system on the AirLand Battlefield. This monograph concludes that the best commanders have been the ones who made the command and control system work for them, and did not become slaves to the system. The study also concludes that its proposed solution - liaison officers equipped with high technology equipment - can improve the command and control system. By doing so, the commander can make his will and intent both informed and clearly transmitted.

An account of the personal experiences and major activities of the Air Force Peacekeeper (MX) Liaison Officer to Wyoming and Nebraska from 1983 to 1986. A brief historical synopsis of the MX program from its beginning through 1986 is included. The report explains the liaison selection process, identifies liaison objectives, and then discusses the most significant liaison activities. Activities such as initial actions, studies undertaken, agreements made, state relations, and public interaction provide valuable lessons for future missile system deployments. The report concludes with author advocating the need to assign a liaison officer to a state designated to receive a new land based missile system. (Author)

"TALO Notes" are a compilation of experience gained during eight months of combat in cooperation with the Third United States Army. Topics include: status of tactical air liaison officers; standing operating procedure, XIX Tactical Air Command; operations; bombing safety limits; aircraft statistics/performance; chemical bombs; reports (aircraft crashes, bombing and strafing attacks by friendly aircraft); evacuation; casualty; monthly missions; counterflak artillery support; tactical air communications; tactical air party organization; battle area control units; weather; combined operations; and introduction to combat films.

Strategic competitors have significantly increased their influence in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) in ways that jeopardize US influence and threaten democratic governance. The People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia do this by exploiting the ambiguity of gray zone activities, such as predatory, opaque lending practices and the spreading of disinformation. US Forces, Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) builds resiliency against these gray zone activities through transparency, which it promotes through cooperation activities to strengthen partnerships and build trust in LAC. SOUTHCOM accomplished this, in part, through Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force – Southern Command (SPMAGTF-SC), whose mission was to conduct mutually beneficial engagements with partner nations (PN) to address shared challenges in the region. SPMAGTF-SC 15, 16, and 17 were US-only task forces. SPMAGTF-SC 18, however, became the first multinational task. SPMAGTF-SC 19 grew on this by integrating ten PN officers from Colombia, Brazil, Peru, Chile, Argentina, Belize, and the Dominican Republic. The author found that integrating PN officers into SPMAGTF-SC 18 and 19 exponentially strengthened partnerships in LAC at a relatively insignificant cost. This paper examines the degree to which integrating PN officers into SPMAGTF-SC 18 and 19 strengthened partnerships, and then compares those findings with theories on narrative and culture. In conclusion, the author presents the concept of a shared regional narrative and illuminates asymmetric characteristics of strategic competition in LAC.

Contains information on the organization, weapons, equipment and future policy of the following arms and branches of the British and Dominion Armies: Royal Armoured Corps, Royal Artillery (Field and Coast, and Anti-Aircraft), Royal Engineers, Royal Corps of Signals, Infantry, Jungle Warfare and Chemical warfare.

This monograph asks the question, "How can the command and control system best support the AirLand Battle commander, i.e., what mix of technology and people is appropriate?" By tracing the historical evidence of liaison and liaison officers, and some of the current and proposed technological command and control aids, the study presents examples of how a commander has been successfully supported by his command and control system, and what some of the problems have been with both human and technological command and control aids. This monograph proposes a solution to the continuing problem facing commanders - how to have a clear picture of the battlefield and simultaneously transmit his intent to his subordinates. Liaison officers equipped with high technology equipment can serve the commander as a directed telescope system on the AirLand Battlefield. This monograph concludes that the best commanders have been the ones who made the command and control system work for them, and did not become slaves to the system. The study also concludes that its proposed solution - liaison officers equipped with high technology equipment - can improve the command and control system. By doing so, the commander can make his will and intent both informed and clearly transmitted.

The study addresses a few selected instances of the use of liaison by French, German and American forces as a foundation for the expression of the writer's opinion and discussion of certain recommendations.

This document is a study of the employment of liaison officers. An endeavor will be made to show the importance of liaison between units, both large and small, the signal communication facilities required, and the employment of liaison officers, with particular interest to when they should be used, proper missions, information and instructions that should be given them, the manner of performing their duty, and the necessary personal characteristics and qualifications which they should possess. Also discussed is the liaison between infantry and artillery.