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This article intends to outline the multifaceted aspect of the indeterminate legal concept called public order. Due to its polysemic nature, it proposed to investigate the structuring elements of public order from the perspective of the three levels (degrees) proposed by Dolinger, which allowed the conclusion that, in the application of indeterminate legal concepts, only through the hermeneutic assumptions is possible to reach the conceptual amplitude of the interpreted disposition, at the same time that reductionist interpretations are avoided and that go against the regulatory frame coming from the text object of the interpretation.

The reference to the nature of things is still working today in legislation and jurisprudence. In this article the reasons for the persistence of this line of reasoning in law and in the legal science are examined. These reasons generally depend on the close connection between law and some fundamental social relations. But also the essential need to assure its effectiveness, without which law would be useless. In turn, the contemporary evolution of the legal culture requires a change in the way of understanding the nature of things. Nowadays, the nature of things distances itself from mere objectivism to get close to the deliberative character of the determination of the law

Larry Alexander defende que as razões de primeiro grau determinam simultaneamente que precisamos de regras e que não devemos observar as regras. No seu juízo, esta “clivagem” é incontornável. Neste comentário, reconheço que o problema é real, mas pode ser mitigado, e adianto razões que depõem contra uma forma extrema de cepticismo jurídico., Larry Alexander argues that first-order reasoning tells us both that we need rules to be followed and that we should not follow rules. Herein lies ‘the gap’, a problem that he finds intractable. I argue that the problem is real but also manageable, and offer reasons to resist an extreme form of legal skepticism.

La dificultad contramayoritaria es una de las principales críticas al control judicial de constitucionalidad de las leyes. Esta crítica es analizada desde la teoría del derecho a la luz de la distinción disposición/norma. El argumento central de este artículo es el siguiente: cuando el control de constitucionalidad tiene como efecto declarar inaplicable una ley a un caso concreto, el argumento de la dificultad contramayoritaria no es aplicable. The counter majoritarian difficulty is one of the main objections against the judicial review. In this paper, this objection is analyzed from the standpoint of the norm formulation/norm distinction. By stressing the distinction between norm formulations and norms, I claim that when judicial review prevents the application of a norm to an individual case the counter majoritarian difficulty objection does not hold.

Les arguments du mouvement Critical Legal Studies sur l’indétermination du droit ne sont doublés d’aucune théorie sur la légitimité des interprétations qu’offrent les juges et donc d’aucun critère juridique pour critiquer une décision. La théorie pluraliste critique du droit, qui prend acte de la pluralité du droit officiel pour redéfinir le phénomène juridique plutôt que de nier qu’il puisse exister, pourrait toutefois fournir un tel critère. En effet, elle présente plusieurs correspondances avec les travaux de Dworkin, qui défend que les citoyens sont en droit d’obtenir les fruits d’une attitude interprétative en germe dans le concept même de droit. Ces deux théories maintiennent que le droit sert à reconnaître la valeur de l’histoire d’un groupe dans sa conception de lui-même tout en soutenant qu’il doit trouver une pertinence contemporaine pour être effectif et légitime. Les pluralistes priorisent toutefois la résonance actuelle des règles de droit et croient que toute communauté est divisée entre diverses définitions du bien. Selon eux, le droit est avant tout un procédé pour penser la conduite humaine et lui conférer un sens, qui dépend des capacités créatrices des citoyens. Chaque règle est alors la cause d’une pluralité d’ordres juridiques concurrents. Suivant ce portrait, seule l’acceptation d’une interprétation par un groupe, sa capacité à lui reconnaître un sens, pourrait rendre cette interprétation légitime. Ce critère nous mène vers un modèle de justice négociée où deux personnes s’adressent à un juge pour développer une lecture en commun du droit, pour identifier une interprétation légitime dans leurs univers juridiques respectifs., No theory of the legitimacy of judges accompanies the Critical Legal Studies’ arguments on the indeterminacy of law, which entails there are no criteria to identify a legitimate interpretation. Critical legal pluralism, which redefines law to take account of its inherent plurality rather than denying its very possibility on these grounds, could however provide such criteria. Indeed, it presents many resemblances with Dworkin’s theory of law which argues that citizens are entitled to reap the benefits of the interpretative nature of law. Both theories defend that law allows to bridge a group’s past, which is essential to its self-understanding, with the present, and both insist that law must be made to appear relevant in the present. Pluralists however prioritize the current significance of law and stress that communities are split by a variety of definitions of the good. According to them, law is mainly a process to think about human conduct and grant it meaning, and it depends as such on citizens’ creative capacities. Accordingly, only an interpretation that is accepted by a group and seen as meaningful can be considered legitimate. This criterion forces us to consider a form of negotiated justice, where two persons consult a judge to develop a common reading of a rule which would be legitimate in each person’s legal universe.

The challenge posed by legal indeterminacy to legal legitimacy has generally been considered from points of view internal to the law and its application. But what becomes of legal legitimacy when the legal status of a given norm is itself a matter of contestation? This article, the first extended scholarly treatment of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA)’s new definition of antisemitism, pursues this question by examining recent applications of the IHRA definition within the UK following its adoption by the British government in 2016. Instead of focusing on this definition’s substantive content, I show how the document reaches beyond its self-described status as a “non-legally binding working definition” and comes to function as what I call a quasi-law, in which capacity it exercises the de facto authority of the law, without having acquired legal legitimacy. Broadly, this work elucidates the role of speech codes in restricting freedom of expression within liberal states., Law, Culture and the Humanities, vol. 18, no. 1, p. 153

Larry Alexander argues that first-order reasoning tells us both that we need rules to be followed and that we should not follow rules. Herein lies ‘the gap’, a problem that he finds intractable. I argue that the problem is real but also manageable, and offer reasons to resist an extreme form of legal skepticism., Larry Alexander defende que as razões de primeiro grau determinam simultaneamente que precisamos de regras e que não devemos observar as regras. No seu juízo, esta “clivagem” é incontornável. Neste comentário, reconheço que o problema é real, mas pode ser mitigado, e adianto razões que depõem contra uma forma extrema de cepticismo jurídico.

Con este trabajo se busca clarificar la compatibilidad entre las exigencias del rule of law y el fenómeno de la discrecionalidad judicial. Para llevar a cabo este objetivo será necesario, en primer lugar, establecer qué entendemos por rule of law y por discrecionalidad judicial. Así, por un lado, se propondrá una concepción de la discrecionalidad judicial en parte originada por la inevitable y, en algunos casos, hasta deseable indeterminación parcial del derecho y cuya característica principal está vinculada con un cierto margen de decisión libre del que gozan en algunos casos los jueces entre, al menos, dos posibilidades justificadas de actuación. Además, se propondrá una noción de las exigencias del rule of law como ideales orientados a servir fines valiosos, que admiten grados en su cumplimiento, que resulta imposible cumplirlas completamente e, incluso, indeseable en algunos casos hacerlo en su mayor medida posible. A partir de estas nociones, se buscará mostrar que si entendemos a las exigencias del rule of law de modo tal que no siempre deban ser cumplidas completamente e incluso que en algunos casos no deban ser cumplidas en la mayor medida posible, ellas podrán ser conciliables con el fenómeno de la discrecionalidad judicial. The aim of this work is to throw some light upon the compatibility between the rule of law desiderata and the phenomenon of judicial discretion. In order to achieve this, it is first necessary to determine what we understand by the terms “rule of law” and “judicial discretion”. In this sense, the conception of judicial discretion that is offered in this work is linked with a certain margin of freedom that judges have when deciding cases that have at least two justified possible courses of action. In addition to this, this work puts forward a notion of the rule of law desiderata and characterizes the latter as ideals that: (i) aim at serving valuable ends, (ii) admit degrees of accomplishment, as it is impossible –and, in some cases, even undesirable– to fulfill them either completely or to the highest possible degree. Based on these notions, this work intends to demonstrate that if the rule of law desiderata are understood as requirements that are not always meant to be accomplished completely, and that even in some cases should not be fulfilled to their highest possible degree, then they can be compatible with the phenomenon of judicial discretion. Fil: Etcheverry, Juan Bautista. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Austral. Facultad de Derecho. Departamento de Filosofía del Derecho y Derecho Constitucional; Argentina

International audience; Legal realism is very much concerned with legal adjudication and judicial decision and it emphasizes and stresses the subjective dimension of both operations and the large part of discretion judges have. Though far from being flawed with naïve psychology, both first and nowadays legal realism do use skills and tools and results from other social sciences in order to bring to light the complexity of legal adjudication and judicial decision. In both cases, deductive logic is not enough though we should not try to think about it as a philosophical argumentation.; L’analyse du jugement juridique par ce que l’on appelle le réalisme juridique entend souligner la dimension subjective qu’implique l’acte de juger et la part importante de pouvoir discrétionnaire dont bénéficient les juges. Néanmoins, loin de verser dans une analyse psychologisante et naïve, le réalisme d’hier et celui d’aujourd’hui, sollicitent les outils et exploitent les résultats que les autres sciences sociales leur offrent pour mettre en évidence la complexité du jugement juridique qui ne saurait être réduit à une opération purement logique et déductive ni avoir l’ampleur d’une argumentation philosophique.

La justicia transicional debe enfrentar la negación de las atrocidades. A pesar de la sofisticación del marco de derechos humanos presente en el sistema legal colombiano, el campo de la justicia transicional en Colombia adolece de un significativo grado de indeterminación normativa, como si dicho campo aconteciera en un "vacío constitucional". Como consecuencia, ha sido objeto de uso estratégico por parte de distintos actores políticos dotados de intencionalidad en la fijación del sentido del arreglo institucional de la llamada justicia transicional. El uso estratégico gravita entre el acatamiento pleno del marco de derechos humanos o su elusión en distintos grados. La elusión niega las atrocidades. Para que el discurso de la justicia transicional en Colombia contribuya a hacer justicia por las atrocidades, debe dar viabilidad práctica a los derechos de las víctimas, no reducir esos estándares. Para ello, son necesarios dos requisitos: desde el punto de vista sustantivo, debe acatar las obligaciones en materia de verdad, justicia y reparación, que son parámetro de constitucionalidad, y respetar el núcleo esencial de tales derechos, sin perjuicio de la libertad de configuración legislativa y de la ponderación judicial. Desde el punto de vista procedimental, debe adoptar como metodología un enfoque contextualizado de análisis comparado que evite el trasplante acrítico de experiencias internacionales inaplicables. Transitional justice (TJ) must confront the denial of atrocities. Despite the sophistication of the national human rights legal framework in Colombia, a significant level of normative indeterminacy qualifies TJ, as if the field could work in a "constitutional vacuum." As a consequence, various political agents, who intentionally attempt to determine the content of the TJ scheme, have used the field strategically. The strategic use of the field ranges from total observance of the human rights framework all the way to attempts to circumvent human rights obligations. These attempts to dodge human rights obligations contribute to the denial of atrocities. If TJ rhetoric is to contribute to accountability in Colombia, it must contribute to the realization of victims' rights, not contribute to the devaluation of standards. In order to reach such a purpose, two requirements are necessary: from a substantive perspective, TJ must observe the essential core of international standards regarding truth, justice and reparation, which serve as constitutional parameters even in the context of legislative authority or judicial weighting; and from a procedural perspective, TJ must apply a sound methodology that considers a contextualized approach to comparative analysis, in order to avoid the non-reflexive transplantation of international experiences. A justiça transicional deve enfrentar a negociação das atrocidades. A pesar da sofisticação do marco de direitos humanos presente no sistema legal colombiano, o campo da justiça transicional na Colômbia adoece de um significativo grau de indetermi nação normativa, como se este campo acontecera em um "vazio constitucional". Como consequência, tem sido objeto de uso estratégico por parte de distintos atores políticos dotados de intencionalidade na fixação do sentido do arranjo institucional da conhecida justiça transicional. O uso estratégico, gravita entre o acatamento pleno do marco dos direitos humanos ou sua esquiva em distintos graus. A esquiva nega as atrocidades. Para que o discurso da justiça transacional na Colômbia contribua a fazer justiça pelas atrocidades, deve dar viabilidade prática aos direitos das vitimas, não reduzir esses padrões. Para issi, são necessários dois requisitos: desde o ponto de vista substancial, deve acatar as obrigações em matéria de verdade, justiça e reparação, que são parâmetro de constitucionalidade e respeitar o núcleo essencial de tais direitos, sem prejuízo da liberdade de configuração legislativa e da ponderação judicial. Desde o ponto de vista procedimental, deve adotar como metodologia um enfoque contextualizado de análise comparado que evite o transplante acrítico de experiências internacionais inaplicáveis.

On August 1, 2002, then Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee signed for President Bush a memorandum of law concluding that some torture was not necessarily illegal if the President ordered it. This Essay examines how Bybee could arrive at a conclusion that is fundamentally at odds with both our national moral spirit and our law. In doing so, it cautions American lawyers to recognize the difference between what is "legal" and what is "arguably legal," and to be aware of their own extra-legal biases when interpreting the law.

This article concerns the issue of legal indeterminacy in American doctrine. Legal indeterminacy in simple words means that law does not always determine the answear to a legal question.It has its origins in the 1920s and 30s, when the argument that Anglo-American law is indeterminate was developed by the legal realists. In the 1980s a new group of legal academics, known as ? Crits ? (from Critical Legal Studies) revived and unfold this thesis. Although today it is regarded as pass e , it seems that not all Crits ? arguments are insubstantial. The author of this article provides basic information about the thesis of legal indeterminacy, its development and kinds (radical indeterminacy, underdeterminacy), explain the relation between uncertainty and indeterminacy, and give some examples. Normal 0 21 false false false PL X-NONE X-NONE /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:Standardowy; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";}