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In his recent monograph, Territorial Status in International Law , Jure Vidmar offers 'a new theory of statehood' that consolidates his existing work and departs in important ways from legal orthodoxy. As a work of doctrinal law, the text is rigorous; however, its theoretical contribution is somewhat unclear. Vidmar's central theoretical claim—that the status of individual states is established by discrete norms of customary international law—adds very little to his doctrinal argument. By examining his position, this review article examines what it might mean to provide helpful 'theories of statehood'. It begins by framing the theoretical challenge posed by such work before setting out some desiderata for theoretical success in this area. Finally, it sketches out a general approach, grounded in Hannah Arendt's conception of power, which offers a promising means for moving beyond doctrinal description within 'reconstructive' international legal theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hohfeld was acutely aware of the 'potent tendency [of words] to control thought'. He was perhaps less aware of the power of syntax to do the same. Hohfeld's tendency to express the content of duties and liberties in the syntactically restrictive to ϕ form has allowed a corrupted version of his analytical scheme to take root. That version takes as axiomatic that the content of any duty or liberty is the action or inaction of the duty bearer or liberty holder. Yet duties and liberties can (and do) pertain to matters other than the action or inaction of the duty bearer or liberty holder. This insight has a range of doctrinal implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Jurnal Ilmu Hukum, Humaniora dan Politik (JIHHP) is the property of Dinasti Publisher and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The enforcement of law is an integral aspect of the legal system's functioning, and it is often criticized with phrases like "no viral, no justice" or "law is sharp downwards, blunt upwards." In this context, how does the philosophy of law play a role in upholding the integrity of law enforcement, and how can a legal enforcement system be grounded in the rationality of legal philosophy. This type of research is normative with a conceptual approach based on secondary data. Secondary data is obtained through literature review and then analyzed qualitatively. Based on the analysis, it is found that the role of legal philosophy in maintaining the integrity of law enforcement involves guiding law enforcers to work effectively, respect, follow, and consistently apply rules to create balanced relationships by providing rights to everyone through fair and proportional procedures. A legal enforcement system based on the rationality of legal philosophy would involve: Methodical Enforcement: Law enforcement. is conducted in a structured and systematic manner. Systematic Enforcement: Law enforcement follows a structured process. Coherent Enforcement: Law enforcement is logically consistent. Rational Enforcement: Law enforcement is based on reason rather than emotion. Comprehensive Enforcement: Law enforcement addresses all relevant aspects comprehensively. Radical Enforcement: Law enforcement applies thoroughly and decisively. Universal Enforcement: Law enforcement is applied universally, ensuring that it is fair and equal for all. This research confirms that a strong and integrated legal philosophy position in the law enforcement system is the key to maintaining and enhancing the dignity of the law itself. This requires commitment from all legal stakeholders to continue to apply and develop the principles of legal philosophy in every aspect of law enforcement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes a new way of thinking about the concept of dignity. It argues that existing conceptions of dignity in moral and legal philosophy fail to meet three key tests: conceptual soundness, analytical usefulness, and a capacity to vindicate the principle of moral egalitarianism. It suggests that we can better satisfy all three of these conditions if we treat dignity as a relational and political concept that is defined by a sense of what we are due. This means its content derives not from any transcendental truth or legal authority but has to be negotiated between different actors. It can then be asserted as part of an egalitarian project without needing to make reference to an external authority or a confused conceptual base. It seeks to show that this understanding of dignity is free of the conceptual confusion that plagues the existing conceptions; is closer to the ‘common’ understanding of dignity in ordinary language and thus more analytically useful; finally can be deployed more successfully in defence of the principle of moral equality.

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In this criticism of Mitrović argument about realism it is pointed out 1): that Mitrović is unaware of how the medieval debate between realists and nominalists about the existence of universals complicates his position, 2) similarly, he is unaware of how the debate on the so-called 'essentially contested concepts' (W.B. Gallie) complicates his position, 3) when taking up the issue of holism and individualism he mistakenly assumes that what has been said about it in the context of the social sciences can also be applied to the writing of history, 4) the debate on the legal person or corporation since Innocent IV further complicates the issue. Finally, I explain why and how one can be a realist in philosophy of history, though on the basis of arguments entirely different from those proposed by Mitrović. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2023 8(3), 1247-1254 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. The autonomy of EU law and legal theory: bridging the disconnect. – II. Overview of this Special Section. | (Abstract) The autonomy of EU law is a source of ample connections between EU law and legal theory. This Special Section contributes to the mutual enrichment between EU constitutional law and legal theory – which traditionally have been mostly disconnected disciplines – by bringing together new, theory-informed perspectives on the autonomy of EU law and European integration from both EU lawyers and legal theorists. The ten Articles in this Special Section are grouped together in three categories, focusing re-spectively on philosophy of law, legal theory and legal history, and legal doctrine and the role of the European Court of Justice. Together, they provide a plethora of contrasting and complementary legal-theoretical views on the autonomy of EU law and the EU legal order, within the broader context of European integration. With this Special Section, we aim to contribute to the legal-theoretical analysis of EU constitutional law, hoping that many others will follow in our footsteps.

Augustine is typically interpreted as having believed that temporal laws cannot help people become virtuous and thus are not deficient for failing to do so. In this respect, he is seen as out of step with much of ancient political philosophy and a precursor to modern liberal legal theory. However, examining Augustine's analyses of two temporal legal systems – Roman law and Mosaic law – reveals this interpretation to be false. Augustine believed that laws should help their followers become virtuous and offered a mechanism by which this happens. The standard interpretation has overlooked these concrete analyses in favor of Augustine's programmatic claims about law. This paper therefore not only corrects a misreading and proposes a novel reading; it also suggests an alternative method for studying ancient legal thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper builds on the work of several exceptional scholars from the disciplines of philosophy, law, and history. My central aim is to introduce and explicate an idea closely related to (and derivative of) the concept of rights talk, a concept I call 'constitutional emotivism'. By drawing upon scholars including Mary Ann Glendon, Jamal Greene, A.J. Ayer, and Alasdair MacIntyre, I aim to gather the conceptual threads that I trace through their work which together form the idea of constitutional emotivism. In a sentence, constitutional emotivism is the conflation of moral disagreements with constitutional rights grievances. When this conflation occurs, rights conflicts that never needed to occur in the first place reinforce rights talk and its uncompromising nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Understanding prescriptive rules is important for understanding the law given that much of law is prescriptive. This work in legal philosophy aims to promote such understanding by offering an analysis of prescriptive rules. It does so by showing what these rules are and how they operate, distinguishing them from other rule types, and advancing a critical analysis of Joseph Raz’s conception of prescriptive rules. The analysis offered helps to clarify not only the nature of prescriptive rules and their treatment within legal philosophy, but also legal norms that operate by prescribing conduct.

This article explores the intersection of philosophical and social concepts with space law, examining their practical implications and relevance to contemporary challenges in space activities. The narrative begins by emphasizing the significance of realization in cultural execution, underscoring the importance of balance and moderation as cultural values. The discourse then transitions to the realm of space law, posing critical questions about the goals, decision-making processes, and the overall horizon of space exploration. The text evaluates the existence and impact of “soft” and “hard” laws, asserting that the effectiveness of laws lies in their impact on opportunity horizons. The role of a space lawyer is contemplated, focusing on the bridging of the gap between present realities and aspirational futures guided by relevant mythologies and ideologies. The narrative concludes with a call for a psychological understanding to accompany legal structures, asserting that laws for space activities must align with foundational cultural elements to be effective. The emphasis of the article’s exploration of space law within the broader context of philosophy and culture, calls for the need of an interdisciplinary approach to address the complexities of space activities.

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Copyright of Teoría & Derecho. Revista de Pensamiento Jurídico is the property of Editorial Tirant Lo Blanch SL and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

One of the frequent philosophical problems of legal ethics is the conflict between common and role morality. This situation is where a lawyer's actions are evaluated differently by these two sets of moral norms. The article seizes on this as a conflict between two conventional moralities that need to be resolved with the help of a justificatory morality and thus an appropriate theory of normative ethics. It offers as a possible response a variant of consequentialism that draws on utilitarianism and brings it closer to pragmatism. This approach seeks to preserve the traditional advantages of utilitarianism, which are minimalist and plausible normative assumptions, and an excellent ability to resolve moral conflicts. At the same time, it takes into account the complex nature of the world in which we live and our epistemic uncertainty, which brings it closer to pragmatism. The author confronts this theory with some existing approaches to resolving the conflict between the common and role morality and tries to show that it is at least as plausible as they are and should have a place among them. Finally, the article concludes with an analysis of the famous case of Alton Logan as its practical application. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on the Constitutional Court decision no. 90/PUU-XXI/2023 which has attracted a lot of attention from experts and practitioners in the field. So the author is interested in studying the decision using the perspective of Hart and Dworkin's legal philosophy. The method used in writing is normative juridical with a case study approach and statutory regulations. Regarding the data collection method used is literature study. Based on the author's analysis, it can be concluded that if we use H.L.A. Hart's legal philosophy, the Constitutional Court Decision No. 90/PUU-XXI/2023 is in line with his framework of thought. However, if you use Dworkin's concept of thought, Constitutional Court Decision no. 90/PUU-XXI/2023 is contrary to the legal concept of integrity Penulisan artikel ini berfokus pada putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi No. 90/PUU-XXI/2023 yang sempat menarik banyak perhatian dari ahli hingga praktisi di bidang. Sehingga penulis tertarik untuk mengkaji putusan tersebut dengan menggunakan perspektif filsafat hukum Hart dan Dworkin. Metode yang digunakan pada penulisan adalah yuridis normative dengan metode pendekatan studi kasus dan peraturan perundang-undangan. Mengenai metode pengumpulan data yang digunakan adalah studi pustaka. Berdasarkan analisis penulis maka dapat disimpulkan jika menggunakan filsafat hukum H.L.A Hart maka Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi No. 90/PUU-XXI/2023 selaras dengan kerangkan pemikirannya. Namun apabila menggunakan konsep pemikiran Dworkin, Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi No. 90/PUU-XXI/2023 ini bertentangan dengan konsep hukum sebagai integritas

This symposium explores the connection between contemporary international law and political morality. Conceptualising political morality as the set of genuine normative reasons that govern how we should interact with each other at the political level, the four papers presented in the symposium illustrate how analysing international law through the lens of political morality can sharpen our thinking about the prescriptive content and legitimacy of international legal norms, and of the relationship between those norms and the norms of domestic legal orders. Although the papers in the symposium engage with discrete aspects of international legal doctrine, all are united in conceptualising the international legal order as a normative space in which political morality plays a defining role. This introduction to the symposium provides an outline of the papers, detailing the various themes and questions explored therein. It also situates the symposium within the 'legal interpretivist' and 'Grotian' traditions in legal theory, traditions which elevate questions of political morality to the forefront of legal analysis. This introduction also offers some reflections on the reasons for the historical neglect of these traditions in international legal scholarship, and on the potential value of rehabilitating them as tools for analysing and evaluating the contemporary international legal order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Individuals sometimes do things that they know will violate the terms of a statute. Most scholars deny that such actions are always morally wrong, but a coherent theoretical account of the relationships between 1) moral obligation, 2) legal obligation, and 3) criminal wrongdoing that can robustly classify hard cases has been elusive. This article starts with a Kantian account of the relationship between law and morality, and it proposes two closely related standards: one for legal obligation, and another for criminal wrongdoing. It then tests the plausibility and resilience of these standards by using them to generate illuminating new analyses of classic hypothetical cases involving alleged crimes committed under circumstances of necessity. These analyses offer reason to believe that the standards proposed in this article can anchor a Kantian theory of criminal responsibility that is simultaneously rigorous and humane. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Classic theories of punishment have been deeply criticized for their failure to attribute significance to victims and the fact of their victimization within their proposed frameworks for the justification and distribution of punishment. Retributive theory, in particular, has been criticized for its failure to recognize the significance of victims. Some theorists have been led by this lacuna to adopt a victim-centred approach to punishment as a solution to the 'absence-of-victim' problem. Per victim-centred approaches, the very justification and imposition of punishment rely on victims and the restoration of egalitarian relations between the offender and victim that were disturbed by crime. This move toward constructing criminal law and punishment in terms of victim recognition and vindication has become increasingly popular and has been endorsed by a number of prominent theorists, yet it raises important worries. This article proposes an alternative solution, embracing the insight that victims ought to matter to the punishment of those who offend against them, yet without constructing the edifice of criminal law and punishment on the function of victim vindication. It offers an account of the way in which the introduction of a victim changes the balance of reasons in favour of punishment, becoming important to the determination of whether or not punishment ought to be imposed (in full). Yet it does so without taking the 'victim's turn' – that is, without reconstructing the institution of criminal punishment entirely in victim-centric terms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Ankara Barosu Dergileri is the property of Ankara Bar Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Prudentia Iuris is the property of Pontificia Universidad Catolica Argentina and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article explores the intersection of philosophical and social concepts with space law, examining their practical implications and relevance to contemporary challenges in space activities. The narrative begins by emphasizing the significance of realization in cultural execution, underscoring the importance of balance and moderation as cultural values. The discourse then transitions to the realm of space law, posing critical questions about the goals, decision-making processes, and the overall horizon of space exploration. The text evaluates the existence and impact of “soft” and “hard” laws, asserting that the effectiveness of laws lies in their impact on opportunity horizons. The role of a space lawyer is contemplated, focusing on the bridging of the gap between present realities and aspirational futures guided by relevant mythologies and ideologies. The narrative concludes with a call for a psychological understanding to accompany legal structures, asserting that laws for space activities must align with foundational cultural elements to be effective. The emphasis of the article’s exploration of space law within the broader context of philosophy and culture, calls for the need of an interdisciplinary approach to address the complexities of space activities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Understanding prescriptive rules is important for understanding the law given that much of law is prescriptive. This work in legal philosophy aims to promote such understanding by offering an analysis of prescriptive rules. It does so by showing what these rules are and how they operate, distinguishing them from other rule types, and advancing a critical analysis of Joseph Raz's conception of prescriptive rules. The analysis offered helps to clarify not only the nature of prescriptive rules and their treatment within legal philosophy, but also legal norms that operate by prescribing conduct. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Pravnik is the property of Czech Academy of Sciences, Institute of State & Law and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article deals with the will and related legal issues. It first discusses the historical development of the concept of will and then looks at other issues relating to it, such as its freedom. It shows the different ways in which the definition of will has been approached, and also explains how contemporary scholarship has approached the question of its freedom. In particular, the text mentions the problem of personhood as one that is related to the question of the will in contemporary legal philosophy. To be able to grant rights to someone (whether human rights in the sense of moral rights or subjective rights in general), some theories recognize as a relevant criterion precisely the will of the agent, or also its freedom. The author argues, however, that we have neither a clearly accepted definition of the will nor a generally accepted explanation regarding its freedom. This then generally puts us on thin ice when we base theories of legal personhood or laws that affect people's lives on this concept. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The emergence of the Feminist Legal Theory is caused by an imbalance in the legal order which tends to be patriarchal, including in writing history the role of women should be balanced with that of men. In the perspective of legal philosophy, fulfilling women’s right and gender equality is an effort to obtain justice as al legal goal to realize the principle of equality before the law. The research method is normative juridical research with a qualitative analysis approach using primary and secondary legal sources . As a conclusion that the need for equal participation for women and men to exercise their rights and obligations in every policy and program as well as legal norms in laws and regulations that can guarantee equality of policies and programsthat provide benefitsto men and women. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article will argue that from Heraclitus' writings on fire, we can better appreciate how genocidal regimes use it against a target population. In doing so, I am not arguing that I have presented the proper reading of Heraclitus' thoughts. Rather, I have tried to approach the available Fragments in a way whereby we can learn from Heraclitus about the potentially genocidal dangers and consequences of fire. To do this, I will approach Heraclitus' Fragments through a framework provided by Martin Heidegger. Ultimately, I will argue that from Heraclitus' thoughts we can better comprehend how tyrannical regimes utilise fire to exact genocides. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]