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Les chiffres publiés le 24 septembre 2014 par la DARES semblent encourageants car ils présentent une baisse de 0.3% du taux de chômage des demandeurs d’emploi de catégorie A. Qu’en estil exactement ? Il ne s’agit en définitive que d’un changement d’un mois à un autre et si l’on observe les changements sur un trimestre, on doute que la tendance pourrait s’inverser. Au contraire, les développements substantiels des derniers mois et ce malgré les débats techniques concernant les chiffres de l’Insee de l’enquête emploi et ceux de Pôle emploi nous conduisent en définitive à une conclusion limpide. La situation de l’emploi en France a continué de se détériorer en 2014 et est des plus inquiétantes. The data released on September 24th, 2014 by the DARES is encouraging because it shows a decline of 0.3% in the Class A job seeker unemployment rate. But what does this really mean? Ultimately, the change is representative of slight fluctuation from one month to another. If we look at changes that have occurred during the last quarter, it is doubtful the longerterm trend could be reversed. In contrast, substantial developments in recent months, despite the technical discussions on figures from the INSEE employment survey and the Pôle Emploi, ultimately lead us to a clear conclusion. The employment situation in France has deteriorated further in 2014 and is of growing concern.

International audience; Les chiffres publiés par la Dares le 27 janvier 2014 confirment que 2013 ne s'est pas terminée avec l'inversion espérée de la courbe de chômage. Au contraire, les indicateurs étudiés ne s'améliorent pas. Le chômage est toujours en hausse et il affecte tous les groupes d'âge et les sexes, à l'exception du taux de chômage des hommes de 15­24 ans pour lesquels on observe une réduction au cours des deux premiers trimestres de 2013. La croissance constante du chômage de longue durée est particulièrement inquiétante. Le taux mensuel de sortie du chômage est demeuré très bas et stable autour de 10% en 2013. Ainsi, on peut espérer une stabilisation du chômage pour le début de 2014, mais une inversion significative de la courbe semble improbable à court terme. Les offres d'emploi collectées et satisfaites de Pôle emploi ont constamment diminué depuis janvier 2012, sauf au cours des six derniers mois où la situation s'est légèrement améliorée en termes d'offres collectées ce qui laisse entrevoir une reprise possible si la tendance se confirme. Enfin en 2013, le taux de croissance de l'emploi était en baisse ou stable dans presque tous les secteurs d'activité.

Although the single employment contract is not popular among both representatives of workers and company leaders, the proposal for a single labor contract, created with the goal of reducing dualism, has paradoxically remained at the forefront of debates on the need for reform of the labor market. At first glance, the single employment contract seems to be an attractive response to the issue of dualism. However, upon looking more closely, it appears that a single contract would not resolve problems linked to precariousness and the consequences of employment protection. Most of the time, alternative policies could be more efficient. Moreover, while there are costs to dualism, these are not as obvious and well established as the ones triggered by employment protection itself. Finally, suppressing temporary contracts would lead, at a constant level of employment protection, to important employment losses, given that not all temporary jobs would become permanent jobs. A drastic reform of employment protection would be needed. Such a reform does not need to be linked to the creation of a new employment contract: counterparts in terms of unemployment insurance or firm­sponsored training are possible.

This paper discusses the pros and cons of a single labour contract. After reviewing the current state of dualism in labour markets and the recent labour reforms in Europe, we discuss the various proposals to eliminate dualism. Next, we emphasise the costs of dualism and discuss whether they would be addressed by introducing a single labour contract. We notably introduce a distinction between reforms based on introducing a single contract with progressive seniority rights (CPSR) or a single contract with long probation periods (CLPP).We argue that their gains and costs are very different, especially with regards to the stigma effects and dualism. We also consider alternative reforms: the introduction of a single labour contract as such, and alternative reforms independent of the labour contract but addressing the issue of dualism (training, access to housing and to credit) and compare their costs and benefits. We then build a simple model where both temporary and permanent contracts are available to firms. We use it to describe the demand for temporary contracts and the potential consequences of removing them and reach the following conclusions. First, employment protection has a moderate negative impact on employment, which can be mitigated when temporary contracts are available. Second, the elimination of temporary contracts decreases total employment (by 7 percentage points according to our calculations). Offsetting this effect would require an ambitious reform of employment protection laws of permanent contracts (in this specific setup, amounting to a cut in layoff costs by two thirds). Finally, the coexistence of temporary and permanent contracts may also have negative effects on social norms within the firm and workers’ motivation and eliminating temporary contracts could therefore enhance productivity in this context. We conclude that while there are costs to dualism, these are not as obvious and well established as the ones triggered by employment protection itself. Further, the single employment contract may partly be a quiproquo (misunderstanding) Instead, more clarity on the objectives of a labour reform is needed.