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What binds a democratic society together? This would seem a well-rehearsed topic in modern political theory, but on closer scrutiny, it may appear less so. If we reformulate the question, it may become clearer why: what binds democratic society together? The emphasis on ‘democratic’ is the clue here. Much recent discussion on the cohesive force in democracies has been parasitic on other debates, such as that between cosmopolitans and communitarians on justice as the first virtue of society; that between nation-state-based and post-national views of contemporary politics or that about the cultural aspects of democratic citizenship as the glue that makes democracy work. All such views and debates tend to assume a somewhat ‘externalist’ perspective, so to speak, of the problem of cohesion in democracies. Cosmopolitans and liberal communitarians have argued over the relative importance of values and identity as the basis for the stability of a just society, whose legitimate political arrangements they generally agree must be democratic, so as to reflect the demands of equality and self-government. Disputes over whether the institutions of democracy still require the background conditions provided by the nation-state, with its consolidated networks of party system, solidarity, civil society organisations and public opinion formation, or whether similar conditions can be reproduced at a more trans- and post-national level, are very similar in scope to those between cosmopolitans and liberal communitarians. Both these disputes concern the social, institutional, ideal or identitarian pre-conditions of democracy, which help it to work with a modicum of stability, in so far as they guarantee the political cohesion of either the demos or the regime itself. Discussions over the quality and competence of citizenship look at democratic culture as an important condition for democratic institutions and procedures to function smoothly and effectively. Debates over the ‘civic culture

European Union boundaries have always been unusual. In no other political community is both the prospect of enlargement and the ever-present possibility of withdrawal part of the constitutional framework. We find few other instances where some territories in a political community adopt a common currency while others do not. Examples of thick association agreements, such as we find between the EU and third countries like Switzerland and Norway, are uncommon. Over the last number of years, EU boundaries have been challenged like never before. Brexit poses a fundamental threat to the EU’s territorial integrity and the rights of EU citizens to cross what have been regarded as open borders; the refugee crisis and the increase of terrorism both call into question the EU’s ability to justly and effectively manage its external borders; the rise of populism is a direct challenge to internal free movement as the demand to reassert national borders becomes formidable; while the aftermath of the euro-crisis continues to put Monetary Union in doubt. By distinguishing between three categories of boundary change – boundary-making, boundary-crossing and boundary-unbundling – the authors in this volume attempt to shed light on the sustainability and legitimacy of Europe’s boundaries in question.