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Entrepreneurship and Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 3 synthesizes key findings about entrepreneurial and innovative activity in the US economy, conveying insights on contemporary challenges and providing an analytical [...]

The Productivity, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship (PIE) Program was founded as the Productivity Program, with Zvi Griliches as the inaugural program director, in 1978. The program benefited tremendously from Griliches' inspirational [...]

We explore the evolution of financial innovation using US finance patents. Patented financial innovations are substantial and increasingly economically important. Their subject matter has changed, consistent with the industry's shift toward household investors and borrowers. Information technology (IT) and other nonfinancial firms drove the surge in financial patenting. The location of innovation shifted, with banks moving activity away from states with tight financial regulation and high-tech regions attracting innovation by payments, IT, and nonfinancial firms. Analyses of returns suggest that the social value of these innovations is higher than their private value. We present a simple model to explain these trends. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Patents and citations are powerful tools increasingly used in financial economics (and management research more broadly) to understand innovation. Biases may result, however, from the interactions between the truncation of patents and citations and the changing composition of inventors. When aggregated at the firm level, these patent and citation biases can survive popular adjustment methods and are correlated with firm characteristics. These issues can lead to problematic inferences. We provide an actionable checklist to avoid biased inferences and also suggest machine learning as a potential new way to address these problems. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix , which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We analyze how contractibility affects contract design. A major concern when designing research agreements is that researchers may use their funding to subsidize other projects. We show that, when research activities are not contractible, an option contract is optimal. The financing firm obtains the option to terminate the agreement and, in case of termination, broad property rights. The threat of termination deters researchers from cross-subsidization, and the cost of exercising the termination option deters the financing firm from opportunistic termination. We test this prediction using 580 biotechnology research agreements. Contracts with termination options are more common when research is non-contractible.