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Despite their importance in the global economy, the complex competitive dynamics of natural resource industries and their implications for business performance remain largely understudied in strategic management. This article identifies major traits that are highly relevant in natural resource industries, including the standardized nature of their products, their emphasis on process-based innovations, the presence of dual physical and financial derivative markets, and the importance of nonmarket forces that affect the creation and appropriation of rents from natural resources. We propose a general framework that guides our observations, and we discuss research opportunities for the study of firm strategy in natural resource industries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I assess how alternative organizational forms affect the ability of multiple actors to appropriate economic rents in activities expected to create social value—defined as broad social benefits to a given population (including more vulnerable groups) minus their associated provision costs. I simultaneously examine three stylized forms: public bureaucracy, involving both public sponsorship and public management; public–private partnerships, with a mix of public sponsorship and private management; and social enterprise, with both private management and sponsorship from impact-oriented investors. Although the extant literature has underscored a supply-side hazard emerging when actors try to appropriate rents by economizing on noncontractible social dimensions, I also examine the implications of a demand-side tradeoff emerging when providers are tempted to focus on more profitable customer segments and exclude more vulnerable populations. In my framework, distinct organizational forms change the managerial incentives to provide inclusive, high-quality social services based on three main factors: the relative attractiveness of beneficiary segments, their cost structure, and the extent of fixed costs to implement and operate services. I thus offer a testable theory of organizational alignment, identifying the comparative merits of each form based on how they incentivize public and private actors to create and appropriate social value. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Counterfactual assessment techniques involving treated and control groups, such as randomized control trials, might be used in outcome-based contracts to avoid rewarding or sanctioning service providers for social outcomes that they did not cause. However, few outcome-based contracts adopt payment rules based on counterfactual assessment techniques. Potential explanations are that these techniques are complex and involve substantial transaction costs. In this paper, we develop a theoretical formal model that integrates the literatures of incentives and policy evaluation to propose the following alternative explanation: counterfactual techniques may lead to counterproductive incentive effects if they reduce the likelihood of payment even if project managers exert sufficient effort to promote the expected interventions. Our model shows that counterfactual assessment may undermine effort when the number of treated subjects is small and there is limited investment per treated subject. Our formal model also suggests that the increased experience of the contract sponsors may inhibit the adoption of counterfactual assessment. Simulations and descriptive evidence from a unique database of 350 outcome-based contracts designed or initiated throughout the world and from linear probability models are aligned with our predictions. By offering additional explanations on why counterfactual assessment methods are not widespread in outcome-based contracts and by identifying the boundary conditions under which these methods are used in incentive contracts, this work informs the literature on cross-sector outcome-based contracts and illustrates the use of formal models to develop novel theories in public administration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To purchase or authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2007.00748.x Byline: Sergio G. Lazzarini (1), Danny P. Claro (1), Luiz F. Mesquita (2) Abstract: abstract Previous research has portrayed buyer-supplier and supplier-supplier alliances as important mechanisms to foster learning and exchange efficiencies. Controversy remains, however, as to how these alliances interact. While some propose they reinforce one another (e.g. learning in horizontal ties generates positive spillovers to vertical ties), others propose a negative interplay (e.g. when increasing vertical-tie intensity, suppliers may weaken horizontal ties to avoid retaliation from buyers who wish to preserve bargaining power). We empirically test these competing views using survey data from the Brazilian auto-parts industry. In an attempt at reconciliation, we propose that the positive or negative interaction between vertical and horizontal alliances depends on the level of technological uncertainty of goods exchanged. Vertical ties seem to inhibit horizontal ties when technological uncertainty is low; when technological uncertainty is higher, vertical and horizontal ties do not seem to have any meaningful form of interaction. We discuss implications for theory and practice. Author Affiliation: (1)Ibmec Sao Paulo; (2)Arizona State University Article note: Sergio G. Lazzarini, Associate Professor of Organization and Strategy, Ibmec Sao Paulo, R. Quata 300, Sao Paulo, SP Brazil 04546-042 (SergioGL1@isp.edu.br).

A study was conducted among small to medium sized enterprises in environments of weak infrastructure and institutions regarding the way to help them achieve more collective efficiencies and access to global markets.

Data from technology licensing contracts between Brazilian seed companies and the Brazilian Federal Agricultural Research Organization is used to examine the survival of contractual relationships.

This is a study of financial exchanges as regulated in the United States and of the industry as is self-regulated and with weak governmental intervention as in Brazil. The authors believe governments should focus on mitigating failures of self-regulation rather than placing constraints on financial innovations.