Search

On November 30,2022, OpenAI released an AI based chatbot called ChatGPT (Generative Pre-trained Transformer). This Al system uses natural language processing (NLP) techniques to generate written text by learning the patterns and structures of natural language. ChatGPT is a versatile chatbot with the ability to write speeches, news articles, and essays either wholly or partially. Some users acknowledge ChatGPT as a co-author of the generated text, while others only acknowledge its use in writing the document. In fact, this issue became so pressing in acade# nia that Springer Nature, the world's largest academic publisher, announced that software like ChatGPT cannot be credited as an author in papers published in its thousands of journals. However, the question of authorship when working with text generator Chatbots remains an open issue. Following the release of ChatGPT other Chatbots, such as Google's Bard and AutoGPT have emerged. It is now clear that these Chatbots are here to stay, and so the issue of co-authorship and IP rights in the final products of these Chatbots became an important legal question. Can ChatGTP and the like be your co-author or whether it is just a tool that assists in writing? This Article further discusses the possibility of granting algorithms with a separated legal personhood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The seminal book Nudge by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein demonstrates that policy makers can prod behavioral changes. A nudge is 'any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people's behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives.' This type of strategy, and the notion of libertarian paternalism at its base, prompted discussions and objections. Academic literature tends to focus on the positive potential of nudges and neglects to address libertarian paternalism that does not promote the welfare of individuals and third parties, but rather infringes on it--a concept this Article refers to as 'evil nudges.' This kind of choice architecture, which negatively influences individual behavior, raises a variety of legal questions and challenges that policy makers must address; yet it remains under-conceptualized. Should the law recognize liability for evil nudges that result in bad faith influence? This Article aims to answer this question. It suggests the inclusion of nudges within tort law, arguing that nudges can and should be subject to third-party liability. The inclusion of evil nudges within tort law can be explored broadly, but this Article focuses on one particular case study: the liability of online intermediaries for speech torts caused by evil nudges. This case study provides a natural starting point for considering liability for evil nudges, as designing effective nudges is much easier in a technologically connected environment than in a brick-and-mortar world. This Article demonstrates that online intermediaries are not just passive middlemen. They influence decisions through website design and promote behavioral change among internet users. The use of big data, the use of artificial intelligence, and the growing use of Internet of Things (IoT) technologies enables unprecedented hyper influence. Drawing on network theory, psychology, marketing, and information systems, this Article further demonstrates how nudges influence the process of information diffusion in digital networks. It shows that by nudging, intermediaries can amplify the severity of speech-related harm. This Article introduces an innovative taxonomy of nudges that online intermediaries utilize, and explains how nudges influence, change internet users' interactions, and form social relations. Afterwards, it examines case law and normative considerations regarding the liability of intermediaries for choice architecture. It argues that the law should respond to 'evil nudges,' and it proposes nuanced differential guidelines for deciding cases of intermediary liability. It does so while accounting for basic principles of tort law, as well as freedom of speech, reputation, fairness, efficiency, and the importance of promoting innovation., TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION 4 II. NUDGES AND NETWORKS: BETWEEN PSYCHOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY 8 A. Why Nudge? 8 B. Intermediaries, Social Contexts, and Online Nudges 11 1. On Context [...]

Imagine that you are at home, when suddenly a drone peers into your window, takes a picture of your wardrobe, familiarizes itself with your fashion preferences, or takes a picture of your kitchen table during dinner. The drone immediately transfers the picture to the commercial platform that operates it, such as Amazon or Uber. The platform in turn targets you with personalized advertisements for merchandise or food, in real time, customized to your lifestyle, at the time when you are most susceptible, manipulating you to make a purchase. How should the law react to this? And what if a drone were to collect information on private individuals in public using sophisticated cameras, sensors and facial recognition software? What if the platform that operates drones were to collect and use information on consumers and third parties? Should the law limit such invasions of privacy? The use of drones is growing rapidly and their technological capabilities are growing exponentially. Drones differ from existing surveillance technology. Their low cost and their ability to fly, equipped with high-resolution cameras, recording systems and sensors, enable them to take in information over longer periods of time and much more effectively than the human eye or ear. Such capabilities are liable to give rise to pervasive surveillance of a kind never known before. Making matters worse, invasion of privacy has serious consequences. By using a network of drone fleets at the service of a single commercial platform, such surveillance could allow the platform to effectively aggregate and analyze tremendous amounts of high-quality information on the parties under surveillance, gain valuable insight on consumers and influence their decisions to order merchandise or food. While much of the scholarship on drone surveillance and invasion of privacy focuses on governmental use and the Fourth Amendment, this Article focuses on the use of drones by private entities engaged in commercial deliveries. Drone deliveries are relatively new; only a few companies have recently overcome the regulatory obstacles to receive Federal Aviation Administration approval for U.S. deliveries. COVID-19 has pushed companies to utilize drones for deliveries and has increased demand for it. Since drones are unmanned, they can deliver food and other products without close contact with the recipient. Such delivery can be safer, faster, cheaper and more efficient than traditional emissaries; yet alongside the benefits, the use of delivery drones can lead to invasion of privacy and can result in abuse of personal data for manipulation, raising significant challenges. This Article addresses the challenges drones pose to privacy and proposes solutions. It aims to contribute to the literature in several ways. First, it outlines a roadmap of the different types of invasion of privacy and harm that can be caused by drones. It demonstrates that the physical boundaries of invasion no longer matter in light of advanced technology. In identifying types of invasion and harm, this Article takes the first step towards creating a legal policy for delivery drones. Second, this Article addresses existing law, arguing that currently there is a gap between the capacity of drones to observe and aggregate personal information and privacy protections under U.S. law. Third, it proposes solutions under privacy law, and even a duty of loyalty for platforms that operate drones. Finally, this Article accounts for possible First Amendment objections to the proposed solutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

COVID-19 started in December 2019 in China and spread rapidly and globally. This virus led to a public health emergency of international concern as a threat to the public's health and safety. The speed of virus infections depended on various aspects of an individual's social network position. Individuals with more friends, or those who were more central in the network, caught the virus sooner. In the beginning of the outbreak, governments thought that tracking human networks and collecting information on the movements of individuals would allow governments to utilize the information for mitigating the spread of the virus. They believed that mass surveillance would help health authorities identify the contacts an infected person had and warn such contacts, thus reducing the likelihood for them to infect others. By gaining such data, governments believed they could focus their efforts to block the spread of the virus and even predict where the next cluster of infections would emerge. In general, information and data-driven models have the potential to promote health. Data is knowledge; however, knowledge is power that can grant governments control over citizens, leading to a slippery slope that could creep beyond health considerations and undermine the infrastructure of civil rights. The result could be constant surveillance instead of privacy, self-censorship instead of freedom of expression, suspicion instead of trust, and the rise of the surveillance state instead of democracy. This Article outlines a taxonomy of surveillance data-driven practices that were used to combat the virus. It describes the potential benefits of such models while addressing the dangers created by such mass surveillance. Additionally, this Article demonstrates that surveillance practices can compromise privacy, infringe on free expression and equality without safeguards or due process, and lead to abuse of power. Finally, it establishes how such practices can erode democracy and creep beyond combating a virus. This Article argues that even in times of crisis, we can have both health and human rights. It warns against surveillance creep and advocates for a privacy-by-design approach in such models, including anonymization of personal information. This Article further proposes safeguards including transparency, impact assessments of data protections and algorithms, fiduciary duties, oversight, and due process. Finally, this Article addresses practices of long-term invasive surveillance that should be ruled out altogether and rejected at all costs. COVID-19 is a test case that demonstrates the consequences of mass surveillance without warrants or adequate regulatory prerequisites, and the misuse of personal data. Thus, this Article warns that the creep of mass surveillance can lead to the rise of the surveillance state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent technological developments allow Internet users to disseminate ideas to a large audience. These technological advances empower individuals and promote important social objectives. Howeverj they also create a setting for speech-related torts, harm, and abuse. One legal path to deal with online defamation turns to the liability of online content providers who facilitate the harmful exchanges. The possibility of bringing them to remove defamatory content and collecting damages from them attracted a great deal of attention in scholarly work, court decisions, and regulations. Different countries established different legal regimes. The United States allows an extensive shield--an overall immunity, as it exempts the liability of content providers in speech torts. This policy is not adopted worldwide. The E. U. directive outlines a "notice- and-takedown" safe haven. Other countries, such as Canada, use common tort law practices. This Article criticizes all of these policy models for being either over or under inclusive. This Article makes the case for a context-specific regulatory regime. It identifies specific characteristics of different content providers with their own unique settings, which call for nuanced legal rules that shall provide an optimal liability regime. To that end, the Article sets forth an innovative taxonomy: it relies on sociological studies premised on net-work theory and analysis, which is neutral to technological advances. This framework distinguishes between different technological settings based on the strength of social ties formed in each context. The Article explains that the strength of such ties influences the social context of online interactions and flow of information. The strength of ties is the best tool for designing different liability regimes; such ties serve as a proxy for the severity of harm that defamatory online speech might cause, and the social norms that might mitigate or exacerbate speech-related harm. The proposed taxonomy makes it possible to apply a sociological analysis to legal policy and to outline modular rules for content providers' liability at every juncture. This Article does so while taking into account basic principles of tort law, as well as freedom of speech, reputationfairness, efficiencyand the importance of promoting innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]