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Section 46(2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (CFRN 1999) empowers the Chief Justice of Nigeria (CJN) to make rules regulating the enforcement of human rights. In 2009, pursuant to the foregoing powers, the CJN made the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules (FREP Rules 2009). Item 3(e) of the FREP Rules 2009 conferred locus standi (LS) on persons other than those specified under section 46(1) of CFRN 1999 to institute fundamental rights enforcement suits. The issues arising are: Is locus standi a substantive or procedural matter? Whether or not by section 46(1), (3) and (4) of the CFRN 1999, the CJN has the vires to make rules on locus standi; what is the status of the FREP Rules 2009 vis-à-vis the Constitution? Through comparative methods, it is argued that locus standi is a substantive matter; hence, the CJN lacks the vires to make rules on it. The comparative experience in Kenya and South Africa is examined to draw lessons in promoting access to justice which is one of the sustainable development goals (SDGs). Since Item 3(e) of the FREP Rules is ultra vires, its nullification and amendment of section 46(1) of CFRN 1999 are suggested to encapsulate the expansion under the FREP Rules 2009 as leeway. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

La deficiente actuación por parte de los Estados ante el cambio climático ha llevado a que los ciudadanos a nivel global busquen diversas vías jurisdiccionales mediante las cuales garantizar el derecho a un medioambiente saludable y exigir la responsabilidad al Estado por sus acciones u omisiones frente a la actual emergencia climática. Ello ha conllevado a que en los últimos años haya habido un aumento de los litigios climáticos. El presente trabajo se realiza con el fin principal de abordar la problemática y casuística jurídica existente en dichos litigios climáticos sobre la base de lo dispuesto por el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos (TEDH) en el caso Verein Klimaseniorinnen Schweiz y Otros v. Suiza, de 9 de abril de 2024 sobre todo, ya que dicha resolución ha marcado relevantes bases jurídicas a utilizar para futuros litigios climáticos. Para ello, la metodología utilizada en el mismo, parte de la utilización de bases de datos que delimitan la concepción del litigio climático y exponen el crecimiento de los mismos, así como del análisis de la doctrina y jurisprudencia dispuesta por el TEDH en relación con los litigios climáticos, la cual se divide en cuestiones de carácter sustantivo y procesal. Con ello, se han desarrollado diversas conclusiones a lo largo del trabajo con las que se pretende determinar la interpretación y la postura del TEDH en torno a esta cuestión, así como las bases jurídicas necesarias para plantear litigios climáticos ante tal órgano jurisdiccional.

Este artículo aborda las limitaciones de los criterios Plaumann en el acceso a la justicia climática ante el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea y propone una reinterpretación fundamentada en un enfoque constitucional europeo. Analiza cómo las restricciones impuestas por estos criterios dificultan que particulares y ONG puedan participar en la labor de control judicial de la UE en materia climática. En este contexto, este artículo aboga por un cambio en la jurisprudencia del TJUE sobre el acceso de las ONG a los tribunales de la UE en el contexto del cambio climático. A través de un enfoque evolutivo, se argumenta que las disposiciones constitucionales de la UE ofrecen una base sólida para flexibilizar estos criterios. Además, el artículo explora la influencia de litigios climáticos nacionales y del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, así como la relevancia del Convenio de Aarhus en la reinterpretación de los criterios Plaumann en el contexto climático.

In Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland , the European Court of Human Rights issued its first climate-change-related decision. In a near-unanimous decision, the Grand Chamber of the Court found that Switzerland had breached its obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. It held that the Alpine state must review and amend its climate change policies accordingly. In this case note, we highlight the key points of the judgment and comment briefly on certain points. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is now commonplace for courts to remark that standing to seek judicial review is 'context-sensitive'. The questions of how the courts adapt standing to context, and whether they do so appropriately, have, however, received remarkably little scholarly and judicial attention. This is perhaps because, until recently, there has been relatively little in the case law to spark scholarly interest. Standing, however, is in the midst of a resurgence. This article makes use of a distinction between three types of judicial review case—challenges to (i) favourable targeted, (ii) unfavourable targeted and (iii) non-targeted decisions—as a mode through which to explore the growing body of standing case law. In doing so, it both seeks to further understanding of how courts determine what constitutes a 'sufficient interest' and to highlight areas of the law in need of clarification or reconsideration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article will explore and analyse a complex and multifaceted question of the rights of nature and the role of Indigenous Peoples in the creating, shaping, and defining of such rights. This perplexing question has legal and philosophical dimensions, which is multi-layered and not easily resolved. The author of this article will endeavour to analyse the rights of nature, the role of Indigenous way of thinking in forming of these rights and whether the rights of nature form a part of Indigenous Peoples' identity. Indigenous Peoples and nature are notions which are frequently linked together. However, the relationship between Indigenous Peoples and mature is challenging and complex. The analysis will be conducted at both the national and international levels, exploring both national and international case law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Стаття присвячена питанням історії виникнення та еволюції доктрини locus standi (locus standi in judicio). Виникнення терміну locus standi, а також його прояви у римському праві, середньовіччі, відродженні та 20-го сторіччя дозволяє краще зрозуміти доктрину locus standi та можливі шляхи її розвитку. У адміністративному праві США, Канади, Італії, Південній Африці та інших країн доктрина locus standi посідає своє визначне місце. Українська правова система оперує термінами право на суд, правом на звернення до адміністративного суду, правом на задоволення позову, правом на судовий захист, які можуть заповнюватись різним змістом в залежності від їх розуміння у матеріальному чи процесуальному аспектах, а також враховуючи можливе їх у розуміння у sensu stricto чи sensu lato. В аспекті з’ясування права на звернення до адміністративного суду у національній правовій системі вирішальне значення має наявність у особи адміністративної процесуальної правосуб’єктності. Будь-яка особа задміністративною процесуальною правосуб’єктністю може бути позивачем у адміністративній справі, але не будь-який позивач є належним позивачем у адміністративній справі. Право на захист має належний позивач, якому належить право вимоги у певному адміністративно-правовому спорі. Наявність у особи права на захист, а у праві США, Канади, Франції, Італії та інших країнах – наявність у особи locus standi (locus standi in judicio), передує з’ясуванню можливості задоволення позову такої особи. Еволюція доктрини locus standi у цій статті розглядається від права особи предстати перед народними зборами у стародавньому римі до право особи предстати перед судом, бути позивачем у справі у наші часи. У даній статті відображена спроба автора розкрити історичний аспект формування доктрини locus standi, а також можливість її застосування як підґрунтя для подальшого з’ясування матеріально-правового аспекту юридичної природи належного позивача.

Los demandantes exigen la repatriación de sus hijas y nietos que se encuentran retenidos en campos de prisioneros en Siria en condiciones calificadas como inhumanas por numerosos organismos internacionales. El Estado francés se niega a intervenir, cuestionando la legitimidad de la pretensión, la existencia de vínculo jurisdiccional y la exigibilidad de tal comportamiento. Se recurre al Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, que juzga que la pretensión es legítima, existe vínculo jurisdiccional y la conducta es exigible en circunstancias específicas, sentenciando que Francia debe reexaminar las solicitudes mediante un proceso en el que existan garantías frente a la arbitrariedad. La clave de la sentencia es el establecimiento de un vínculo jurisdiccional por la violación del artículo 3.2 del protocolo nº4 del CEDH, responsabilizando a Francia de la creación de una situación de exilio de facto.

This article is dedicated to the issues of the history of the emergence and evolution of the locus standi doctrine (locus standi in judicio). The occurrence of the term "locus standi," as well as its manifestations in Roman law, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and the 20th century, allows for a better understanding of the locus standi doctrine and possible avenues for its development. In administrative law of the United States, Canada, France, Italy, South Africa, and other countries, the locus standi doctrine holds a prominent place. Ukranian legal system operates with the right to access to the court, the right to appeal to an administrative court, the right to judicial protection, and the right to seek redress, which can have different meanings depending on their understanding in substantive or procedural aspects, taking into account their possible understanding in sensu stricto or sensu lato. In the aspect of determining the right to appeal to an administrative court, the presence of administrative procedural legal subjectivity in a person is crucial in national legal system. Any person with administrative procedural legal subjectivity can be a plaintiff in an administrative case, but not every plaintiff is a proper plaintiff in an administrative case. The right to protection belongs to the proper plaintiff, who has claims in a particular administrative legal dispute. The presence of the right to protection, and in the laws of the United States, Canada, France, Italy, and other countries - the presence of locus standi (locus standi in judicio) in a person, precedes the determination of the possibility of granting the claims of such a person. The evolution of the locus standi doctrine in this article is examined from the right of an individual to appear before popular assemblies in ancient Rome to the right of an individual to appear before the court and act as a plaintiff in a case in modern times. This article attempts to explore the historical aspect of the formation of the locus standi doctrine, as well as its potential application as a basis for further clarification of the substantive legal nature of a proper plaintiff. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to analyze the circumstances under which private parties (natural and legal persons) can have a legal standing in annulment actions in EU Law. The limitations imposed on these private parties justifiably mark them as non-privileged applicants. Besides proving the legal grounds for initiating an annulment action and the compliance with the short preclusion period, two additional conditions must be cumulatively met: the non-privileged applicants must prove that they are directly and individually affected by the challenged act. The latter requirement, which is more disputable and difficult to meet, is additionally made more stringent in the jurisprudence of the EU Court of Justice. Therefore, the central part of the paper focuses on the analysis and criticism of the Plaumann test as an extremely strictly set application test for acquiring a legal standing by private parties. In light of understanding EU law as a comprehensive legal order including a complete system of protection of individual rights, the paper provides an overview of arguments and counter-arguments for a prospective reform of the Plaumman test. The analysis leads to the conclusion that the limiting conditions for locus standi of non-privileged applicants, as well as the occasional unavailability of legal remedies before national courts, are the shortcomings of EU law as an order that strives to achieve the rule of law and bring the EU closer to its citizens. In the past decades, the Plaumann test served as a tool for effectively denying the legal standing to private parties. Although the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) has made some progress in the direction of liberalizing the acquisition of locus standi, it is only the case in a limited and narrowly defined number of situations.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the circumstances under which private parties (natural and legal persons) can have a legal standing in annulment actions in EU Law. The limitations imposed on these private parties justifiably mark them as non-privileged applicants. Besides proving the legal grounds for initiating an annulment action and the compliance with the short preclusion period, two additional conditions must be cumulatively met: the non-privileged applicants must prove that they are directly and individually affected by the challenged act. The latter requirement, which is more disputable and difficult to meet, is additionally made more stringent in the jurisprudence of the EU Court of Justice. Therefore, the central part of the paper focuses on the analysis and criticism of the Plaumann test as an extremely strictly set application test for acquiring a legal standing by private parties. In light of understanding EU law as a comprehensive legal order including a complete system of protection of individual rights, the paper provides an overview of arguments and counter-arguments for a prospective reform of the Plaumman test. The analysis leads to the conclusion that the limiting conditions for locus standi of non-privileged applicants, as well as the occasional unavailability of legal remedies before national courts, are the shortcomings of EU law as an order that strives to achieve the rule of law and bring the EU closer to its citizens. In the past decades, the Plaumann test served as a tool for effectively denying the legal standing to private parties. Although the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) has made some progress in the direction of liberalizing the acquisition of locus standi, it is only the case in a limited and narrowly defined number of situations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Con la incidencia del COVID-19 en la vida social organizada, la labor de la Organización Mundial de la Salud fue puesta a prueba respecto de la coordinación y prevención ante una enfermedad nueva e infecciosa. Dado que la Organización está dotada de ciertas competencias en su Tratado Constitutivo y el Reglamento Sanitario Internacional, es relevante discutir si las conductas de la OMS respetaron el contenido de estas obligaciones internacionales en el marco de la respuesta ante una pandemia. Este estudio, por tanto, examina la conducta de la OMS en el momento previo y posterior inmediato a la declaración del COVID-19 como pandemia en el marco de la responsabilidad internacional. También, considerando los perjuicios reputados para individuos, este estudio identifica y analiza las vías procesales internacional para implementar esta responsabilidad internacional.

The article analyzes the locus standi of the legal person. The locus standi is one of the conditions for exercising the civil action and signifies the identity between the person of the plaintiff and the person who is the holder of the subjective right brought to trial, respectively the identity between the person of the defendant and the person who owns the obligation under suit. The locus standi can be transferred during the civil trial, through legal or conventional transmission. In the case of legal person, the legal transmission operates if the legal person, participating in a lawsuit, is subject to reorganization. The practical examples highlight the way in which the procedural exception of the lack of standing of the legal person was brought before the court.

Background: Some jurisdictions provide for the right of members of a corporation to sue on its behalf and in its interests. This remedy is called ‘a derivative action’ (derivative lawsuit), and the right to file such a lawsuit is granted to a company’s members in case the wrongdoers are in its control, preventing the company from taking actions to protect its rights and interests – which is detrimental to the interests and rights of minority shareholders. However, derivative lawsuit’s regulation differs in each jurisdiction despite sharing common features, raising a variety of issues to be resolved. Methods: In this article, the author points out several issues and their possible solutions, which could be implemented in Ukrainian legislation: property qualification by itself cannot prevent abuse in filing a derivative lawsuit – extended ‘locus standi’ has to be implemented; holders of preferred shares have to be granted the right to file a derivative lawsuit; property qualification has to be substituted with a representation quota for members of non-entrepreneurial corporations; the circle of defendants should include major members (majority of members) and third parties, etc. Results and Conclusions: The concepts of a preventive derivative lawsuit and a derivative lawsuit for the invalidation of a company’s transaction and possible issues regarding them are analysed. Additionally, the necessity for implementing a ‘business judgement rule’ is emphasised.

The article analyzes the Federal Circuit's approach to the doctrine of standing arising from appeals from the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. Topics include doctrines of standing and patent nonobviousness and novelty requirements; ModernaTx, Inc. v. Arbutus Biopharma Corp. court case dealing with the doctrine of standing; and the way Federal Circuit's decision in tension with and diverges from the congressional intent of the America Invents Act.

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The article discusses the role of private litigation under the Glass-Steagall Act constructed and proposed by Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr. and its implications for the potential reform of financial regulation system. Topics tackled are history of the litigation battle between banks to break down statutory limitations on their activities, problem of agency forbearance and challenges of the private litigation enforcement solution, and structure of the constitutional and statutory standing doctrine.

The article analyzes the circuit court split on tester stigmatic in-jury standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, and concludes that the conflict between Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman and TransUnion v. Ramirez is untenable. Topics discussed include tester stigmatic injury standing in the Second, Fifth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, the rationale for each court's decision, and options to resolve the conflict.

In England, Parliament introduced the 'necessary interest rule' through the enactment of section 115 of the Charities Act 2011 (England and Wales), allowing 'any person interested' in a charitable trust to initiate charity proceedings against defaulting trustees in their administration of charitable assets. Nevertheless, insufficient attention has been paid to this rule despite it being initially enacted in 1853. Parliament has refrained from clearly defining the rule, and the courts have long been grappling with its meaning in determining whether a person is eligible to sue. This paper studies the necessary interest rule by exploring the way in which the courts have interpreted it and the uncertainties surrounding its operation. It is shown that, in the context of charitable trusts, the concern of securing the due administration and execution of the trust lies at the heart of the rule. The final section of this paper discusses the significant theoretical implications of the necessary interest rule. It considers the beneficiary-enforcer debate concerning the conceptual nature of express trusts and highlights the insights that analysis of the rule can provide into this debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Nworika v Ononeze-Madu, the Nigerian Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower court, denying the appellant standing to challenge the decision of the Imo State government. This highlighted the position of Nigerian courts on the rule of locus standi, which denies access to justice for many Nigerians who seek a court order to declare a law unconstitutional or to challenge the actions of the government or its agencies. This article examines the context of the application of the rule of locus standi before Nigerian courts and argues that the decision of the Supreme Court in Adesanya v President of Nigeria, which is the classic authority on the strict rule of locus standi in Nigeria, is outdated in the context of contemporary human rights development and that Nigerian courts can learn from the Indian courts that have discarded the strict application of the rule of locus standi through judicial activism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The importance and contribution of derivative litigation to the effectiveness and credibility of a jurisdiction's corporate governance system is indisputable. There is a positive correlation between good corporate governance practices, which include shareholders' rights, and investors' return on their investments. On the one hand, an overly pro-shareholder derivative scheme is vulnerable to abuse and results in unnecessary interference with company management. This may, in turn, discourage directors from entrepreneurial risk-taking and undermine enterprise efficiency. On the other hand, a complex and ineffective system of derivative litigation protects errant directors and decreases investor confidence. This article is a critical assessment of Zimbabwe's recently adopted statutory derivative remedy. The analysis focuses on five locus standi-related aspects of the new statutory derivative regime. The article highlights some major weaknesses within Zimbabwe's statutory remedy and proposes pertinent legislative amendments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The action for annulment is the judicial remedy used to attack acts edited by the Community institutions. The Treaty on the European Community (EC) says the individuals, to have locus standi conditions, shall demonstrate they are direct and individual affected. The expression direct and individual was written on the Treaty, but it was not explained. The Court of the Justice has defined what it is individual concern, and The Court did this in the Plaumann case. This researches analyses if the Plaumann test coexists with the principle of the effective judicial protection, and if there are other legal alternatives or remedies available to the individuals.

Copyright of Romanian Review of Private Law / Revista Română de Drept Privat is the property of Universul Juridic Publishing House and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Under Directive 1989/665/EEC, locus standi in public procurement remedies is recognised to at least any person having or having had an interest in obtaining a particular contract and who has been or risks being harmed by an alleged infringement. The Croatian Public Procurement Act does not diverge from this definition. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has established expansive and detailed case-law on locus standi, and in particular on what is to be considered a 'particular contract' under Article 1(3) of Directive 1989/665/EEC. Unfortunately, the case-law of the State Commission for Supervision of Public Procurement Procedures (DKOM) and of the High Administrative Court of the Republic of Croatia (VUSRH) established a much narrower interpretation. This paper aims to analyse relevant case-law of the CJEU, DKOM and VUSRH and explain how has this narrow interpretation of 'particular contract' affected the availability of public procurement remedies in Croatia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a court case in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an award of nominal damages can redress a completed injury, thus, reversing the ruling of a district court and the Eleventh Circuit. In the case Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, students Chicke Uzuegbubam and Joseph Bradford filed a case against officials of Georgia Gwinnett College enforcing speech policies to seek monetary damages and declaratory and injunctive relief.

Although government recognition is a legal concept of public international law, it interacts with other branches of law, including private international law and international civil procedure. According to the jurisprudence of British and American courts, unrecognized governments do not possess locus standi in civil proceedings in regard to matters which fall within the state dominium. In the mentioned jurisprudence, a doctrine has been formulated according to which judges are bound by the position of their state executive bodies in regard to foreign state and government recognition, which has direct influence on the locus standi of foreign states in the courts of Britain and the United States. The aim of this paper is to present the above rulings, as well as to analyze whether there are grounds for accepting the doctrine which follows from them in Polish civil litigation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo is the property of Centro de Estudios Politicos y Constitucionales and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Areva NP Incorporated in France v Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd 2017 6 BCLR 675 (CC) was a dispute over a multi-billion-rand tender. Although the majority of the Constitutional Court recognised the public importance of the case, it adjudicated the dispute entirely on a preliminary point. It found that the applicant did not have legal standing to seek the judicial review of the award of the tender. This case note has three aims. First, I will argue that the Constitutional Court's majority judgment in Areva was generally unpersuasive. Second, I will attempt to show that Areva exposes an unresolved legal question: when should a court consider the merits of a case made by a litigant with questionable standing? Third, I will propose a method for resolving this question by way of substantive judicial reasoning in any given case.