Search

Attention, the mechanism that prioritizes stimuli in the environment for further processing, plays an important role in behavioral choice. In the present study, we investigated the automatic orienting of attention to cues that signal reward. Such attentional capture occurs despite negative consequences, and we investigated whether this counterproductive and reflexive behavior would persist following outcome devaluation. Thirsty participants completed a visual search task in which the color of a distractor stimulus in the search display signaled whether participants would earn water or potato chips for making a rapid eye movement to a diamond target, but looking at the colored distractor was punished by omission of the signaled reward. Nevertheless, participants looked at the water-signaling distractor more frequently than the chip-signaling distractor. Half the participants then drank water ad libitum before continuing with the visual search task. Although the water was now significantly less desirable for half of the participants, there was no difference between groups in the tendency for the water-signaling distractor to capture attention. These findings suggest that once established, counterproductive attentional bias to signals of reward persists even when those outcomes are no longer valuable. This suggests a "habit-like" attentional mechanism that prioritizes reward stimuli in the environment for further action, regardless of whether those stimuli are aligned with current goals or currently desired.

When making decisions, we are often forced to choosebetween something safe we have chosen before, andsomething unknown to us that is inherently risky, but mayprovide a better long-term outcome. This problem is known asthe Exploitation-Exploration (EE) Trade-Off. Most previousstudies on the EE Trade-Off have relied on response data,leading to some ambiguity over whether uncertainty leads totrue exploratory behavior, or whether the pattern ofresponding simply reflects a simpler ratio choice rule (such asthe Generalized Matching Law (Baum, 1974; Herrnstein,1961)). Here, we argue that the study of this issue can beenriched by measuring changes in attention (via eye-gaze),with the potential to disambiguate these two accounts. Wefind that when moving from certainty into uncertainty, theoverall level of attention to stimuli in the task increases; afinding we argue is outside of the scope of ratio choice rules.

Before we can make any choice, we must gather information from the environment about what our options are. This information-gathering process is critically mediated by attention, and our attention is, in turn, shaped by our previous experiences with—and learning about—stimuli and their consequences. In this review, we highlight studies demonstrating a rapid and automatic influence of reward learning on attentional capture and argue that these findings provide a human analog of sign-tracking behavior observed in nonhuman animals—wherein signals of reward gain incentive salience and become attractive targets for attention (and overt behavior) in their own right. We then consider the implications of this idea for understanding the drivers of cue-controlled behavior, with focus on addiction as a case in which choices with regard to reward-related stimuli can become injurious to health. We argue that motivated behavior in general—and addiction in particular—can be understood within a "biased competition" framework: Different options and outcomes compete for attentional priority as a function of top–down goals, bottom–up salience, and prior experience, and the winner of this competition becomes the target for subsequent outcome-directed and flexible behavior. Finally, we outline the implications of the biased-competition framework for cognitive, behavioral, and socioeconomic interventions for addiction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within the domain of associative learning, there is substantial evidence that people (and other animals) select among environmental cues on the basis of their reinforcement history. Specifically, people preferentially attend to, and learn about, cueing stimuli that have previously predicted events of consequence (a predictiveness bias). By contrast, relatively little is known about whether people prioritize some (to-be-predicted) outcome events over others on the basis of their past experience with those outcomes (a predictability bias). The present experiments assessed whether the prior predictability of a stimulus results in a learning bias in a contingency learning task, as such effects are not anticipated by formal models of associative learning. Previously unpredictable stimuli were less readily learned about than previously predictable stimuli. This pattern is unlikely to reflect the use of strategic search processes or blocking of learning by the context. Instead we argue that our findings are most consistent with the operation of a biased learning mechanism.

Attentional prioritisation of stimuli in the environment plays an important role in overt choice. Previous research shows that prioritisation is influenced by the magnitude of paired rewards, in that stimuli signalling high-value rewards are more likely to capture attention than stimuli signalling low-value rewards; and this attentional bias has been proposed to play a role in addictive and compulsive behaviours. A separate line of research has shown that win-related sensory cues can bias overt choices. However, the role that these cues play in attentional selection is yet to be investigated. Participants in this study completed a visual search task in which they responded to a target shape in order to earn reward. The colour of a distractor signalled the magnitude of reward and type of feedback on each trial. Participants were slower to respond to the target when the distractor signalled high reward compared to when the distractor signalled low reward, suggesting that the high-reward distractors had increased attentional priority. Critically, the magnitude of this reward-related attentional bias was further increased for a high-reward distractor with post-trial feedback accompanied by win-related sensory cues. Participants also demonstrated an overt choice preference for the distractor that was associated with win-related sensory cues. These findings demonstrate that stimuli paired with win-related sensory cues are prioritised by the attention system over stimuli with equivalent physical salience and learned value. This attentional prioritisation may have downstream implications for overt choices, especially in gambling contexts where win-related sensory cues are common. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Attentional theories of associative learning and categorization propose that learning about the predictiveness of a stimulus influences the amount of attention that is paid to that stimulus. Three experiments tested this idea by looking at the extent to which stimuli that had previously been experienced as predictive or nonpredictive in a categorization task were able to capture attention in a dot probe task. Consistent with certain attentional theories of learning, responses to the dot probe were faster when it appeared in a location cued by a predictive stimulus compared to a location cued by a nonpredictive stimulus. This result was obtained only with short (250-ms or 350-ms) but not long (1,000-ms) delays between onset of the stimuli and the dot probe, suggesting that the observed spatial cuing effect reflects the operation of a relatively rapid, automatic process. These findings are consistent with the approach to the relationship between attention and learning taken by the class of models exemplified by Mackintosh's (1975) theory.

We propose that biases in attitude and stereotype formation might arise as a result of learned differences in the extent to which social groups have previously been predictive of behavioral or physical properties. Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate that differences in the experienced predictiveness of groups with respect to evaluatively neutral information influence the extent to which participants later form attitudes and stereotypes about those groups. In contrast, Experiment 3 shows no influence of predictiveness when using a procedure designed to emphasize the use of higher level reasoning processes, a finding consistent with the idea that the root of the predictiveness bias is not in reasoning. Experiments 4 and 5 demonstrate that the predictiveness bias in formation of group beliefs does not depend on participants making global evaluations of groups. These results are discussed in relation to the associative mechanisms proposed by Mackintosh (1975) to explain similar phenomena in animal conditioning and associative learning. (Contains 1 footnote, 6 tables, and 6 figures.)