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Jokes understanding is an important part of people's social life, especially in aging. However, little is known about older adults' humor understanding and the role of the cognitive skills underpinning social communication, mainly pragmatics and theory of mind (ToM). To fill this gap, we created the Phonological and Mental Jokes (PMJ) task, a fine-grained task distinguishing two types of jokes based on the mentalistic load. The PMJ task was administered, together with the Assessment of Pragmatic Abilities and Cognitive Substrates (APACS) test for pragmatics and the Strange Stories for ToM, to 147 older adults (age-range 60-85). Through structural equation modeling (SEM), we analyzed: i) the latent structure of the PMJ task; ii) the relationships between humor comprehension, pragmatics, and ToM, controlling for other background variables (vocabulary, education, and age). Results revealed a two-latent-factor model for the PMJ task, which separated phonological from mental jokes. Furthermore, pragmatic skills predicted humor comprehension irrespective of the type of joke, whereas the relationship between humor understanding and ToM skills was specific, being significant for mental, but not for phonological, jokes. These results suggest that humor understanding is part of the larger pragmatic competence of older adults and that it may additionally tax ToM skills when reasoning about the mental states of the joke's characters is required. These findings pave the way to a lifespan consideration of humor in social communication and add to the debate over the relationship between pragmatics and ToM, showing the different role of these abilities in humor., Author(s): Luca Bischetti [sup.1] , Irene Ceccato [sup.2] , Serena Lecce [sup.2] , Elena Cavallini [sup.2] , Valentina Bambini [sup.1] Author Affiliations: (1) grid.30420.35, 0000 0001 0724 054X, Center for [...]

Although metaphors are essential tools in everyday communication and educational settings, the literature lacks evidence of effective training tools to promote metaphor comprehension in typical development. Grounding in theoretical pragmatics, we developed a novel metaphor comprehension training (MetaCom) for school-age children that focuses on inferential and contextual aspects of metaphors. The effects of the MetaCom were tested against a control training focusing on text comprehension in a randomized controlled trial involving 55 children aged between 8;8 and 9;8. Only children in the MetaCom group improved in the ability to verbally explain the meaning of a metaphor. Moreover, only the MetaCom showed transfer effects to reading comprehension. These findings suggest that targeting inference and attention to context is key to promote metaphor understanding, and that the benefits might extend to linguistic and communicative skills at large. The MetaCom training can thus represent a promising tool for educational programs, possibly also in atypical populations.

The recent expansion of research on children's understanding of others' minds (or 'theory of mind', ToM) into middle childhood provides fresh opportunities to consider its origins and consequences. In this paper, we propose that, in addition to supporting children's social interactions, individual differences in ToM benefit academic achievement, in particular, reading comprehension and scientific reasoning. Furthermore, we argue that the school and classroom context can influence individual differences in ToM and its ongoing development in middle childhood. We suggest future directions for research to test these claims, which will provide a new perspective on the consequences of ToM and test the developmental continuity of socio-cultural accounts of mindreading.

The present study evaluated: (1) the effects of two training programs designed for promoting Theory of Mind (ToM) skills in children aged 7/8; and (2) the relations between second-order recursive thinking (II-order-RT), advanced-ToM (Adv_ToM) and metacognition. Ninety-one 7- to 8-year-old children were assigned to one of three training conditions: a II-order-RT, an Adv_ToM, and a control condition. Groups were equivalent at pretest for SES, executive functions and reading comprehension. The main effect of time was significant on II-order-RT, but not on Adv_ToM and metacognition. Children of the II-order-RT group improved their performance on over the training period II-order-RT while children of the control group did not) and they also outperformed children of the control condition at posttest. This positive effect generalized to Adv_ToM. Children of the Adv_ToM group improved over the training period their performance on both Adv_ToM and II-order-RT (while children of the control group did not); moreover, they outperformed children of the control condition at posttest on Adv_ToM, but not on II-order-RT. The benefits of both ToM training programs extended to metacognitive knowledge. Our findings throw light upon generative mechanisms of acquisition that explain the relation between II-order-RT and Adv_ToM, and between these mature ToM skills and metacognition.

This study explores the longitudinal association between Theory of Mind (ToM) and reading comprehension (RC) in middle childhood, focusing on three advanced ToM (AToM) components: social reasoning, reasoning about ambiguity and recognition of social norm transgressions. Over the course of a year, 112 nine‐year‐olds (61 girls, 51 boys; Mage = 9; 0 years, ±4 months at wave 1) were followed from Grade 3 to Grade 4 and assessed for AToM predictors of Grade‐4 RC. Findings show that only social reasoning predicts RC, independent of general intelligence and prior RC performance. In turn, RC did not predict any AToM component. These findings contribute to understanding cognitive development in educational contexts, emphasizing the significance of AToM, particularly social reasoning, in RC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examined the link between classroom ethnic diversity, cross‐ethnic friendships, and children's theory of mind. In total, 730 children in the United Kingdom (54.7% girls, 51.5% White) aged 8 to 13 years completed measures of theory of mind in 2019/2020. Controlling for verbal ability, executive function, peer social preference, and teacher‐reported demographic characteristics, greater classroom ethnic diversity provided opportunities for cross‐ethnic friendships, and children with cross‐ethnic friendships performed better than peers without cross‐ethnic friendships on theory of mind. These results extend accounts of intergroup contact by using direct assessments of children's theory of mind and advance social accounts of theory of mind by demonstrating how experiences outside the family are linked with theory of mind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theoretical accounts and experimental data on young children have shown that executive functions (EFs) are predicted by experiential factors. However, studies on school-aged children are rare. The present study has addressed this gap using a short-term cross-lagged longitudinal design focusing on the relationship between working memory (WM), conflict inhibition (CI), and peer acceptance (PA) and rejection (PR) in middle childhood. 245 children, aged 8 to 12 years at Time 1 (M = 10.03 years, SD = 1.21 years), were tested three times over 1 year. SEM showed that (a) PA at Times 1 and 2 positively predicted WM at Times 2 and 3 and (b) PR at Time 1 negatively predicted CI at Time 2. Our findings are in line with the view that EFs are significantly affected by children's social life at school and are interpreted in light of the regulatory depletion model and of the socio-constructivist models.

Background: Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS) was traditionally described as a disease restricted to the motor system. However, recent findings suggested that it also affects cognition, especially executive functions, social cognition, language and pragmatics. A relevant issue in current research is thus the description of the cognitive phenotype of ALS and the identification of the most vulnerable aspects. Aims: The focus was on a communicative phenomenon placed at the crossroads of pragmatic and other cognitive domains, namely humour, which till now has been poorly explored in ALS. The first aim was to investigate whether ALS is associated with impairments in understanding and appreciating jokes. The second aim was to explore the predictors of humour comprehension and appreciation in patients, to confirm the involvement of pragmatic skills and to explore the role of other cognitive and clinical aspects. Methods & Procedures: A total of 30 non-demented patients with ALS and 27 controls were assessed with a task of verbal humour comprehension and appreciation, including two types of jokes: phonological and mental. We also administered a battery of pragmatic and other language tasks, and cognitive and socio-cognitive tasks. Mixed-effects models were used to test differences in the humour task between the two groups. Multiple regressions determined the best predictors of humour comprehension and appreciation in patients. Outcomes & Results: Patients obtained lower comprehension accuracy scores than controls in the humour task, independently of the type of joke. Conversely, patients and controls did not differ in joke appreciation and both rated mental jokes as funnier than the phonological ones. Patients' comprehension accuracy was predicted by pragmatic skills and ALS severity, whereas appreciation was predicted by several clinical variables and, to a smaller extent, by language skills. Conclusions & Implications: The findings suggest that humour is a very vulnerable aspect in ALS, and that impairment in humour comprehension might be part of the larger cognitive impairment, being linked to pragmatic impairment. Clinical variables were also important, especially in relation to humour appreciation. More generally, these data speak in favour of pragmatics as a relevant aspect to sketch the cognitive phenotype of ALS. On the practical level, these findings point to the need of supporting communication at large, not only motor-related aspects such as dysarthria but also social--pragmatic aspects such as understanding jokes, to increase well-being in ALS.

We investigated the association between individual differences in metaphor understanding and Theory of Mind (ToM) in typically developing children. We distinguished between two types of metaphors and created a Physical and Mental Metaphors task, echoing a similar distinction for ToM. Nine-year-olds scored lower than older age-groups in ToM as well as in the interpretation of mental, but not physical, metaphors. Moreover, nine-year-olds (but not older children) who are better in ToM are also better in interpreting mental, but not physical, metaphors. This suggests that the link between metaphor and ToM is stronger when metaphorical interpretation involves mental aspects, and it is more evident in early rather than later childhood.

Recent evidence showed that it is possible to help children's Theory of Mind (ToM) development during preschool and middle childhood. This study aimed to promote advanced mentalizing skills in children attending Year 2 of primary school through a ToM training programme based on narratives followed by multiple-choice questions and conversations about mental states. Participants were 49 children, aged between 7 and 8 years (M[subscript age] = 7.6 years; SD = 3.98 months), assigned to the experimental (27 children, 11 boys) or to the control condition (22 children, 7 boys). The two groups were matched at pretest for age, ToM, socio-economic background, reading comprehension, and executive functioning. The classroom-training programme was delivered by an experimenter in four sessions (each 50 min long). The ToM group improved ToM skills significantly more than the control group both in the practiced and in the transfer ToM task. Theoretical and practical implications of our findings are discussed.

While there is considerable evidence that children's early ability to understand others' mental states, called "theory of mind," is shaped by family experiences, it remains unclear whether children's social interactions at school influence theory of mind (ToM) beyond early childhood. We tested whether the mean level ("quantity") and/or the diversity ("variety") of peers' ToM influenced children's own ToM. We also examined whether peer effects on ToM were independent of possible confounding variables (e.g., verbal ability, social isolation) and comparable across children with different initial levels of ToM and social status. Four hundred fifty-four 8–12-year-old children completed assessments of ToM and peer and friendship nominations at baseline and (for ToM only) 1 year later. The variety (but not the quantity) of peers' ToM predicted the development of children's ToM over and above control variables. The magnitude of the peer effect was comparable across different levels of children's ToM and between children indexed as socially isolated and those who were not. These findings fit with sociocultural models and highlight the importance of the school environment in the development of ToM. Public Significance Statement: This study delves into the critical question of whether peers influence the development of "theory of mind" defined as children's ability to understand others' mental states such as desires, beliefs, and emotions. Involving 454 children aged 8–12, the research reveals that belonging to a classroom with greater heterogeneity in theory of mind performance predicts the advancement of children's own theory of mind, irrespective of other factors such as verbal ability and social isolation. These findings underscore the importance of the school environment in fostering the development of fundamental social cognitive skills, with significant implications for enhancing children's educational experiences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Translating research findings into practice should be one of the objectives of developmental psychology. Recently, research demonstrated the existence of individual differences in theory of mind (ToM) during middle childhood that are crucial for children's academic and social adjustment. Aims: This study aims to transfer the results of recent experimental studies on ToM interventions into primary-school teachers' practices. It examines whether a ToM training programme, based on conversations about mental states, can be effective under real-world school conditions and if it can be translated in such a way that it becomes suitable for primary-school teachers. Sample: Seventy-two 8- to 9-year-old children took part in the study. A total of four classes were recruited and randomly assigned to the experimental (34 children, 18 boys) or to the control condition (38 children, 18 boys). Methods: The ToM group and the control group were matched at pre-test for age, ToM, socio-economic background, verbal ability, working memory, and planning. Teachers were trained in four teacher-training sessions; the classroom-training programme was delivered by teachers in four sessions (each 50 min long). Children were assessed before the intervention, after the end of the programme, and 2 months later. Results: The ToM group improved ToM skills significantly more than the control group both in the short and in the long term. Conclusions: Teachers can successfully promote their pupils' ToM development during their regular teaching hours. Results are discussed in the light of the importance of ToM promotion for children's school adjustment.

Although long-term memory and Theory of Mind (ToM) are closely related across the whole lifespan, little is known about the relationship between ToM and semantic memory. Clinical studies have documented the co-occurrence of ToM impairments and semantic memory abnormalities in individuals with autism or semantic dementia. However, to date, no study has directly investigated the existence of a relationship between ToM and semantic memory in the typical population. We addressed this gap on a sample of 103 healthy adults (M age = 22.96 years; age range = 19–35 years). Participants completed a classical false memory task tapping on semantic processes, the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) task, and two ToM tasks, the Triangles and the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task. They also completed the vocabulary scale from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale. Results showed that participants' semantic performance in the DRM task was significantly related to that in the Triangles task. Specifically, the higher participants' ToM in the Triangles task, the higher participants' reliance on semantic memory while making false memories in the DRM task. Our findings are consistent with the Fuzzy Trace Theory and the Weak Central Coherence account and suggest that a (partially) common cognitive process responsible for global versus detailed-focus information processing could underlie these two abilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigated the relation between theory of mind (ToM) and metamemory knowledge using a training methodology. Sixty-two 4- to 5-year-old children were recruited and randomly assigned to one of two training conditions: A first-order false belief (ToM) and a control condition. Intervention and control groups were equivalent at pretest for age, parents' education, verbal ability, inhibition, and ToM. Results showed that after the intervention children in the ToM group improved in their first-order false belief understanding significantly more than children in the control condition. Crucially, the positive effect of the ToM intervention was stable over 2 months and generalized to more complex ToM tasks and metamemory.

Theory of mind (ToM) refers to humans' ability to recognize the existence of mental states, such as beliefs, emotions, and desires. The literature on ToM in aging and on the relationship between ToM and other cognitive functions, like executive functions, is not homogenous. The aim of the present study was to explore the course of ToM and to investigate the role of working memory, inhibition, and language on the possible age differences in ToM. To address these issues, we examined ToM using the Strange Stories task and executive function task in three age groups. Results showed that young adults outperform both old groups on the ToM stories. This difference remains significant also when controlling for working memory and inhibitory control. Our findings suggest a specific impairment in inferring mental states starting from 60 years of age that seems to be independent of changes in executive functions. (Contains 3 tables and 1 figure.)