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Despite being two-thirds the creation of the flashy dramatist whom scholars used to call the 'Wakefield Master,' (1) the Towneley Judgment pageant has attracted little study. (2) A partial recycling [...]

Employing Luther's two strategies paradigm as an overarching heuristic for interpreting his theology proves fruitful for understanding several apparent contradictions or paradoxes in his thought. Just as it has proven [...]

This article discusses various arguments for and against treating equality as a fundamental norm in law and political philosophy, combining prior arguments to the effect that equality is essentially an empty idea with arguments that treat it as a non-empty but mistaken value that should be rejected. After concluding that most of the arguments for treating equality as a fundamental value fall victim to one or both of these arguments, it considers more closely arguments made by philosophers such as Ronald Dworkin and Thomas Nagel that base a duty of promoting equality on the fact that governments impose a legal order on persons without their consent. It concludes that these arguments are mistaken: if the legal order imposed by government is justified then imposing it is not wrongful and generates no duty of equal treatment, while if that order is not justified no requirement of equality of treatment would cure the lack of justification. It concludes that equality should not be a value in law or political theory, but in some cases other considerations (such as alleviating poverty and distress, promoting accuracy and substantive justice, avoiding arbitrariness, and other values) may justify particular rules that are sometimes mistakenly thought to be based on equality. DOI: 10.1080/00201741003784648

This article explores the traditional basis of modern human rights doctrines and exposes some of the systemic shortcomings. It then posits that a number of these problems are advanced via integrating some developments in the philosophy of science and substantive scientific research into legal philosophy. This article argues that supervening holism grounded in quantum mechanics provides an alternative basis to human rights by positing an ontological construct that is congruous with many of the wisdom traditions practiced around the world. Such a foundation exposes a rational imperative for universal human rights and hence appeals to legal pragmatists. KEYWORDS: Holism, human rights, legal theory, quantum mechanics, perennial philosophy DOI: 10.1080/02604020903080699