Search

Cognitive appraisal theory predicts that emotions affect participation decisions around risky collective action. However, little existing research has attempted to parse out the mechanisms by which this process occurs. We build a global game of regime change and discuss the effects that fear may have on participation through pessimism about the state of the world, other players’ willingness to participate, and risk aversion. We test the behavioral effects of fear in this game by conducting 32 sessions of an experiment in two labs where participants are randomly assigned to an emotion induction procedure. In some rounds of the game, potential mechanisms are shut down to identify their contribution to the overall effect of fear. Our results show that in this context, fear does not affect willingness to participate. This finding highlights the importance of context, including integral versus incidental emotions and the size of the stakes, in shaping effect of emotions on behavior.

State repression and protest are common in modern authoritarian and hybrid regimes, yet individual responses to these events are not well understood. This article draws on unique panel data from the months spanning Zimbabwe’s 2018 election, which we view as a moment of uncertainty for most Zimbabwean citizens. Using a difference-in-difference estimator, we estimate change in individual protest intentions following exposure to repression and dissent and we assess three individual-level mechanisms hypothesized to drive responses. We find evidence that exposure to local repression and dissent are mobilizing among opposition supporters and nonpartisans. Analysis of potential mechanisms suggests that the effects of exposure to dissent may be driven by information updating, whereas relational and emotional mechanisms seem to drive backlash against repression, despite increased perceptions of risk. We find no evidence of counter-mobilization by ruling party supporters, and little effect of exposure to contentious events over social media.

How does exposure to criminal violence shape attitudes towards justice and the rule of law? Citizens care about crime prevention and procedural legality, yet they also value punishing perpetrators for the harm they have done. We argue that anger induced by exposure to criminal violence increases the demand for retribution and harsh punishments, even at the expense of the rule of law. We test this theory using one observational and two experimental studies from an original survey of 1,200 individuals in Western Mexico, a region affected by organized criminal violence and vigilantism. First, we first show that exposure to violence is correlated with increased anger and support for punitive justice, including vigilante actions. Second, across our two experiments, we show that citizens are more supportive of harsh punishments and place less value on their legality in response to morally outrageous crimes. Third, we find that the innocence of the victim, rather than the severity of the crime, is what triggers outrage and punitiveness. This suggests that citizens may support extreme levels of violence as long as they perceive that its targets are criminals. Finally, we show that outrageous forms of violence against civilians can lead individuals to prioritize harsh punishment regardless of its legality. When criminal actors target perceived innocents with common crimes like extortion, there is greater support for harsh, vigilante action. These patterns provide a bottom-up explanation for harsh justice.

Large numbers of people living under authoritarian governments participate in pro-opposition politics despite sometimes significant risks. Increasing amounts of this political participation are taking place and being organized online. Do emotions play a causal role in inducing pro-opposition participation in authoritarian regimes? Can emotions that mobilize participation be spread via social media? Through an experiment carried out by an opposition party in Zimbabwe, I test whether campaign appeals to opposition supporters’ emotions affect their level of political participation in online pro-opposition discussions. I find that across two different issue areas, randomly assigned anger appeals increase participation on average by 0.4 standard deviations more than enthusiasm appeals with the same informational content. In real terms, this represents between 30% and 170% more participation in the groups assigned to the anger appeals across four different measures of participation. There is little evidence that these effects are stronger in areas with less poverty or that have historically been affected by more violence, or when coupled with messages emphasizing personal power. These results suggest that anger appeals that highlight economic grievances can be an important force for mobilizing online political participation in repressive environments.

Purpose: The clinical utility of next-generation sequencing (NGS) in breast cancer has not been demonstrated. We hypothesized that we could perform NGS of a new biopsy from patients with metastatic triple-negative breast cancer (TNBC) in a clinically actionable timeframe.Experimental Design: We planned to enroll 40 patients onto a prospective study, Individualized Molecular Analyses Guide Efforts (IMAGE), to evaluate the feasibility of obtaining a new biopsy of a metastatic site, perform NGS (FoundationOne), and convene a molecular tumor board to formulate treatment recommendations within 28 days. We collected blood at baseline and at time of restaging to assess cell-free circulating plasma tumor DNA (ptDNA).Results: We enrolled 26 women with metastatic TNBC who had received ≥1 line of prior chemotherapy, and 20 (77%) underwent NGS of a metastatic site biopsy. Twelve (60%) evaluable patients received treatment recommendations within 28 days of consent. The study closed after 20 patients underwent NGS, based on protocol-specified interim futility analysis. Three patients went on to receive genomically directed therapies. Twenty-four of 26 patients had genetic alterations successfully detected in ptDNA. Among 5 patients, 4 mutations found in tumor tissues were not identified in blood, and 4 mutations found in blood were not found in corresponding tumors. In 9 patients, NGS of follow-up blood samples showed 100% concordance with baseline blood samples.Conclusions: This study demonstrates challenges of performing NGS on prospective tissue biopsies in patients with metastatic TNBC within 28 days, while also highlighting the potential use of blood as a more time-efficient and less invasive method of mutational assessment. Clin Cancer Res; 23(2); 379–86. ©2016 AACR.

There has been a proliferation of research with human participants in violent contexts over the past ten years. Adhering to commonly held ethical principles such as beneficence, justice, and respect for persons is particularly important and challenging in research on violence. This letter argues that practices around research ethics in violent contexts should be reported more transparently in research outputs, and should be seen as a subset of research methods. We offer practical suggestions and empirical evidence from both within and outside of political science around risk assessments, mitigating the risk of distress and negative psychological outcomes, informed consent, and monitoring the incidence of potential harms. An analysis of published research on violence involving human participants from 2008 to 2019 shows that only a small proportion of current publications include any mention of these important dimensions of research ethics.

Existing theories of democratic reversals emphasize that elites mount actions like coups when democracy is particularly threatening to their interests. However, existing theory has been largely silent on the role of elite social networks, which interact with economic incentives and may facilitate antidemocratic collective action. We develop a model where coups generate rents for elites and show that the effort an elite puts into a coup is increasing in their network centrality. We empirically explore the model using an original dataset of Haitian elite networks that we linked to firm-level data. We show that central families were more likely to be accused of participating in the 1991 coup against the democratic Aristide government. We then find that the retail prices of staple goods that are imported by such elites differentially increase during subsequent periods of nondemocracy. Our results suggest that elite social structure is an important factor in democratic reversals.

Reactions to acts of state-sponsored election violence and other forms of repression vary greatly across individuals. This article develops a theory that the psychological characteristic of self-efficacy moderates opposition supporters’ reactions to state-sponsored election violence. I use data from an original survey and in-depth qualitative interviews with opposition supporters in Zimbabwe to illustrate and test this theory. Self-efficacy is a strong predictor of intention to take action in support of the opposition after episodes of state-sponsored election violence and is related to the emotional reactions that opposition supporters have after violent events. Specifically, people who are higher in self-efficacy report that they would feel more anger relative to fear after episodes of state-sponsored election violence. The relationship between self-efficacy and persistence in pro-opposition action after violence is similar in magnitude to variables that the existing literature argues are the most important predictors of dissent in repressive environments, including strength of identification with the opposition and gender. These results provide empirical support for the assumption in many collective action theories that psychological characteristics create variation in dissent in repressive environments. Understanding how individual psychological differences can shape reactions to coercive violence may help explain why forms of repression like state-sponsored election violence have such unpredictable effects on subsequent pro-opposition mobilization.

Many authoritarian regimes use frightening acts of repression to suppress dissent. Theory from psychology suggests that emotions should affect how citizens perceive and process information about repression risk and ultimately whether or not they dissent. I test the effects of emotions on dissent in autocracy by running a lab-in-the-field experiment with 671 opposition supporters in Zimbabwe that randomly assigns some participants to an exercise that induces a mild state of fear, whereas others complete a neutral placebo. The fear treatment significantly reduces hypothetical and behavioral measures of dissent by substantively large amounts. It also increases pessimism about parameters that enter into the dissent decision as well as risk aversion. These results show that emotions interact in important ways with strategic considerations. Fear may be a powerful component of how unpopular autocrats exclude large portions of their populations from mobilizing for regime change.

In elections around the world, voters are influenced not only by positive offers of gifts and favors but also by the threat of negative sanctions for their individual electoral choices. Preelectoral entitlements such as jobs, assets, and welfare create expectations of future access that brokers can use as powerful negative inducements at the moment of the vote. We argue that in conditions where ballot secrecy makes it difficult to monitor vote choices, brokers are likely to target core supporters with both preelectoral entitlements and election-time threats. We refer to this counterintuitive logic as the “core voters’ curse.” We find evidence for this argument using an original household survey of 1,860 Hungarian citizens in 93 rural communities fielded shortly after the 2014 parliamentary election.

Cultivating cooperation with local populations is necessary for peacekeeping operations to effectively prevent and reduce violence. To accomplish their missions in complex foreign theaters of operation, peacekeepers must solicit information about local political actors, social networks, and violence. Under what conditions do local populations cooperate with United Nations peacekeepers? How does exposure to peacekeeping security activities, relief activities, or abuse – three of the primary ways that local communities experience peacekeepers – affect the likelihood that individuals cooperate with peacekeepers by providing information to them? Using an original survey of a random sample of residents of metropolitan Port-au-Prince, Haiti, we show that people who are exposed to security and relief activities by the United Nations peacekeeping operation, MINUSTAH, have more positive opinions of how effective they are, and are more willing to cooperate with peacekeepers by providing them with information. On the other hand, exposure to abuse dramatically undermines civilian opinions of how effective, benevolent, and abusive peacekeepers are but has a smaller effect on cooperation. These findings present an opportunity and challenge for peacekeepers: if public opinion and cooperation are responsive to peacekeeper policy, then peacekeepers must deliver services and prevent abuse in order to solicit the cooperation that is necessary for mission success.

Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework of the analysis. Definitional and conceptual issues related to the study of electoral clientelism are clarified, and a classification of clientelistic strategies that differentiates among strategies based on public versus private resources, and those structured as positive promises versus negative threats, is proposed. A theory is built that begins by conceptualizing the way that voters who are directly and indirectly exposed to different forms of clientelism perceive and react to it. Drawing on normative theories, it is conjectured that voters are likely to judge coercive strategies more severely than strategies premised on positive inducements. While candidates incur political audience costs from using various clientelistic strategies, they may attempt to reduce the severity of this constraint by sending voters signals about their personal attributes and their policy positions. The chapter develops theoretical expectations about the informational signals that may result from the use of different non-programmatic strategies for voters with certain policy preferences or characteristics. Finally, the chapter conceptualizes how these audience costs and resource constraints shape the choices that politicians make about the level and form of clientelism that they use. The normative reactions of voters and their likelihood of complying with the clientelistic exchanges shape the potential effectiveness of different strategies. It is also predicted that politicians’ abilities to employ different forms of clientelism are shaped by access to resources, including, most importantly, control of local flows of social policy through city halls.

Chapter 6 turns to the analysis of clientelistic strategies premised on economic coercion. In urban settings, the main brokers involved in coercive strategies are employers who threaten employees with a reduction in their wages or with economic layoffs. In rural settings, the main economic brokers are moneylenders, who threaten voters with the worsening of their ongoing economic exchanges. The chapter documents the existence of these coercive strategies using a combination of quantitative and qualitative analyses. The variation across localities in the incidence of such strategies is likely to be affected by economic conditions that increase the capacity of brokers to withstand efforts of some candidates to reduce their economic influence.

This study examines clientelistic politics in two post-communist countries, Hungary and Romania. Chapter 3 presents descriptive information on the recent evolution of party systems in both countries and the changes in patterns of political competition in recent elections. It examines the most significant policies that provide opportunities for clientelistic manipulation of state resources. In both countries, the main social policy programs that can be subjected to political manipulation are workfare programs. The chapter discusses the main political considerations leading to the adoption of workfare programs characterized by high discretion of mayors over the allocation of policy benefits. It also describes how a mixed methods research design was crafted to study behavior that candidates, brokers, and voters often prefer to hide.

Vote buying, the offer of particularistic rewards to voters in exchange for electoral support at the ballot box, is the form of clientelism that has been analyzed most extensively in previous studies. Chapter 7 documents the presence of this clientelistic strategy in East European elections. It documents important differences between vote buying and clientelistic strategies that politicize state resources relating to the types of brokers used in these exchanges, the goods offered to voters, and the identity of the voters targeted by these strategies. It is shown that the use of this strategy creates opportunities for candidates to send voters signals about their personal attributes and policy position, which lower the political audience costs incurred by candidates who use this strategy.

In many recent democracies, candidates compete for office using illegal strategies to influence voters. In Hungary and Romania, local actors including mayors and bureaucrats offer access to social policy benefits to voters who offer to support their preferred candidates, and they threaten others with the loss of a range of policy and private benefits for voting the “wrong” way. These quid pro quo exchanges are often called clientelism. How can politicians and their accomplices get away with such illegal campaigning in otherwise democratic, competitive elections? When do they rely on the worst forms of clientelism that involve threatening voters and manipulating public benefits? This book uses a mixed method approach to understand how illegal forms of campaigning including vote buying and electoral coercion persist in two democratic countries in the European Union. It argues that clientelistic strategies must be disaggregated based on whether they use public or private resources, and whether they involve positive promises or negative threats and coercion. The authors document that the type of clientelistic strategies that candidates and brokers use varies systematically across localities based on their underlying social coalitions, and also show that voters assess and sanction different forms of clientelism in different ways. Voters glean information about politicians’ personal characteristics and their policy preferences from the clientelistic strategies these candidates deploy. Most voters judge candidates who use clientelism harshly. So how does clientelism, including its most odious coercive forms, persist in democratic systems? This book suggests that politicians can get away with clientelism by using forms of it that are in line with the policy preferences of constituencies whose votes they need. Clientelistic and programmatic strategies are not as distinct as previous studies have argued.

Chapter 1 motivates the theoretical contribution of the book, situates it within the existing literature, and provides an executive summary of the remaining part of the book. It begins by presenting four examples of clientelistic strategies commonly encountered during elections. These examples illustrate the existence of significant variation among the brokers mediating between candidates and voters and among the strategies used by these brokers to incentivize voters. While existing studies do not differentiate among different forms of electoral clientelism, but only contrast clientelistic and programmatic targeting, this volume highlights how different forms of electoral clientelism carry different information about politicians’ programmatic priorities. The main object of this book is to characterize the variation among clientelistic strategies and to examine how voters evaluate candidates that pursue different illicit strategies.

Chapter 4 examines clientelistic strategies where political brokers deploy state resources—privileged access to policy resources or administrative favors—as positive promises of future access to incentivize electoral choices of voters. Drawing on ethnographic research, it examines the strategies by which these brokers (mayors or employees in the local administration) seek to establish norms of political reciprocity to voters, the activation of these norms of reciprocity during elections, and the strategies used by brokers to ensure that voters comply with their political promises and vote for the correct candidate. Using list experiments, the chapter documents the use of these strategies during recent elections and examines the variation across localities in the use of such strategies. Finally, the informational opportunities and constraints associated with the use of this clientelistic strategy are examined. Using survey-based experiments, the chapter shows that the use of clientelistic strategies premised on favors has the least negative impact on perceptions of candidates with voters who are happy with the existing distribution of social policy resources.

The foundational adenine base editors (for example, ABE7.10) enable programmable A•T to G•C point mutations but editing efficiencies can be low at challenging loci in primary human cells. Here we further evolve ABE7.10 using a library of adenosine deaminase variants to create ABE8s. At NGG protospacer adjacent motif (PAM) sites, ABE8s result in ~1.5× higher editing at protospacer positions A5-A7 and ~3.2× higher editing at positions A3-A4 and A8-A10 compared with ABE7.10. Non-NGG PAM variants have a ~4.2-fold overall higher on-target editing efficiency than ABE7.10. In human CD34

In elections around the world, large numbers of voters are influenced by promises or threats that are contingent on how they vote. Recently, the political science literature has made considerable progress in disaggregating clientelism along two dimensions: first, in recognizing the diversity of actors working as brokers, and second, in conceptualizing and disaggregating types of clientelism based on positive and negative inducements of different forms. In this review, we discuss recent findings explaining variation in the mix of clientelistic strategies across countries, regions, and individuals and identify a few areas for future progress, particularly in explaining variation in targeting of inducements by politicians on different types of voters.

Ecological instability and low resource use efficiencies are concerns for the long-term productivity of conventional cereal monoculture systems, particularly those threatened by projected climate change. Crop intensification, diversification, reduced tillage, and variable N management are among strategies proposed to mitigate and adapt to climate shifts in the inland Pacific Northwest (iPNW). Our objectives were to assess these strategies across iPNW agroecological zones and time for their impacts on (1) winter wheat (WW) (Triticum aestivum L.) productivity, (2) crop sequence productivity, and (3) N fertilizer use efficiency. Region-wide analysis indicated that WW yields increased with increasing annual precipitation, prior to maximizing at 520 mm yr−1 and subsequently declining when annual precipitation was not adjusted for available soil water holding capacity. While fallow periods were effective at mitigating low nitrogen (N) fertilization efficiencies under low precipitation, efficiencies declined as annual precipitation exceeded 500 mm yr−1. Variability in the response of WW yields to annual precipitation and N fertilization among locations and within sites supports precision N management implementation across the region. In years receiving

Ghana can be considered a relative success story in Africa. We cite six variables - peace and stability, democracy and governance, control of corruption, macroeconomic management, poverty reduction, and signs of an emerging social contract - to suggest the country’s admirable political and economic progress. The expected arrival of sizeable oil revenues beginning in 2011-13, however, threatens to undermine that progress. In fact, numerous studies have linked natural resources to negative outcomes such as conflict, authoritarianism, high corruption, economic instability, increased poverty, and the destruction of the social contract. The oil curse thus threatens the very outcomes that we consider signs of Ghana’s success. This paper draws lessons from the experiences of Norway, Botswana, Alaska, Chad, and Nigeria to consider Ghana’s policy options. One common characteristic of the successful models appears to be their ability to encourage an influential constituency with an interest in responsible resource management and the means to hold government accountable. The Alaska model in particular, which was designed explicitly to manufacture citizen oversight and contain oil-induced patronage, seems relevant to Ghana’s current predicament. We propose a modified version of Alaska’s dividend program. Direct cash distribution of oil revenues to citizens is a potentially powerful approach to protect and accelerate Ghana’s political and economic gains, and a way to strengthen the country’s social contract. We show why Ghana is an ideal country to take advantage of this option, and why the timing is fortuitous. We conclude by confronting some of the common objections to this approach and suggest that new technology such as biometric ID cards or private mobile phone networks could be utilized to implement the scheme.