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The processes used by the government of Guam to develop the key cost estimates for planned off-base projects and programs varied depending on project or program value, complexity, and size; whether independent consultants provided input; and the extent to which DOD provided data to help set project requirements. As a result, the estimates prepared to date vary in quality, and the overall costs to develop supporting off-base infrastructure are still uncertain. These off-base projects range from large, multiyear projects, such as improving Guam's road network linking the commercial port to DOD's bases, to small, local projects, such as expanding certain fire stations. In instances where DOD was involved in clarifying or providing updated information on its buildup requirements, and the government of Guam used independent consultants to help develop and verify cost estimates, we found that the government of Guam developed cost estimates that may better reflect likely final requirements and may better justify investment decisions since they are informed by expert analysis and the most up-to-date planning information. For example, when Guam's Department of Public Works initially estimated that it needed $4.4 billion to improve the road network on Guam, it did not have the benefit of DOD's involvement. However, after the May 1, 2008, hearing and after engaging DOD in further defining buildup requirements, Guam's Department of Public Works was able to narrow the scope of the project from overall highway improvements to roadways directly affected by the military buildup. Guam hired consultants from two national transportation and engineering firms, using funding from the Federal Highway Administration, to develop and validate cost estimates based on DOD's input in clarifying requirements.

The Department of Defense (DoD) relies on a global network of DoD and non-DoD infrastructure so critical that its unavailability could have a debilitating effect on DoD's ability to project, support, and sustain its forces and operations worldwide. DoD established the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) to assure the availability of mission-critical infrastructure. GAO was asked to evaluate the extent to which DoD has done the following: (1) incorporated aspects of DCIP into its exercises in the Transportation Defense Sector, and (2) developed DCIP training standards department-wide and made installation personnel aware of existing DCIP expertise. GAO examined a nonprojectable sample of 46 critical assets representing the four military services, five combatant commands, and selected installations within five defense sectors. GAO reviewed relevant DoD DCIP guidance and documents and interviewed cognizant officials regarding DCIP exercises, training, and awareness. GAO recommends that DoD do the following: (1) develop department-wide DCIP training standards and an implementation time frame, and (2) develop an effective means to communicate to installation personnel the existence and availability of DCIP expertise at the combatant command and military service levels. DoD concurred with both recommendations., Report to Congressional Requesters.

While the fiscal year 2009 overseas master plans generally reflect recent changes in U.S. basing strategies and the challenges DOD faces in their implementation, as well as address most of our prior recommendations, DOD provided the plans to Congress in May 2008, 3 months after the February 2008 budget submission, even though both the Senate and conference reports accompanying the fiscal year 2004 military construction bill require DOD to issue the plans with the military construction budget submission. The master plans contain information on current defense basing strategies and infrastructure requirements overseas and the challenges that DOD faces in implementation of the plans. The plans also generally address our prior recommendations except that the U.S. Pacific Command plan does not provide details of training challenges for the Air Force in South Korea, despite our prior recommendation that it should describe these challenges and their potential effects on infrastructure and funding requirements. DOD officials said that since last year the South Korean government and the U.S. Air Force have taken several steps to address these training challenges. However, DOD has submitted the plans to Congress after the annual budget submissions even though the congressional reporting requirement directed DOD to provide updates of the master plans with each yearly military construction budget submission. According to DOD officials, OSD's most recent efforts to incorporate last-minute changes in basing plans and projects contributed to providing Congress the fiscal year 2009 plans 3 months late.

Over the next several years, implementation of the Department of Defense's (DoD) Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy will result in the realignment of U.S. forces and the construction of new facilities costing billions of dollars at installations overseas. The Senate and House reports accompanying the fiscal year 2004 military construction appropriation bill directed GAO to monitor DoD's overseas master plans and to provide congressional defense committees with assessments each year. The Senate report accompanying the fiscal year 2007 military construction appropriation bill directed GAO to review DoD's master planning effort for Guam as part of these annual reviews. This report, first, examines how the overseas plans have changed and the extent to which they address the challenges faced by DoD and, second, assesses the status of DoD's planning effort and the challenges associated with the buildup of military forces and infrastructure on Guam. GAO is not recommending executive action. However, Congress should require DoD to report on residual value and U.S. Pacific Command's (PACOM) training limitations, as well as periodically on its planning efforts for Guam and efforts to address various challenges. DoD believes congressional action is not necessary., Report to Congressional Committees.

DOD components have developed guidance to facilitate the integration of UAS into combat operations; however, further steps are needed to fully coordinate the deployment of these assets. For example, DOD developed a Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems and a Joint Concept of Operations for Unmanned Aircraft Systems.5 This guidance represents an important first step for the use of UAS in combat operations and DOD officials acknowledge these documents will continue to evolve as DOD learns more about the capabilities of UAS and other ISR assets and their application in combat operations. However, the guidance does not address, on a DOD-wide basis, the issue of advance coordination, which CENTCOM has recognized is a critical factor in integrating UAS into combat operations by enabling efficient deployment and utilization of assets and by allowing the combatant commander time to plan to support incoming assets. In the absence of such guidance, CENTCOM has established procedures for the services to coordinate system requirements prior to ISR assets arriving into CENTCOM s theater of operations. These procedures apply only to CENTCOM s theater of operations. However, we found that CENTCOM s procedures for advance coordination were not always followed because the services indicated that they were not aware of the requirement. According to CENTCOM officials, they distributed these procedures to each of CENTCOM s service components, such as Central Command Air Forces and U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, but were not aware if they were distributed further, and the service officials we interviewed were not aware of the requirement. As a result of this lack of advance coordination, CENTCOM is not always aware, on a timely basis, of assets entering theater, which can potentially exacerbate existing operational challenges such as limited interoperability and communications bandwidth.

DOD components have developed guidance to facilitate the integration of UAS into combat operations; however, further steps are needed to fully coordinate the deployment of these assets. For example, DOD developed a Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems and a Joint Concept of Operations for Unmanned Aircraft Systems.5 This guidance represents an important first step for the use of UAS in combat operations and DOD officials acknowledge these documents will continue to evolve as DOD learns more about the capabilities of UAS and other ISR assets and their application in combat operations. However, the guidance does not address, on a DOD-wide basis, the issue of advance coordination, which CENTCOM has recognized is a critical factor in integrating UAS into combat operations by enabling efficient deployment and utilization of assets and by allowing the combatant commander time to plan to support incoming assets. In the absence of such guidance, CENTCOM has established procedures for the services to coordinate system requirements prior to ISR assets arriving into CENTCOM s theater of operations. These procedures apply only to CENTCOM s theater of operations. However, we found that CENTCOM s procedures for advance coordination were not always followed because the services indicated that they were not aware of the requirement. According to CENTCOM officials, they distributed these procedures to each of CENTCOM s service components, such as Central Command Air Forces and U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, but were not aware if they were distributed further, and the service officials we interviewed were not aware of the requirement.

The Department of Defense (DoD) transient lodging programs were established to provide quality temporary facilities for authorized personnel, and to reduce travel costs through lower rates than commercial hotels. DoD has approximately 82,000 temporary duty (TDY) and permanent-change-of-station (PCS) rooms worldwide. These accommodations were reported to cost about $860 million in appropriated and nonappropriated funds to operate in fiscal year 2005. While the Army plans to privatize its lodging in the United States, there are concerns as to whether these plans are cost-effective, and about how they relate to DoD-wide lodging efforts. GAO was asked to address the following issues: (1) how each military service and DoD manages, funds, and assesses the performance of its lodging programs to meet short- and long-term needs; and (2) the effect that lodging privatization would have on costs to the Army and on its ability to maintain and recapitalize facilities. GAO also is providing information on the status of DoD's actions on prior recommendations regarding the lodging program. GAO obtained data from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military services, and nine military installations. GAO is making recommendations to improve DoD's oversight of the lodging program. In commenting on a draft of this report, DoD agreed with the recommendations., Report to Congressional Requesters. The original document contains color images.