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3. Explicating Quantum Indeterminacy

Author

Lewis, Peter J., Bueno, Otávio, Editor-in-Chief, Brogaard, Berit, Editorial Board Member, Chakravartty, Anjan, Editorial Board Member, French, Steven, Editorial Board Member, Dutilh Novaes, Catarina, Editorial Board Member, Rowbottom, Darrell P., Editorial Board Member, Ruttkamp, Emma, Editorial Board Member, Miller, Kristie, Editorial Board Member, and Allori, Valia, editor

Published
2022
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5. On Closing the Circle

Author

Lewis, Peter J., van Beijeren, Henk, Series Editor, Blanchard, Philippe, Series Editor, Coecke, Bob, Series Editor, Dieks, Dennis, Series Editor, Dittrich, Bianca, Series Editor, Dürr, Detlef, Series Editor, Durrer, Ruth, Series Editor, Frigg, Roman, Series Editor, Fuchs, Christopher, Series Editor, Giulini, Domenico J. W., Series Editor, Jaeger, Gregg, Series Editor, Kiefer, Claus, Series Editor, Landsman, Nicolaas P., Series Editor, Maes, Christian, Series Editor, Murao, Mio, Series Editor, Nicolai, Hermann, Series Editor, Petkov, Vesselin, Series Editor, Ruetsche, Laura, Series Editor, Sakellariadou, Mairi, Series Editor, van der Merwe, Alwyn, Series Editor, Verch, Rainer, Series Editor, Werner, Reinhard F., Series Editor, Wüthrich, Christian, Series Editor, Young, Lai-Sang, Series Editor, Allori, Valia, editor, Bassi, Angelo, editor, and Zanghi, Nino, editor

Published
2021
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9. The indeterminate present.

Author

Jhou, Nihel and Lewis, Peter J.

Subjects
*SPECIAL relativity (Physics)
Abstract

A non-solipsist form of presentness is usually thought to require the non-relative co-presentness of space-like separated events, where this requirement further implies the non-relative simultaneity of these events. Since special relativity is thought to rule out any global, non-relative simultaneity, typical non-solipsist forms of presentness are taken to be inconsistent with special relativity. To address this problem, we re-explain the relationship between the non-solipsism of presentness and co-presentness by appealing to metaphysical indeterminacy. We propose presentness indeterminacy, the thesis that where an event, p, is determinately present, any event in space-like relation to p lacks a determinate tense. We argue that for many theories of time, indeterminate co-presentness is all that the non-solipsism of presentness requires. Since there is no determinate co-presentness, the inconsistency between presentness and special relativity in these theories disappears. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2024
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10. Bohmian Philosophy of Mind?

Author

Lewis, Peter J., Bueno, Otávio, Editor-in-Chief, Brogaard, Berit, Editorial Board Member, Chakravartty, Anjan, Editorial Board Member, French, Steven, Editorial Board Member, Dutilh Novaes, Catarina, Editorial Board Member, de Barros, J. Acacio, editor, and Montemayor, Carlos, editor

Published
2019
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11. Bell’s Theorem, Realism, and Locality

Author

Lewis, Peter J., Bueno, Otávio, Editor-in-Chief, Brogaard, Berit, Editorial Board Member, Chakravartty, Anjan, Editorial Board Member, French, Steven, Editorial Board Member, Dutilh Novaes, Catarina, Editorial Board Member, and Cordero, Alberto, editor

Published
2019
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30. Accuracy-first epistemology and scientific progress

Author

Lewis, Peter J., Fallis, Don, Fitelson, Branden, Lewis, Peter J., Fallis, Don, and Fitelson, Branden

Abstract

The accuracy-first program attempts to ground epistemology in the norm that one’s beliefs should be as accurate as possible, where accuracy is measured using a scoring rule. We argue that considerations of scientific progress suggest that such a monism about epistemic value is untenable. In particular, we argue that counterexamples to the standard scoring rules are ubiquitous in the history of science, and hence that these scoring rules cannot be regarded as a precisification of our intuitive concept of epistemic value.

Published
2022

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