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The article focuses on the historical issue surrounding the 1580s plans to transfer the Ecumenical Patriarch Jeremiah II Tranos’ seat to the Rus regions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Due to the changes in the structure of the Constantinople Patriarchate and the fact that the Rus lands were becoming increasingly dependent on the Moscow, Lithuanian and Polish principalities, such a plan allowed for a new context of relations between the Kyiv Metropolitanate and the Constantinople Patriarchate. The unification of the Eastern and Western Churches in the 15th century enabled popes to actively participate in the Kyiv Church’s life. At the end of the 16th century, the functioning of church institutions varied throughout the Christian world. The Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches were planning a missionary invasion of the East, while the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Kyiv Metropolitanate were becoming increasingly consumed by the institutional crises. The shared aspirations of the Greek Orthodox and Kyiv Churches in the revival of Byzantine Church ecclesiastical, cultural, and political traditions strengthened the institutional ties between the Kyiv Metropolitanate and the Patriarchate of Constantinople. They were defined at the end of the 16th century by the calendar reform and the prospect of establishing a patriarchate in the East Slavic lands, namely in the settlement of the Orthodox Prince Kostiantyn Vasyl Ostrozkyi. The claims of the Ruthenian-Ukrainians to a patriarchate in the Rus lands boosted the formation of the Moscow Patriarchate (1589).

The article describes the facts and examines the Polish-Lithuanian territo¬rial dispute of 1919-1920, which occurred during the time of the formation of independent states in Central and Eastern Europe following World War I. The parade of the newly pro¬claimed states of the Czechoslovak Republic, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the Kingdom of Hungary, the Western Ukrainian People's Republic, each of which had territorial claims against its neighbours, created a precedent for a series of frontier military actions. Hungar¬ian-Czechoslovak, Polish-German, Polish-Czechoslovak, Polish-Lithuanian, and Polish-Ukrainian territorial conflicts persisted until 1923, following the signing of the Armistice in 1918. The issue of a territorial dispute between the Second Polish Republic and the Republic of Lithuania over the city of Wilno (Vilnius) and the Vilnius area is explored through the per¬spective of those historical events. Military actions, including a Polish-inspired "insurrec¬tion," continued as a result of a reluctance to follow political agreements and ignore demar¬cation lines. The goal was to construct a federal state that would act as a deterrent to Russian imperial ambitions in Poland, Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine. Lithuania, on the other hand, was rather cautious of the idea of forming a state made up of the lands of "Poland-Lithuania-Belarus-Ukraine," even if the borders favoured the Second Polish Republic. Anticipating the dangers of assimilation and the refusal to accept Lithuania without Vilnius, the Lithuanian government seemed uncompromising in its dealings with Poles yet cordial with Russians. As a result, the Polish federalist project failed.

The article analyzes the polemical socio-religious thought in Ukraine after the Union of Brest and the Union of the Kyiv Metropolitanate with Rome, aimed at finding the lost Orthodox tradition and reviving the idea of “God’s protection” of the city of Kyiv in the Rus Orthodox intellectual tradition of the early 17th century. After-union period in Ukrainian realities is characterized as crisis in the sense of decline of religious life, Rus bourgeoisie and fraternal movement and deviation from the policy of support of the Orthodox princely families. The entire plan of church reform, cultural and national revival of the “Commonwealth of the Rus People” was undermined in its foundations. Therefore, the intellectual religious thought of the early 17th century took into account the memory of the “good old days”, when national (regional) identity based on the Orthodox tradition was searched. However, from the point of view of the continued existence of the Orthodox Church, the defeat was only partial, as Konstiantyn Ostrozkyi and his supporters among the nobility, clergy and burghers managed to preserve the Orthodox church structure. The Cossacks demanded a rethinking of this new reality by intellectuals of the post-Brest era and Ukrainian polemicists were forced to look for an independent base for their socio-religious thought. Completely accepting neither the specific Byzantine coverage of the principles of religious-ecclesiastical ethos, nor Catholic, nor Moscow with its self-confident dogmatism and limited polemics with other confessional world, Rus intellectuals had to delve into the very foundations of a particular ideology and reconsider its value from a domestic and ecclesiastical-legal point of view. There were no winners or losers in this verbal duel. The way out of the crisis was understood by Petro Mohyla, who was ready to recognize the primacy of the Pope in order to preserve the internal independence of the Church.

The article analyzes the polemical socio-religious thought in Ukraine after the Union of Brest and the Union of the Kyiv Metropolitanate with Rome, aimed at finding the lost Orthodox tradition and reviving the idea of “God’s protection” of the city of Kyiv in the Russian Orthodox intellectual tradition of the early 17th century. After-union period in Ukrainian realities is characterized as crisis in the sense of decline of religious life, Russian bourgeoisie and fraternal movement and deviation from the policy of support of the Orthodox princely families. The entire plan of church reform, cultural and national revival of the “Commonwealth of the Russian People” was undermined in its foundations. Therefore, the intellectual religious thought of the early 17th century took into account the memory of the “good old days”, when national (regional) identity based on the Orthodox tradition was searched. However, from the point of view of the continued existence of the Orthodox Church, the defeat was only partial, as K. Ostrozkyi and his supporters among the nobility, clergy and burghers managed to preserve the Orthodox Church structure. The Cossacks demanded a rethinking of this new reality by intellectuals of the post-Brest era and Ukrainian polemicists were forced to look for an independent base for their socio-religious thought. The way out of the crisis was understood by Petro Mohyla, who was ready to recognize the primacy of the Pope in order to preserve the internal independence of the Church.

The article is devoted to the phenomena of secularization in contemporary European and Ukrainian culture. The author considers about a notion “modern world” and its valuable content. Such criteria of secularization as public institutions, relevant practice and public space are recognized in the article. The author provides the evidence in favor of modern world secularity on faith problems in society. The author states that condition of spiritual experience and spiritual search can confirm or deny secularity of the modern world. The “place of fulness” location on which “the person is oriented morally or spiritually” as a criterion of faith and disbelief is determined in the article. It is concluded that postmodern period is the time of “multiple modernities” which does not deny religion but creates new conditions of faith.