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Motivation: In 2020, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) was merged with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) as the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO). This policy move strengthens the trend to "securitize" development, whereby the provision of aid is motivated by national security concerns. Purpose: Many researchers have raised concerns about the securitization of aid and its consequences for development, but little research has examined its impact on aid‐recipient countries. Approach and Methods: This study evaluates 144 securitized aid projects implemented by DFID between 2000 and 2018 in Kenya, Nigeria and South Sudan, using the Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD) evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability. Findings: Our analysis finds that although most of the projects assessed were "relevant", i.e. formally aligned with recipient and funders' objectives, many struggled to achieve their intended outputs ("effectiveness"). Few of the projects had a positive "impact". We conclude that the securitized projects reviewed did not significantly strengthen the recipient countries' institutions, stability, or security but had some negative side effects. Policy Implications: In view of the merger of DFID with the FCO and the decision to reduce aid from 0.7% to 0.5% of Gross National Income (GNI), the UK is likely to draw an even closer connection between domestic security priorities and its development aid. In view of our empirical findings, the UK government needs to be more aware of the limitations of development interventions undertaken in the name of security and consider other means of enabling development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Motivation: How has the securitization of development affected the distribution of bilateral development aid by sector? Over the past two decades, academics and development NGOs have become increasingly concerned about the impact of the securitization of development. This debate has not, however, adequately addressed the impact of securitization on actual aid commitments to key sectors. If aid commitments are influenced by securitization this will have implications for the types of programmes funded by bilateral donors. Purpose: This article examines whether and how securitization has affected the distribution of UK, US, Danish and Swedish development aid by sector through investigating how conflict in aid‐recipient states—and the extent to which these states are perceived as a security threat—affect aid commitments to priority sectors; democratization and peace, conflict and security. Approach and Methods: A mixed‐methods approach analyses the policy discourse and aid commitments of the four bilateral donors. The former involves a systematic collection and analysis of development policy documents from the four donors over the last two decades. For the latter we use data from the OECD's Creditor Reporting System and the Uppsala University Conflict Data Programme, along with data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the Global Terrorism Database in a cross‐sectional time‐series regression analysis. Findings: The new data produced indicate that the securitization of development has had the most significant effect on aid commitments to states not affected by conflict and that the strategic importance of conflict‐affected states and the domestic character of donor governments both influence the strength of aid securitization. Policy Implications: Given the concerns regarding aid for security purposes and donors' policy discourse, bilateral donors should consider the need of current funding for conflict, peace and security programmes in states not affected by conflict and recognize the role of national security interests in decisions about the distribution of aid. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The securitization of development theme has developed substantially since the late 1990s within the critical global governance literature. To varying degrees, contributors to this debate argue that a liberal global governance complex links the discourses of security and development in what is described as the ‘security–development nexus’, such that the South is conceived as an international security threat. Whilst the security–development nexus itself has been thoroughly explored, the use of the central concept of liberalism has not. This paper addresses this issue through demarcating and critiquing the three readings of liberalism relevant to the securitization of development debate. Identifying and elucidating the three distinct strands of liberalism enable this paper to identify several weaknesses within the debate and propose a number of amendments. This includes proposing that the liberal discourse of global governance reflects complexity rather than consensus and that the centrality of ‘liberalism’ is at the expense of a robust investigation into how the structural power of global capitalism underpins the security–development nexus. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]