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International audience; This article proposes to explore the interaction between populism and environmentalism in the discourse of populist radical left parties, through a case study of Jean-Luc Melenchon's parties, Parti de gauche (2008-2016) and La France insoumise (from 2016). While an emerging literature primarily investigated the populist framing of populist radical right parties' climate (sceptic) discourse, the article analyses how a populist radical left party incorporates environmental issues into its agenda and the extent to which environmentalism and populism concretely interweave. Using mixed-methods, we first show that the logics of party competition and the growing salience of environmental issues led La France insoumise to gradually develop an ambitious green agenda. We then show that there is evidence for a populism/environmentalism nexus that could be defined as 'green populism'. La France insoumise's ecosocialist ideology combines to anti-elitism and people-centrism to blame the environmental crisis on the 'oligarchy' and to promote a green transition that would protect the people.

International audience; The Great Recession (2007-2009) has created a breeding ground allowing the emergence of new left-wing movements in Europe, among which are Podemos and La France insoumise (LFI). These two movements adopted a populist strategy, inspired by the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (Gómez-Reino & Llamazares, 2019; Kioupkiolis, 2016). They developed a national-popular narrative, closely associating the category of the “people” to the concept of “homeland”. The aim of this paper is to analyze to what extent the adoption of this narrative represents an ideological and strategic turning point regarding the French and Spanish far-left tradition. This work is the result of several months of qualitative surveys : Participant observation during the electoral campaigns (2015, 2016, 2017, 2019) and interviews (with members and leaders of these movements) were made. Firstly, we analyze the common features of their narratives mainly inspired by the Latin American national- popular experiences of the 2000s. Both movements oppose the “people” to the “oligarchy” and propose a civilian-politic, democratic and progressive definition of the homeland, linked to the defense of public services, social rights, and to the protection of the most destitute citizens facing the neoliberal offensive. Secondly, we situate these discourses in their respective national contexts to determine (1) To what extent the adoption of this narrative represents a break with traditional far-left strategies; (2) How these narratives are shaped according to each national construction. On the one hand, in Spain, the adoption of a national- popular narrative is a key element to understand the break operated by Podemos with the Spanish traditional radical Left characterized by its reject of the adoption of a “patriotic” speech associated to Francoism (Barón & Cuello, 2016; Redondo, 2016). It also represented an answer to the Spanish territorial crisis and as a way to “re-think” the territorial model of Spain by leaning on a “Plurinational hypothesis” (Iglesias, 2016). On the other hand, in France, the strategic use of the “national-popular” narrative by LFI during the 2017 French presidential election falls in line and enhances the Jacobin Republican tradition painting France as “the one and indivisible nation”. This Republican tradition is anchored in the discourse of a part of the French radical left since the 20th century – especially by the French Communist Party – and has been assumed for a long time by the its leader, Jean-Luc Mélenchon.

Les élections législatives françaises ont vu émerger une alliance électorale de gauche, la Nouvelle Union populaire, écologique et sociale (NUPES) sous l’impulsion de La France insoumise (LFI) et de son leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon. L’analyse de cet électorat, qui provient autant de LFI, du Parti communiste français (PCF), d’Europe-Écologie-Les Verts (EELV) et du Parti socialiste (PS), montre qu’il est davantage ancré des les catégories moyennes assez diplômées mais déclassées que dans les catégories populaires, ces dernières étant bien plus présentes dans les électorats de la droite radicale. Un noyau dur de valeurs unit la NUPES autour d’un faible niveau de libéralisme économique et d’un haut niveau de libéralisme culturel. En revanche, les domaines socio-économiques considérés comme prioritaires varient assez fortement d’une composante politique à l’autre. Le rapport à la démocratie est également contrasté selon l’origine politique des électeurs de la NUPES. Au total, il existe bien une NUPES populaire et une NUPES bourgeoise.

Le premier mandat d’Emmanuel Macron a été une période de réformes mais aussi de crise pour la fonction publique. La recherche porte sur le vote des fonctionnaires aux premier et second tours de l’élection présidentielle de 2022 et s’appuie sur un échantillon important fourni par le Baromètre de la confiance politique du Cevipof. Le vote des fonctionnaires a suivi la même logique que celle des salariés du secteur privé : une montée des radicalités à droite comme à gauche associée à la permanence d’un pôle macroniste central qui assèche la gauche socialiste comme les écologistes ou la droite libérale de Valérie Pécresse, un phénomène auquel échappe cependant la FPT. La comparaison entre le premier tour de l’élection présidentielle de 2017 et celui de 2022 montre que le vote en faveur de la droite radicale a progressé de manière générale dans les trois fonctions publiques, mais surtout dans la FPH. Il se stabilise dans la catégorie C où il était déjà d’un niveau élevé en 2017 mais progresse fortement dans les catégories A et B. Le vote des fonctionnaires au second tour de l’élection présidentielle de 2022 a vu progresser très sensiblement Marine Le Pen qui avait d’ailleurs mis l’accent sur la situation difficile des agents publics lors de la campagne électorale alors que Valérie Pécresse avait repris le thème du « trop de fonctionnaires » dans une perspective libérale classique. C’est bien sur le terrain de l’antilibéralisme économique que Marine Le Pen a innové.

International audience; It is often assumed that conspiratorial thinking shares important affinities with the Manichean views of populism, and its profound distrust of elites and experts. Such connection between conspiracy theory and populism should be explored further, however, in order to shed light on the different ways in which they may be articulated in populist politics. Based on a qualitative case study of the populist radical left and radical right in France, this paper examines the interplay between conspiracy theory and populism during the Covid-19 crisis. We find that both populist parties have channelled the Covid-19 pandemic into their existing ideological framework to mobilize the anxieties and grievances produced by the crisis. However, we see variation in the interpretation of the health crisis through the lenses of the ‘thin’ ideology of populism. More importantly, we find that populist actors may also vary significantly in their use of conspiracy theories, reflecting different ideological legacies and political strategies.

International audience; This chapter examines the supply and demand sides of populism in France. It looks at the two main populist actors i.e. the Front National (FN) and La France Insoumise (LFI). The FN exemplifies the typical radical right populist organization, primarily mobilizing grievances over immigration, while LFI shows a left-wing egalitarian and socially inclusive profile. Electoral support for populism in France is fuelled by economic instability and voter distrust of mainstream politics and of the EU. Both LFI and the FN increasingly converge on a common protectionist platform, opposing the EU and globalization. Populist voting in 2017 is found predominantly amongst the youngest cohorts and it is strongly correlated with populist attitudes. FN voters are primarily found amongst the so-called ‘losers’ of globalization in the lower social classes, who are typically more anti-immigrant and more authoritarian. LFI attracts on the other hand a broader coalition of secularized voters in the middle and lower social classes, who are primarily motivated by economic concerns. Both FN and LFI voters are more Eurosceptic than the mainstream, and they share similar concerns about globalization.