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In this research, we conduct a systematic comparative analysis of 366 stories extracted from English-language magazines by ISIS, Al Qaeda, Tehrik-e Taliban of Pakistan (TTP) and the Taliban. We employ the Information, Motivation, and Behavior Skills (IMB) model of behavior change to conduct in-depth qualitative and quantitative analysis of these stories. By focusing on stories featured in jihadi magazines, this research illustrates that (1) stories of 'average' jihadists can be effective persuasive tools, (2) the majority of the content of stories by all groups falls within the motivational component of the IMB model and that, (3) groups differ in their focus on various element of the IMB. For example, while Al Qaeda stories provide more informational content, other groups focus on motivational rhetoric. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Graphs seem to connote facts more than words or tables do. Consequently, they seem unlikely places to spot implicit sexism at work. Yet, in 6 studies (N = 741), women and men constructed (Study 1) and recalled (Study 2) gender difference graphs with men's data first, and graphed powerful groups (Study 3) and individuals (Study 4) ahead of weaker ones. Participants who interpreted graph order as evidence of author 'bias' inferred that the author graphed his or her own gender group first (Study 5). Women's, but not men's, preferences to graph men first were mitigated when participants graphed a difference between themselves and an opposite-sex friend prior to graphing gender differences (Study 6). Graph production and comprehension are affected by beliefs and suppositions about the groups represented in graphs to a greater degree than cognitive models of graph comprehension or realist models of scientific thinking have yet acknowledged. Keywords: gender differences, gender stereotypes, graphs, power, social construction of knowledge DOI: 10.1037/a0018590

Immigration can evoke two recurring and contradictory social psychology situations: group inclusion and group threat. This ambiguity implies that immigration can bring out either people's communal, egalitarian natures, or their prejudicial, oppressive natures. Further, it means that immigration policies can be framed in ways that appeal to one psychological orientation or the other. Using this perspective, we examined Californians' attitudes toward a fictitious immigration policy. The policy was framed in one of two ways, and participants' values concerning group equality versus group dominance were measured. Results showed that framing the policy as a way of maintaining dominance over immigrants appealed to those high in social dominance orientation, whereas framing the policy as a way of increasing equality between immigrants and members of the receiving society appealed to those low on social dominance orientation. The practical political aspects of promoting immigration policy are discussed.

What factors impact how people mobilize against state human rights abuses? Drawing on Image Theory, we examine how perceptions of an out-group, government abuse, and sociopolitical orientations impact political action. Using an online survey-embedded experiment with a sample of 2,932 U.S. adults, we manipulated two factors: (1) the level of government abuse and (2) the risk of punishment for taking action against the state, while also including social dominance orientation (SDO) and right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) as covariates. Participants indicated their propensity to engage in and justify both protest and violence. Participants rated the out-group as oppressive and evil. State abuse of human rights was associated with more oppressive and evil out-group images. Oppressive out-group images increased protest engagement and justification, whereas evil out-group images increased violence engagement and justification. Abuse increased all forms of action and justifications for them. Oppressive and evil images mediated many of the relationships between abuse, SDO, and RWA on one hand and political action on the other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do media frame attacks with Muslim perpetrators as "terrorism" and attacks with White perpetrators as the result of "mental illness"? Despite public speculation and limited academic work with relatively small subsets of cases, there have been no systematic analyses of potential biases in how media frame terrorism. We addressed this gap by examining the text of print news coverage of all terrorist attacks in the United States between 2006 and 2015. Controlling for fatalities, affiliation with a group, and existing mental illness, the odds that an article references terrorism are approximately five times greater for a Muslim versus a non-Muslim perpetrator. In contrast, the odds that an article references mental illness do not significantly differ between White and non-White perpetrators. Results partially confirm public speculation and are robust against numerous alternative explanations. Differences in media framing can influence public (mis)perceptions of violence and threats, and ultimately harm counterterrorism policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines how Da'esh utilizes anashid ("Islamic songs" or "recitation") as soundtrack elements within its video messaging, focusing primarily on a sample set of 755 videos released in 2015. The authors also present the development of an automatic content recognition (ACR) tool that enabled them to engage this large data set. The article then explores the possibilities of ACR for the identification of terrorist audio and video, utilizing the conclusions drawn from the trends of audio usage in Da'esh video messaging to support the validity and promise of such an approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public perceptions of terrorism are out of line with reality. How can perceptions be changed? Using a 4 × 2 experimental design with a national sample of U.S. adults, we examine how source of information and details provided impact views of terrorism. Sources, details, and individual-level factors—Islamophobia, trust in media, and trust in science—impact perceived accuracy of terrorism data. Many people updated their views on terrorism after reading factual information, yet only trust in science was related with this change. In short, people can be persuaded by factual information on terrorism, but it is less clear why they change beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why would individuals engage in or support contentious politics? This question is challenging to answer with observational data where causal factors are correlated and difficult to measure. Using a survey-embedded experiment, we focus on three situational factors: grievances, risk, and identity. We also explore how individual differences in sociopolitical orientations—social dominance orientation (SDO) and right-wing authoritarianism (RWA)—impact action. Grievances influence engagement in and support for protests. Risk influences engagement in protest, but not support for it. Regardless of condition, SDO and RWA help explain why some people engage in protest while others do not, particularly within the same context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]