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Recent years have seen multiple controversies between the EU and its member states that revolve around different conceptions of what kind of polity the EU is, and what it should be. These controversies are particularly heated when fundamental democratic values are at stake. In this article, we address the fundamental tension between the assertion of common EU values and the pluralistic character of the EU polity, both among and within member states. The driving question of this article is how we can understand controversies between the EU and its member states in light of the presence of alternative conceptions of the EU and its democratic and pluralistic character. We reconstruct two opposing conceptions of the EU – the intergovernmental and the cosmopolitan conception – and then analyse how the disagreement between these fundamental conceptions plays out in five key controversies. We argue that the disagreement over what the EU is, and what it should be, is inherent to EU politics. The EU can only become democratic if it recognizes these conflicting understandings and provides political arenas in which the disagreements between them can be articulated, confronted, and resolved.

Centraal in dit artikel staat een onderscheid dat ik maak tussen drie registers van normativiteit: doelmatigheid, rechtvaardigheid en fatsoen. Aan de hand van voorbeelden betoog ik dat binnen een verantwoorde evaluatie van het recht aan alle drie de registers aandacht wordt geschonken. Het hoofdvoorbeeld vormt het systeem van promoveren en degraderen in het gevangeniswezen. Ook komt aan bod hoe de beweging ELS zich verhoudt tot deze registers.

This article investigates how participatory art can contribute to legal change. As a case study, it discusses Jonas Staal’s project of New World Summit in Rojava, a (so far still) autonomous region in North and East Syria. It offers an interesting case, since it invites the law to include what it has excluded so far. To begin with, it is clarified how change is conceived within legal systems based on the rule of law. Although law resists radical change, it is involved in a constant process of adaptation to its environment. Subsequently, Staal’s project of New World Summit is discussed from a utopian perspective. Its apparent impossibility is what makes is so valuable for law and its development. By erecting a parliament for Rojava, it presents a picture of how the international order could look like when things were different. It basically is an exercise in “utopian world-making”.

Advances in reproductive biotechnology increase control over who is born and under what circumstances. Resulyingly, we are confronted with the question: what do we owe to future people who are born with the help of these technologies? In an attempt to do justice to future people, a new entity has appeared the legal stage: the future child. This is the child that has not been born or even conceived yet – but might be at some point in the future. In order to be able to include this new entity in discussions on the regulations on reproduction, we need a theoretical framework that helps us understand what this entity is and how we can address it. In the regulations on reproduction, the future child is often conceptualised as a subject of rights or interests. Yet, as a result of these regulatory frameworks that invoke the interests of the future child, the future child itself is ultimately prevented from coming into existence, which renders the future child as a merely legal construct and a complex entity. This research aims to assess the conceptualisation of the future child in the regulations on reproduction, by scrutinizing the tenability of the ‘interests of the future child’ construction. In order to assess this construction, it is deconstructed into the four assumption upon which it is based. These are: first, the core values underlying the regulations on reproduction can be understood as interests of an individual subject; second, the future child has an implicitly assumed interest in its own non-existence; third, the future child is a legal subject and, fourth, the future child whose existence is prevented is capable of having interests. The critical assessment of these four assumptions reveals that each of them is questionable. The first and second assumptions are untenable in most cases. The third and fourth assumptions, pertaining to the future child’s subjectivity, are completely untenable due to the future child’s non-existence. In short, the interests of the ‘interests of the future child’ construction appears to be unable to articulate various values that underlie the regulatory framework and it is internally contradictory. In response, I propose an alternative theoretical framework based on the work of Hans Jonas that is capable of taking up this task. This alternative approach conceives the future child as the object of our responsibility. In order to set the parameters of our responsibility towards the future child, we need a more articulated normative account of the human person. In this research, I explore how perceiving the human person as equal and an autonomous end in himself is capable of making sense of the various values that can be distilled from the regulation of reproduction. Of course, the notion our humanity may remain topic of discussion, as it is surrounded by unprecedented complexities. As technological developments erode the boundaries between the given and the made, it may seem that we are losing our grip on this endeavour. But precisely because the regulation of biotechnology touches upon the intimate aspects of our humanity, and every regulatory choice implies an idea of what it means to be human, we cannot escape articulating such a collective perspective. Nor can we hide behind the ‘interests of the future child’ in an attempt to present our perspective on humanity as based on individual interests or rights. Therefore, rather than shy away from it, we must take up the challenge to at least further reflect upon the notion of humanity that forms the foundation of the regulations on reproduction and to attempt to articulate in more depth what it means to be human.

This article aims to provide a semiotic analysis of environmental law and youth protests. More precisely, drawing on speech act theory this article regards both as types of communication and teases out the inherent voice and message, specifically with regard to the interests of future generations. The argument unfolds in three steps. First, the article looks into speaker and speech of environmental law and argues that it speaks, as legislation does, in the first-person plural voice of a ‘we’. Second, the article examines a speech of Greta Thunberg through the lens of Stanley Cavell’s theory of passionate utterances. This interpretation will unlock the political stakes of Thunberg’s speech as she claims standing with those responsible for enacting environmental law. Finally, the consequences of this reading will be analysed by relating message and voice of environmental law. As youth protests question ordinary forms of political representation, new ways of safeguarding the interests of future generations are called upon.

In the Middle Ages, goods washed up on the beach or fished up from the sea were an important economic asset. The customs and rules that determined the status of these goods are referred to as the ‘law of wreck’ or ‘right of wreck’. Several competing interest groups were involved: the local inhabitants as salvagers, finders or beach combers; merchants, skippers and ship-owners; landowners and the prince. Seventeenth century Dutch lawyers like Hugo Grotius and Johan van Heemskerk painted a favourable picture of the law of wreck in the Dutch Republic by pointing to the greed of the medieval counts of Holland who would only have exploited the misery of castaways. This article shows how the law of wreck developed in Holland and Zeeland in the late Middle Ages and how its rules were applied in the stewardship of North Holland between 1340 and 1400. Although the preserved accounts of the stewardship show that the count did take advantage of washed up goods, the count also had drowned people found on the beach buried and allowed merchants who could prove their goods had washed up on the Dutch beach to recover them.

Het doel van het onderzoek is om argumenten in kaart te brengen die relevant zijn voor de beantwoording van de vraag of het noodzakelijk is om bepaalde vormen van lijkschennis strafbaar te stellen dan wel bestaande strafbepalingen aan te passen en om op basis daarvan – indien het onderzoek daar aanleiding voor geeft – concrete aanbevelingen te doen voor aanpassing van de strafwetgeving. De centrale onderzoeksvraag luidt: Is het noodzakelijk om vormen van lijkschennis strafbaar te stellen die nog niet strafbaar zijn of om bestaande strafbepalingen ter zake van vormen van lijkschennis te wijzigen? Het onderzoek dat tot beantwoording van deze vraag leidt, is uitgevoerd aan de hand van de volgende deelvragen: Hoe wordt de integriteit van het gestorven lichaam buiten het strafrecht juridisch beschermd, zoals in de context van fundamentele rechten (art. 11 Grondwet en art. 3 en 8 EVRM), het privaatrecht en het gezondheidsrecht? Welke rechtsbeginselen en rechtsgoederen zijn daarbij relevant? Welke vormen van lijkschennis zijn naar huidig recht strafbaar of niet strafbaar in Nederland, hoe worden deze strafrechtelijk afgedaan en wat is de prevalentie ervan? Bestaat in Nederland draagvlak voor strafbaarstelling van vormen van lijkschennis die nog niet strafbaar zijn of voor wijziging van bestaande strafbepalingen ter zake van vormen van lijkschennis? Welke argumenten voor of tegen strafbaarstelling kunnen worden ontleend aan buitenlands recht? INHOUD Inleiding Criteria voor strafbaarstelling De juridische status van het lijk Strafbaarheid, afdoening en prevalentie van lijkschennis in Nederland Opvattingen over de strafbaarheid van lijkschennis in Nederland Rechtsvergelijking toepassing van de criteria voor strafbaarstelling op lijkschennis Conclusies

Het doel van het onderzoek is om argumenten in kaart te brengen die relevant zijn voor de beantwoording van de vraag of het noodzakelijk is om bepaalde vormen van lijkschennis strafbaar te stellen dan wel bestaande strafbepalingen aan te passen en om op basis daarvan – indien het onderzoek daar aanleiding voor geeft – concrete aanbevelingen te doen voor aanpassing van de strafwetgeving. De centrale onderzoeksvraag luidt: Is het noodzakelijk om vormen van lijkschennis strafbaar te stellen die nog niet strafbaar zijn of om bestaande strafbepalingen ter zake van vormen van lijkschennis te wijzigen? Het onderzoek dat tot beantwoording van deze vraag leidt, is uitgevoerd aan de hand van de volgende deelvragen: Hoe wordt de integriteit van het gestorven lichaam buiten het strafrecht juridisch beschermd, zoals in de context van fundamentele rechten (art. 11 Grondwet en art. 3 en 8 EVRM), het privaatrecht en het gezondheidsrecht? Welke rechtsbeginselen en rechtsgoederen zijn daarbij relevant? Welke vormen van lijkschennis zijn naar huidig recht strafbaar of niet strafbaar in Nederland, hoe worden deze strafrechtelijk afgedaan en wat is de prevalentie ervan? Bestaat in Nederland draagvlak voor strafbaarstelling van vormen van lijkschennis die nog niet strafbaar zijn of voor wijziging van bestaande strafbepalingen ter zake van vormen van lijkschennis? Welke argumenten voor of tegen strafbaarstelling kunnen worden ontleend aan buitenlands recht? INHOUD Inleiding Criteria voor strafbaarstelling De juridische status van het lijk Strafbaarheid, afdoening en prevalentie van lijkschennis in Nederland Opvattingen over de strafbaarheid van lijkschennis in Nederland Rechtsvergelijking toepassing van de criteria voor strafbaarstelling op lijkschennis Conclusies

Over 30 million people worldwide have taken a commercial at-home DNA test, because they were interested in their genetic ancestry, disease predisposition or inherited traits. Yet, these consumer DNA data are also increasingly used for a very different purpose: to identify suspects in criminal investigations. By matching a suspect’s DNA with DNA from a suspect’s distant relatives who have taken a commercial at-home DNA test, law enforcement can zero in on a perpetrator. Such forensic use of consumer DNA data has been performed in over 200 criminal investigations. However, this practice of so-called investigative genetic genealogy (IGG) raises ethical concerns. In this paper, we aim to broaden the bioethical analysis on IGG by showing the limitations of an individual-based model. We discuss two concerns central in the debate: privacy and informed consent. However, we argue that IGG raises pressing ethical concerns that extend beyond these individual-focused issues. The very nature of the genetic information entails that relatives may also be affected by the individual customer’s choices. In this respect, we explore to what extent the ethical approach in the biomedical genetic context on consent and consequences for relatives can be helpful for the debate on IGG. We argue that an individual-based model has significant limitations in an IGG context. The ethical debate is further complicated by the international, transgenerational and commercial nature of IGG. We conclude that IGG should not only be approached as an individual but also—and perhaps primarily—as a collective issue.There are no data in this work.

Het artikel ziet op de voorgestelde strafbaarstelling van seks tegen de wil. De formulering van de culpa in het ‘Wetsvoorstel seksuele misdrijven’ van maart 2021 verschilt van die in het (op de Kamerbrief uit 2019 gebaseerde) Voorontwerp uit 2020, in die zin dat het ‘redelijkerwijs moeten vermoeden dat bij de ander de wil ontbreekt’ is gewijzigd in ‘ernstige reden om te vermoeden dat bij de ander de wil ontbreekt’. In het artikel worden de verschillende formuleringen van de culpa onderzocht en wordt gepleit voor een terugkeer naar het ‘redelijkerwijs had moeten vermoeden’ uit het eerste voorstel.

This article focuses on the references (allegations) made by the lawyers in a selected number of cases to Roman and customary law as well as to court decisions when arguing their case. The analysis focuses on three similar civil litigation records from the Court of Friesland from 1716, 1718 and 1720. Network analysis was used to examine whether certain sources were more dominant (i.e. more central) in the network than others and to explore the relationship between the references. The lawyers in the three cases from the Court of Friesland appear to have used some references in common when arguing whether security rights (i.e. mortgages) included a right of pursuit and whether the auctioneer could recover the object if the buyer failed to pay.

Making archives searchable by digitalisation and applying artificial intelligence to this will not only generate new information, but opens also the door for new questions. On basis of a case study from the Court of Friesland, the importance of this digital unlocking and method is shown: network analysis in three similar cases demonstrates and visualises the dominance of certain sources (allegations) in the network over other sources and by that the different working methods of the involved lawyers. This type of analysis is very useful to expose patterns which cannot be discerned otherwise when dealing with large quantities of civil litigation records from the Courts of Holland and Friesland. In this way until now hidden relations between names, places, dossiers and allegations, and even interprovincial links, may be revealed and lead to new investigations.

Zacharias Huber (1669-1732) evaluated in the revised Heedensdaegse Rechtsgeleertheyt arguments, hitherto unknown, which were brought forward in a case, pursued before the Court of Friesland and decided on December 14th 1718. The case dealt with the ownership of a box with gold, found on the beach of Schiermonnikoog in 1710 and which came from the ship De Witte Haas, shipwrecked off the coast in 1674. Newly found civil records show that Maria Wilree (1667-1729) from Amsterdam started the procedure to recover the box with gold, because it purportedly belonged to her father Dirck Wilree (1636-1674), director-general for the West India Company in Guinea and who died in the shipwrecking. She took legal action against Henrica Helmhout, regent of Schiermonnikoog and receiver of wrecks, and Gillis Vermeersch, representative of the West India Company. Only Vermeersch was successful in his argument, which he based on the instructions of the Company: it was forbidden to transport unregistered private goods. Such goods forfeited immediately to the Company. Consequently, Wilree claimed for the Company ownership and possession of the box with gold. Helmhout claimed to be the owner by prescription. Their arguments appear not to have been convincing.

It is a truth universally acknowledged (apologies to Jane Austen) that complex and fast-moving new biotechnologies inevitably outstrip legal regulation and ethical scrutiny. Surrogacy, the subject ...

In dit artikel worden twee empirische stellingen besproken die veelvuldig betrokken worden in het wetenschappelijke debat over excuses. De eerste claim is dat excuses niet oprecht hoeven te zijn, terwijl de tweede claim behelst dat het loskoppelen van excuses en aansprakelijkheid leidt tot minder juridische procedures. Hoewel beide claims soms met grote stelligheid naar voren worden gebracht, missen zij voldoende wetenschappelijke basis. Methodologisch is er tegen in te brengen dat bevindingen uit een andere discipline niet te snel mogen worden verabsoluteerd en dat het vruchtbaar kan zijn om niet slechts te focussen op één hulpdiscipline, zoals in dit geval de psychologie, maar dat ook inzichten uit andere disciplines, zoals de sociologie en de filosofie, waardevolle inzichten kunnen opleveren. Inhoudelijk wordt geconcludeerd dat de mogelijkheden binnen het recht om betekenisvolle excuses te faciliteren, beperkt zijn. Het al te actief stimuleren van het maken van excuses leidt er al snel toe dat niet de spijtbetuiging, maar de mogelijk gunstige effecten daarvan centraal komen te staan. Excuses verworden op die manier tot een instrumenteel inzetbaar loos gebaar.

Millions of human biological samples are stored worldwide for medical research or treatment purposes. These biospecimens are of enormous potential value to law enforcement as DNA profiles can be obtained from these samples. However, forensic use of such biospecimens raises a number of ethical questions. This article aims to explore ethical issues of using human bodily material in medical biobanks for crime investigation and prosecution purposes. Concerns about confidentiality, trust, autonomy and justice will be discussed. We explore how to balance these concerns against the importance of crime solving. Relevant case examples of forensic use of medical biobanks show that requests by law enforcement to access biobanks are handled in disparate ways. We identify some core ethical issues and conclude that further research on these issues is needed to provide ethical guidance.

In most legal orders, human germline modification is either prohibited or severely restricted. A recurring thought in these legal frameworks is that heritable genome editing would result in practices that are at odds with principles of human rights, such as dignity, justice, and equality. However, now that CRISPR is bringing heritable genome editing within human reach, the question has risen as to whether these human rights bans still make sense. The call is growing louder to lift the ban on heritable genome editing for therapeutic purposes as soon as the technology is safe for introduction in the clinic. This article critically examines these recent proposals from a human rights perspective. First, it examines the question as to how realistic the proposed distinction between the therapeutic and the nontherapeutic uses of human germline modification is in the CRISPR era. Second, it argues that these proposals rely on a one-dimensional understanding of the meaning of human rights for this issue. Finally, it suggests that this one-dimensional understanding paves the way for a regime of self-regulation by the scientific community that leaves little room for public debate on the question as to whether or how human germline modification fits in the long-term aspirations of society.

In deze bijdrage worden verschillende democratieconcepties onderzocht, waaronder Rijpkema’s conceptie van democratie als zelfcorrectie en Hendersons op agonisme gestoelde benadering van democratie. De auteur komt uiteindelijk tot een conceptie van democratie als inclusieve, zichzelf corrigerende staatsvorm.

Human beings are cultural beings. This implies that being deprived of valuable cultural objects may directly affect them in their possibilities of being human. This predicament could explain the special attention given to cases of Nazi-looted cultural objects and, more recently, to collections of cultural objects looted or acquired under duress in territories of the former colonial empires. It may be one of the reasons why, in particular, the quest for restitution of specific cultural objects is deemed to be so important, despite efforts to also explore alternative 'fair and just solutions', as indicated in the Washington Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art of 1998. With reference to ideas of the German-Jewish philosopher Walter Benjamin (1892-1940), this paper explores the value of restitution in more detail. How could these ideas be helpful in understanding and perhaps overcoming legal obstacles in the present on the road to restitution of objects from colonial collections?

Mag een arts op grond van een eerder opgestelde euthanasieverklaring het leven van haar diep demente patiënt beëindigen, omdat zij meent dat er sprake is van uitzichtloos, ondraaglijk lijden, zelfs als de inmiddels wilsonbekwaam geworden patiënt zelf expliciet zegt (nog) niet dood te willen? Onlangs beantwoordde de rechtbank Den Haag deze vraag bevestigend. Dit artikel biedt een kritische juridische en rechtsfilosofische analyse van het vonnis.

This article pays attention to the relevance and form of national apologies for colonial slavery. The focus is on the legal-political meaning of apologies: how can apologies actually contribute to the recognition of legal injustice from the past? It will be argued that apologies in which colonial slavery is declared a criminal form of injustice (a crime against humanity) repeals its historical legal validity. In doing so, the enslaved will posthumously obtain the legal recognition they deserve as persons in their own right. Next, the formal side of national apologies is discussed: should they indeed take the form of statutory law, as recommended by the Dutch Advisory Committee on the History of Slavery? What exactly happens if national apologies are accompanied by a ‘disclaimer’, ruling out in advance any legal liability that might result from the apology? It is argued that the legal form recommended for this purpose by the Advisory Committee would merit reconsideration if national apologies for the slavery past come ‘from the heart’. The recommendation that those legal apologies be provided with a ‘disclaimer’ should be critically examined, because apologies for legal injustice that involve new forms of exclusion are highly problematic.

This short paper contains three observations in response to the report The Impacts of Litigation in relation to Systematic and Large-Scale Atrocities committed by the Dutch Military Forces in the ‘Dutch East Indies’ between 1945-1949 (Amsterdam, 2019). First, the scope and wider relevance of the Rawagedeh-judgment of the District Court of The Hague (14 September 2011) is discussed. Secondly, the presumed 'exceptional' nature of the unlawful conduct of Dutch military forces during the Indonesian War of Independance is questioned. Thirdly, the explicit connection that the Court of Appeal of the Hague has made in its judgment of 1 October 2019 between the contemporary immunity of war crimes to prescription due to a higher, international law and the suspension of time bars within Dutch civil law in relation to colonial crimes is highlighted and briefly discussed.

This innovative book explores the role of utopian thinking in law and politics, including alternative forms of social engineering, such as technology and architecture. Building on Levitas’ Utopia as Method, the topic of utopia is addressed within the book from a multidisciplinary perspective.The book addresses central questions surrounding utopian thinking: What are its implications for law and politics? To what extent does it constitute a desirable vision? What are its risks or dangers? How is utopia related to ideology? An impressive selection of contributors reflect on the challenge of utopianism and its attraction, advancing the global public debate on social and political issues. Divided into three accessible parts, this book discusses the relationship between utopia and the law, the notion of utopian politics and utopia in architecture and technology.Addressing the topic of utopia from a variety of perspectives, this book will be an interesting read for academic scholars and students in the field of law, legal and political theory, philosophy, ethics, sociology, religious studies, technology and architecture. In particular, it is relevant for scholars who are interested in the dynamics of social, legal and political change.

This chapter argues that the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) radically reframed one of the corner stones of data protection: the purpose limitation principle. In short, the purpose limitation principle provides that personal data are not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with the purposes it was originally collected for. Under the Directive 95/46/EC (DPD) regime (supported by a wider regime of fundamental rights and case law), purpose limitation was considered the main rule, and exceptions were to be interpreted restrictively, thus only allowed on an individual and incidental basis. The GDPR (specifically Article 6(4)) has altered (or attempted to alter) this regime by changing the legal framework for purpose limitation, by allowing public administrative bodies to make collective and permanent exceptions to the purpose limitation principle, thus turning the exception into the rule. The chapter is divided in two sections. The first section provides a broad analysis of the purpose limitation principle, its functions, the restrictive interpretation, and the GDPR reframing. The second section establishes the connection between the relevant legislative amendments introduced in the GDPR and the Dutch 'big data' legislations known as the SyRI legislation and the WGS proposal.

In this chapter, we give an overview of some of the work on legal philosophy currently being done in the Netherlands. We explore: 1) work related to three classical approaches within legal philosophy: legal positivism, natural law theory and legal pragmatism; 2) work related to debates regarding the moral-legal foundations of society in late modernity; 3) work done on democracy and the rule of law in the globalized twenty-first century; 4) work related to legal argumentation and judicial decision-making; and 5) work in the field of legal methodology and legal ethics.

In political liberalism there is, generally speaking, a deep distrust of utopian thought. It is conceived as a blueprint for a radical reordering of the existing legal and political order. At the same time, liberal politics appears to be a rather dull affair. Compared with utopia, it seems to have less inspirational and motivational force. This chapter addresses the question of how to conceive of the relation between utopia and the rule of law. Does the rule of law completely rule out utopian thought? According to Van Klink, the rule of law depends for its survival on its ideological as well as its utopian dimension. To prevent that the rule of law is taken too much for granted as a self-evident and fixed idea, it is important to stress its utopian dimension. Conversely, its ideological stabilisation has to secure that the rule of law does not become a flee-floating fantasy.

In this chapter, Van Beers builds on Helmuth Plessner's philosophical anthropology to come to a better understanding of the relation between two contemporary utopias: the humanist utopia of human rights and the transhumanist techno-utopia of human enhancement. According to transhumanist thinkers, transhumanism is the logical extension of humanism. They stress that their school of thought, like humanism, presupposes a rather utopian account of the human based on which individual choice and freedom are to be pursued and protected. For them, human enhancement is not only compatible with, but even commanded by, human rights. Based on an analysis of the utopianism involved in humanism and transhumanism, I argue that this position only holds superficially. Upon closer examination, the transhumanist's quest for techno-utopia, even if he uses human rights as a starting point, is likely to pave the way for a world that can hardly be viewed as utopian according to humanist standards. To come to that conclusion, Van Beers offers a comparison between humanism and transhumanism through the lens of Plessner's first and third fundamental law of anthropology: the law that humans are artificial by nature and the law of the utopian standpoint.

This innovative book explores the role of utopian thinking in law and politics, including alternative forms of social engineering, such as technology and architecture. Building on Levitas’ Utopia as Method, the topic of utopia is addressed within the book from a multidisciplinary perspective.

In Nederland houden wij van doeners. Sterker nog: ons land draait er voor een heel groot deel op. Doeners zijn praktisch, werken hard en snel, zijn creatief en hebben goede ideeën. De doeners van nu hebben vroeger een vakopleiding gevolgd en een vak geleerd. Daarna zijn ze begonnen ze met het uitoefenen ervan. Na een aantal jaren werken hebben deze doeners meer ervaring, ze worden ouder en wijzer. Daarom groeien deze doeners vaak door naar een leidinggevende functie. Als leidinggevende worden er van doeners ineens andere dingen verwacht. Ze moeten communiceren, rapporteren, leidinggeven, onderhandelen…. Helaas merken veel doeners dat ze deze vaardigheden niet voldoende in huis hebben. Het boek Doeners aan Zet is dé oplossing voor deze doeners. Want soms is het niet nodig om te doen. Soms moet je meer denken, plannen en beslissen. En daar heb je nu eenmaal andere vaardigheden voor nodig. In dit boek leren doeners schriftelijk rapporteren, presenteren, gesprekken voeren, leidinggeven, vergaderen, onderhandelen, kritisch, logisch en creatief denken en het op een praktische, efficiënte, en effectieve manier toepassen van praktijkonderzoek. Doeners aan Zet is een studieboek en naslagwerk voor doeners en zo stevig gemaakt dat je het vaak uit de kast kunt pakken.

Boëtius Epo is a jurist whose life reflects all areas of tension and all contrasts typical of the sixteenth century. Born in Friesland, in the Northern Netherlands, which were soon to struggle out of the grasp of the Spanish king, he was to find his ultimate destination in Douai, situated in the Southern Netherlands still under Spanish rule. In his young life attracted to the enticing approach of the awakening Reformation toward the primitive church, he nevertheless retraced his footsteps, recognizing the orthodox Catholicism in which he had been raised. More than that, he revealed himself as belonging to the considerably radical wing of the Counter-Reformation. In his scholarly attitude there was a certain ambiguity between, on the one hand, being inclined to adhere to a re–foundation (ressourcement) of the sources of canon law, especially the texts compiled in the Decretum Gratiani, and, on the other, still adhering to spurious texts, maybe because from an ideological viewpoint their content was dear to him.

Die actio quasi Publiciana im byzantinischen Recht. In literature, D. 17,1,57 has been extensively discussed. In this fragment the former owner could reclaim his property by using the actio Publiciana, notwithstanding that the defendants had in good faith acquired ownership by acquisitive prescription (usucapio). The actio Publiciana in D. 17,1,57 should be interpreted as a special form of the actio Publiciana, which was normally given to a possessor in good faith. From Basilica-scholia it can be deduced that this special action, mentioned as actio quasi Publiciana, also applies in other cases. In Justinianic and Byzantine law the judge had to evaluate whether it was right that the defendant could raise an exceptio iusti dominii against this special form of the actio Publiciana.

© 2019 American Political Science Association.What, if anything, is problematic about the involvement of celebrities in democratic politics? While a number of theorists have criticized celebrity involvement in politics, none so far have examined this issue using the tools of social epistemology, the study of the effects of social interactions, practices, and institutions on knowledge and belief acquisition. We will draw on these resources to investigate the issue of celebrity involvement in politics, specifically as this involvement relates to democratic theory and its implications for democratic practice. We will argue that an important and underexplored form of power, which we will call epistemic power, can explain one important way in which celebrity involvement in politics is problematic. This is because unchecked uses and unwarranted allocations of epistemic power, which celebrities tend to enjoy, threaten the legitimacy of existing democracies and raise important questions regarding core commitments of deliberative, epistemic, and plebiscitary models of democratic theory. We will finish by suggesting directions that democratic theorists could pursue when attempting to address some of these problems.

Summary Nowadays it is generally held, that the owner who brought an actio legis Aquiliae usually claimed no more than his loss, perhaps already in Ulpian’s time, for certain in Justinian’s. For the sum of condemnation based upon the estimation-clauses of the lex Aquilia would only then exceed his damages, if either the injured object’s value had decreased in the last year or 30 days (Inst. 4,3,9) or the wrongdoer had denied having caused the damage (C. 3,35,4). There is, however, a third reason, which the Roman texts fail to mention: a possible residual value of killed lifestock, wounded slaves, and damaged objects, which benefitted the owner. Only a few later jurists took this into account: in medieval times Jacques de Révigny and Pierre Jacobi, Johann Oldendorp in the Early Modern era. The notion prevailed that the lex Aquilia obliged to pay at least the object’s full value.

The chapter provides a Kantian reading of EU internal market law and the refugee crisis of 2015. The chapter argues that the EU should be viewed as a cosmopolitan union. The authors ask whether EU law, understood as positive cosmopolitan law, can be qualified as an extension of the legal condition, and whether it can be viewed as consistent with the other two parts of public law, especially with the freedom of EU member states which also depend on the possible connection to global, much less extensive, systems of positive cosmopolitan law such as migration law.

Te midden van een strijd om macht en religie vluchtte in 1537 de laatste katholieke aartsbisschop van Noorwegen, Olav Engelbrektsson, naar de Nederlanden van Karel V. Op zijn vlucht nam de kerkvorst een groot deel van de schat van de Nidaroskathedraal in Trondheim mee, waaronder de bijl van Sint-Olav, twee kronen, kelken, monstransen en andere kostbaarheden. Dit boek volgt het spoor van de aartsbisschop, zijn gevolg en de kerkschatten. Een jarenlange zoektocht in archieven en musea levert een verrassend verhaal op over ballingschap, diplomatie en Noors erfgoed in de Habsburgse Nederlanden aan het begin van de Reformatie.

De Europese Unie heeft zich, als dynamische democratie, verschillende keren heruitgevonden. De aandacht ging naar de verhouding tussen de burgers en de Europese instellingen, specifiek naar de manier waarop deze kon worden verbeterd. Sinds de jaren zeventig werd nagedacht over aanpassingen van het Europese democratische bestel. Dit leidde tot de versterking van de positie van het Europees Parlement, hervormingen in de besluitvormingsprocedures, de introductie van het Europees burgerschap, het ontwikkelen van het petitierecht, de ombudsprocedure en de wetgevende consultaties en eindigde in 2012 in het summum van participatieve democratie, het Europees burgerinitiatief.De centrale onderzoeksvraag leest als volgt: “In hoeverre vormt het Europees burgerinitiatief een meerwaarde voor de democratie en de democratische legitimiteit van de Europese Unie?” Het proefschrift voert een uitgebreide analyse van het Europees burgerinitiatief uit en bekijkt onder meer de procedure, de doelstellingen en de praktische toepassing. Bovendien wordt het burgerinitiatief ook binnen een ruimer perspectief geplaatst. De eerder ingevoerde instrumenten, zoals het petitierecht, de Europese ombudsprocedure en de wetgevingsconsultaties worden functioneel bestudeerd. Deze maken immers deel uit van de participatieve democratie. De analyse maakt daarnaast gebruik van inzichten uit de politieke en bestuurswetenschappen ter aanvulling van de juridische analyse. Dit onderzoek geeft een systemische analyse van het Europees burgerinitiatief, zowel vanuit theoretisch als praktisch perspectief. Bovendien kijken we naar de nationale instrumenten en hebben we aandacht voor de manier waarop de lidstaten en de Unie elkaar beïnvloeden. De samenhang tussen de verschillende niveaus, de instellingen en de instrumenten van participatieve democratie wordt door middel van dit proefschrift voor het eerst duidelijk in kaart gebracht. De systemische analyse wordt toegepast binnen de Europese participatieve democratie. Ze leidt tot nieuwe inzichten en opent pistes voor toekomstig onderzoek.