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For decades, developmental psychologists and educators have emphasized that learning about counterintuitive phenomena may be a critical driving force for cognitive development. Thus far, little is known about the specific content that children seek to enrich their knowledge. Using a novel book-choice paradigm, we directly examine children's preference to engage with media that contains more mundane vs. more counterintuitive content. Children ranging from 3- to 8-years (N = 174), from the U.S. and Canada, were presented with pairs of books about animals. The two books in each pair were visually identical aside from their printed title. One book in each pair was described as presenting a fact that (according to validation data on children's and adults' beliefs in these facts) was relatively intuitive, and the other book was described as presenting a fact that was relatively counterintuitive. The youngest participants (3-4 years) demonstrated no preference in selecting books with intuitive vs. counterintuitive facts about animals, whereas older children (5-years onward) demonstrated an increasing preference for counterintuitive content. Combined with validation data on children's and adults' intuitions about the focal facts, these data suggest that children's preference to seek information that adults deem counterintuitive (at least in the domain of biology) increases with age as a function of changes in the strength of children's intuitions about what is possible.

The recent proliferation of research on children's supernatural concepts is noteworthy, as this work is necessary for a full account of human cognition. Despite this advancement in our field, there is a lingering tendency for scholars to exotify supernatural concepts; to treat them as distinct or special. Arguments have been raised that these concepts are "prepared" to develop, even inherent; other arguments dismiss these ideas as "immature" or "childish." Yet, the empirical record documents that supernatural concepts are no more inherent and no more childish than "natural" concepts. Just like concepts of nature, supernatural concepts are constructed upon and constrained by one's existing conceptual architecture. I illustrate these points by drawing upon work on children's understanding of supernatural minds, like the minds of "omniscient" deities. This work reveals that young children have great difficulty in understanding such purported minds, but through a protracted developmental process children and adults may gradually approach an understanding of all-knowingness. Based on these and other data, I argue that constructivism makes possible some supernatural ideas that are typically not realized until late childhood or adulthood, contradicting both the view that supernatural concepts are inherent and the view that such concepts are "childish". As well, I emphasize that understanding how children develop "beliefs" in supernatural concepts requires understanding how they construct mental representations of those concepts. Embracing the fact that supernatural concepts develop through the same processes as concepts of nature will help to further bring research on these critical topics into the mainstream.

Advocates for the use of specific labels to describe persons with disabilities presume that these labels fundamentally shape lay conceptions of persons with disabilities, and are thus critical targets for intervention. In two studies (N = 285) we test this presumption, by presenting participants with descriptions of persons with disabilities that use either person-first labels or condition-first labels; disability diagnoses were either made at birth or during the teenage years. For each description, participants judged how essential (consistent, deeply-rooted, broadly-ramifying) physical, sensory, or cognitive disability symptoms (Study 1) or diagnoses (Study 2) are to that person. Across both studies, participants judged disabilities to be equally essential to persons regardless of how they were labeled; this was robust whether diagnoses were made earlier or later in life. Although there may be other points of influence, these labels, which are primary targets of advocacy groups, do not seem to influence psychological essentialism of disabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Children and adults appreciate that physical action is typically the conduit between individuals' desires and the fulfillment of those desires. However, certain forms of petitionary thought -- e.g., wishing and praying -- are believed by many people to influence the external world and fulfill desires without direct physical action. We examine whether children's and adults' predictions about the occurrence of desired events differs based on: (1) the ways in which desires are expressed (wishing vs. praying), (2) whether desired events are plausible vs. impossible, and (3) participants' religious backgrounds. Children ages 3- to 11-years (n = 144) and young adults (n = 85) were read scenarios in which a protagonist either wished or prayed for a desired event to occur. Some of the desired events could plausibly happen with ordinary human intervention and others were impossible, even with human intervention. Preschoolers often predicted that desired events would obtain; with increasing age, participants judged that fewer events would obtain. Participants' predictions varied by the probability of the desired event -- across the entire age-range participants predicted that impossible events would obtain less often than plausible events. Thus, participants' everyday probabilistic reasoning was imported into their reasoning about the fulfillment of supernatural petitions. Children's and adults' religious experiences predicted their judgments that events would obtain if they had been prayed for, but not if they had been wished for. Thus, the effects of socio-cultural experience did not globally pervade children's and adults' probabilistic reasoning, but were specific to certain contexts about which they reasoned.

When we hear about a transgression, we may consider whether the perpetrator's individual circumstances make their transgression more understandable or excusable. Mitigating circumstances may reduce the severity of punishment that is deemed appropriate, both intuitively and legally. But importantly, in courts of public opinion and of law, mitigating information is typically presented only after information about a perpetrator's transgression. We explore whether this sequence influences the force of mitigating evidence. Specifically, in two studies, we examined whether presenting evidence about a perpetrator's background before or after evidence of their violation influenced how severely U.S. participants punished perpetrators. In Study 1 (N = 132), evidence about the perpetrator's mitigating circumstances reduced punishment only when it was presented before evidence about the perpetrator's violation. Study 2 (N = 316) additionally revealed this moderating effect of presentation order across a variety of premeditated and impulsive violations. These findings are consistent with person-centered theories of punishment and with the Story Model of adjudication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This prospective longitudinal study provides evidence of preschool-age precursors of hostile attribution bias in young school-age children, a topic that has received little empirical attention. We examined multiple risk domains, including laboratory and observational assessments of children's social-cognition, general cognitive functioning, effortful control, and peer aggression. Preschoolers (N = 231) with a more advanced theory-of-mind, better emotion understanding, and higher IQ made fewer hostile attributions of intent in the early school years. Further exploration of these significant predictors revealed that only certain components of these capacities (i.e., nonstereotypical emotion understanding, false-belief explanation, and verbal IQ) were robust predictors of a hostile attribution bias in young school-age children and were especially strong predictors among children with more advanced effortful control. These relations were prospective in nature-the effects of preschool variables persisted after accounting for similar variables at school age. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for future research and prevention.

For centuries, humans have contemplated the minds of gods. Research on religious cognition is spread across sub-disciplines, making it difficult to gain a complete understanding of how people reason about gods' minds. We integrate approaches from cognitive, developmental, and social psychology and neuroscience to illuminate the origins of religious cognition. First, we show that although adults explicitly discriminate supernatural minds from human minds, their implicit responses reveal far less discrimination. Next, we demonstrate that children's religious cognition often matches adults' implicit responses, revealing anthropomorphic notions of God's mind. Together, data from children and adults suggest the intuitive nature of perceiving God's mind as human-like. We then propose three complementary explanations for why anthropomorphism persists in adulthood, suggesting that anthropomorphism may be (a) an instance of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic; (b) a reflection of early testimony; and/or (c) an evolutionary byproduct.

We examine how understandings of ordinary and extraordinary communication develop. Three- to 10-year-old children and adults (N = 183) were given scenarios in which a protagonist wanted help from a human (their parent) or from God. Scenarios varied in whether protagonists expressed their desires aloud (by asking) or silently (by hoping), whether (for human scenarios) parents were nearby or far away, and whether (for God scenarios) protagonists expressed desires through ordinary means (asking or hoping) or more extraordinary means (praying). Following each scenario, participants were asked whether the recipient (either the parent or God) was aware of the protagonist's desire. Children as young as 3 to 4 years old understood that both loudness and distance limit the effectiveness of human communication, reporting that humans would most likely be aware of desires when they were expressed both aloud and nearby. As well, by this age children reported that God would more often be aware of desires than would humans, but children of all ages often reported that God (like humans) would be more aware of desires expressed aloud (rather than silently). These concepts of ordinary and extraordinary communication continued to be refined through middle childhood. Children's performance on standard theory-of-mind tasks and participants' religious background predicted whether they attributed awareness to God.

Individuals in many cultures believe in omniscient (all-knowing) beings, but everyday representations of omniscience have rarely been studied. To understand the nature of such representations requires knowing how they develop. Two studies examined the breadth of knowledge (i.e., types of knowledge) and depth of knowledge (i.e., amount of knowledge within domains) that preschoolers, elementary-school children, and adults (N = 180) attributed to an all-knowing being. Preschoolers often reported that an omniscient mind would lack many types of knowledge, and they completely failed to understand the depth of omniscient knowledge. With increasing age, children approached an understanding of omniscience--attributing broader and deeper knowledge to an omniscient agent--but only adults firmly understood the depth of omniscient knowledge. We identify socio-cultural and cognitive factors that correlate with children's understandings of omniscience. Findings demonstrate that childhood representations of fallible, limited, human minds both make possible and constrain developing representations of radically non-human minds.

Children and adults often encounter counterintuitive claims that defy their perceptions. We examined factors that influence children's acceptance of such claims. Children ages 3-6 years were shown familiar objects (e.g., a rock), were asked to identify the objects, and were then told that each object was something else (e.g., that the rock was soap). For some children, informants explicitly stated that the objects were different from what they appeared to be, whereas other children received testimony about the objects' identities without any reference to the discrepancy between appearance and reality. Children also completed standard tasks measuring appearance-reality understanding. When later asked about the objects' identities and properties, children who had a firm understanding of the appearance-reality distinction and those who heard informants mention that distinction were more accepting of the informants' counterintuitive claims. Thus, receptivity to counterintuitive claims can reflect conceptual growth rather than simple deference or conformity.

Traditional looking-time paradigms are often used to assess infants' attention to sociocognitive phenomena, but the link between these laboratory scenarios and real-world interactions is unclear. The current study investigated hypothesized relations between traditional social-cognitive looking-time paradigms and their real-world counterparts in caregiver-infant social interaction. Seventy-five 10-to 12-month-old infants participated in a structured play session with their caregiver, as well as a traditional looking-time paradigm targeting intentional action. Infants' ability to quickly parse intentional displays correlated with several key qualities of their everyday interactions. In particular, caregiver and infant interaction quality, maternal supportiveness, caregiver and infant joint engagement skill, and social attentiveness in infants correlated with faster habituation to looking-time displays. These results support a linkage between social-cognitive looking-time laboratory paradigms and more naturalistic partner interaction, at this key age. The data provide external validation for the large body of social-cognitive findings emerging from laboratory looking-time paradigms and contribute to a growing literature tracking the developmental trajectory of infants' understanding of people during the first 2 years.

The emotional reactivity hypothesis holds that, over the course of phylogeny, the selection of animals with less reactive temperaments supported the development of sophisticated social-cognitive skills in several species, including humans (Hare, 2007). In the ontogenetic human case, an emotional reactivity hypothesis predicts that children with less reactive temperaments will reach certain milestones in theory-of-mind (ToM) development more quickly. We examined relations between temperament and false-belief understanding in 102 preschool-age children from China and the United States. Temperament was measured via parental ratings of behavior as well as with physiological measures of children's reactivity (hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical axis reactivity gauged via salivary cortisol). In accord with an emotional reactivity hypothesis, children with certain reactive temperaments--specifically, those who were more aggressive and those who were both socially withdrawn and physiologically reactive--evidenced poorer social-cognition. However, our findings also force amendment to the ontogenetic emotional reactivity hypothesis. For the majority of children in both countries, physiological reactivity predicted more advanced ToM, perhaps by facilitating social engagement and attention to social stimuli. Moreover, children who were withdrawn from social interaction yet nonreactive, especially Chinese children of this temperament, evidenced advanced ToM. Thus, some forms of social disengagement may foster social-cognitive development in certain sociocultural contexts. (Contains 3 tables and 1 figure.)

This study examined how informants' traits affect how children seek information, trust testimony, and make inferences about informants' knowledge. Eighty-one 3- to 6-year-olds and 26 adults completed tasks where they requested and endorsed information provided by one of two informants with conflicting traits (e.g., honesty vs. dishonesty). Participants also completed tasks where they simultaneously considered informants' traits and visual access to information when inferring their knowledge and trusting their testimony. Children and adults preferred to ask and endorse information provided by people who are nice, smart, and honest. Moreover, these traits influenced the knowledge that young children attributed to informants. Children younger than 5 years of age reported that people with positive traits were knowledgeable even when they lacked access to relevant information. (Contains 4 figures.)

Three- to 5-year-old (N = 61) religiously schooled preschoolers received theory-of-mind (ToM) tasks about the mental states of ordinary humans and agents with exceptional perceptual or mental capacities. Consistent with an anthropomorphism hypothesis, children beginning to appreciate limitations of human minds (e.g., ignorance) attributed those limits to God. Only 5-year-olds differentiated between humans' fallible minds and God's less fallible mind. Unlike secularly schooled children, religiously schooled 4-year-olds did appreciate another agent's less fallible mental abilities when instructed and reminded about those abilities. Among children who understood ordinary humans' mental fallibilities, knowledge of God predicted attributions of correct epistemic states to extraordinary agents. Results suggest that, at a certain point in ToM development, sociocultural input can facilitate an appreciation for extraordinary minds.

Temperament dimensions influence children's approach to and participation in social interactive experiences which reflect and impact children's social understandings. Therefore, temperament differences might substantially impact theory-of-mind development in early childhood. Using longitudinal data, we report that certain early temperament characteristics (at age 3)--lack of aggressiveness, a shy-withdrawn stance to social interaction, and social-perceptual sensitivity--predict children's more advanced theory-of-mind understanding 2 years later. The findings contribute to our understanding of how theory of mind develops in the formative preschool period; they may also inform debates as to the evolutionary origins of theory of mind.

Almost half of the US public rejects the idea that humans originated via evolution rather than by supernatural design. Moreover, studies demonstrate that even biology teachers have difficulty teaching their students about evolution, often including creationist explanations as well. A typical response to such findings is the argument that greater exposure to evolutionary theory would eliminate these unscientific alternatives. However, creationist ideas are not easily extinguished. Even after repeated exposure to evolutionary concepts, creationist ideas are more likely to be "incorporated" into hybrid frameworks along with evolutionary ideas, rather than completely rejected. Thus, members of the public often find these ideas complementary rather than contradictory. In this review, we apply dual-process theory to examine individuals' understandings of the origins of species. We describe cognitive biases that operate at the intuitive-autonomous level (system 1), some of which, we argue, anchor belief in supernatural design, and others of which potentially anchor evolutionary ideas. At the other end of the continuum, reflective and abstract reasoning (system 2) processes are apparent in both scientific and theological explanations of origins. We conclude that presenting supernatural and natural explanations of biological origins as contradictory belies the way they function in everyday reasoning. By understanding the theological and the scientific arguments as well as the way most people intuitively reason about such existential questions, teachers might be better prepared to deal with these issues in the classroom. (Contains 1 table.)

The current study utilized longitudinal data to investigate how theory of mind (ToM) and emotion understanding (EU) concurrently and prospectively predicted young children's moral reasoning and decision making. One hundred twenty-eight children were assessed on measures of ToM and EU at 3.5 and 5.5 years of age. At 5.5 years, children were also assessed on the quality of moral reasoning and decision making they used to negotiate prosocial moral dilemmas, in which the needs of a story protagonist conflict with the needs of another story character. More sophisticated EU predicted greater use of physical- and material-needs reasoning, and a more advanced ToM predicted greater use of psychological-needs reasoning. Most intriguing, ToM and EU jointly predicted greater use of higher-level acceptance-authority reasoning, which is likely a product of children's increasing appreciation for the knowledge held by trusted adults and children's desire to behave in accordance with social expectations.

How and when do children develop an understanding of extraordinary mental capacities? The current study tested 56 preschoolers on false-belief and knowledge-ignorance tasks about the mental states of contrasting agents--some agents were ordinary humans, some had exceptional perceptual capacities, and others possessed extraordinary mental capacities. Results indicated that, in contrast to younger and older peers, children within a specific age range reliably attributed fallible, human-like capacities to ordinary humans and to several special agents (including God) for both tasks. These data lend critical support to an anthropomorphism hypothesis--which holds that children's understanding of extraordinary minds is derived from their everyday intuitive psychology--and reconcile disparities between the findings of other studies on children's understanding of extraordinary minds.

Individuals often develop negative biases toward unfamiliar or denigrated groups. Two experimental studies were conducted to investigate the extent to which brief negative messages about novel social groups influence children's (4- to 9-year-olds'; N = 153) intergroup attitudes. The studies examined the relative influence of messages that are provided directly to children versus messages that are overheard and examined whether the force of these messages varies with children's age. According to implicit and explicit measures of children's intergroup attitudes, children rapidly internalized messages demeaning novel groups, thus forming negative attitudes toward outgroups merely on the basis of hearsay. These effects were generally stronger among older children, and were particularly pronounced when the message was provided directly to children. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]