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Banks rely on soft information when assessing loan applications, making it crucial to evaluate the trustworthiness of potential borrowers in order to set loan conditions, even in a legal environment where contractual rights are straightforwardly enforced. Given the common belief that certain personality traits—such as trustworthiness, reliability, loyalty, thriftiness, and stinginess—are more often linked to conservatives (Republicans) than to liberals (Democrats), we investigate whether companies with conservative chief executive officers (CEOs) secure more advantageous loan terms compared to others. Our findings indicate that firms with conservative CEOs are able to negotiate bank loans with lower interest spreads and upfront fees. While we do not observe a direct impact of CEO overconfidence on loan pricing, we reveal that the combined influence of CEO conservatism and overconfidence contributes to our primary findings. Additionally, we discovered that conservative CEOs tend to receive more favorable non-price conditions (fewer covenants) and are less inclined to offer collateral. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of International Journal of Specialized Islamic Studies (SIS) is the property of Refaad for Studies, Research & Development and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Abstract Banks rely on soft information when assessing loan applications, making it crucial to evaluate the trustworthiness of potential borrowers in order to set loan conditions, even in a legal environment where contractual rights are straightforwardly enforced. Given the common belief that certain personality traits—such as trustworthiness, reliability, loyalty, thriftiness, and stinginess—are more often linked to conservatives (Republicans) than to liberals (Democrats), we investigate whether companies with conservative chief executive officers (CEOs) secure more advantageous loan terms compared to others. Our findings indicate that firms with conservative CEOs are able to negotiate bank loans with lower interest spreads and upfront fees. While we do not observe a direct impact of CEO overconfidence on loan pricing, we reveal that the combined influence of CEO conservatism and overconfidence contributes to our primary findings. Additionally, we discovered that conservative CEOs tend to receive more favorable non-price conditions (fewer covenants) and are less inclined to offer collateral.

Copyright of Journal of Technology Economics is the property of Chinese Society of Technology Economics and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper analyzes if lenders resolve managerial agency problems in loan contracts using sweep covenants. Sweeps require a (partial) prepayment when triggered and are included in many contracts. Exploiting exogenous reductions in analyst coverage due to brokerage house mergers and closures, we find that increased borrower opacity significantly increases sweep use. The effect is strongest for borrowers with higher levels of managerial entrenchment and if lenders hold both debt and equity in the firm. Overall, our results suggest that lenders implement sweep covenants to mitigate managerial agency problems by limiting contingencies of wealth expropriation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Resulting law on Banking Operations without Usury, approved on 10/06/1362, was not part of formal transactions for banking. The designers of this law, without understanding the nature of banking, built a structure where the bank acts as a businessman to earn profit. A structure that is contrary to the function and expertise of banking. Such a structure is rooted in a view that does not distinguish between "natural interest of money" and "usury". In this article, this point of view is evaluated, and it is proved that money is assigned to that benefit in the course of time according to the natural course of affairs; "Benefit" that is different from "usury" and "decreasing the purchasing power of money". Therefore, the depositor's money is deposited to the acquiring bank and the "owner" bank of the deposited funds, and the banks can pay the interest of the money to the depositor without involving themselves in contentless contracts based on the deposit agreement. Based on the loan contract, they can receive the principal and interest from the recipient of the facility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under fractional reserve banking system, banks activity and operations rely primarily on demand deposits, which are often known as current accounts, especially when it comes to granting loans. Consequently, bank deposits are the primary source of ‘inexpensive’ funding for commercial banks. This article aims to analyze and discuss the widely agreed upon characterization of the demand deposit as a loan contract. Since all today’s legal systems consider the demand deposit a loan contract, this article attempts to challenge this characterization by discussing the arguments and building blocks of the loan theory and examining the essence of both contracts through the lens of law and jurisprudence. The paper concludes that the demand deposit contract cannot be considered a loan contract, with supporting solid arguments from economic and legal perspectives.

Copyright of Galatasaray Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi is the property of GALATASARAY UNIVERSITESI HUKUK FAKULTESI and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Under fractional reserve banking system, banks activity and operations rely primarily on demand deposits, which are often known as current accounts, especially when it comes to granting loans. Consequently, bank deposits are the primary source of 'inexpensive' funding for commercial banks. This article aims to analyze and discuss the widely agreed upon characterization of the demand deposit as a loan contract. Since all today's legal systems consider the demand deposit a loan contract, this article attempts to challenge this characterization by discussing the arguments and building blocks of the loan theory and examining the essence of both contracts through the lens of law and jurisprudence. The paper concludes that the demand deposit contract cannot be considered a loan contract, with supporting solid arguments from economic and legal perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Demand deposits (current accounts) are crucial to banks activity, particularly with regards to granting loans. For commercial banks, the primary source of funds is bank deposits. This article attempts to analyze and discuss the legal nature of the demand deposit contract, with a particular focus on the widely agreed upon characterization of this contract as a loan contract in all today’s legal systems (Common law, Civil law, Islamic law and hybrid legal systems). After discussing the arguments and building blocks of the loan theory and examining the essence of both contracts through the lenses of economics, law and Islamic jurisprudence, this paper concludes that the demand deposit contract cannot be considered a loan contract, with supporting arguments from economic, legal and Islamic jurisprudential perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Referring to the conditions of the unpredictability to the substantive elements of the loan agreement, it can be observed that this institution could intervene when the exceptional circumstance of its essence would affect the object of the contract. More specifically, in the case of CHF (Swiss national currency) loans, unpredictability may arise as a result of an exceptional circumstance that would exponentially increase the value of this currency relative to the Romanian leu.

The emergence of finance companies has affected the competitive strategies of financial service industry and has also altered the financing patterns of various borrowers. This study's theoretical model illustrates that finance companies are able to offer larger loans and reach risky niche‐market borrowers more easily than banks can because of certain advantages of the finance company's business model, including unique funding sources, cross‐subsidization, relatively low collateralization costs, and extensive financial intermediation. The resulting loan terms are typically more attractive than those that banks can offer, including higher loan‐granting ratios. These advantages can expand borrowers' financing sources and thereby reduce their financing difficulties. This is especially the case for risky borrowers or entrepreneurs who operate small‐ and medium‐size enterprises. Such borrowers, who typically face liquidity constraints and are thus willing to pay higher interest rates, are more inclined to obtain operating funds from finance companies than from banks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides evidence that the managerial effect is a key determinant of firms' cost of capital, in the context of private debt contracting. Applying the novel empirical method developed by an earlier study to a large sample that tracks the job movement of top managers, we find that the managerial effect is a critical and significant factor that explains a large part of the variation in loan contract terms more accurately than firm fixed effects. Additional evidence shows that banks "follow" managers when they change jobs and offer loan contracts with preferential terms to their new firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Al-Frahids Arts is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Dowry is the necessities of life that are provided by the woman or her family at the beginning of life. There are ambiguities in the dowry that have caused controversy in the judicial decisions. In addition to inequality of judicial decisions, these ambiguities provide a source of conflict for couples and damage the foundation of the family. Some of these ambiguities are the unclear nature of couple's legal relationship regarding the dowry and uncertainty of the husband's legal and criminal responsibility for the deficiency or loss of equipment in dowry claims. The aim of the author is to identify the nature of the dowry, and by analysing the loan contract and permission of conditional possession has concluded the husband's contractual responsibility regarding dowry and subsequently the guarantee of criminal execution in betrayal of trust the husband is responsible regarding the dowry and subsequently the guarantee of criminal execution in betrayal of trust and suggested based on " the rule of Ál- mu'menūn ĕndá shorūtīhem”, dowry can be considered as a new contract with special effects and conditions. This research has been done by library method and by the study of documents, Jurisprudential and legal books and the related rules.

The loan contract contract is a legal contract by which a person, lender, transmits to another person, loanee, the use or the full legal rights regarding an object, with the obligation of returning, at a certain time, of the good or another good of the same quantity and quality The loan contract has two forms, the loan for use and the loan for consumption. The loan for use (Romanian: comodatul) is a free basis contract by which a party, lender (Romanian: comodant), hands in a movable or immovable good in order to be used by the other party, loanee with the obligation of returning, at a certain time, according to the contract . The loan for consumption contract is an agreement by which a person, the lender, gives to another person, the loanee, a sum of money or any goods that are fungible and will be consumed by own nature and the loanee will return the same sum of money or the same quantity and quality of goods.

Copyright of Journal of Northeastern University (Social Science) / Dongbei Daxue Xuebao (Shehui Kexue Ban) is the property of Dongbei Daxue and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)