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Combining historical, conceptual, and empirical approaches, this article studies one of the most fundamental, yet underexplored, questions surrounding Regulation 1/2003: What limits European Union (EU) competition law places on the adoption and application of national competition and other laws? The relationship between EU competition and national laws was supposedly settled with the adoption of Regulation 1/2003. There are two exceptions to the rule in Article 3(1), under which national competition authorities and courts must apply EU competition law when applying their national competition laws, with primacy for EU provisions: Article 3(2) leaves room for 'stricter' national competition rules on unilateral conduct, and Article 3(3) for national rules pursuing a 'predominantly different objective'. The solution offered by Article 3 is not workable. Through a historical study of the political discussions preceding Article 3's adoption, a conceptual analysis of potential interpretations, and a systematic content analysis of French and German practice, this article reveals the lack of a dividing line between the notions of national competition laws and other laws. It calls for reform of Article 3 to ensure that conduct that should be governed by EU law is not assessed under national rules and standards that differ from one Member State to another. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Purpose: This study aims to provide a critique of the institutional framework of the National Asset Reconstruction Company Limited (NARCL), India's "bad bank." Design/methodology/approach: The approach followed is the development of an economic model of the gains to trade of an Asset Reconstruction Company. Findings: Using an economic model, the paper shows that the rules of the game create an uneven playing field and are likely to lead to a systematic overpricing of nonperforming loans (NPLs). While this might increase the upfront cash received by the bank, it will come at the cost of higher liabilities for the government on account of the sovereign guarantee that is part of the proposed structure. The overpricing is also likely to act as an obstacle to efforts aimed at the revival of the distressed company. The NARCL could become a warehouse for NPLs subverting the objective of reconstruction. Practical implications: Solutions to create a vibrant market for NPLs are proposed. Originality/value: The Indian case is unique in the sense that a bad bank backed by the government has been introduced after almost two decades of the existence of similar entities in the private sector. To the best of the author's knowledge, this paper is the first that addresses the design of such a market using economic modeling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Notorious cases of corporate misconduct often revolve around the misapplication of pay to performance. Yet many business schools have too easily given themselves up to these kinds of high-powered incentives in the management of research. This practice is contrary to the very management knowledge taught in business school classrooms and it can wreak havoc with business schools' mission of knowledge production. The reduction of managing research to a bean-counting performance evaluation, that is, keeping count of discrete units of research outputs as A-class journal hits and citation counts, has arguably tilted the scales in favor of form and against content. This undermines both the quality of knowledge produced and the autonomy that academics need to create knowledge. Much as combat sports, football or soccer, and democratic societies prevent certain traits and actions from conferring an unfair advantage, academics need to reclaim the principle of a level playing field to prevent practices inimical to the academic enterprise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As part of the European Commission's Open Strategic Autonomy agenda, the European Union has reformed its unilateral trade and investment policy toolbox. Existing instruments have been updated (e.g., Trade Defence Instruments, the Enforcement Regulation) and new instruments have been adopted (e.g., the Foreign Subsidies Regulation, the Foreign Direct Investment Screening Regulation, the Anti-Coercion Instrument). These developments are significant: taken together, they herald a unilateral turn in the EU's trade and investment policy. This special issue explores aspects of this unilateral turn. It combines a bird's-eye perspective with studies of specific instruments; it brings together political science and legal methodologies; and it looks at the unilateral turn from the inside-out and from the outside-in. The special issue scratches the surface of what we consider to be a seismic change in the EU's trade and investment policy. We hope it will trigger further debate and scholarly analysis of this important topic. In this introduction, we set the scene and introduce the six articles that are part of this special issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Foreign Subsidies Regulation, which came into force on 12 January 2023, constitutes the missing piece to protecting the internal market from the distortive effects of public intervention and bridges a glaring regulatory gap. However, although tackling distortions of competition caused by non-EU countries' public intervention has always been widely recognized as a worthy objective, the complexities and administrative burden deriving from Commission-designed tools have been broadly and harshly criticized. Even though more conceptually interesting topics are on the table, the present contribution focuses on the issue that seems to be the most controversial in the current phase: the quantity and type of information required in the notification process with regard to foreign subsidies/financial contributions received by the notifying undertaking in the previous three years. Indeed, the Commission requires all foreign financial contributions to be listed (with few exceptions) in the context of concentrations and public procurement procedures. Therefore, after a brief overview of the Foreign Subsidies Regulation, the contribution analyses the rationale and related risks of the Commission's choice to require the notification of foreign financial contributions rather than foreign subsidies, it evaluates the possible alternative paths proposed during the public consultation and it concludes by proposing a reasonably balanced solution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Different opinions exist about the goal of risk equalization in regulated competitive health insurance markets. There seems to be consensus that an element of the goal of risk equalization is 'to remove the predictable over- and undercompensations of subgroups of insured' or, equivalently, 'to achieve a level playing field for each risk composition of an insurer's portfolio' or, equivalently, 'to remove the incentives for risk selection'. However, the role of efficiency appears to be a major issue: should efficiency also be an element of the goal of risk equalization, or should it be a restriction to the goal, or should efficiency not be an element of the goal or a restriction to the goal? If efficiency plays a role, a comprehensive analysis of the total effect of risk equalization on efficiency needs to be done. An improvement of the performance of a risk equalization scheme has both negative and positive effects on efficiency. Negative effects include the reduction in efficiency via cost- or utilization-based risk adjusters. Positive effects result from leveling the playing field and reducing the incentives for risk selection, which increase efficiency as the outcome of a competitive market. In practice many regulators and policy makers take efficiency into consideration by looking at the negative effects, but hardly at the positive effects. The definition of the goal of risk equalization has consequences for the design and evaluation of risk equalization schemes and for the equalization payments. We describe relevant potential goals, tradeoffs and possible solutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the end of 2022, the European Union (EU) adopted the EU Regulation on Foreign Subsidies Distorting the Internal Market (Foreign Subsidies Regulation). The regulation is intended to counter the distortive impacts on the EU market arising from foreign subsidized investments and other economic activities. Allegedly, the regulation seeks to ensure a level playing field within the EU, namely to subject foreign investments and economic activities to subsidy controls comparable with the level provided by EU State aid law. This article critically assesses the Foreign Subsidies Regulation and demonstrates that, by drawing upon rules in differing legal schemes, the Regulation departs from EU State aid law. More importantly, the disparities might result in heavier procedural and substantive burdens for foreign investors, rendering it difficult for the EU to fulfil its promise of a level playing field. Finally, the article contends that, in the context of cross-border subsidy control, the normative argument of a level playing field is empty and precarious. Cross-border subsidy regulation is concerned with curtailing the adverse effects of a foreign subsidy rather than creating a level playing field for all. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the EU proposal for a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) and a recent US proposal for the establishment of a border carbon adjustment (BCA) as examples of 'defensive' policies, broadly informed by an economic level playing field and an environmental level playing field rationale. From an environmental law perspective, the CBAM's narrow focus on price-based policies, distortions of competition and trade intensity is unsatisfactory; however, the EU CBAM is more feasible in practical terms and overall more likely to be WTO law compatible than the US proposal for a BCA. An environmental level playing field perspective is associated with several practical problems: these relate to the determination of environmental equivalence, the identification of appropriate remedies, and the demarcation of the scope of application of the relevant regulatory arrangements. Further, measures informed by an economic level playing field rationale can be easier to justify under WTO law. Taking stock of these findings, the paper concludes that practical obstacles and structural legal constraints push towards a narrower focus on an economic level playing field, as a matter of regulatory design. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ombudsman idea in Ireland is now almost fifty years old. This article provides a citizen perspective on several ombudsman-type institutions and services across a broad variety of fields and issues. The underlying assump -tions of ombudsman-type services are outlined, with a citizen perspective of how they work in practice. Ten illustrative case studies are provided, each followed by a short commentary. The article analyses the cross-cutting issues arising: the uneven resource field in skills, knowledge and time; the need for ‘blue sea’ between the ombudsman-type institution and state agencies; the evidence bar for complaints; and the individualisation of complaints when there are systemic issues important for public administration. Because of the asymmetry of resources between the two parties, there is a strong case for ombudsman-type institutions to provide more assistance to complainants to advance and progress their complaints, so that a more level playing field can be achieved.

A level playing field is enabled when business enterprises can freely compete in the market. However, they cannot compete freely if different rules apply to them. Therefore internationally accepted human rights have to be respected by all business enterprises, no matter their size, sector, ownership and the state of operations. The purpose of the paper is to identify three criteria by which it is possible to achieve a level playing field in business and to examine the criteria using respect for human rights as an example. Using a descriptive method and a method of analysis, the author argues that without the universal minimum standards of respect for human rights a level playing field in business cannot be possible. This will be feasible only with the adoption of a binding international instrument and imposing sanctions on the international level. Consequently, establishing of an international judicial mechanism with a power to sanction corporate human rights abuse is of vital importance.

We provide initial evidence that stock exchange procedures around closing auctions advantage speed traders at the expense of auction participants. We show that, on Nasdaq and NYSE Arca, 4:00 pm earnings releases result in informed trading in the continuous regular-hour session in the short window between 4:00 pm and the closing auction; this trading subsequently moves closing prices in the direction of the earnings news. The ability of speed traders to submit 4:00-pm-news orders to the auction through the continuous session earns them up to 1.5 percent profit and creates an unlevel playing field because most auction participants are not allowed to cancel their orders. When stock exchanges recommended that firms delay disclosures until after the market closes, those with higher institutional ownership were more likely to voluntarily do so. Our study has implications regarding the timing of information releases and the design of the closing process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Growing concern that domestic undertakings are priced out of the European public procurement market has yielded EU rule makers to push forward with legislative action to level the playing field as regards foreign subsidies. Hence, the Commission has recently presented a legislative proposal on 'foreign subsidies distorting the internal market'. Given the potential impact of the proposed tools on public procurement procedures, the main aim of this article is to offer a critical assessment of the present proposal. Overall, we contend that it is difficult to argue why the proposal under its current form should hold sway in public procurement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the impact of supranational investment policies on the resilience of the common market project and its impact on core-periphery dynamics. Reconstructing the hybrid governance processes around the Investment Plan for Europe (2015–2020) and its geographical distribution, it finds that these policies were effective in channelling funds to the Southern periphery after the Eurozone crisis, but aggravated the core-periphery dynamic for Eastern Europe. This fact stems from the differential presence of national public financing institutions as well as unevenly developed capital markets, two factors that are linked to the multi-level and public-private governance mix in the EU's investment policies. These results hold implications for how to assess follow-up programs such as InvestEU and the Sustainable Investment Plan in the European Green Deal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A level playing field is enabled when business enterprises can freely compete in the market. However, they cannot compete freely if different rules apply to them. Therefore internationally accepted human rights have to be respected by all business enterprises, no matter their size, sector, ownership and the state of operations. The purpose of the paper is to identify three criteria by which it is possible to achieve a level playing field in business and to examine the criteria using respect for human rights as an example. Using a descriptive method and a method of analysis, the author argues that without the universal minimum standards of respect for human rights a level playing field in business cannot be possible. This will be feasible only with the adoption of a binding international instrument and imposing sanctions on the international level. Consequently, establishing of an international judicial mechanism with a power to sanction corporate human rights abuse is of vital importance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Recommendation on Competitive Neutrality was adopted by the OECD Council at Ministerial Level on 31 May 2021. The Recommendation calls for Adherents to ensure a level playing field both between state-owned and privately-owned enterprises. The Recommendation establishes a set of principles ensuring that governments' actions are competitively neutral and that all enterprises face a level playing field, irrespective of factors such as the enterprises' ownership, location or legal form. It recommends adopting and maintaining neutral market rules, so that adhering governments ensure that the legal framework is neutral and that competition is not unduly prevented, restricted or distorted. It also recommends avoiding selective advantages and measures that may unduly enhance an enterprise's market performance and distort competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Party systems are expected to grow and mature with time; however, the case of Madagascar is one of high fluidity: parties and leaders rise and fall from one election to the next and there is a low entry cost for new contenders. This study explores the role of authoritarian legacies and elites’ efforts to skew the playing field as key factors for understanding why the Malagasy party system has failed to institutionalise since the start of the Third Republic. The findings show how leadership centralisation, ethnicity, personalism and clientelism shaped party formation during the authoritarian era and beyond; and also how incumbents’ attempts to create asymmetries in access to resources, media and law have been ineffective and successfully countervailed by the opposition.

The United Kingdom has definitively ceased to belong to the European Union. Since January 1st, 2021, bilateral relations with the United Kingdom are part of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement. The new conditions in which Spanish companies must operate are less favorable than the ones existing before the agreement. It is to be expected that a new phase of permanent dialogue will open between the European Union and British authorities precisely to avoid these risks. Once the agreement came into force, operators on one side and the other have begun to experience difficulties, some of them as a result of a lack of preparation but in many cases because of the need to adapt to new and much more complex conditions. The goal is to continue to have the United Kingdom as a strategic country for our companies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Self-serving politicians and self-entrenchment of the political establishment is a diachronic problem tantalizing liberal democracies. Incumbent political actors around the world constantly purport to entrench not only their presence in the political arena, but also their power and as a result, barriers to entry to new political actors are set, the chain of the democratic choice is disrupted and equality of opportunity is distorted. This article focuses on the available means in the constitutional system in order to safeguard a level playing field in the political arena. To this end, this article has three scientific objectives. First, it elaborates on the significance of equality of opportunities in the political system. Second, it identifies how political self-entrenchment creates an uneven playing field. Third, it focuses on the remedies that exist in the constitutional system and examines both legal and quasi legal mechanisms. With an analysis on the current means that are available in the constitutional system, the judicial review, and the alternative political processes based on independent bodies and quasi-judicial mechanisms, this article concludes that self-entrenchment and self-serving politicians are mainly left to be resolved by political means, the so called self-corrective promise of politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2019, the High Court of Australia used the term 'level playing field' no less than 18 times when considering limits on electoral campaign expenditure. This article examines the usefulness of this metaphor when assessing the opportunity to compete in elections on an equal basis. It shows that the metaphor is often used in electoral jurisprudence and by electoral monitoring bodies, but rarely subject to analysis. One place where it has been analysed is in the democratisation literature, where it is defined in terms of access to state resources, media, and the law. However, it needs further elaboration to make it useful in analysing the fairness of electoral competition in established democracies. The assumption of only two teams, incumbents and opposition, needs to be modified through considering the hierarchy of incumbency benefits. A case study of the 2019 Australian federal election illustrates the differential access to state resources of electoral contenders as well as the need to add the role of private money to the attributes of the playing field. It finds that although there has been some levelling of the playing field at the State and Territory level, at the federal level there has been further tilting. This article examines the usefulness of the concept of the level playing field in assessing electoral fairness. It presents a case study of the 2019 Australian federal election, suggesting the concept needs to include the hierarchy of incumbency benefits and regulation of the role of private money. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to present the White Paper on levelling the playing field as regards foreign subsidies, from the public procurement perspective. This is the first time that the problem of foreign subsidies within public procurement is approached by European Commission and it is useful to analyse Commission's findings on that regard. Due to the problems caused by COVID-19 pandemic and the forthcoming Next Generation EU initiative, the Commission is determined to develop and implement suitable legal instruments for dealing with distortions in the Internal Market, caused by foreign subsidies. Legal analysis within the paper is focused on the proposed Module 3 under the White Paper, trying to detect possible practical repercussions of implementing measures as are proposed in the White Paper. In addition, the paper seeks to identify primary function of the measures proposed and tries to examine if that function could result in protectionist effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]